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ABSTRACT 
External audit has a long history and used to be one of many inspection activities performed 
on local authorities. It has been used to provide assurance concerning the reliability of the 
accounts of an authority and on the legality of the underlying transactions. However, since 
the 1980s, it has been used in a variety of contexts which include new and intense account-
giving and verification requirements. Governments resort to auditing to secure local authority 
accountability to their various stakeholders. External auditors' work for local authorities in 
England is extended beyond certification audit to cover the Use of Resources assessment, a 
component included in the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) regime. The 
inspection activities were performed by auditors even though the coverage of inspection 
goes beyond traditional definitions of auditing. The assessment regime of UoR gone through 
various changes and alterations every year since it was first introduced in 2002 and subject 
to greater alterations for assessment in 2009. Many researchers have highlighted the issues 
of extensive and high cost external audit but not many have attempted to discover what is 
going on in the field. This study fills the gaps found in literatures, exploring what is going on 
at local authorities and their perception on the external audit performed on them. Published 
data were analysed before developing structured interview questions. Responses were 
received from the Director/Head of Finance from 20 local authorities in Yorkshire and The 
Humber region and 19 were interviewed. This research contributes to the understanding 
and designing of assessment process covered in external audit practice at local authorities. 
It helps analyse the impact, perceptions and expectations of local authorities as to how much 
the external audit has helped and in what ways it could be improved. Different views were 
shared among the local authorities on the benefit of external audit and how it could be better 
performed. To conclude, the extensive assessment bears some positive drivers for 
improvement but should be more carefully designed to include feedback from the auditees 
and provide a longer time period for one assessment regime to help local authorities to fully 
respond and adapt its processes. These would help local authorities to reflect the 
improvement at their organisation rather than in numbers alone. 
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1.1 General background and motivation for research 
External audit has a long history and used to be one of many inspection activities performed 
on local authorities. It has been used to provide assurance concerning the reliability of the 
accounts of an authority and on the legality of the underlying transactions. However, since 
the 1980s, external auditing has been used in a variety of contexts to refer to new or more 
intense account-giving and verification requirements (Courville et ai, 2003). As argued by 
Power (1997), there has been an 'audit explosion'. In the context of local authorities in 
England, the establishment of the Audit Commission (AC) was clearly an important landmark. 
Although inspection is not new for English local authorities, its intensity has been increasing 
since the 1980s, because of government concern that local authorities and councillors were 
losing accountability, effectiveness, even legitimacy (Kelly, 2003). Governments have had 
recourse to placing greater value on external auditing to secure local authority accountability 
to their various stakeholders (Laughlin, 1996). 
External auditors' work for local authorities in England covers the Use of Resources (UoR) 
assessment which is one component of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
regime. These inspection activities have been called 'auditing' and performed by auditors, 
even though the coverage of inspection goes beyond traditional definitions of auditing. HM 
Treasury (in Byatt and Lyons, 2001) believes that external review provides a potentially 
valuable incentive for improving performance as well as providing independent assurance on 
standards. Although the 'Modernising Government' agenda demands that inspection activities 
be combined with performance management to achieve the goal of continuous improvement 
(Cabinet Office, 1999, p. 40), coordination and sharing of learning between inspectorates was 
weak (Byatt and Lyons, 2001). The AC has been proposed to take the lead role of 
coordinating inspection in 2001 to achieve the aspiration of 'Modernising Government' 
agenda. 
The AC was established during an earlier period of controversy about the performance, roles, 
size, and funding of local government and the wider public service (McSweeney, 1988). It 
was part of the Conservative Government's agenda to improve local authorities, introducing 
'market' systems where local authorities had to function more like business organizations. 
The emphasis on service standards has subsequently been maintained by the Labour 
Government after 1997; their pledge to improve public services during general election 
campaign in 1997 was a major element contributing to their electoral success (Boyne, 1998). 
The AC, carrying the mandate from central government to regulate local authorities since 
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1980 has introduced a number of inspection activities using various indicators, which have 
been changed from one year to another. 
The AC's first set of statutory performance indicators (PI) in English and Welsh local 
government was introduced and applied from assessment year of 1993/94 until later in the 
assessment year 2001/02, when Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) were introduced 
to replace the PI. To coordinate the performance of local authorities assessed by various 
inspectorates, the AC introduced CPA in 2002. CPA is an extension to the auditor's work of 
certifying the financial statements to include certifying services provided by the local 
authorities. Under the CPA regime, external auditors perform their duties of inspection to 
gather data and evidence on almost all aspects of local authority activities from financial 
matters to services provided to the public. The CPA exercise is done on an annual basis and 
covers all local authorities in England. The AC's appointed auditors write a report on each 
local authority's performance and later the individual local authority performance is combined 
to form a report on the performance of the country as a whole. 
Local authorities are also ranked according to their performance ranging on a five star scale 
from 0 stars to 4 stars. Reports are published on the AC website. The CPA has come to its 6th 
year of assessing local authorities in 2007 and has gone through various changes since it 
was first introduced. The activities should have had some impact on local authorities. 
Therefore it would be interesting to discover the extent of the contribution and influence 
external auditing has had on English local authorities. To achieve this objective, Finance 
Directors and other staff at selected local authorities based within the Government Office 
Region of Yorkshire and The Humber were interviewed in addition to a comprehensive 
analysis of archival documents, policy documents, government published reports, audited 
financial statements, auditors' reports, and other relevant published documents. 
There is an extensive literature on external auditing for the private sector but limited research 
and publication on local government external auditing and how it is used for and contributes 
to improve the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector. One of the areas 
which remain unclear is evidence of improvement from the audited organisation -the local 
authorities themselves, and their views. Is there improvement? Has the improvement shown 
in published scores been real? What are the reasons if there is no improvement? What 
impact has the drive for improvement had on local authorities? The New Public Management 
(NPM) which has been embraced by many governments including the United Kingdom (UK) 
carries a banner of improvement to the public sector (Awio et aI., 2007). However, limited 
evidence has been presented on its achievement and the impact it has had on the public 
sector. The extent of NPM's contribution on the public sector is disputed. Hood et al (1998; 
1999) suggests that the enhanced regulation introduced in the public sector (and local 
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government), which is used as a means of control, contradicts the NPM notion of 
decentralization for the public sector. 
The essential idea of NPM is that it is a generic management approach similar to the private 
sector because of the assumption that management for both sectors should be approached 
in similar ways and should not be differentiated according to type of structure or task (Peters, 
1996; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Awio et aI., 2007). This argument however is disputed 
because the public sector is different from the private sector in terms of its objectives and 
stakeholders. Thus, some aspects of management which are effective in the private sector 
have to be carefully adapted into the public sector. The system of governance in the public 
sector has to be adapted into the sector so it could meet the diverse objectives and 
management structures within it (Hodges et ai, 1996). The authors argue that objectives of 
public service organisations have to be clear so that proper governance and appropriate 
performance indicators can be identified for reporting. 
The public sector represents a principal-agent relationship (The IIA, 2006). The officials, 
acting as the agent, must periodically account to the principal for their use and stewardship of 
resources and the extent to which the public's objectives have been accomplished. The 
inherent risks in the principal-agent relationship may be reduced by an effective 
accountability mechanism. Thus, governments place greater value on public audit to secure 
local authorities' accountability (Laughlin, 1996). There has been much evidence of 
increasing inspection activities since 1980s which is described as audit (Kelly, 2003; Hood et 
ai, 1998). The principal relies upon the auditor to provide an independent, objective 
evaluation of the accuracy of the agent's accounting and to report on whether the agent uses 
the resources in accordance with the principal's wishes. This is also reflected in Power's 
(1997) argument that there had been an explosion in audit, in which auditors' work extends to 
cover assessment of services. The author also argues that there are more people watching 
and less people doing; increase in the policing of policing where an auditor inspects the 
control systems of local government. The money spent for these policing of policing activities 
is also increasing (Hood et. aI., 1999). 
Accountability is said to be improved by transparency, when an agent is required to provide 
more information, that would make them more accountable and more likely to work for 
common good (Prat, 2006, Heald, 2006b). However, there is not more transparency in 
practice for several reasons such as that 'strong entrenched interests' prevent transparency, 
full disclosure may not be an optimal policy, the direct cost of information disclosure and 
difficulty in communicating the information (Prat, 2006, p. 94-96). Introducing or increasing 
transparency would be beneficial only if it is seen to make a difference (Heald, 2006a). 
Furthermore, the ability to objectively measure efficiency, effectiveness and economy has 
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always been argued by many researchers to be problematic because of its complexity for 
auditors and as a concept in practice (Lapsley and Pong, 2000). 
The review of literature in the following chapter will discuss further the issues of NPM, 
governance, accountability, auditing as a means of inspection, performance measurement 
and transparency. This research attempts to contribute to both, (i) the local authorities and 
the regulators in England by discovering how the local authorities as auditee are performing, 
responding and adapting to the process as well as (ii) developing countries by documenting 
the processes, measuring and analysing the improvement and experiences of local 
government in England. The findings should therefore be very useful for further research to 
generate improvement at local authorities. 
1.2 Research Problem and Gap 
The accountability measurement process may be extensive and invited a huge criticism in 
terms of effectiveness to have such an extensive and costly system. Many researchers argue 
that the cost benefit of the system is unproven, while others argue about the validity of the 
number-driven measures presented to reflect a local authority's position and improvement. 
There is however a lack of empirical evidence on the real experiences of local authorities as 
the subject of those accountability measures. This thesis explores these issues and provides 
a basis of knowledge on what is happening on in the audit field, especially what the audit 
subjects themselves have experienced. Ideas from 'Regulation Inside Government' (Hood et 
al 1998, 1999, 2000) and 'Audit Explosion' (Power, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2003) will be used to 
guide and inform the research approach. It is expected that, having the auditees' view heard, 
the assessment process could be more efficiently designed and effectively measured to 
improve the functioning of local authorities'. Figure 1 below illustrates the environment of this 
research in order to explain clearly the main gap this research aims to fill. 
Assessment Procedures 
Auditor 
Published Data and 
Ranking 
.-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'---'. 
Evidence Gathering 
Evaluating 
Scoring 
I Local Councils' Views and i 
Feedbacks 
Auditors' Statements and 
Reports 
'_._._._._.-._.-.-.-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-
Figure 1: Research Gaps in the external audit for local government 
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The diagram shows items within the context of this study which evolved around the Audit 
Commission (AC) as the regulator of local authorities throughout England. The AC, through its 
committee, designs assessment procedures and guide and appoints auditors to audit local 
authority based. The appointed auditor will gather evidence based on indicators prescribed by 
the AC to determine the performance level achieved by that local authority. The results then are 
moderated and reported by the appointed auditor to the AC which moderates the results at 
national level moderation before publication. The process continues each year with the AC 
continuously amending the assessment procedures and evidential requirements. The dotted-
lined-box represents the main item which is unexplored, the gap that my study aims to fill. This 
study documents the external audit practice at local councils in England, considers how it affects 
local authorities in terms of the AC's review and how the impact is felt by the local authorities 
themselves. The Finance Department is chosen as the primary contact point in this study for it is 
where the external audit is centred. 
Considering these gaps in the literature, this study examines these aspects, in an innovative 
way, providing details about the structure of local government through to the audit 
processes, the administering body, to the output of the process and then analysis of 
feedback from the audit subjects. Thus, this research may be seen as comprehensive 
because it documents from the very beginning of these external audit activities to its impact. 
This research uses an applied approach so that its findings may be used to improve the 
current audit process in England and could be adapted for application in developing 
countries, such as my own country, Malaysia. 
1.5 Research Question, Aim and Objectives 
Having introduced the gaps found in the literature concerning the external audit performed 
on local authorities in England and explained the professional motivation for choosing this 
topic to research, the research question, aim and objectives are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Research Question, AIm and ObjectIves 
Research HOW DO THE EXTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL 
Question AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND AFFECT LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS 
AUDITEES? 
Aim 
Objectives 
(Sub-
research 
questions) 
To discover how the external auditing performed at local authorities in 
England affects local authorities as recipients of the service. 
1. What are the functions of external auditors for local authorities in 
England? 
2. How do the local authorities perform based on their auditor's 
assessment (certification audit and Use of Resources 
assessment)? 
3. Do the auditees view the published scores as reflecting their local 
authority's performance? 
4. What are the perceived factors contributing to the variations in the 
local authorities' performance? 
5. How do the auditees view the external audit process and the 
performance assessments? 
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The first sub-research question is to review the background of external audit performed on 
local councils throughout England, the regulatory bodies, the local council structures, the 
processes involved and the outputs. The review which is presented in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis is necessary because it will be the foundation for further exploration of its impact on 
local councils. Sub-research question two is based upon a review of published performance: 
certification audit and Use of Resources Assessment (UoR) which gives feedback on how 
local councils performed based on their auditor's assessment, and also the impact on the 
local councils' behaviour towards the assessment. The results will be presented in Chapter 5 
of this thesis. Sub-research questions three, four and five will be answered through fieldwork 
interviews and presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis which completes the main aim of this 
research. 
The sequence of the research objectives (from which sub-research questions one to five 
were derived) reflect the phases involved in achieving the aim "to discover how the external 
auditing performed at local authorities in England affect local authorities as recipients of the 
service". Hence, this study intends to answer the main research question, aim and objective, 
filling the gaps found in the literature previously mentioned and providing both theoretical 
and practical contributions on the contribution of external auditing towards economy, 
effectiveness and efficiency at local authorities. 
1.6 Thesis structure 
The main aim of this research is to explore and understand the external audit performed on 
local authorities in Yorkshire and The Humber region of England and the impact it has had 
on local authorities in the region; the structure of this thesis is as illustrated in Figure 2. 
In Chapter 1, the research background, motivation, key gaps identified from literatures, the 
professional interest and national context in the topic are introduced. The main research 
question, aim and sub-questions generated as exploratory guidance to achieve the main aim 
are also discussed. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature on the external audit of local 
government. Chapter 3 reviews the local government audit structures in England, to highlight 
the 'Yorkshire and The Humber' region and the local authorities within it. Chapter 4 
discusses the methodological position chosen and the research processes involved. Chapter 
5 presents findings from an analysis of the local authorities scored performance from the 
UoR process. Chapter 6 then discusses the findings from structured interviews conducted 
with the local authorities in the focus region which constitutes the main data collection phase 
of this research. Finally, the concluding Chapter 7 summarises the research questions 
answered, the theoretical and practical contributions, the limitations of the study and 
directions for further research. 
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2 REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT , 
GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Introduction ----. Literature ----. Methodology ----. Findings & ----. Conclusions 
Review I Discussion 
2.1 Introduction 
Considering the gap introduced in Chapter 1 which was reflected in Figure 2, the focus of 
this study is the external audit of local authorities in England . Therefore , to establish the 
base for reviewing literature, an outline is presented in Figure 3. 
f--- English Local 
External Audit Councils 
I ~ ~ (( ~'>- ~( ~~ ~( ~~ ~[ ~:';,.. 
Public Sector New Public Public Sector Performance 
Audit Management Governance Accountability Measurement Transparency 
-REVIEW I 
/j;: \~ ..,/~ \ .\ ..,/-:? ~ ~~ '\~ 
Use of Comprehensive Audit Works at Auditors, the Auditees, the 
Resources Performance Local Audit Local 
Assessment Assessment Authorities Commission Authorities 
-REVIEW II 
Figure 3: Literature Review Structure 
The literature review for this study will be divided into two separate chapters; Chapter 2 
which is Review I will look at the background and at issues concerning the external audit of 
local government, and Chapter 3 which is Review II will explore the technical aspects of 
external audit of local authorities in England . The literature review for each chapter will follow 
the subtopics listed in Figure 3. The subtopic boxes will be shaded in the section where each 
is reviewed . 
This chapter reviews government audits in general (Section 2.2) . Government audit is the 
key to good governance and accountability through assessment and performance 
measurement and reporting . Reporting provides transparency to various government 
stakeholders. Thus, separate sections are created to review the topics of governance 
(Section 2.4) , accountability (Section 2.5) , performance measurement (Section 2.6) and 
transparency (Section 2.7) before the chapter is summarised (Section 2.8). The new public 
management (NPM) which underlies governance and regulation will be reviewed in Section 
2.3. 
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2.2 Auditing and the Public Sector 
Governance Transparency 
......,.----~------~--~~----~~~~ -~~~~----~~~~~---:~~~-'~ -....--REVIEW I 
This section reviews auditing in the public sector in general with a brief review of the UK 
approach followed by roles and needs for government audits . 
2.2.1 Defining audit in the public sector 
Porter et al (2003) define auditing as a systematic process of objectively gathering and 
evaluating evidence related to assertions about economic actions and events which the 
individual or organisation making the assertion has been engaged , to ascertain the degree of 
correspondence between those assertions and established criteria , and communication of 
the results to users of reports in which the assertions are made. Basically, the external audit 
is a periodic examination of the books of account and records of an entity which is conducted 
by an independent third party, the auditor, to certify that the books of accounts have been 
properly maintained, with accuracy and compliance to established concepts , principles, and 
accounting standards, and provide a true and fair view of the financial state of the entity . 
According to Power (1997) audit symbolizes a cluster of values which are independent 
validation , efficiency, rationality and visibility . Lee (1984) wrote : 
In most general sense , an audit is the means by which one person is assured by another 
of the quality, condition or status of some subject matter which the latter is examined . The 
need for such an audit arises because the first-mentioned person is doubtful about the 
quality, condition or status of the subject matter, and is unable personally to remove the 
doubt or uncertainty' (p. 84) 
Dunn (1996) highlighted the fundamental elements which are common to each audit 
definition: (i) the auditor must be independent (the auditor's examination must be 'objective'); 
(ii) the auditor must collect evidence to support his opinion; and (iii) the auditor must produce 
a report to the users of financial statements. He further wrote that strangely none of the 
definitions mention the need for the auditor to be qualified to express an opinion on the 
matter under consideration and suggested that this could however have been taken for 
granted in the sense that each definition has been taken from documents addressed 
primarily to professional accountants. Thus the purpose of an audit is not to provide 
additional information , but is intended to enable users to rely more heavily upon the 
information which has already been prepared by others and to allow an auditor to provide an 
opinion on the financial statements that have been prepared within a framework of 
recognised accounting pol icies. The auditor' s opinion helps establish the credibility of the 
financial statements and is not meant to represent the future viability of the organ isation , nor 
the efficiency or effectiveness of the organ isation's management (Dunn , 1996). 
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Barrett (1999) said that state audit is materially different to the private-sector audit due to the 
fact of different accountability regimes between the public and private sectors. Similarly, 
English and Guthrie (2001) wrote that these two sectors are different in terms of auditor 
independence, audit mandate and focus, discretion to conduct audits, public reporting and 
funding. 
The public sector represents a principal-agent relationship (The IIA, 2006). The officials, 
acting as the principal's agent must periodically account to the principal for their use and 
stewardship of resources and the extent to which the public's objectives have been 
accomplished. The inherent risks in a principal-agent relationship may be reduced by an 
effective audit activity. The principal relies upon the auditor to provide an independent, 
objective evaluation of the accuracy of the agent's accounting and to report on whether the 
agent uses the resources in accordance with the principal's wishes. 
Figure 4: 3-Party Relationship 
(Source: Adapted from The IIA, 2006, p. 10) 
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The need for a third party to attest to the credibility of the financial reporting, performance 
results, compliance, and other measures arises from several factors inherent in the 
relationship between the principal and its agent: 
i. Moral hazards - conflicts of interest: Agents may use their resources and authority to 
benefit their own interests, rather than the principal's interests. 
ii. Remoteness: Operations may be physically removed from the principal's direct 
oversight. 
iii. Complexity: The principal may not possess the technical expertise needed to 
oversee the activity. 
iv. Consequence of error: Errors may be costly when agents are stewards of large 
amounts of resources and are responsible for programs affecting citizens' lives and 
health. 
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2.2.2 Roles of public sector audit 
An effective public sector audit activity strengthens governance by materially increasing 
citizens' ability to hold their government accountable (The IIA, 2006). Auditors perform an 
especially important functions in those aspects of governance that are crucial in the public 
sector to promote credibility, equity, and appropriate behaviour of government officials, while 
reducing the risk of public corruption. Therefore it is crucial that government audit activities 
are configured appropriately and have a broad mandate to achieve these objectives. The 
audit activity must be empowered to act with integrity and produce reliable services, although 
the specific means by which auditors achieve these goals vary. 
Government auditing supports the governance roles of oversight, insight and foresight (The 
IIA, 2006). Because government's success is measured mainly by its ability to deliver 
services successfully and carry out programs in an equitable and appropriate manner, 
government audit activities should have the authority and competency to evaluate financial 
and program integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency. Auditors also have to protect the core 
values of the government as it serves all citizens. 
Oversight 
Auditors evaluate whether government entities are doing what they are supposed to do, 
spending funds for the intended purpose and complying with laws and regulation provides 
the necessary oversight for the decision makers in government (The IIA, 2006). Governance 
structures are supported through verifying agencies' and programs' reports of financial and 
programming performance and by testing their adherence to organizational rules and aims. 
Accountability is achieved through providing access to the performance information to 
relevant principals within and outside of the organization under audit. Government auditors 
would assess and report on the success of the elected officials and managers' effort in 
setting direction, defining organizational objectives, assessing risk and establishing effective 
controls to achieve objectives and avert risks (The IIA, 2006). Under their oversight role, the 
auditors would also seek to detect and deter public corruption, including fraud, inappropriate 
or abusive acts, and other misuses of the power and resources entrusted to government 
officials (The IIA, 2006). This is achieved through monitoring the effectiveness of 
management's internal control structure to identify and reduce the conditions that breed 
corruption. Government auditors would also be responsible for responding to allegations of 
corruption in the government organizations they serve. 
Detection 
The auditors' role of detection is intended to identify improper, inefficient, illegal, fraudulent, 
or abusive acts that have already transpired and to collect evidence to support decisions 
regarding criminal prosecutions, disciplinary actions, or other remedies (The IIA, 2006). 
There are several types of detection effort: (i) the auditors' investigation based on suspicious 
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circumstances or complaints, or 'red flag' that appear during audit work for unrelated 
reasons; (ii) cyclical audits such as payroll, accounts payable, or information systems 
security audits, that test an organization's disbursements and/or related internal control; (iii) 
audit requested by law enforcement officials that analyze and interpret complex financial 
statements and transactions for use in investigating and building evidentiary cases against 
perpetrators; (iv) reviews of potential conflicts of interest during the development and 
implementation of law, rules, and procedures. 
Deterrence 
This role is aimed at identifying and reducing the conditions that allow corruption (The IIA, 
2006). Deterrence is achieved by assessing controls for existing or proposed functions, 
assessing organizational or audit-specific risks, reviewing proposed changes to existing 
laws, rules, and implementation procedures, and reviewing contracts for potential conflicts of 
interest. Deterrence can also be achieved through successful detection efforts (The IIA, 
2006). 
Insight 
This role is provided through the assessment of programs and policies, sharing best 
practices and benchmarking information, and viewing horizontally across government 
organizations and vertically between the levels of government to find opportunities to borrow, 
adapt, or re-engineer management practices (The IIA, 2006). Audit activity helps 
institutionalize organizational learning through providing continuous feedback to adjust 
policies. To enable conclusions being drawn based on evidence, auditors conduct their work 
systematically and objectively to develop a detailed understanding of operations. Hence, 
audits can provide a fair description of problems, resources, roles, and responsibilities that, 
combined with useful recommendations, can encourage stakeholders to rethink problems 
and programs. This contributes to improvement and enhances the capacity of government 
when dealing with similar problems. 
Foresight 
This role helps audited organizations to look forward by identifying trends and bringing 
attention to emerging challenges before they become crises (The IIA, 2006). The audit 
activities highlight future challenges from demographic trends, economic conditions, or 
changing security threats, and identify risks and opportunities arising from rapidly evolving 
science and technology, the complexities of modern society and changes in economic 
nature. Such issues normally represent long-term risks that may exceed the terms of office 
of some elected officials, and sometimes may not be treated as priority for attention 
especially where resources are scarce and necessary to focus on urgent concerns (The IIA, 
2006). Foresight is also achieved with the common audit approach of risk based auditing 
(IIA, 2006). Risk based auditing focuses on the organization's overall risk management 
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framework, which can help identify and deter unacceptable risks and also provides useful 
and relevant information for the organization's risk management. Government auditors playa 
key role in helping managers understand and initiate risk assessments. 
As a key to good public governance, maintaining an appropriate configuration with a broad 
mandate is important for government auditing (The IIA, 2006). These ensure achievement of 
the organization's governance objectives. Obtaining an appropriately broad mandate would 
enable government audit to respond to the full scope of the government's or governmental 
unit's activities. At a minimum, every government requires some form of independent audit 
activity that has authority to evaluate the full range of the government's activity (The IIA, 
2006). Complementary external and internal audit entities would be able to provide the full 
coverage of audit (The IIA, 2006). However, one audit entity alone, or an entity combining a 
hybrid of internal and external audit characteristics, may be appropriate for some smaller 
governments or sub-governmental units. As government auditing strengthens governance by 
providing accountability and protecting core government values, elected and appointed 
officials at all levels should support effective audit activities by establishing independent audit 
functions that meet all of the key elements (The IIA, 2006). 
To achieve an effective public sector audit activity, at a minimum these key elements are 
necessary (The IIA, 2006, p. 4): 
i. Organisational independence. Organizational independence allows the audit 
activities being performed without interference by the entity under audit. The audit 
activity should have sufficient independence from those it is required to audit so that 
it can both conduct its work without interference and be seen able to do so. Coupled 
with objectivity, organizational independence contributes to accuracy of the auditors' 
work and the ability to rely on the results and report. 
ii. A formal mandate. The auditors' powers and duties should be established by the 
government's constitution, charter, or other basic legal document. The mandate 
document would include an address to procedures and requirements of reporting 
and the obligation of the audited entity to collaborate with the auditor. 
iii. Unrestricted access. Auditors should be able to conduct their audit with complete 
and unrestricted access to employees, property and records. 
iv. Sufficient funding. Auditors must have sufficient funding relative to the size of audit 
responsibilities. This important element should not be left under the control of the 
organization under audit because the budget impacts on the auditors' capacity to 
carry out their duties. 
v. Competent leadership. The head of auditors must be able to effectively recruit, 
retain, and manage highly skilled staff. Moreover, the chief audit executive should be 
an articulate public spokesperson for the auditors. 
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vi. Competent staff. Auditors should be a professional staff that collectively has the 
necessary qualifications and competence to conduct the full range of audits required 
by their mandate. Auditors must comply with minimum continuing education 
requirements established by their relevant professional organizations and standards. 
vii. Stakeholder support. The legitimacy of the audit activity and its mission should be 
understood and supported by a broad range of elected and appointed government 
officials, as well as the media and involved citizens. 
viii. Professional audit standards. Professional audit standards support the 
implementation of the previous elements and provide a framework to promote quality 
audit work that is systematic, objective, and based on evidence. Just as many 
governments have adopted internal control standards, either as requirement or 
guidance for public sector managers, and auditors should conduct their work in 
accordance with recognized standards. 
2.2.3 Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness 
McSweeney (1988) wrote that the aim of external auditing of local government under the 
direction of the Audit Commission is now not merely the continuation of traditional financial 
and regularity audits, but also to judge the 'economy', 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' of 
local authorities' operational arrangements and accomplishments. Economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness have been recognised as the three pillars of value for money, the three 
Es (Buttery et. ai, 1993). The AC (1987) defines three Es as: 
Economy may be defined as the terms under which the authority acquires human 
and material resources. An economical operation acquires these resources in the 
appropriate quality and quantity at lowest cost. 
Efficiency may be defined as the relationship between goods and services produced 
and the resources used to produce them. An efficient operation produces the 
maximum output for a given set of resource inputs; or, it has minimum inputs for any 
given quantity or quality of service provided. 
Effectiveness may be defined as how well a programme or activity is achieving its 
established goals or other intended effects. 
The auditor's role regarding economy and efficiency is not as problematic to justify as their 
role to ensure effectiveness (Buttery et. aI., 1993): 
When the auditor begins to question how effective an organisation's policies are in 
achieving its defined objectives there may well be resistance: yet, if the auditor is to meet 
the objectives defined in the Auditing Practices Board (APB) guideline, the effectiveness of 
policies must be evaluated. (p. 86) 
McSweeney (1988) argues that the criteria for three Es may be simplified but their 
meanings are complex and their use for auditing or managerial purposes is often 
problematic, indefinite, and capable of different and conflicting interpretations. He raises 
questions: 
How, and on the basis of what other values, can, or should, the relative importance of 
each of the three E's' be decided and evaluated? Are each of equal status? Wh~t 
additional criteria should be, or are, used in evaluating trade-offs between them? It IS 
not difficult to imagine circumstances in which effectiveness could be enhanced but to 
the detriment of economy, and the converse. Are such arrangements known? Within 
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what. length of time should the achievement, or not, of the criteria be judged? Is it 
possible to do so within an audit year? (p.32) 
Thus, any attempt to measure three Es has to be thought and done carefully. A reflection 
of the environment and capacity of an organization should also be dealt with for the 
measures to be meaningful and reliable. 
2.2.4 Value for Money Auditing 
Dewar (1985) claimed that value for money (VFM) auditing has been around since the fifth 
century. It has become widespread in the twentieth century when value for money auditing 
has make an escalating contribution to the development of public administration and 
government as a whole (Normanton, 1966). Normanton wrote: 
In England, it is doubtful whether the idea of an audit going beyond consideration of 
regularity was ever even considered in the early days of parliamentary control of 
accounts.' (p.104) 
The author gives an example of a case that pushed the boundary of auditing beyond 
regularity during the early days of VFM audit, highlighting from an 1887 audit report about 
the purchase of ribbon for army medals for 20 shillings when it could be bought from other 
supplier for 14 shillings, in which it provoked a landmark declaration from the Committee of 
Public Accounts (PAC) because the military department refused to reply to the report initially. 
The declaration by PAC: 
'If in the course of his audit the C&AG becomes aware of facts which appear to him to 
indicate an improper expenditure or waste of public money, it is his duty to call the 
attention of parliament to this.' (p. 105) 
INTOSAI (1977) describes value for money audit as a comprehensive audit of management 
activities from reviewing performance, effectiveness, economy and efficiency of public 
administration up to the organisation and its administrative system. Bowerman (1996) wrote 
that it is generally acknowledged that, as a minimum, value for money audit includes the 
examination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and she distinguished value for money 
based on its approaches into six different types: 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
Review of management systems, arrangements and procedures - auditor identifies 
poor value for money, makes recommendations for improvement and gives advice 
on management arrangements to improve value for money. 
The value for money procedures audit - auditor checks that an organisation has 
established objectives, and has a system for measuring performance and for 
ensuring that objectives have been achieved. 
Policy audit - auditor assesses whether a policy or programme has been effective 
as well as economical and efficient. 
Audit of management representations of value for money - auditor verifies 
information prepared by management on the achievement of value for money. 
Comparative performance audit - auditor compiles a database to compare 
cost/performance between similar organisations, and identifies and recommends 
best practice to improve value for money. 
Quality audit - auditor uses customer satisfaction surveys to evaluate successful 
performance; may also verify management's quality assurance information. (p. 195) 
In England and Wales the statutory authority to conduct VFM audit was granted in 1982 for 
local government and 1983 for central government (Bowerman, 1996). The main public 
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sector external auditors in Britain are the National Audit Office (NAO), the Audit Commission 
(AC) for England and Wales and the Accounts Commission for Scotland. Local governments 
in England are evaluated for their VFM based on the AC's specified criteria, which the 
appointed auditors would assess, use their judgement and score local authorities. 
2.2.5 Audit models and UK approach 
In the public sector, the cornerstone of good public financial management is accountability 
for the use of public funds. Therefore scrutinising public expenditure and providing an 
independent opinion on how the officers have used public resources is considered 
necessary. Supreme Audit Institutions (SAls) are the national bodies' entrusted with this 
responsibility. Different external audit models are applied throughout the world by the 
different SAls, but there are four fundamental objectives of public sector auditing 1 which 
guide their work. The objectives are: 
i. to promote proper and effective use of public funds; 
ii. to promote the development of sound financial management; 
iii. to promote proper execution of administrative activities; and 
iv. to promote the communication of information to public authorities and the general 
public through the publication of objective reports. 
Table 2: Common Audit Models 
Model Distributions 
Westminster model, also 
known as the Anglo-Saxon 
or Parliamentary model 
The United Kingdom and most Commonwealth countries 
including many in sub-Saharan African, a few European 
countries such as Ireland and Denmark, Latin American 
countries such as Peru and Chile 
Judicial 
model 
or Napoleonic The Latin countries in Europe, Turkey, francophone 
countries in Africa and Asia, several Latin American 
countries including Brazil and Colombia 
Board or Collegiate model Some European countries including Germany and the 
Netherlands, Argentina, Asian countries including Indonesia, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea 
Source: Policy Division, Department for International Development 
Department for International Development Briefing, 2004, Policy Division, Characteristics of different external audit 
systems 
Table 2 shows common audit models published by the Department of International 
Development (2004) in an attempt to group countries based on shared characteristics of 
external audit. Nevertheless, every country in the groups will have their own SAl and 
maintain different models. Thus belonging to one of the groups does not mean that their 
external audit characteristics are exactly the same. As for the UK, there are four national 
audit agencies: Audit Commission (AC), Audit Scotland, National Audit Office (NAO) and the 
Northern Ireland Audit Office (NIAO). These agencies are responsible for the audits of 
1 The Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing Precepts issued .by the International Organisation of Supreme 
Audit Institutions in 1977 and reissued in 1998, quoted in DFID Briefing (2004) 
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central government (including executive agencies, trading funds and the non-departmental 
public bodies (NDPBs)), local government and the health service. Separate audit 
arrangements are in place for education institutions and registered social landlords (formerly 
housing associations). Audit Scotland covers substantially all public sector entities and the 
NAO also supports the Auditor General for Wales. 
The AC, Audit Scotland, NAO and NIAO co-operates in the development of common 
practices across the public sector, notably in the issue of Practice Note 10 (PN10) Revised 
on 'Audit of Financial Statements of Public Sector Entities in the United Kingdom' by the 
Auditing Practices Board (APB) and in the establishment of the Public Audit Forum (PAF) in 
1998. The PAF has issued a series of reports on public sector audit topics including The 
Principles of Public Audit'. The principles of public audit introduced by the PAF are: (i) the 
independence of public sector auditors from the organisation being audited; (ii) the wider 
scope of public audit, that is covering the audit of financial statements, regularity (or legality), 
propriety (or probity) and value for money; (iii) the ability of public auditors to make the 
results of their audits available to the public and to democratically elected representatives. 
Governing legislation determines the ways national audit agencies operate; generally NAO 
and NIAO operate in similar manner while the AC and Audit Scotland share many similar 
characteristics. 
The four national audit agencies have common features (CIPFA, 2002): 
i. auditors are appointed to public bodies independently of the management or elected 
or appointed members of those bodies; 
ii. audit appointments are reviewed regularly and audit firms are rotated at intervals; 
iii. the provisions of non-audit services to public bodies by the firms that provide the 
statutory audit are regulated; 
IV. a fee regime is operated for auditors; 
v. an audit that is wider in scope than the audit under the Companies Act is specified; 
vi. results of audit are made available to the public and to democratically elected 
representatives. 
Besides the features above, the public sector in the UK generally appoints a Chief Financial 
Officer (or any title of similar position), who is a qualified member of a recognised 
accountancy institute. The public sector places considerable responsibility by statute on 
individual officers for the financial management and financial reporting of the entity. For local 
government in England and Wales, the chief financial officer (CFO) must under statute be a 
qualified member of a CCAB body, has certain responsibilities in law and is bound by the 
ethical code of his or her institute and must have the technical ability to understand financial 
reporting standards (CIPFA, 2002). An internal audit function which its size and scope of 
work to be determined by the audit committee, is a mandatory requirement for local 
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government. The broad responsibility of internal audit is set out in statute and the 
requirement is accompanied with an abundance of codes , standards and other gu idance 
relative to the particular area within the public sector (CIPFA, 2002). External auditor rel iance 
on and co-operation with internal aud it is thus expected and encouraged at loca l 
government. 
The New Public Management (NPM) has brought some changes in governance and 
accountability mechanisms in the public sector. Hence, the following section is a review on 
the NPM, its features and impact on audit. 
2.3 Public Sector and the New Public Management 
Public Sector 
Audit 
2.3.1 The New Public Management 
New Public Management is a term used to describe a set of broadly similar administrative 
doctrines which has developed from the changes in public sector accounting in many 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the late 
1970s and has dominated those countries ' public administrative reform agenda (Hood , 1995; 
Pollitt, 1993; Ridley 1996). NPM is also considered as a collection of activities and measures 
designed to introduce an ethos of business management and entrepreneurship into the 
management and delivery of public services (Hall et ai , 2003) . NPM being the driving force of 
various innovations in public sector accounting has also affected auditing practices at local 
government. Pollitt (2007, p. 110) assumes that NPM is a two level phenomenon : 
1. Higher level - it is a general theory or doctrine that improvement in the public sector 
is possible through the application of business concepts , techniques and values ; 
2. Mundane level - it is a bundle of specific concepts and practice which include: 
• Greater focus on 'performance' , especially through output measurement; 
• A preference for lean, flat , small , specialized (disaggregated) organizational 
forms over large, multi-functional forms ; 
• A widespread substitution of contracts for hierarchical relat ions as the 
principal coordinating device; 
• A widespread injection of market-type mechanisms including competitive 
tendering , public sector league tables and performance-related pay ; 
• An emphasis on treating service users as 'customers ' and on the appl ication 
of generic quality improvement techniques such as 'total qual ity 
management'. 
The majority of concepts described above have been introduced at local government in 
England , such as the emphasiS on performance measurement, injection of market-type 
18 
REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASURE MEN T 
mechanisms, emphasis on treating service users as 'customers' and quality improvement. 
Therefore sections that follow will review the drivers for change in public management, the 
characteristics of NPM and its impact on public sector audit. 
2.3.2 Drivers for change 
Government bodies and agencies are not isolated from the drive of management innovation 
and change. Lapsley and Wright (2004) wrote that developed and developing countries have 
been embarking on public sector management reforms since the 1980s. Hood (1991) wrote: 
the rise of 'new public management' (NPM) over the past 15 years is one of the most 
striking international trends in public administration. (p.3) 
The NPM reforms have been attractive to many governments because of their acclaimed 
benefits of improving efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in the public sector (Awio et 
aI., 2007). Holmes (1992) claimed that the motives for reform in public sector administrative 
machinery were modernization and economy which in other words is 'improved public sector 
performance'. The motives therefore linked to decentralization, rationalization, 
professionalization and standardization. Rhodes (1994) claimed that the management 
reforms were based on the conviction that the public sector must emulate private sector 
management. The changes to human resource management systems, accounting systems 
and industrial relations systems are due to a combination of factors that have also occurred 
in other western democracies (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Ryan, 2000). 
English (2003) wrote that the movement is closely related the election of 'market-oriented' 
conservative governments in the late 1980s in Britain. On the other hand, labour or socialist 
administrations in Australia and New Zealand have also made their move where such 
changes have also been classified as NPM policies (Hood, 1995). As written in Hood (1991): 
NPM is emphatically not a uniquely British development. NPM's rise seems to be linked 
with four other administrative 'megatrends', namely: 
(i) attempts to slow down or reverse government growth in terms of overt public 
spending and staffing (Dunshire and Hood 1989); 
(ii) the shift toward privatisation and quasi-privatisation and away from core government 
institutions, with renewed emphasis on 'subsidiarity' in service provisison (ct. Hood 
and Schupert 1988); 
(iii) the development of automation, particularly in information technology, in the 
production and distribution of public services; and 
(iv) the development of a more international agenda, increasingly f~cused on general 
issues of public management, policy design, decision styles and Inte.r-~ove~nment~1 
cooperation, on top of the older tradition of individual country speclailsm In pubilc 
administration. (p.3) 
According to English (2003), the managerial reform movement has been promoted on the 
basis that the public sector was too large and cumbersome, organized on the wrong 
principles and in need of re-invention and industrial renewal. As a result, several techniques 
has been applied into government bureaucracies such as the economic theories to endorse 
purchaser/provider, and policy/operations splits, the funding of outputs to achieve outcomes 
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and the introduction of contestability into provision of services (Barton, 2001; English and 
Guthrie, 2001). 
Advancement and prosperity are not the only reasons for the adoption of the NPM 
techniques. Other factors have also contributed to the adoption of private sectors styles of 
management by the public sector. The public sector also has the urged to provide some 
security for the public that they have a stable government. Tax payers who contributed their 
money for the running of government would like to see that their money is being used 
properly for their benefit. James (2003) wrote that the reform in regulation inside government 
seems implicitly to reflect a public interest view of regulation, seeing it as a means to mitigate 
government failures and improve public welfare. English (2003) suggests that NPM reforms 
could possibly not be economically motivated but politically motivated by a government 
sensitive to criticism. 
The public at large also want to ensure that money is not wasted on popular projects to 
boost political parties. At the same time, councillors are elected to lead local authorities, are 
trusted with public money and need to exhibit their accountability to the public to maintain the 
public's trust. This has made government resort to enhanced transparency as a means to let 
the public know how their money has been used. Hood (1990) identified five possible 
reasons for the rise of NPM in the 1980s, as depicted in Figure 5 below: 
I'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'~ 
i NEW MACHINE POLITICS' I-_________ ---... 
~ (policy- making by pollsters i 
! and party strategists) 
I'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'~ 
i NEW CLIENT POLITICS ! 
'. -. -. -. -. -. -'j . -. -. -. -. -. -. -'
? ~ (rise of private information- : ____ ~~~. -~~~. ~ ! /: ___ ~a~e~:c~n~m:) ____ ; 
._.-.-._.-._._._._._., 
POST-FORDISM 
ACCUMULATION 
REGIME 
.. -.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-~. 
~.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.~ '-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-'~ 
i MOOD SWING (resistance ;-' --.,~i NEO-TREASURY ~ 
i to extra taxes as Fordist . CONTROL 
~ welfare coalition destroyed) : _._._.-._._._._._.-. 
~-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. 
Figure 5: The Rise of New Public Management - Possible Explanation 
(Source: Adapted from Hood, 1990, p.208) 
The first reason for NPM is interpreted as a 'mood-swing - a new intellectual fast food for the 
f takeaway management' (p 206) The second reason represents NPM as fickle consumers 0 . . 
a new-look form of Treasury control, a set of convenient doctrines fastened upon by central 
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controlling agencies to destroy the administrative bases of the 'public service welfare lobby' 
and to increase their power vis-a-vis the professionalized line departments. Both reasons 
however do not justify why NPM boom happened in the 1980s rather than at any other time 
(Hood, 1990). The third reason is that NPM works to reflect a new political campaign 
technology - a shift to public policy based on intensive opinion polling which is part of the 
new political machine. This means that policy making is driven through pollster and 
professional party strategists, which reduced bureaucracy. Hence, the politicians will 
maintain only the skills of managing, not formulating policy. Some commentators view this 
move as reason why governments like Thatcher, Hawke and Lange/Palmer have been able 
to stay in power longer than the governments of the 1960s and 1970s (Hood, 1990). 
The fourth reason is a reflection of 'new client politics', the start of a new, flexible coalition 
whose shared self-interest drives a 'policy boom' (Hood, 1990). This means a combination 
of 'bureau-shaping' top managers with an interest in abandoning the 'front-lines' of their 
organizations, politicians aiming to increase their power of patronage, management 
consultants, financial intermediaries, insurance companies, and other groups with a clear 
stake in privatisation and contracting out (Hood, 1990). According to Hood (1990), this 
explanation provides reasons for NPM being successful in conquest for 'self-interest' 
reasons rather than for its rhetoric focus of 'public good'. But still this reason does not 
explain why NPM emerged in the 1980s, when the same interest groups could have stood to 
benefit in 1880s or 1920s (Hood, 1990). The fifth and last reason for NPM is because social 
changes triggered by 'post-industrialism' or post-Fordism,.2 Hood (1990) wrote: 
The shift from 'Fordism' to 'Post-Fordism' has potentially profound implications for the 
management of public services, particularly in post-Fordism's features of 'flexible 
specialization' and 'an increasingly heterogeneous labour force'. (p.207) 
'Flexible specialization' can remove barriers that existed between 'private sector work' and 
'public sector work' (Hood, 1990). This feature creates the potential for a new era of 'public 
sector Taylorism with computers' and makes it transactionally convenient to contract out 
more 'white collar' government activities than previously. 'An increasingly heterogeneous 
labour force' allows a break up of traditional electoral coalitions for government growth, by 
changing the position of the median voter in the income distribution scale. Hood further 
explained that, out of the five possible reasons, the last is 'certainly the most complete' to 
explain the rise of N PM in 1980s, although a strong link between changes in the government 
sector and changing technologies in the wider world could be argued (Hood, 1990). 
2 , Fordism' is the term used by the Marxist regulationist school to la.bel the emerging regime of production and 
Post. .' . t d 'th the late twentieth century Kondratlev cycle and Its frontier technology. notably 
consumption which IS aSSOCla e WI . 
microelectronics, biotechnology and matenals. 
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2.3.2 Characteristics of NPM 
NPM has many characteristics that are frequently mentioned by researchers (Gruening, 
2001). Ferlie et al. (1996) put these characteristics under four broad categories. The first is 
that N PM is seen as characterised by a large-scale privatisation programme which involves 
the sale of many nationalised industries. Second, the social policy functions of the public 
sector have been subjected to the process of managerialisation and marketisation. There is 
a growing challenge to fashion 'quasi-markets' within the public sector in order to 
disaggregate previously line-managed organisations into purchasing and providing wings 
and to create legal relations or contracts between them rather than a hierarchy. Third, there 
is more emphasis on 'doing more with less' to secure value for money which hinges on the 
use of comparative performance indicators, the development of enhanced cost, information, 
and audit systems. Finally, there is movement from maintenance management to 
'management of change' where the public services are managed by more active, visible and 
individualistic forms of leadership. 
According to Norman and Gregory (2003), some of the key features of NPM are that: it 
promises greater efficiency within public organisations by providing managers with greater 
freedom to allocate resources but holding them responsible; it preaches the need to 
organise for results; it teaches the need to clearly specify objectives; and upholds the 
generation of quality information about progress. Hood (1990) describes these features as 
clearness of objectives; freedom to manage; accountability; sufficient information flows; and 
effective evaluation of performance as the 'NPM Manifesto'. 
Nagel (1997) points out that NPM has one basic characteristic, expressed in its emphasis on 
economic norms and values. Christensen and Laegreid (2002) assert that this one-
dimensional feature of NPM implies an ideological supremacy of economic norms over many 
traditionally legitimate norms and values. The authors maintain that NPM is strongly 
influenced by opinions based on economic and management theories concerning how an 
efficiency focus should transform the public sector in terms of its formal organisation, the 
procedures used, the expertise needed and its relationship with the private sector. 
Essentially, NPM is an idea of generic management for it argues that both public and private 
sector management should be approached in similar ways as they have similar challenges 
and should therefore not be differentiated according to type of structure or task (Peters, 
1996; Peters and Pierre, 1998; Awio et aI., 2007). 
According to Christensen and Laegreid (2002), NPM has a hybrid character despite its 
emphasis on economic values and objectives. It is a well-known assessment that there are 
tensions within the hybrid character of NPM which combine economic organisation and 
management theories (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991; Self, 2000; Yeatman, 1997). NPM is a 
loose and multifaceted concept with diverse components consisting of hands-on 
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professional management which allows managers to possess a dynamic and discretionary 
control of an organisation; explicit standards of performance; increased competition; greater 
emphasis on output control; private sector management techniques; contracts; 
decentralization; disaggregation of units; deregulation; and customer service orientation 
(Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 1995; and Christensen and Laegreid, 2002). In essence NPM is 
based on a combination of microeconomic theory and managerial ism. 
Cope et al. (1997) wrote that NPM is characterised by five traits: 'private good, public bad'; 
centralisation; decentralisation; competition; and fragmentation. According to the authors, 
NPM reflects an ideological commitment based on the simple faith of 'private good, public 
bad', which asserts the superiority of the market over the state and, therefore, urges 
injecting market forces into government. NPM represents the New Right way of public sector 
management which reorganises public sector bodies in a way that brings their management, 
reporting and accounting approaches closer to a particular perception of business methods 
(Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). Again, NPM progressively centralises the formulation of policy 
strategy, particularly policy goals and budgets in the hands of the executives who are at the 
heart of government, embracing a closely knit network of senior ministers and officials and 
trying to separate the 'steering from rowing', thus leaving the centre to steer while other 
agencies row (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
Cope et al. (1997) argue that NPM decentralises the delivery of public policy to several 
agencies, including local authorities, non-government organisations and private contractors 
that apply managerial and operational discretion within the confines of policy strategy laid 
down by the centre. The authors further note that NPM reflects the view that greater 
competition between the public and private sectors and within the public sector will 
encourage greater efficiency by making public sector agencies more consumer-responsive. 
Finally, the authors note that NPM has the tendency to fragment governments due to the 
nature of steering/rowing, client/contractor and purchaser/provider splits within government. 
Gruening (2001) classifies NPM characteristics into (i) undisputed; and (ii) debatable, and 
maintains that these are the common features frequently mentioned by academic observers. 
Among the undisputed characteristics are budget cuts, vouchers, accountability for 
performance, performance auditing, privatization, customers (one-stop shops, case 
management), decentralisation, strategic planning and management, separation of provision 
and production, competition, performance measurement and changed management style. 
The other undisputed characteristics are contracting out, freedom to manage (flexibility), 
improved accounting, personnel management (incentives), user charges, separation of 
politics and administration, improved financial management and more use of information 
technology. The debatable characteristics, on the other hand, are legal, budget, and 
spending constraints, rationalisation of jurisdictions, policy analysis and evaluation, improved 
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regulation, rationalisation or streamlining of administrative structures, democratisation and 
citizen participation. 
Barberis (1998) wrote that NPM in Britain has been associated with a number of specific 
initiatives: the creations of Next Step agencies (see also Heald and Geaughan, 1997); 
Management Information Systems for Ministers (MINIS) (see also Likierman, 1982); the 
Financial Management Initiative (FMI); the Citizen's Charter; the open government initiative; 
market testing and many more. These have included a greater emphasis on controlled 
delegation; value for money within specified cash limits; stronger consumer or customer 
orientation; the formulation of business plans and agency agreements preserved in formal 
contracts; and decentralized cost centres, replete with performance targets and 
performance-related pay, implying the abandonment of central recruitment and common 
grading structures. Rhodes (1994) wrote: 
... NPM does not refer to anyone idea but to the currently fashionable set of ideas 
driving administrative reform. (p. 144) 
Rhodes (1994) wrote that the first thrust of managerial change in the public sector is 
captured by the acronym of three Es, and the key phrases are 'value for money' and 'better 
use of resources'. He further maintains that the reforms were based on 'an impoverished 
concept of management': that is, management is about setting clear objectives, and 
exercising hierarchical control and coordination. 
The rise in NPM has certainly increased regulations and inspection. Thus, the officers and 
staff at government bodies are subject to various reporting and evaluation regimes to prove 
that they are working diligently. The question now is whether the reports and evaluation do 
help them achieve the 3E's? To help the public sector cope with the rigid inspection and 
evaluation, their regulators have made an effort to provide them with detailed measures and 
steps that they should take. Does this help them or just create a sector which is not 
innovative and responsive only to detailed instructions? 
Different commentators have written about the phases of development in NPM and share 
common ground on several themes where NPM have shifted its emphasis from: (i) policy 
making to management skills; (ii) process-based focus to output-based; (iii) from orderly 
hierarchies to more competitive bases for providing public services; (iv) from fixed to 
variable-pay; and (v) from a uniform and inclusive public service to a variant structure 
emphasizing more on contract provision (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991, 1995; Pollitt, 1993). 
Hood (1991, 1995) identified seven dimensions of change associated with NPM, 
summarised in Table 3: 
24 
REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMEN T 
Table 3: Doctrinal components of new public management 
No Doctrine Typical Replaces o' 
. . peratlonal 
PS distinctiveness 
1 Unbundling of the 
public sector into 
corporatized units 
organised by 
products 
2 More contract-based 
3 
4 
competitive 
provisions, with 
internal markets and 
term contracts 
Stress on private 
sector styles of 
management practice 
More stress on 
discipline and 
frugality in resource 
use 
Rules vs discretion 
5 More emphasis on 
visible hands-on top 
management 
6 Explicit formal 
measurable 
standards and 
measure of 
performance and 
success 
7 Greater emphasis on 
output controls 
Justifications S'lg 'fi nI Icance 
Make units 
manageable; and 
focus blame; split 
provision and 
production to create 
anti-waste lobby 
Rivalry as the key to 
lower costs and 
better standards; 
contracts as the key 
to explicating 
performance 
standards 
Need to apply proven 
private sector 
management tools in 
the public sector 
Need to cut direct 
costs, raise labour 
discipline, do more 
with less 
Accountability 
requires clear 
assignment of 
responsibility not 
diffusion of power 
Accountability means 
clearly stated aims; 
efficiency needs hard 
look at goals 
Need for greater 
stress on results 
Belief in uniform and 
inclusive public 
sector to avoid under-
laps and overlaps in 
accountability 
Unspecified 
employment 
contracts, open-
ended provision, 
linking of purchase, 
proviSion, production, 
to cut transaction 
cost 
Stress on public 
sector ethic fixed pay 
and hiring rules, 
model employer 
orientation 
centralised personnel 
structure, jobs for life 
Stable base budget 
and establishment 
norms, minimum 
standards, union 
vetoes 
Paramount stress on 
policy skills and rules, 
not active 
management 
Qualitative and 
implicit standards and 
norms 
Stress on procedure 
and control by 
'collibration" 
Erosion of single 
service employment; 
arms-length dealings; 
devoted budgets 
Distinction of primary 
and secondary public 
service labour force 
Move from double 
imbalance public 
sector pay, career 
service, un-
monetised rewards 
"due process" 
employee 
entitlements 
Less primary 
employment, less 
producer -friendly 
style 
More freedom to 
manage by 
discretionary power 
Erosion of self-
management by 
professionals 
Resources and pay 
based on 
performance 
(Source: Hood, 1995, p.96) 
Some Possible 
Accounting 
Explanations 
More cost centre 
units 
More stress on 
identifying costs and 
understanding cost 
structures; so cost 
data become 
commercially 
confidential and 
cooperative 
behaviour becomes 
costly 
Private-sector 
accounting norms 
More stress on the 
bottom line 
Fewer general 
procedural 
constrai nts on 
handling of contracts, 
cash, staff; coupled 
with more use of 
financial data for 
management 
accountability 
Performance 
indicators and audit 
Move away from 
detailed accounting 
for particular activities 
towards broader cost 
centre accounting 
may involve blurring 
of funds for pay and 
for activity 
The seven dimensions in Table 3 above embedded elements discussed by various scholars 
and innovators of NPM (Hood, 1991, 1995; Hughes, 1998). The first dimension of change is 
the division of large and indivisible ministries into smaller units with separate performance 
contracts, aiming to detach the policy from operational units. The second dimension is about 
competition in the public sector. The public sector organisations are urged to compete 
between them and with the private sector. Market principles are adopted through 
privatisation, commercialisation and market testing. Higher standards and lower cost of 
services or products can be achieved through this parting of provision (legal authority) from 
production (technical transformation of inputs into outputs), and competition among diverse 
producers. 
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The third dimension is about shifting towards greater use of private corporate sector 
management practices within the public sector. Having done this could allow public service 
ethics to move away from military-style to flexibility in hiring and rewards, for example, lateral 
entry into the public service, performance evaluation and merit pay. The fourth dimension 
puts emphasis on discipline and prudence in resource use and on an active search for 
alternative, less costly ways to deliver public services. These means cutting down direct 
costs, raising labour discipline, reSisting union demands, limiting compliance costs to 
business and, most importantly, the application of information and communication 
technology, all in the drive to do more with less. Hood (1995) explained that these first four 
principles distinguish the public sector and the private sector in their area of organisation 
and methods of accountability. 
The fifth dimension is about vigorous control of public organisations by visible top managers 
exercising discretionary powers. Managers should be given a free hand to manage (Olowu, 
2002; Ocampo, 2002). This dimension acknowledges the need for professional management 
at the very top to wield substantive responsibility to manage and achieve clearly specified 
goals rather than being administrators whose function is primarily to administer rules. Such 
positions, if possible, should be contractualised (Oluwo, 2002) so that the manager would 
only be responsible for specific results. This agrees with the accountability notion which 
requires a clear assignment of responsibility for action, and not diffusion of power. The sixth 
dimension is a move towards more explicit and measurable standards of performance for 
public sector organisations, in terms of the range, level, and content of services to be 
provided. Goals, targets and indicators of success must be clearly defined and preferably 
expressed in quantitative terms, justified on the basis of greater accountability in the use of 
resources. This doctrine focuses on results, outputs and outcomes (Lienert, 2005) for 
individuals, units and whole ministries and it is in sharp contrast to the tendency to focus on 
inputs under the traditional public administration arrangement. 
The final dimension is about an attempt to control public organisations according to pre-set 
output measures, particularly where pay is based on job performance rather than on rank or 
educational attainment. In other words, controls are exercised by mechanisms such as 
performance and programme budgeting in contrast to line item budgeting and long term 
planning and strategic management of the organisation. Strategic management is focused 
on the changing goals that the organisation must achieve in a rapidly changing environment. 
There is, therefore, an emphasis on the use of SWOT analysis. Hood (1991, 1995) said that 
these final three dimensions are related to the issue of how far managerial and professional 
discretion should be fenced in by explicit standards and rules (Hood 1991, 1995). 
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Gray and Jenkins (1993) posit that the basic beliefs, principles or doctrines of NPM can be 
summed up in the following terms: accountability, competition, results and efficiency. 
Dunleavy and Margetts (2000) sum up the NPM paradigm as disaggregation, competition 
and incentivisation. This constitutes a 'moral crusade' to transform the traditional convention 
of the public sector (Hewison, 1999) in order to improve performance and service delivery 
(Gray and Jenkins, 1993). Olowu (2002) compares the old public administration "chestnuts,,3 
with NPM doctrines. This is illustrated in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Old public administration chestnuts compared with NPM doctrines 
Old Public Administration New Public Administration 
A political Civil Service Political and accountable management 
Hierarchy and rules 
Markets are superior to markets, emphasis on 
contracts, not rules 
Permanence and stability Contractual management 
Institutionalised Civil Service Only small policy and a strategic centre required 
Internal regulation 
Internal regulation only for the rump of the service, 
not privati sed or decentralised 
Equality of outcomes Differential outcomes 
Source. Extracted from Peters (1996) cited In Olowu (2002, p.8) 
The NPM challenged the old style public administration which emphasises several central 
principles for organising public sector services (Olowu, 2002). Each of the old public 
administration "chestnuts" presents an element of an administrative culture that took over a 
century to institutionalise in each of the industrialised countries. Therefore, the need for a 
profound form of administrative reform in each country prevailed. The reform of public 
service institutions was seen as the foundation of public service in each country as it was 
crucial for ensuring that the best and brightest in the society worked for the public good 
(Rouban, 1995; Mosher, 1968). Schick (1999) argues that the NPM reformers, with regard to 
the management of core functions, did not find the old public administration systems suitable 
to encourage efficiency. While the NPM targeted compliance with such systems the 
traditional reform targeted managerial malfeasance or incompetence (Keating and Holmes, 
1990). Moynihan (2006) summarises the logic of NPM reform common to the benchmark 
countries as follows: 
Traditional public management systems provide only limited types of 
information, which act to discourage efficiency. Managers are provided 
with a list of inputs-budgeted appropriations - which they are obliged to 
spend. Financial controls are centred on con~rolli~g. these inputs, ensuring 
that money is spent for the purpose for which It IS allocated. M~nager~ 
lack the discretion to reallocate the money they have received, If 
reallocation could foster more effective and efficient achievement of goals. 
Personnel controls reinforce financial controls, restricting the ability of the 
manager to make decisions about human resources. (p.79) 
3 Chestnuts is a terminology originally used by Peters (1996) to refer to the basics of the old style public 
administration. 
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Moynihan (2006; 1998) also maintains that there are no incentives for the individual or 
organisation to deviate from existing controls toward more efficient performance but rather 
there are disincentives. For example, where an agency manages some savings from 
efficient budget execution, those savings are not retained by the agency but re-appropriated 
to the entire government. Therefore, it is common practice that agency administrators are 
likely to seek more than they need to cover costs in their budget proposal and then spend 
the remaining money before the end of the budget cycle to avoid losing unspent 
appropriations and receiving lower allocations in the future. Hence the definition of 
accountability underpinning these control systems was devoid of goal achievement, 
technical efficiency, or programme effectiveness instead of focusing on legal compliance, 
probity and error avoidance. 
2.3.3 Impacts of the NPM 
Some empirical studies show that NPM may lead to improved performance in the public 
sector. Van Heiden (1998) indicates that the introduction of an improved management 
information and control system (known as 'BBI'-system) has led to a more favourable 
assessment of eight Dutch municipalities' by its managers and politicians. Miah and Mia 
(1996) also claim that the decentralisation of decision making offices in five Central 
Government Departments in New Zealand appeared to lead to an improved performance 
only when the decentralisation efforts were associated with an increased use of accounting 
control systems by district offices. 
Ogden (1995), in investigating the ways in which accounting and accounting information has 
contributed to and shaped processes of organisational change in the ten Regional Water 
Authorities of England and Wales, comments that this area of public sector reforms as 
having been successful. This assertion is confirmed by the Government White Paper of 
1986 (paragraphs 35, 38) in which the Government had praised the Water Authorities for 
their "improved financial performance" and transformation into "ten modern businesses"; and 
were considered "capable of standing independently as commercially viable entities". 
Bale and Dale (1998), indicate the success story of New Zealand public sector reform. 
According to the authors the core sector reforms in New Zealand have succeeded in 
improving both service delivery and efficiency as the system is wholly supported by 
departmental managers. The writers claim that performance has generally improved in 
tandem with the development of wage scales linked to performance, and savings from better 
cash management have been substantial enough to cover all the system's costs of the 
f Moreover the extensive un-appropriated expenditures have now disappeared and re orms. , 
cost per unit of output has declined, in some cases quite markedly, as confirmed by Deloitte 
et al. (1990). 
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Some empirical studies cast considerable doubt on the effectiveness of NPM for improving 
organisational performance. For example, in New Zealand, most of the values of the NPM 
reforms introduced by a new system of delegated budgeting in a hospital appeared to be 
effectively resisted by the absorbing role of the clinical director (Jacobs, 1995). Pettersen 
(1995) also confirmed that in Norway, budgeting control measures do not seem to have 
contributed significantly in reducing health care expenditures. Lapsley (1994) notes that 
decentralisation of National Health Service reforms which was aimed at introducing 
responsibility ('Grey Book' recommendations) accounting, the decentralisation efforts in the 
central government as proposed in the Fulton Report (1968) and the Financial Management 
Initiative (1982), all in the UK, have initially not been successful. 
Peters (2001) and Fusarelli and Johnson (2004) ask an important question: does NPM, 
which stresses on satisfying individual needs adequately and sufficiently meet the public 
needs as a whole, or does NPM satisfy the common good and dilute the public purpose of 
public organisations? As NPM emphasises accountability and privatisation and requires 
public administrators to become entrepreneurs, Peters (2001) questions the demands of 
public entrepreneurship as they conflict with democratic theory and public policy. In effect, 
NPM, according to several critics, may not be adequate to ensure the common good or meet 
the essential needs of society (Brown and Contreras, 1991). Fusarelli and Johnson (2004) 
therefore argue that education reforms based on market mechanisms may be inappropriate 
as public school managers see such public institutions' mission as a moral one focusing on 
cost and benefit analysis rather than economics. This idea confirms that of Fry (1989) who 
argues that the public administrators' activities are quite different from those of the private 
sector administrators, in that the latter's effectiveness is judged by the extent of its profit 
margin while the effectiveness of the former is difficult to measure. 
Sawicky (1997) maintains that markets and business organisations often fail miserably in 
promoting social welfare as they do not often do well in satisfying public wants. He notes 
that contracting out educational services to private companies to date has not yielded any 
fruitful results in improving schools. Similarly, privatisation ideology which suggests that 
business will always do better, according to the writer, is false. The author points out that 
because educational outcomes are diverse and complex, neither easy to define nor to 
measure to aid assessment and analysis; and due to their loosely coupled nature, it is 
difficult for private sector firms to operate effectively. 
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) note that quality in service provision may fall as aspirational 
professional standards are increasingly compromised with minimalist, economizing 
. I t dards Aga'ln NPM's emphasis on cost reduction may promote the pursuit of 
managena s an . , 
efficiency in flawed policies with short-term gains to the detriment of a long-term perspective 
. . ch as education technology health and environment. The authors 
and gains on Issues su ' I 
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therefore caution that, in seeking to transfer NPM to less developed countries, due 
consideration should be taken particularly when these delicate issues are concerned. 
The critics of NPM lament the collapse of the welfare state and also pOint out that NPM has 
promoted inequality as market-type mechanisms produce "market-niche-seeking" behaviour 
by public service providers. For example, health care doctors may seek to avoid those socio-
economic groups most prone to illness, while good secondary schools may bias their entry 
requirements toward the children of parents of higher socio-economic groups (Pollitt, 1994). 
Mackintosh (1997) therefore argues that the cultural and organisational change in social 
provision, expressed in the concepts of markets and individualism, may create conditions of 
social exclusion and such reforms may harm those in need of state provision like the poor 
and the vulnerable. Critics, including Dunleavy and Hood (1994), maintain that NPM may 
encourage self-interest and corruption as policy makers and senior bureaucrats opt for 
privatisation and contracting out because of increased opportunities for rent-seeking and 
other forms of misbehaviour. Critics also argue that NPM has caused a fall in ethical 
standards in public life with the growing incidence of greed, preferential treatment and 
conflicting interests. The adoption of NPM may lead to more abuses and arbitrary use of 
discretion in less developed countries (for example in contracting) where patronage systems 
are more prevalent and accountability mechanisms are weak. 
Pollitt (1994) observes that, in practice, NPM techniques may work better in some areas of 
the public sector than in others. One should bear in mind that the public service sector 
covers a wide variety of activities, some of which have high technological content while 
others have low; some are person-centred (e.g. health and education) and some are not; 
some are competitive, but for some it is very hard to remould them into a competitive set up. 
The ability to sort out these differences is important, because they increase or decrease the 
probability of NPM being a "good fit" in less developed countries or otherwise. For example, 
public sector reforms in less developed countries have been externally driven by donor 
institutions with their stringent conditions and bound timetables (Uddin and Tsamenyi, 2005). 
Therefore these countries have been adopting comprehensive reforms looking for quick 
positive results without taking into account existing institutional and management capacities. 
This has not gone well, as in most cases the administrative and management capacities 
have been overstretched by these reforms coupled with the volatile political environment 
existing in some of those countries. 
Therkildsen (2000) maintains that a country needs to assess realistically its present and 
foreseeable political and economic realities before it adapts wholesale the NPM concept 
which is perceived to improve service delivery, since countries differ widely in terms of their 
. . . I d't' s and their capacity to implement public sector management reforms Instltutlona con I Ion 
NPM pts Therkildsen therefore recommends to less developed countries based on conce. , ' 
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that in implementing NPM the affected country must be sensitive to operational reality since 
certain characteristics of less developed countries, such as malfunctioning of markets, 
scarcity of resources, and external dependence, playa major role in negating the operation 
of NPM reforms. According to Larbi (1998), countries that want to implement NPM principles 
and practices in their public sector reforms have to critically consider and answer questions 
of how to implement rather than just what to implement. Hence the argument about the 
application of NPM to less developed countries should not be whether it is good or bad, right 
or wrong but needs a careful consideration of the context, and whether or not prevailing 
contexts or conditions are suitable (Caiden, 1994; Turner and Hulme, 1997). Adequate 
attention must also be given to appropriate arrangements for implementation other than 
focussing on the policy content (Brinkerhoff, 1996). 
Rhodes (1994) claims that the administrative reform breeds more cynicism than efficiency 
and effectiveness and outlined four interrelated trends to support the claim: 
(1) Privatisation and limiting the scope and forms of public intervention; 
(2) The loss of functions by central and local government departments to alternative 
service delivery systems; 
(3) The loss of functions by British government to European Union institutions; 
(4) Limiting the discretion of public servants through the new public management, with its 
emphasis on managerial accountability, and clearer political control through a sharper 
distinction between politics and administration. (pp. 138-139) 
Power and Laughlin (1992, p. 133) wrote that central to the change of modes in public 
management was a shift towards "accountingization" - the introduction of ever more explicit 
cost categorization into areas where costs were previously aggregated, pooled or undefined. 
Hood (1995) argued that this shift is part of a broader shift in the doctrines of public 
accountability and administration. He claims that the accountability paradigm of progressive 
public administration emphasized heavily on two basic management doctrines: 
(i) to keep the public sector sharply distinct from the private sector in terms of continuity, 
ethos, methods of doing business, organizational design, people, rewards and career 
structure; (ii) to maintain buffers against political and managerial discretio~. by means of .an 
elaborate structure of procedural rules designed to prevent favouritism and corru~tlon 
and to keep arms-length relations between politicians and the entrenched custodians 
of particular public service "trusts". (p.94) 
This new concept of accountability will use accounting as the key element because it 
reflected high trust in the market and private business methods and low trust in public 
servants and professionals, whose activities therefore need to be more closely costed and 
evaluated by accounting techniques (Hood, 1995). Barberis (1998) conclude that the NPM 
may not be the root cause of the disparity between the doctrine and the reality of 
accountability, but has further exposed the accountability gap in the public sector. He said 
that NPM has accelerated the need to reconstruct the traditional doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility to allow for some direct accountability of civil servants, especially the senior 
officials. 
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Hood (1990, p. 212-213) suggests that NPM deserves further inquiry and debate and 
discussed four possible 'loose ends' to the NPM. Among these are concerns over losing 
traditional public service ethics, loyalty to the public service as a whole and resilience to 
political crisis when emphasizing on NPM. It is argued that political accountability involves 
greater than just achieving one-line results, and NPM accounting can reduce accountability 
by making processes more ambiguous. There is also a problem in reconciling the Taylorist 
and 'new institutional economics' NPM ideas. The Taylorist idea is manipulation from the top, 
or the controlling centre, but the NPM notion is about public choice, decentralist and 
consumer oriented. Another issue is about where the NPM revolution would stop, at what 
level of competitive environment, because there is no limit in its possibilities. And finally the 
issue of ambiguity in what exactly is the kind of public services that the NPM revolution aims 
to produce. 
The NPM has had its champions and its critics but, whether for good or ill, it is widely held to 
have escalated the challenge to traditional canons of public administration (Dunleavy and 
Hood, 1994; Hughes, 1994; Massey, 1995; Pyper, 1995). Metcalfe and Richards (1991) 
commented that a reform of such would drag British government to the old management 
style of high bureaucracy and centralization. Accounting has been used as a means for 
change throughout the public sector although researchers have diverse opinions on the 
power of accounting to do so (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). 
Having explored public sector and NPM, the next section discusses governance in the public 
sector for which audit has been extensively utilised. 
2.4 Public Sector Governance 
REVIEW I 
2.4.1 Audit and Public Sector Governance 
Audit of the public sector is necessary to safeguard public money and help public services 
achieve value for money. It also plays an essential role in maintaining confidence in the 
stewardship of public funds and in those to whom the funds are entrusted. In other words 
audit is a cornerstone of good public sector governance (The IIA, 2006). Public sector 
. I d the pol·lcl·es and procedures used to direct an organization's activities to governance inC u es . . 
provide reasonable assurance that objectives are met and that operations are carn~d out In 
an ethical and accountable manner. Governance is also related to the means by which goals 
are established and accomplished and includes activities that ensure a governmenfs 
credibility, establish equitable provision of services, and assure appropriate behaviour of 
government officials, thereby reducing the risk of public corruption. 
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Given their duties, public sector auditors should be accountable for their performance and 
are duty bound to undertake their work in a professional, objective and cost-effective manner 
and with due regard to the needs of the organisation's stakeholders. By providing unbiased 
objective assessments of whether public resources are responsibly and effectively managed 
to achieve intended results, auditors help government organizations achieve accountability 
and integrity, improve operations, and instil confidence among citizens and stakeholders. 
The government auditor's role supports the governance responsibility of oversight, insight, 
and foresight (IIA, 2006). Oversight addresses whether government entities are doing what 
they are supposed to do and serves to detect and deter public corruption. Insight assists 
decision-makers by providing an independent assessment of government programs, policies, 
operations, and results. Foresight identifies trends and emerging challenges. To fulfil each of 
the roles, auditors use financial audits, performance audits, and investigation and advisory 
services as tools. 
Hodges et al (1996, p.l) explain that an authoritative definition of 'corporate governance' in 
the context of public services is not available, although many agree that it is about the 
procedures associated with: (i) decision-making, performance and control of organisations; 
and (ii) providing structures to give overall direction to the organisation and to satisfy 
reasonable expectations of accountability to those outside it. The term that is commonly 
used for governance in the literature is 'corporate governance' because this mainly considers 
companies and corporations. According to Tricker (1984, p.l), while management is about 
running the company, corporate governance is about ensuring the company is run properly. 
Corporate governance is defined by the Cadbury Report (1994) as the system by which 
organisations are directed and controlled. All organisations would need to be governed, 
managed and controlled, thus corporate governance is very important. Separation of 
ownership from control of the organization is the origin of concerns about corporate 
governance and accountability issues (Hodges et ai, 1996). Flint (1988) wrote that the link 
between corporate governance and audit is consistent with the societal approach to the 
corporate audit function, which holds that its principal task is perceived as one which assists 
in corporate governance and managerial accountability. Keasey and Wright (1993) 
suggested that corporate governance concerns the structures and processes associated 
within an organization while accountability involves monitoring, evaluation and control of 
organizational agents to ensure that they behave in the interest of shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Therefore, accountability is a sub-set of corporate governance. Figure 6 is a 
diagram on regulatory framework by Keasey and Wright (1993). The framework emphasizes 
two main concerns in corporate governance which arise from the separation of ownership 
and control in large companies. The first concern is the need for supervision and monitoring 
of the executive and the second concern is the mechanisms for ensuring that management 
is accountable to shareholders and other stakeholders. The framework includes the 
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involvement of auditors as independent third parties and links the accountability problems of 
the auditor's role and the expectations that arise from audit activities with the supervisory 
role of non-executive directors through audit committees. Audit committees will be discussed 
in subsection (2.4.2) to this discussion because these are included in the performance 
measurement of local government. 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
SELF v. LEGAL 1 COMPANY LAW 1 TAKEOVER CODES 
t ~ 1 
ACCOUNTABILITY SUPERVISION OF DIRECTORS 
AUDITORS - ROLE AND - SHAREHOLDERS 
EXPECTATIONS GAP - DEBT PROVIDERS 
- MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
AUDIT COMMITTEES CONTROL 
- NON EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS 
EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION- - EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
COMMITTEES AND - COMPENSATION 
DISCLOSURE 
~I \RECTOR! 
(EXECUTIVE) 
~ I 
I DIVISIONAL! MANAGEMENT 
Figure 6: The Corporate Governance Framework, reproduced from Keasey and Wright 
(1993) 
The diagram suggests that corporate governance is achieved through a regulatory 
framework. The inspection activities performed in the public sector are also widely termed as 
'regulation'. Hood et al (1999) wrote that we live in the age of the 'regulatory state'; 
suggesting that modern states are emphasizing more on the use of authority, rules and 
standard-setting, partially displacing an earlier emphasis on public ownership, public 
subsidies, and directly provided services. The regulatory framework for local government 
includes various inspection activities designed by the Audit Commission to reflect local 
authorities' performance. The inspection activities are designed to serve as a driving force 
towards the three E's, organisations that are able to provide high quality services for the 
public. Besides achieving the three E's, local authorities have to also exhibit their 
achievement so that the public are confident with local authorities' commitment and 
achievement. The combination of all these factors gives rise to the needs for an independent 
party to inspect, report and certify that the authorities have achieved their intended purpose. 
Thus the Audit Commission have been granted the authority for inspection and certification 
of local government. The issues of regulation in the public sector will be discussed further in 
section 2.4.3 
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2.4.2 Audit Committees 
Good corporate governance requires independent, effective assurance about the adequacy 
of financial management and reporting issues within an organisation, as well as providing a 
forum for the discussion of issues raised by internal and external auditors (CIPFA, 2005). To 
govern local authorities, the Local Government Act 2000 specifies that all local authorities 
should have an executive (this could be a directly elected mayor with a cabinet, or a cabinet 
with a leader, or a directly elected mayor and council managers) and one or more scrutiny 
committees. Marrian (1988) defines an audit committee as a committee of the board which 
normally comprises of three to five directors with no operating responsibility in financial 
management. The primary tasks of this committee are to review the financial statements, the 
effectiveness of the company's accounting and internal control systems, the findings of the 
auditors, and to make recommendations on the appointment and remuneration of the 
external auditors. 
Establishing an audit committee is not a requirement of local government although audit 
committees have been a feature of public sector for some time (CIPFA, 2005). Local 
authorities are given flexibility in organising their audit committees depending upon the 
specific political and management arrangements in the authority (CIPFA, 2005). However, a 
council is required to "ensure that its financial management is adequate and effective and 
that it has a sound system of internal control which facilitates the effective exercise of its 
functions" (OOPM, 2003). The Local Government Act 1972, Section 152 also requires local 
authorities to make arrangements for the proper administration of their financial affairs. The 
chief financial officer (CFO) is key to discharging these requirements and in fulfilling the 
requirements effectively, the CFO requires an effective audit committee (CIPFA, 2005). The 
purpose of the audit committee in local government is "to provide assurance of the adequacy 
of the risk management framework and the associated control environment, independent 
scrutiny of the authority's financial and non-financial performance to the extent that it affects 
the authority's exposure to risk and weakens the control environment, and to oversee the 
financial reporting process" (CIPFA, 2005, p. 9). 
Companies are motivated to form audit committees voluntarily because of the extensive 
benefits they bring (Collier, 1997). Having an audit committee in a company would bring 
benefits to many; the board of directors, the non-executive directors, external auditors, 
internal auditors, internal control functions and to shareholders as well as other users of 
financial statements. Simnet et al (1993) found that audit committees improve (or maintain) 
the quality of financial reporting process, aid the actual and perceived independence of the 
internal and external auditors, and improve the confidence of the financial statement user in 
the quality of financial reports. Recognizing the usefulness of audit committees to support 
governance, financial reporting and performance of the whole authority, CIPFA published a 
practical guidance for local government to assist in implementing an effective audit 
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committee. The UoR also sets a challenge to each local authority to ensure that its audit 
committee works effectively. 
Audit committees at some local authorities have evolved from ad hoc committees (with few 
defined responsibilities) but this development is not reflected across local government as a 
whole (CIPFA, 2005). Thus CIPFA has encouraged local authorities to maintain an effective 
audit committee because it: 
• raises greater awareness of the need for internal control and the implementation of audit 
recommendations; 
• increases public confidence in the objectivity and fairness of financial and other 
reporting; 
• reinfor~e~ the if!1portance and independence of internal and external audit and any 
other Similar review process (i.e. providing a view on the Statement of Internal Control); 
• provide additional assurance through a process of independent and objective review. 
(CIPFA, 2005, pp. 9-10) 
The core functions of audit committees at local authorities are related to four aspects: 
1. Internal Audit - the audit committee will have a clear role in relation to the 
authorities' internal audit function. The functions include: (a) formally approving (not 
directing) the overall strategy to ensure that it meets the authority's overall strategic 
direction; (b) approving the annual programme of audits; (c) monitoring progress 
against the plan and assessing whether adequate skills and resources are available 
to provide an effective audit function. The audit committee's role to review the work 
carried out will include formal consideration of summaries of work done, key 
findings, issues of concern and actions resulting from audit work. The audit 
committee also would judge the effectiveness of internal audit by receiving feedback 
on the work carried out. A key part of the role is receiving and reviewing the annual 
report from the head of internal audit in order to reach an overall opinion on the 
internal control environment and the quality of internal audit coverage. The head of 
internal audit also provides independent assurance to the audit committee. 
2. External Audit and Inspections - the audit committee will receive and consider the 
work of the external auditor, comment on the inclusion of any audit work and should 
receive reports following completion of the work to monitor action taken. The audit 
committee also should (a) contribute to the authority's response to the AC's annual 
audit and inspection letter, reports and opinion, and also should consider and 
express opinion on the selection and rotation of the external auditor; (b) have 
opportunity to meet privately and separately with the external auditor, independent of 
the presence of those officers with whom the auditor must retain a working 
relationship; (c) have access to inspection reports from inspection agencies as a 
source of assurance and to compare with any relevant internal audit and external 
audit reports; (d) ensure that it is aware of the work of scrutiny and other committees 
so that it can take account of issues relevant to it area of interest; (e) ensure that 
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there is effective working between all audit and inspection functions to maximise the 
value of the review function to the authority. 
3. Control Strategies - the audit committee should take review the strategies adopted 
by the authority's to regulate its activities and control the actions of its employees, 
elected members and contractors, whether the strategies have been properly 
formulated and remain effective. The strategies to be overseen by the audit 
committee will include (a) risk management; (b) the assurance framework, including 
the production of the Statement of Internal Control (SIC); (c) legal codes of corporate 
governance, standards and behaviour; (d) arrangements for delivering value for 
money (VFM); (e) anti-fraud arrangements; (e) anti-corruption arrangements 
including the authority's whistle-blowing guidelines. By reviewing the strategies, the 
audit committee will be in position to monitor the action recommended by auditors 
and inspectors and agreed and implemented by officers to improve the situation, and 
able to monitor changes to the risk environment and guide any associated actions. 
4. Financial Statements - the audit committee should review the financial statements 
(i) before they are approved under regulation 10 of the Accounts and Audit 
Regulation and (ii) concurrent with the external auditor's SAS 610 (ISA 260) report to 
those charged with governance subsequent the completion of the audit. In reviewing 
the financial statements, the audit committee should focus on (a) the suitability of 
accounting policies and treatments; (b) any changes in accounting policies and 
treatments; (c) major judgemental areas such as provisions; (d) significant 
adjustments and material weaknesses in internal control reported by the external 
auditor. 
(CIPFA, 2005, pp. 13-17) 
Although an audit committee is said to bring extensive benefits, there are some reservations. 
Collier (1997) wrote that the claimed advantages of audit committees are not always realized 
in practice and that the support for audit committees is based upon anecdotal information on 
their effectiveness rather than objective evidence. Menon and Williams (1994) research 
findings showed that companies which had formed an audit committee were often reluctant 
to rely upon it and concluded that audit committees are often created for the purpose of 
appearances rather than to enhance stockholders' control of management. 
Several studies (Verschoor, 1989, 1990; Campbell, 1990) which explored the ineffectiveness 
of the audit committee in corporate failures confirmed the reservation about audit 
committees. Vicknair et al (1993) identified one possible reason for the limitations in 
effectiveness of audit committee as the existence of 'grey' area directors, who are not wholly 
independent of management, which may undermine the position of audit committees as truly 
independent corporate governance entities and jeopardize auditor independence. 
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Industrialists and academics also raised questions about the possible dangers brought by 
the operations of audit committees. Collier (1992) identified the following four main dangers: 
(1) encroachment on the functions of the executive and dilution of executive 
authority; 
(2) diversion of non-executive directors from their strategic and other roles; 
(3) creation of divisiveness between the executive and non-executive directors; and 
(4) reduction in the contact between the auditors and the main board. 
(pp. 11-12) 
Hood et al (1998; 1999) argue that regulation as a means of governance for the public sector 
has increased in its scale, affecting both auditors and local government. To understand the 
impact external auditing or regulation has had on local government, the model of regulation 
introduced by Hood et al (1999) will be applied. The following section will review regulation 
inside government and link this to the audit of local government. 
2.4.3 Regulation inside Government 
'Regulation' is generally used to mean governing, the ways in which public purposes are 
decided on and implemented; however, it has taken on a more specific meaning as 
achieving public goals using rules or standards of behaviour backed up by the sanctions or 
rewards of the state (James, 2003). Regulation in that sense has always been thought of as 
what government does to businesses (Wilson, 1980; Hancher and Moran, 1989; Noll, 1989; 
Foster, 1992; Majone, 1994; Ogus, 1994). 
Hood et ai, (1998) wrote that regulation inside government is hard to define with precision 
and suggest the following concept: 
'the way public organizations are subject to influence from other public agencies 
operating at arm's-length from the direct line of command and endowed some 
sort of authority over their charges' 
(Hood et ai, 1998) 
In Hood et al (1998; 1999), regulation inside government (in UK) is described as consisting 
of three basic features; one bureaucracy aims to shape the activities of another; there is 
some degree of organizational separation between the 'regulating' bureaucracy and the 
'regulatee'; and the regulator has some official mandate to scrutinize the behaviour of the 
regulatee and seek to change it. 
Nowadays, government itself is also subject to regulation by a large and diverse body of 
'regulators'. Many literatures have explored the ways government regulates itself through a 
range of bodies which set standards for public sector organisations, monitoring them and 
seek to bring about compliance with those standards (Hood and Scott, 1996; Hood et al 
1998, 1999; 2000). Regulators common to private sectors like auditors, inspectors, licensing 
bodies, competition and fair trading authorities are now scrutinizing and overseeing the 
public sector (Hood et ai, 1998). In addition, public sector organizations are being watched 
by further specific regulators including systems of audit, grievance chasing, standard setting, 
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inspection and evaluation. These make a typical public bureaucracy face scrutiny by a 
growing army of waste-watchers, quality checkers, 'sleaze-busters' and other regulators 
(Hood et ai, 1998). 
The reform in UK public management since the 1970s is meant to ease management from 
excessive rules so they can add more value to public services, and make management in 
government like that in businesses. However, the supposed flexibility in management 
specified to public managers has been compensated by stricter regulations; increased 
formality, complexity, intensity and specialization over the past two decades (Hood et ai, 
1999). 
The rhetoric of public services reform by reducing 'red tape' and allowing managers' greater 
discretion has led to an increase in formal public sector regulation (James, 2003). This has 
added to the procedural constraints and 'second guessing' faced by public managers 
(James, 2003); increasingly formal controls that are contrary to the cutting down of red tape 
(Hoggett, 1996). Power (1997) argues that the search for auditability associated with 
declining trust in traditional styles of professional self-regulation has produced a formalized 
self-regulation. Increased regulation has been accompanied by decreases in managerial 
discretion (Hood et ai, 1998). 
Hood et al (1998) wrote that regulators use a range of methods to shape the behaviour of 
their charges, running from the role of official whistle-blower, able to do no more than draw 
public attention to lapses or problems, to the role of 'terminator', able to close down an 
organization deemed to be failing (or to impose financial surcharges and disqualifications 
from office on local councillors and officials). Some regulators are more separated from their 
charges than others and their mandates also vary. Some regulators have statutory authority, 
some are established by Order in Council, and many have no formal mandate other than 
what is assumed to be the policy of the government of the day. 
Regulation is a multi-faceted concept and is used interchangeably with concepts associated 
with specialist practices such as audit, inspection and scrutiny (Kelly, 2003; Boyne et ai, 
2002). Regulation is also practised through advice and guidance from regulatory bodies, 
professional organizations and government departments on how organizations should act in 
order to comply with their regulatory regime. The ideology of NPM itself emerged from 
private sector practice, popularly summarised for public sector practitioners by Osborne and 
Gaebler's 'Reinventing Government' (1992). 
The change in public management has been recognized by various academic literatures. 
Public bodies are required to focus more on strategic goals, rather than just delivering 
services (Hoggett, 1996). Increased accountability of public service organizations by 
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judgments made on their achievements, usually by performance measurement of outputs 
and outcomes (Hood, 1991). Public bodies may serve consumers better by encouraging 
greater actual or quasi competition, either by privatization, contracting out or by employing 
outside contractors (McSweeny, 1988; Stewart and Walsh, 1992). 
Overlaps and grey areas of regulation are unavoidable; there are direct oversight of public 
bureaucracies by legislators and the oversight exercised by law courts besides the regulation 
by the AC (Hood et ai, 1999). The example provided by the authors is whether Britain's 
administrative tribunals should be considered as a specialized administrative courts or 
bureaucratic regulators? Where is the drawing line between internal chain of command 
structures and external regulation? Some heads of public organisations may welcome the 
arm's-length regulators to influence their organizations and bring extra pressure to push on 
problematic individuals or unit within their domains. Another grey area that is problematic to 
draw the borderline is between regulation and advice. Some organizations may only have 
the power to advise. However, the AC may give advice but later enforce punishments 
through the scoring for performance if the public bodies did not follow their advice. Hence, 
should the AC be considered as giving advice or instructions because of the nature of their 
advice which always requires public bodies to follow? These considerations might influence 
local governments' actions towards performance indicators established by the AC and 
thereby alter their priorities. 
Regulation inside government starts from the oversight of one public bureaucracy by 
another, but private actors also appear in the process because the AC appoints private 
accountancy firms to conduct some of the local authority audits. In measuring for scale and 
growth of regulation inside government, Hood et al (1999) wrote that they recognize its fuzzy 
boundaries. Even though regulation inside government is not very clear in terms of its 
boundaries and authorities among bodies of regulators, it has become a familiar 
phenomenon to every public servant. Public managers and officials are exposed to multiple 
regulatory influences over their working life and day to day routine besides regulation from 
their immediate bosses in the chain of command. However, at times the regulation through 
performance indicators enables immediate bosses in the chain of command to encourage 
their officials to work and justify their actions to local authorities' elected members. 
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2.4.3.1 Scope, scale and modus operandi of regulation inside 
government 
Hood et al (1998)4 outlined three main themes of scope, scale and how regulation inside 
government works: 
1. Regulation inside UK government, (taken together all its forms) amounts to a large 
enterprise, approaching, if not exceeding the scale of regulation of private 
businesses. 
2. Internal regulation of government seems in many of its domains to have increased in 
formality, complexity, intensity and specialization over the past two decades. 
3. The behaviour of regulators inside government seems to be related to how close 
they are to those they oversee in professional/social backgrounds.s 
All the three themes may put pressures on public managers and open rooms for variations in 
control regimes imposed by regulators upon regulatees. UK government invests more 
resources (staff and public spending) in regulating itself than it does to regulate the 
privatised utilities (Hood et ai, 1998). The scale of investment in the regulation of government 
is close to the total of private sector regulation even on the most restrictive definition of the 
public sector at national government level (Hood et ai, 1998; 1999). This means more tax-
payers money being channelled to regulation and less money for other core activities. The 
authors also wrote that the increased numbers of regulatory organisation inside government 
has also substantially escalated their claims on public budget. Hence, the cost effectiveness 
of enhanced regulation is arguable. 
Hood et al (1998; 1999) evidenced that the number of regulating staffs was then increasing 
while public sector organisations were downsizing. This situation raises questions as to how 
does the government body cope with their activities when their size keeps on decreasing and 
at the same time they are being strictly watched and subjected to many rules and 
D regulations. Spending more on regulation and less on other activities would possibly limit the 
government bodies' spending on training or hiring better-skilled staff to enhance their 
performance. Besides that, the staff of local authorities will be kept busy with adhering to 
regulators requirement than their core responsibilities. 
In supporting their arguments, Hood et al (1998; 1999) estimated that the number of 
regulatory organizations in the UK public sector ranges from about 130 to over 200 and that 
4 They conducted their study through exploration and i~-depths interviews .with regul~to~s and regulatees to reveal 
scope and scale of regulation inside government, to discover how regulations work mSlde government and how It 
altered with the 'New Public Management' (complex of changes in public service organization). 
5 In general, they found the more distant regulators ar~ from their client in backgroun~s, the more formally they 
behave ( in the sense of non-participatory standard-settmg, rule-bound regulatory behaViour and heavy reliance on 
formal reporting and sanctioning, rather than participating, discretionary regulation with co-operative methods for 
gathering information and modifying behaviour) (Hood et ai, 1998). 
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estimated regulatory staff runs from almost 14,000 to 20,000. The running costs were 
estimated at £800m to £1 billion. These costs (which could be more now) are only the direct 
costs of internal regulation (staffing and operating costs for the regulatory bureaucracies). 
From their examination on expenditure over the past two decades, they found that the level 
of central government regulators spending had increased by a factor of at least two on the 
regulation of local government. Spending on public audit bodies has at least doubled; it has 
increased by a factor of three for inspectorates and has grown at least fourfold for some 
other regulatory organizations. 
Hood et al (1998) also maintain that this is the most visible part of the iceberg of regulatory 
compliance. If the other part of costs incurred in complying with the regulations (i.e. the 
compliance cost) faced by regulates is considered, it will add substantially to the overall 
costs of regulation inside government. It is also possible for compliance obligations to 
change (usually in the direction of imposing much greater costs on regulatees) without any 
substantial change in the administrative inputs of the regulators (Hood et ai, 1998). From 
their interviews and other material, they suggested that the growth in compliance costs was 
commensurate with, or even greater than, the growth in direct cost of regulation inside 
government. 
Those costs are only estimates because they are not routinely collected across government 
as a whole (Hood et ai, 1998). Does this mean that governments do not expect the costs of 
regulations to be this high or that they perceive that the results they will get from enhanced 
regulation outweigh the money and time spent? From their interviews, they found that 
regulators tended to turn a blind eye to the compliance costs, claiming that compliance costs 
were not an issue in the public sector and therefore did not need to be measured. However, 
they also noted that this view was not shared by those who are being regulated. 
Hood et al (1998) also evidenced that regulation inside government was not just substantial 
business but also expanding. They examined the number of regulators from 1976 to 1995 in 
different parts of the UK public sector and found growth in all sectors, with stronger growth in 
the body-counts of organizations in local government. They estimated the overall staff 
increase in regulatory bodies inside UK government was 90% between 1976 and 1995 and 
this growth contrasts sharply with what happened to staffing in the public sector as a whole, 
with a fall of more than 30% in total civil servants and over 20% in local authority staff (Hood 
et ai, 1998, quoted from Cabinet Office, 1995; DoE, 1996b). 
Regulation inside government is not just large and growing but also diverse in several 
senses (Hood et ai, 1998). The regulators were found to pursue various and sometimes 
conflicting goals, with no sense of belonging to any overall community, and with no central 
point in the government machine capable of, or responsible for, gauging the overall size and 
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growth or reviewing how it operates. From the 134 regulators within the UK public sector 
included in their study, over 60% of organizations, over 75% of the staff and over 80% of 
spending were devoted to oversight of organizations outside the core of central government, 
and many more resources devoted to the regulation of local than central government. They 
also found, the social 'distance' between those who regulate and those who are regulated 
tends to be greatest in the public sector, and regulatory behaviour tends to be most formal 
(as in the case of central government civil servants regulating local authorities). Some 
regulators or overseers in government bodies came from the same professional and social 
backgrounds as their clients, their roles being reversed when they move on with their career 
and change jobs. 
2.4.3.2 Features of regulation inside government 
Hood et al (1998; 1999) offered three basic dimensions (James, 2003 described these as 
'features') of regulation inside government to comprise the followings: 
• 
• 
one bureaucracy aims to shape the activities of another (the regulator has a degree 
of authority over the regulated bodies and sets standards for them); 
organizational separation between the regulating bureaucracy and the 'regulatee' 
(organizational separation of regulators and regulated bodies, so regulation is 
distinct from internal management within an organization); 
• some official mandate for the regulator organization to scrutinize the behaviour of 
the regulatee and some authoritative basis for changing it (the regulator monitors 
performance and uses persuasion or direction over the regulated bodies to change 
their behaviour). 
Regulation inside government is a subset of the broader context of control over bureaucracy 
and there are many ways to classify various mechanisms usable to keep public bureaucracy 
under control (Hood et al 1999). Oversight comes in various forms; self conscious oversight 
is also different from the inspector-free control over bureaucracy. Self conscious oversight or 
comptrol (Hood, 1996) is when the system is held within limits without overt controllers in the 
form of official overseers, the bureaucratic version of Adam Smith's hidden hand. However a 
hidden hand is not the sole determinant for exchange process of a market, because culture 
also generally regulates human behaviour. Hood et al (1999) wrote that it is important to 
distinguishes 'comptroller' and 'inspector-free control' because the main lesson of cybernetic 
analysis for bureaucracy is that a system can be under control without having identifiable 
overseers and that, in any complex system, control cannot be affected by simple steering 
alone, but must in large measure constitute of self controlling mechanism (Beer 1965; 
Dunsire, 1978; Brans and Rossbach, 1997). Hood et al (1999) concentrate on four types of 
controls; oversight, mutuality, competition and contrived randomness, as shown in Figure 7. 
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CONTRIVED OVERSIGHT RANDOMNESS 
(CONTROL THROUGH (COMMAND AND 
UNPREDICTABLE CONTROL TECHNIQUES) 
PROCESSES OR PAYOFFS) 
COMPETITION MUTUALITY 
(CONTROL THROUGH (CONTROL THROUGH 
RIVALRY AND CHOICE) GROUP PROCESSES) 
Figure 7: 'Oversight' and Three Other 'Inspector Free' Types of Control Over Public 
Management (different mechanisms used to keep public bureaucracy under control 
(Source: Hood et. aI., 1999) 
'Command and control styles' of regulatory intervention can possibly produce unintended 
side effects or even reverse effects through functional disruption of the system being 
regulated (Hood et ai, 1999, quoting Teubner, 1987; Sieber, 1981). However, the problem of 
excessive or over-legalistic intervention has been much less discussed for regulation of 
government than for regulation of society at large (Hood et ai, 1999; with exception to 
Laughlin, 1996). 
Competition is recognized as one important inspector-free control over public bureaucracy, 
also aimed to promote competition within and among bureaucracies. Competition is common 
in the British civil service for promotion purposes. Competition is also achieved by generating 
a ranking based on performance which is common among universities. Similarly, competition 
among departments, agencies and other units for 'turf', budgets, and the policy limelight that 
is commonly argued as a key element for maintaining external control over bureaucracy. 
However, there is some doctrine that competition within the public service is wasteful and 
disruptive. For those of a 'public-choice' persuasion, a gram of competition in bureaucracy 
may be viewed as worth a tonne of regulation through oversight. The star-ranking system for 
CPA introduced for local government supported this control feature. 
Mutuality works in the opposite way to oversight because, through mutuality, a group will 
influence individuals. Hood et ai, 1999 borrowed an example from a classic study by Hugh 
Heclo and Wildavsky (1974); seeing mutuality as an informal oversight-central regulatory 
process from Ministers or Parliament to govern the behaviour of top civil service in Britain. 
This resembled a small 'village world', with the villagers' intent to pursue reputation among 
their peers and rating their colleagues. Regulating through mutuality will work when 
everybody in the group knew what should be achieved. However there is an issue of 
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mutuality being built into formal structures of consultation or group decision making, through 
board or collegial structures. The system of committee that is pervasive in Britain seeing 
individual action being restrained by group decision-making and the climates of expectation 
and mutual obligations that those committee structures generate. 
Contrived randomness acts as a check on behaviour by making outcomes and operating 
conditions unpredictable. Contrived randomness works with not telling employees on what 
job, which organization, which location and with whom they will be working in the future. With 
this, they will not have the opportunities for joining up 'scams' or corrupt anti-system 
conspiracies at any level. Contrived randomness is obvious in the operation of imperial 
bureaucracy, tax bureaucracy, and large field structures in many kinds of organization, 
including churches and multinational corporations. In these structures, the organization will 
post key employees unpredictably around the system to prevent them going native and their 
next posting will be kept unpredictable. The UK civil service also has a tradition of Iimited-
term posting which is similar to the convention adopted by the Chinese imperial bureaucracy 
of no more than three-year tenure in one position, with no certainty about where the next 
position would be. 
The mixture of controls via oversights and the inspector-free mechanisms for regulation 
inside government comprises a variety of forms (Hood et ai, 1999). Variation of the mixtures 
will create different environments and pressures in government bureaucracy. Increased 
emphasis on oversight has seen heavier stress on competition in the UK public service over 
the past two decades. Oversight mixes with other inspector-free modes of control to produce 
a range of hybrids. It is unusual to see control by pure oversights than the hybrid forms. An 
example of oversight linked with competition is the way that overseers of government (like 
the AC in its assessment of comparative local-authority performance on a range of services) 
often encourage their charges to compete for high ratings in a 'saints and sinners' table. The 
system of rating UK universities for teaching and research quality by panels of assessors 
drawn from the world of university teaching and research, and linked with funding and quality 
control by government overseers is an example of oversight linked with mutuality. While an 
example of oversight linked with randomness is the way the Prison Inspectorate combines a 
programme of visits arranged in advance with a series of unannounced spot checks on 
prisons; which are said to be more effective than the visits announced in advance. 
Hood et al (1998) identified four main weaknesses in the current institutionalization and 
behaviour of public sector regulators. The first weakness is lack of coordination for 
regulators in government for identification of good practice, examination of 'hot spots' and 
discussion of general approaches or overall philosophy across the various domains of 
regulation. The second is the government regulators' lack of systematic exposure to 
productive rivalry, rather than ad hoc turf battles or collaborative deals where responsibilities 
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overlap. The third is a lack of clear central responsibi lity and finally a lack of snap 
inspections or random scrutinies , especially at the top and the centre of government. Thus, 
next section will review accountability. 
2.5 Accountability 
REVIEW I 
2.5.1 Audit and Accountability 
Accountability is defined as an obligation for a person or organization to justify actions to 
another body in terms of some authorization for the activity given by that body; and it 
involves several elements (James, 2003) : 
I. the assignment of duties or purposes; 
ii . an obligation to answer for them; 
iii . surveillance of performance; and 
IV. some reward or sanctioning for performance or non-performance. 
Funnell (2001 , 2003) suggests that public accountability means government being 
answerable to the people for governing in the best interests of all citizens according to legally 
prescribed processes and accepted conventions and there are two aspects to constitutional 
accountability : 
(i) governing as prescribed by the body of the law; and 
(ii) governing in the best interests of all citizens according to accepted conventions . 
Fountain (1991) wrote that accountability is the basis of government in the Westminster 
system because it is the right of the electorate to received information about the actions and 
expenditures of the executive and legislative arms of government. Patton (1992) opined that 
it is more important for the local public and stakeholders of the public sector entities to be 
able to make informed judgments about the performance of the entities against stated 
objectives and the stewardship of public monies because they have no freedom to choose 
between alternative entities in the public sector (unlike the private sector where investors 
have access to capital markets) . Thus, performance reporting is vital in the public sector. 
Light (1993) suggests that accountability in government can be divided into two different 
forms : 
I. 'compliance accountability ' - managers are subject to detai led rules , with some 
sort of sanction for non-compl iance; 
ii . 'perfo rmance accountability ' - managers are subject to incentives to reach goals . 
(p.14) 
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Based on the definition above, Kluvers (2003) wrote that accountability relationship in the 
public sector exist between: (i) elected officials and managers; (ii) elected officials and 
citizens, and (iii) citizens and managers. Although there are similarities with the 
accountability relationships between directors of a company and shareholders and 
management, the public sector is not judged by the profits it makes but on the policies that 
are developed and the extent to which stated objectives have been achieved. Foster (2000) 
suggests that by using a contracts which reduce accountability to become obligations (where 
there is principal-agent relationship), accountability can be best achieved. He claimed that as 
long as a contract is clear, the obligations under the relationship will also be clarified. 
Kluvers (2003) noted that accountability is not straightforward but is multifaceted and 
complex. If accountability is not adequate, resources may not be used efficiently, effectively 
and economically (Kluvers, 2003). Accountability is also necessary to ensure that decisions 
may not be favouring particular individuals or groups that may result in the amassing of 
wealth by a country's elite at the expense of development for the population as a whole. 
Figure 8 illustrates the environment of accountability mechanisms in local government. The 
figure does not show other actors such as ministers, officers, and other civil servants who 
operate inside organisations (Central Government, Local Authorities, Audit Commission) 
shown in the figure. 
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Figure 8: Mechanisms of Accountability for English Local Authorities 
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The figure above is derived from a review of government documents and literature related to 
local authority audit in England to describe the accountability mechanisms currently in 
operation for local authorities in England. There are three important actors in the 
mechanism; the central government, the AC and the local authorities. Local electors elect 
councillors for their local authority and the local authority has statutory obligations under 
legislation to provide services to the community on their behalf. A local authority's income to 
support their activities is mainly derived from central government grants and allocations and 
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taxes collected from local electors. Therefore, local authorities are accountable to both 
central government and their local electors. Ensuring the accountability of their agents (local 
authorities) is vital, and central government prefers a concept of accountability that describes 
the responsibility and obligations of local authorities to be measured against 'apparently 
impartial criteria' (Kelly, 2003: p. 462). 
The AC was formed and assigned with responsibility to report to central government on the 
accountability and performance of local authorities. Under Section 99, Local Government Act 
2003, the AC has a duty from time to time to report on its findings and categorise English 
local authorities according to their performance in exercising their functions. In this case, 
direct monitoring by the principal (central government) over their agents (local authorities) 
has been replaced with AC's monitoring. Local electors can expect to find out on the 
accountability of their councillors based on the same report produces by the AC, a body 
appointed to report on local authorities' accountability to central government. Given that the 
AC's establishment is to help central government monitor local authorities and report on their 
accountability, the AC is to devise and implement mechanism for local government to meet 
the needs of being accountable to central government. In other words, local authorities will 
be assessed for their accountability from the perception of the AC that is derived from the 
mandates of central government. At the same time local authorities also have to be 
accountable towards the public, the council having been elected by the public to serve them. 
It is well known that accountability is important for the effective operation of both public and 
private organisations. When public and private organisations grow large and complex, 
shareholders or citizens cannot direct the management of these institutions. Therefore, they 
employ managers to operate public or private organisations on their behalf and the 
managers are usually asked to be accountable for their stewardship. As for the public sector, 
accountability is necessary because the sector exists for specific goals/mission to serve the 
community and resources are allocated to them for that reason. The community then has 
rights to assurance that their monies are allocated to programs that have a clear and 
relevant purpose, are efficiently and effectively executed, provide value for money and that 
the parties entrusted with the resources have maintained the highest standards of ethics. 
James (2003) supports the view that regulation is related to the accountability concept and 
that both involve the exercise of authority. 
The accountability (principal-agent) relationships are made difficult by information asymmetry 
and power differentials (Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992). Sinclair (1995) suggests that the 
conflicting accountability-relationship of the public sector made the accountability issues 
more complicated. Bowerman (1998) identifies two major sources of tension in 
accountability: (i) the different interpretations of accountability, and (ii) the accountability 
between different stakeholders. Different groups define accountability in different ways: 
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auditors discuss accountability as financial or numerical issues, political scientists view 
accountability as a political imperative, legal scholars view accountability as constitutional 
arrangements, while philosophers treat accountability as a subset of ethics (Bowerman, 
1998). Hence understanding the perceptions of accountability held by elected officials and 
management in the public sector is important because accountability is the key to 
maintaining trust and its existence at various levels (Kluvers, 2003). 
Patton (1992) suggests that different types of information and disclosure are necessary for 
different modes of accountability, for example information to determine managerial 
accountability would differ from information to determine accountability for probity or 
reporting of performance. Reliance on the financial and audit reports which initially are meant 
for financial accountability has reduced accountability to a 'contractual relationship' which is 
inadequate (Kluvers, 2003). As noted by Hopwood (1984), the efforts to secure better 
internal management accountability using accounting technologies may not necessarily lead 
to greater public accountability, but instead give 'selective visibility' to some organisational 
outcomes. 
This is supported by Lovell (1996), if accountability is considered to be the same as an audit, 
then an independent audit is seen as a guarantee of accountability and he lists a number of 
problems with this limited definition of accountability: 
While ex-post audit is a public statement that financial rectitude has been achieved, it also 
reinforces the belief that public assessment via external audit need only (or possibly can 
only) take place after the event. Such an approach can be lamented on three grounds: (i) 
that too much power is allowed to reside in too few hands; (ii) it allows the policy too easy 
an excuse to absolve themselves of some of the important responsibilities of citizenship; 
and (iii) audit cannot deliver the degree of protection or validation which seems to be 
attributed to the practice. (p.267) 
Lovell further said that there is a risk when only organisational activities which can be 
financially quantified become part of the accounting system and therefore get audited. He 
argues that accountability is increasingly seen as the auditing of simplistic measures and 
therefore audit criteria are affecting accountability criteria in the public sector. This approach 
has limitations especially in the public sector because the sector deals with delivery of public 
services. Rentscheler and Potter (1996) also wrote that accountability should not be confined 
to financial effects only because this risks overlooking effectiveness and quality of service 
which are difficult to quantify. 
Green (1997) wrote that auditing in the public sector requires a unique and aggressive 
approach, with the basic goal being to protect the public interest. This is because 
bureaucrats and politicians have a vested interest not to reveal potentially damaging 
information, hence public sector audit 'must be and be seen to be' fearless and without 
favour. Pallot (1999) agreed that audit plays a vital role in any accountability arrangement in 
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which a principal cannot personally investigate what is happening with resources entrusted 
to an agent. 
Barberis (1998) discusses the tricky nature of accountability in the public sector. Quoting the 
court case of Carltona V. Ministry of Works decision which reconciled with the traditional 
doctrine of accountability that 'the minister is subject to a direct and active accountability to 
Parliament, not only for the actions of civil servants but also for his own decision as to whom 
to delegate' he argue what if the: 
i) civil s~rvants are now less anonymous - if the official machine has, by design or 
oth. e. rwlse, assumed something of a constitutional 'personality'? 
ii) mInisters can and have blamed civil servants; and if, in occasion, civil servants have 
returned fire? 
iii) lines of accountability are unclear? (p.452) 
Barberries further wrote that the court ruling implies some impediment in the system and 
reason to think that the reality of accountability rests at further variance with the formal 
doctrine. Quoting various literatures he said that: 
'There is now quite widespread acknowledgement that the traditional notion of 
ministerial responsibility is itself no longer satisfactory and can no longer serve as the 
sole constitutional touchstone of accountability.' (p. 452) 
Foster (2000) is also critical of the traditional Westminster notion of accountability, insisting 
that it is diminishing in effectiveness because it is based on historic and forensic notions of 
accountability. The changes in public sector management under NPM induce substantial 
change to the accountability concept and to the accountability of public sector participants. 
Parker and Gould (1999) wrote that NPM has changed the fundamental orientation of public 
sector accountability from accountability to the public to accountability for financial outcomes. 
Managerial accountability under NPM has expanded its scope beyond traditional 
administrative accountability (monitoring processes) to include the monitoring of inputs, 
outputs and outcomes. Under NPM the emphasis is more on 'performance accountability', a 
change from tactical to strategic guidance, direct to indirect command, detailed instructions 
to freedom within constraints (Light, 1993). The basis of NPM is the reduction or removal of 
differences between the private and public sectors and placing more emphasis on results 
(Hood, 1995). 
However, some aspects of regulation in government seem to take on more compliance 
accountability, moving in the opposite direction from operational management where an 
extra freedom given to public managers is countered by more regulations (Hood et al 1999). 
These moves cause the traditional view of accountability to become no longer adequate and 
changes are necessary to the accountability concept (Kluvers, 2003). Accountability under 
NPM expands beyond producing an account of the resources used to embrace the efficiency 
of usage and effectiveness of policy decisions (Kluvers, 2003). Managers are required to be 
more entrepreneurial, concerned with performance and involved in policy decisions under 
NPM which make the traditional accountability relationship of fiduciary responsibility, 
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stewardship and probity between elected councillors and managers less relevant. Under 
NPM, accountability is hoped to be achieved by the invisible hand of the marketplace, where, 
if end users are dissatisfied with policy or service provision, they will go elsewhere, leaving 
providers at loss. This is difficult to achieve and is not an appropriate mechanism for the 
public sector because the relationship between government and its citizens is more complex 
than a consumer-provider relationship (Ryan, 2001; Patton, 1992). 
Kelly (2003) claims that accountability itself is a contested term, and that the criteria used to 
evaluate local authorities' accountability towards their various stakeholders are ultimately 
derived from preferences about political choices and from normative judgments. She argued 
that the government's actions to increase accountability through public audit as denying the 
contestability of the criteria used to benchmark standards and performance. Through 
compliance with the AC required procedures, local authorities will be certified as being 
accountable. The same reports are made public by the AC to inform local electors about the 
performance and accountability of their local authorities, and in comparison to other local 
authorities throughout England. That very same report is also used to provide feedback for 
local authorities. Thus, these would encourage local authorities to focus on complying with 
the indicators. 
The AC does not just hold a mandate to report on local authorities' performance, but at the 
same time is responsible for ensuring that local authorities deliver the services expected 
from them economically and effectively. The AC has generated a set of specific performance 
indicators for auditors to assess local authorities; by not meeting the specific indicators, local 
authorities would risk their scoring. Thus, an element of force is evident. In other words, 
besides reporting on local authorities' performance, the AC are trying to change local 
authorities' behaviour to fit with their required performance indicators (Hood et ai, 1999, 
James, 2003). The AC monitors local authorities' activities, assesses their activities and 
reports to the Central Government. The same assessment report will be used to provide 
feedback to local authorities on their achievement. The AC's appointed auditors will advise 
local authorities (based on their assessment and scoring) as to how the local authority can 
improve their scoring in the future. 
An audit might promise to compensate for lack of regulatory oversight by government 
through council elections and to provide accountability for organizational behaviour. 
However, the capacity of audit to do so depends on several factors (Courville et ai, 2003) 
which will impact on the auditees in the auditing process and increase the subjectivity in 
audit judgments. Power (1997) argued that there is an 'expectation gap' between the 
explosion of demands and the expectations of auditing at a policy or system level and the 
reality of an audit's technical and operational capacity. Kelly (2003) argued that activities 
performed by the AC present several significant challenges to local authorities, central 
government and the AC itself: 
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First, whether the activities of AC in measuring and ranking council performance 
will make a significant difference to those local authorities that are middle 
ranking. Second, whether central government monitoring of the performance of 
local authorities according to their capacity to deliver national welfare policies will 
weaken further political accountability of locally elected representatives. Third, 
whether it is feasible for the AC to retain its legitimacy as an independent 
adjudicator if it continues to design and operationalize the criteria by which 
councils are judged. (Kelly, 2003, p.474) 
Courville et al (2003, p. 180) also question the capacity of audit to provide accountability for 
organizational behaviour. The authors suggest that audit capacity is dependent on various 
factors such as, (i) the auditors; (ii) the auditors' expertise; (iii) the way these auditors are 
regulated or accredited; (iv) the auditors' relationship to the auditee, (v) the auditors' data 
collection methods for evidence, whether the auditors sample the data to be checked, the 
extent which the auditors use fieldwork, rely on expert opinions, rely on checks of internal 
controls and systems; (vi) the extent of auditors' consultation in collecting data for evidence 
and their reliance on the consultations; (vii) the genuine participation of any stakeholders; 
(viii) the way the auditors form an opinion on the data or evidence; (ix) the setter for the 
parameter of the opinion that the auditor is to form; (x) the extent of the audit findings being 
negotiated with auditee before being publication; (xi) the auditees response to the audit; (xii) 
the possibility to measure the impact of the audit process; (xiii) the intended and/or 
unintended ways in which the prospect of the reality of audit change the auditees' behaviour; 
(xiv) if there is evidence of creative compliance to maintain autonomy while appearing to 
comply; and (xv) if there is evidence of dysfunctional side-effects or conflicts between the 
consequences of audit and effectiveness or performance. 
Many issues have to be considered in measuring or evaluating the implementation and 
success of public sector audit. English (2003) questions whether the public accountability 
obligations of auditor-generals can be maintained under a regime in which an auditor-
general conducts no audit. She concluded that: 
the tension between economic incentives and community imperatives suggest that 
private sector auditors would be unlikely to deliver audit of the scope, depth, quality 
and impartiality required to discharge public accountability. (p. 70) 
In the previous discussion on public sector governance (2.4), regulation which is used as a 
mean to ensure accountability is understood as going on at huge scale. Regulation is done 
through inspection, therefore inspection is also increasing. As some forms of these 
regulation and inspection are performed by auditors, increases in regulation have created an 
audit explosion. Thus, the following sections review the increase in inspection and then the 
audit explosion. 
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2.5.2 Increasing Inspection 
Public service audit and inspection are not entirely new phenomena (Downe and Martin, 
2007). Their origin can be traced back at least as far as the early 18th century (Rhodes, 
1981) but the preoccupations of nineteenth-century inspection were very different to those of 
today. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Conservative Government started the use of 
performance indicators and VFM auditing in UK central and local government (Hood et ai, 
1999). The current government has greatly extended the scale, scope and intensity of 
external regulation (Downe and Martin, 2007). The rise of inspection is driven by several 
factors (Clarke et ai, 2000): 
(i) the crisis of public spending in the 1980s, which increased pressure to ensure that 
public services provided value for money; 
(ii) the continued erosion of trust in the capacity of professionals to safeguard the 
interests of service users and taxpayers; 
(iii) the need for new mechanisms to monitor and control the increasingly fragmented 
pattern of public service providers that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a 
result of the privatisation and marketisation of public services. 
Inspection has become important to reconcile the issues above as it offers a mode of control 
that enables government to exercise supervision and direction of services that were 
increasingly being provided in new devolved, decentralised and dispersed organisational 
forms (Clarke et al. , 2000). Inspection also fits neatly with New Labour'S commitment to 
evidence-based policy making because it provides a diagnostic tool with which ministers can 
weed out or intervene in failing services and safeguard the public. These contributed to 
extended audit functions to serve some of the inspection needs and the 'audit society' 
phenomena as claimed by Power (1994). The author describe audit society as referring to 
Britain's occupation with using the word 'audit' to refer to various kinds of inspection beyond 
the accounting-auditing profession, i.e. clinical audit, school-audit. 
Power (1994) argues that the existing audit and inspection ability to promote improvement 
seems to be failing. This is because additional inspection and external inspection always 
accompanied flexibility and empowerment of the service providers. Various other 
researchers have also considered the benefits of inspection. Davis et al (2001) wrote that 
inspection in theory may produce a range of benefits such as: 
(i) a catalyst for improvement; 
(ii) to enhance accountability; 
(iii) to identify failures and seek remedy; 
(iv) to prevent failure and take a lesson; 
(v) to protect vulnerable service users and taxpayers; 
(vi) to encourage self-evaluation; and 
(vii) network of learning within and between organisations. 
53 
REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMEN T 
However, aiming for the benefits just mentioned is not cheap and straightforward. The costs 
involved in having inspection are high, involving not just the direct costs of running the 
inspectorates, but also indirect costs which incurred at the inspected bodies such as: 
(i) compliance cost - staffing costs to demonstrate compliance with a regime; 
(ii) avoidance costs - investment in staffing and legal advice to seek to circumvent 
legislation as an alternative strategy; 
(iii) opportunity costs - diverting staff time to prepare and manage inspection 
processes resulted in sacrificing of other activities; 
(iv) displacement effects - focusing on monitored and measured activities/outcomes 
and less attention on other important issues not included in the indicators· , 
(v) hindrance to innovation - organisations adopt a risk avoidance behaviour for fear 
of failures and risks when trying to develop innovative approaches; 
(vi) damaging to staff morale - morale depression among staff because of being 
checked upon and the workload involved in preparing reports for inspection. 
(Davis et ai, 2001, pp. 14-15) 
The costs involved are difficult to quantify accurately (Geddes and Martin, 2000) and the full 
impact of inspection may not surface immediately (Power, 1994). Although the AC has 
reported opportunities for cost savings with the inspection regime through increased value 
for money, attempts to quantify the impact of inspection have not reached unanimous 
conclusion. Scanlon (1999) studies on school inspection found positive impacts but she 
noted the inverse relationship between staff morale and improvement in education 
standards. Supporting the finding, Kogan and Maden (1999) found evidence of major 
management changes combined with lower levels of staff satisfaction. 
Given the benefits and costs of inspection, many practitioners argue that there is a need to 
develop regimes that give less attention to process and greater emphasis to outcomes and a 
widespread support for a more 'risk-based' approach to inspection. Some have suggested 
an inspector-free regulation regime where the service provider would be encouraged to 
undertake self-evaluation (Dunford, 1998; Kogan and Maden, 1999). Ferguson et al (2000) 
argued that the disadvantages of a set-piece inspection could be made more effective 
through self-evaluation and self-inspection system. Hood et al (1999) in their four types of 
inspection introduced competition and mutuality as regimes which did not require external 
inspection. Both competition and mutuality played roles in the current assessment regime 
(McGarvey and Stoker, 1999). 
Davis et al (2001) suggest that it is important for an inspection regime to achieve a balance 
between: 
(i) local diversity and central prescription: allowing au~horities to. ad~pt approaches that 
meet local priorities whilst also ensuring that service users In different parts of the 
country do not experience wide disparities in standards; 
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(ii) , expenmentation and, 'zero-t,oleranc~ of failure': dealing with serious and persistent 
underperformance without discouraging appropriate risk taking', 
(iii) I I ,oca capacity, building an,d central p~escriptio~: encouraging self-sustaining 
Improvement whilst also making sure that, In those Instances where it is clear 'what 
works', all authorities are encouraged to adopt 'good practice'; 
(iv) achiev!~g 'early wins' ~nd sustainable improvement: providing incentives for 
authontles to deal as rapidly as possible with underperforming services whilst also 
creating the con?itio~s (including necessary resources and stability) to enable them to 
reconfig~re servlc~s In ways that lead to sustainable, long-term improvements; 
(v) cost savings and, Improveme,nts in the quality of services: keeping up the pressure to 
ens~re that services are dellv~red as, cost effecti~ely as possible whilst also making 
available the funds needed to Invest In long-term Improvements in infrastructure and 
training, (pp,19-20) 
To conclude, there are benefits and weaknesses of the current inspection regime which 
require further investigation and modification so the objectives of having inspection to 
improve services and accountability can be achieved without a damaging effect to inspected 
organisation, especially in terms of staff morale and costs, 
2.5.3 Audit Explosion 
Increased regulation for accountability contributes to increased inspection to provide 
assurance that the framework is reliable, Reliance on audit to provide assurance and checks 
on the regulatory framework for accountability has contributed to an expanding role for 
audits, Power (1994, p, 5) wrote that 'audit has become central to the ways of talking about 
administrative control' where audit is extended into different settings to work as a technical 
response to problems of governance and accountability, The author also asserts that audit 
emerged at the boundary between the older traditional control structures of industrial society 
and the demands of a society which is increasingly conscious of its production risks, and 
further claimed: 
'Audit is a way of reconciling contradictory forces: on one hand, the need to extend a 
traditional hierarchical command conception of control in order to maintain existing 
structures of authority, on the other hand, the need to cope with the failure of this style 
of control, as it generates risks that are increasingly hard to specify and control.' (p, 5) 
The author in his various articles on the issue termed this phenomenon as 'audit explosion'; 
and claimed that Britain has become an 'audit society', Prior to NPM, external and internal 
audit had low status and impact in administrative and management hierarchies (Power, 
2003), The traditional constitutional analysis by lawyers had neglected the critical role of 
public sector auditing in mediating managerial and democratic accountability (White and 
Hollingsworth, 1999), Power (2003) wrote that the traditional audit has maintained several 
characteristics: 
• the professional and intellectual invisibility of aU,diting, ~ela~ive t~ ot~e~ com,ponents of 
management and public administration, enabled It to malntal~ a~ Instltu~lonal Image as a 
neutral, technically necessary but minor practice correspon~lng In function !o the equally 
humble practice of bookkeeping and relate? ,low-level ,financial control ~ractlces; , 
• at the operational level, the scope of traditional audl,t tended ,to be highly ~onstralned, 
being concerned primarily with the legal and managen~~ authOrity of ~ransactlOns; 
• the point of view of this traditionalist account, auditing and auditors are not to, be 
regarded as natural organizational change age~t~ and ~r,e not re,l~vant to Wider 
discussion of organizational performance, By definition, traditional auditing cannot and 
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does not disturb the climate of "mutuality" and bureaucratic oversight and the auditor of 
the 1960s and 1970s is not yet enlisted in the reform process. (p.187) 
The NPM mantras of three Es and value for money have forced the legacy of concept and 
practices in auditing to adapt and change (Power, 2003). Power in his various articles argues 
the usage of the word 'audit' to refer to many extended activities without offering any 
preferred definition. This is to reflect the slippage in the approach to define audit by 
preference and causing the word 'audit' to be 'smuggled in' as an analytical concept to label 
the practices of inspection and evaluation (Power, 2003, p. 187). The new 'audit' was 
performed not on the primary activities, but rather on the systems of control. Power 
described this notion of auditing on the systems of control as 'policing the policing' and called 
that the 'audit explosion' because the policing activities have gone beyond financial 
statements. This gives rise to an expectation gap because audits are not directly concerned 
with the quality of performance but rather with the system in place to govern quality. Thus 
the policing (auditing) will be never-ending activities if the policing (organisational control 
system) is not sound. 
The impact of an audit of this kind had, is that, it actively constructs the contexts in which it 
operates, shaping the standards of the auditee's performance in crucial ways as well as 
public conceptions of the problem for which audit is the solution. Thus, the AC's style of audit 
has the power to shape auditees' behaviour and performance in certain ways through their 
prescription in the key lines of enquiries (KLoE) indicators. This situation will limit auditees' 
motivation to find better ways of improving and to stick with what the AC's requires them to 
do because that will be reflected in their scored performance. At the local government level, 
the formation of the AC marked the explosion of inspection activities from its basic original 
task of organising the certification of annual accounts. The inspection activities are also 
called 'regulation' (because the AC acts as regulator to regulate local authorities) and 'audit' 
(because the activities are being performed by auditors). 
Power (1994) doubts that audit deliver what they promise in the form of greater 
accountability, efficiency and quality or whether they fuel the problems which they address 
by, for example encouraging distrust. Power (1994, pp. 4-8) forwards eight discrete 
arguments in his exploration of the newly emerged auditing function: 
i. the word audit has been used in a variety of contexts and meanings depending 
on fields where it is referred to; 
ii. there has been an explosion of audit in many different fields, audit has been 
assumed to be an all-purpose solution to problems of administrative control; 
iii. audit has been used as a way of reconciling contradictory forces, audit has 
emerged at the boundary between the older traditional control structures of 
industrial society and the demands of a society which is increasingly conscious 
of its production of risks, in fields ranging from the environment, to medicine and 
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finance. (the spread of audit corresponds to a fundamental shift in pattern of 
governance in advanced industrial societies); 
iv. the pervasive feature of audits is that they work not on primary activities but on 
other systems of control, audit is often not directly concerned with the quality of 
performance but rather with the systems in place to govern quality; 
v. audits are not simply answers to the problems of accountability although it is 
linked to the ideals of organisational transparency and accountability, the audit 
explosion could signify the displacement of trust from one part of the economic 
system to another; from operative to auditors; 
vi. audits are usually publicly visible when they fail, same character of all kinds of 
policing which have problematic criteria of success, but failure generally leads to 
a call for more policing; 
vii. audits are not passive practices but strongly influence the environment in which 
they operate, 'auditing is a peculiar form of alchemy which, in making auditees 
auditable, produces regulatory comfort'; 
viii. there are other ways of achieving accountability but the audit explosion has 
made it difficult to think of alternatives to itself. 
So, what causes audit to explode from its main function and where is it evident? The rise of 
the NPM, increasing demands for accountability and transparency, and the rise of quality 
assurance models of organizational control were identified as three reasons for the audit 
explosion (Power, 2000). The explosion effect can be seen in both institutional and 
behavioral contexts (Power, 2003): 
(i) Institutional: transformation of existing, and the emergence of new, formal 
institutions for monitoring: 
. .. the audit explosion represents the rise of "control of control" (Power 
1999:66) in which the first-order of quality are subordinate to a logic of management 
system integrity, and in which audit serves a virtualist form of "meta-regulation" 
(Parker 2002: chap. 9) (p.189) 
(ii) Behavioural: the growth of auditing has had profound impacts on behaviour 
beyond those intended by NPM reform processes, the rise of 'auditee' and 'audit 
mentalities', a system that seeks to represent performance in such a way as to 
make it readily auditable, leads to decline of organizational trust. 
In local government, institutional context prevalent in the formation of the AC to takeover 
several inspectorates' function and coordinate the remaining inspectorates. In terms of 
behavioural context, the AC presents a list of detailed indicators to measure performance in 
which forces auditees to comply. Thus monitoring and assessing with specific indicators 
would have impact on the behaviour of the auditees. Furthermore, the attempt to make 
everything auditable and quantifiable is complex and might work in contrast to what is 
intended by NPM. 
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Some academics have noted that the idea of NPM in government bureaucracies was derived 
from those of private sectors and that VFM auditing is not yet tested on the private sector 
(Gruening, 2001; Ferlie et ai, 1996; Boston et ai, 1996; Dunleavy et ai, 2007). The VFM 
audit, however, has been applied for government bodies which include local authorities. 
Applying the techniques that have never been testified by the private sector has contributed 
to arguments on the reliability and effectiveness of the techniques. In local government VFM 
is assessed using criteria developed by the AC and judged by the auditors. Private sectors 
or other government agencies such as universities and health sectors would likely have 
professionals other than auditors assessing their VFM unlike local government. Thus the 
limit of professional judgement would prevail when auditors alone certify VFM. This give rise 
to the question of the capacity of auditors in measuring those activities - whether they (the 
auditors) really understand the nature of the specific activities being measured and ranked? 
Power (1994) argues that audit actively constructs the contexts in which it operates. Audit 
not only shapes the activities under its control but also represent a very specific concept of 
accountability. Hence, the behavioural impact of audit occurs when it not only passively 
monitors auditee performance but shapes the standards of that performance in critical ways. 
The author also argues that audit now has an institutional foothold in the public imagination 
which has made it difficult for alternative accountability and control procedures to gain 
audience. He uses a diagram, presented in Figure 9, to illustrate different models of 
accountability and control. 
STYLE A 
Quantitative 
Single Measure 
External Agencies 
Long Distance Methods 
Low Trusts 
Discipline 
Ex Post Control 
Private Experts 
STYLE B 
Qualitative 
Multiple Measures 
Internal Agencies 
Local Methods 
High Trusts 
Autonomy 
Real Time Control 
Public Dialogue 
Figure 9: Different Models of Controls and Accountability (Power, 1994, p. 7) 
The audit explosion prioritised style A above as a solution to any problem (VFM could be 
regarded as incorporating both) (Power, 1994). Using the quantified, simplified, ex-post 
forms of control by outsiders have progressively displaced other types of control (the 
alternative style B). Power argues that the shift to style A has brought 'complex bundles of 
gains and losses' (Power, 1994, p. 8) and that the new accountability mechanisms 
introduced by the AC has displaced trust (will be discussed in Section 2.7). He suggests that 
the gains will be most visible if used with the alternative style B: qualitative and multiple 
measures, internal agencies, local methods, high trusts, autonomy, real-time control, and 
public dialogue (Power, 1994). 
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Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) supporting Power's (1997) arguments, suggest that the 
pervasive presence of audit on society can lead to: (i) legitimation and decoupling strategies; 
(ii) colonization and cultural change, and (iii) displacement of core organizational activities. 
The authors (2008, p. 27) explain legitimation as audits having the potential in producing 
'comfort or organizational legitimacy' because audits always work as a rationalized ritual. In 
terms of colonization and cultural change the authors suggest that audit may be mobilized to 
counter and challenge the organizational discretion and power of professional groups which 
have held significant autonomy. Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008, p. 27) also suggest that Power 
(1997) views VFM auditing as 'explicitly a vehicle for organizational change'. The process of 
compliance to auditor's demand is argued as not neutral and that the act of compliance may 
result in dissemination and implanting of the values underlying the audit approach and 
thereby achieve colonization (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008; Power, 1997). Performance 
auditing may have dysfunctional impacts or 'reverse effects' where unintended 
consequences of audit activity may occur; and that audit processes may fail because side 
effects may undermine performance, including the displacement of organizational core 
activities to fulfil the audit agenda (Power, 1997 in Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008). 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) study the impact of Best Value (BV) on the perception of 
management in local authorities and found limited legitimating behaviour, some colonization 
and a picture of resistance. They found evidence of behaviour which is seen as legitimating 
the actions of management, senior managers who said that they would address BV in a tick-
a-box manner rather than acting upon its guidance. In terms of colonization which can be 
depicted as 'culture change', they found evidence of limited buy-in to the language and 
practices of BV and limited culture change, and admit that this may be due to time-factors. 
Their study confirms the elusive nature of cultural change. 
Bowerman et al (2000) and Pallot (2003) are rather critical of Power's argument. Bowerman 
et al (2000) observed that the situation of public sector audit was more complex and 
multidimensional than what Power has implied, thus the authors criticized Power's inclusion 
of 'audit' beyond its traditional concepts. They argue that bracketing 'inspection' with 'audit' 
does not address fundamental differences in these activities. However, although audit and 
inspection may have different focus, they complement each other in terms of the reporting 
system and evaluation process (public Audit Forum, 2002). Pallot (2003) disagrees with 
Power's interpretation that activities of the UK's supreme audit institution as being UK-
centric, comparing a differing situation in New Zealand. 
The following section will review audit quality and effectiveness. 
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2.5.3 Audit Quality and Effectiveness 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the probability an auditor will both discover and 
report a breach in the client's accounting system. There have not been many stUdies done 
on audit quality in the public sector, but similar to the private sector, audit quality deficiencies 
in the public sector threaten public confidence in the profession (Deis and Giroux, 1992). 
Audit quality is also influenced by specific industry knowledge and uniformly stated 
standards (Krishnan and Schauer, 2000). Specialization, which is a proxy for audit expertise, 
is developed through training and practical experience gained from auditing in a specific 
industry (Gramling and Stone, 2001). Thus, the expertise gained through auditing experience 
increases the likelihood that auditors will detect errors in financial statements (Hammersley, 
2006; Ashton, 1991; Libby and Frederick, 1990). Several researchers have indicated that 
auditors with training in specialized areas outperform those without training or experience 
(Kwon, 1996; Libby, 1995). Lowensohn et. al. (2007) found positive association between the 
degrees to which audit firms specialize in government auditing and audit quality as perceived 
by the finance officers of Florida local governments. 
The effectiveness of many public services is difficult to determine because objectives are 
often imprecise and ambiguous, and even if they are not, their achievement is frequently 
impossible to measure (Pendlebury and Shreim, 1990). Therefore, the evaluation of 
effectiveness is an inherently subjective process and the appropriateness of involving 
auditors has always been a matter for concern. A House of Commons report in 1946, more 
than 60 years ago, contained the following comment: 
When you are getting down to the question of whether you are getting value for money, it 
is not a question of expert advice ... it is a question of a common sense attitude to a public 
problem which can only be achieved by the combined abilities of a group of men with 
different aspects, coming from different walks of life, with different ideas; and that 
examination is not going to be materially helped by a body of experts auditors or 
accountants. (Pendlebury and Shreim, 1990, p. 177) 
The appropriateness of auditors to do the inspection at local authorities has been debated by 
many researchers since the early 1980s. The debate has focused on issues related to 
whether the 'audit' of effectiveness was achievable, whether the existing external auditors 
were the appropriate individuals to carry out the 'audit', whether the 'audit' should be 
undertaken by a team made up of auditors plus experts drawn from and trained in other 
disciplines, and whether the audit of effectiveness involves the auditor too closely with 
matters of policy (Pedlebury and Shreim, 1990). The Price Waterhouse handbook (1983, p. 
59-60) on value for money auditing also contain doubts over the ability to perform such audit. 
The handbook mentions that to develop a guide towards evaluating effectiveness is more 
difficult but certain rules can be identified. The form of approach required can be identified 
through a few basic questions: (1) Is there a clear identification and ranking of goals?; (2) 
Can progress towards goals be objectively assessed? (3) Is the 'target' service level (i.e. 
how activities contribute to goals) clearly known? 
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Effectiveness can be reviewed in a reasonable scientific way if the answer to all the 
three questions above is 'yes'. If the answer to question (3) is 'no', evaluation can only 
be done on a highly subjective basis. If the answer to question (1) is 'no' and goals 
cannot be objectively determined or agreed then the interpretation of effectiveness of 
policies can only be a political process. In both cases, but particularly the latter, 
effectiveness audit would therefore found to be extremely difficult to carry out at all 
(Price Waterhouse Handbook, 1983, p. 59-60). 
Some researchers regarded inspection and audit as distinct activities: the AC's principles of 
inspection are concerned primarily with the nature of service outcomes and conformity to 
professional standards while audit is focused upon issues of financial regularity, value for 
money and the appropriateness of the audited body's management arrangements (Day and 
Klein, 1990; Rhodes, 1981). Humphrey et al (1999) wrote that the boundary has become 
blurred as inspection has been progressively 'colonised' by audit practices and the 
associated performance and managerialist paradigms resulting in a hegemonic of 'audit-and-
inspection regime'. Grimwood and Tomkins (1986), conducting two case studies on local 
authority audits carried out by an auditing firm, found that effectiveness auditing was not 
being achieved, and they concluded a strong prima facie that, if these audits were typical, 
little real effectiveness auditing is conducted by the auditors. Pendlebury and Shreim (1990), 
however, found that 'auditors feel that effectiveness auditing is achievable and that it is 
appropriate for them to be involved' although the auditors do acknowledge the need for 
support from specialists with skills other than auditing. 
Davies et al (2001) suggest that inspectors need to demonstrate an understanding of the 
service(s) that they are inspecting and an appreciation of what is likely to work in individual 
authorities. They further wrote that this should include not only technical know-how but 
sensitivity to local political contexts. There have been some arguments over the 
inconsistencies between different inspectorates and these raise important questions about 
what inspectors see as their role and whether there is a common understanding among 
inspectorates (Davies et ai, 2001). Thus, the establishment of auditors' (or inspectors') 
credentials is very important and necessary so that the quality of their audit is convincing to 
the auditees as well as to the public at large. 
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2.6 Performance Measurement 
Transparency 
2.6.1 Performance Measurement and the Public Sector 
A system of measuring performance may be compared with the Rubik's Cube (Halachmie 
and Bouckaert, 1996). The system which comprises of many components with distinctive 
shape must be matched properly to provide the correct picture. It is not a simple task to 
match the individual components because all are linked , although the linkages are not 
readily apparent. An understanding of the options and limitations of the underlying 
mechanism and the dynamics of performance measurement is necessary. Without the 
understanding , the performance measurement system - similar to the Rubik's Cube - can 
get out of shape, get stuck, break down, and frustrate everybody involved with it. Like the 
difficulty experienced by some individuals in solving the Rubik's Cube, some organizations 
will never be able to develop a proper performance measurement system. In some cases , 
frustrated managers will abandon efforts to measure performance and will thus deprive 
themselves and their organization of the opportunity to improve. 
A measurement system consists of practices, procedures, criteria , and standards that govern 
data collection , the analysis of data and the compilation of results into quantitative or 
qualitative forms (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996). The system of measurement can be 
simple or complex , temporary or permanent. Depending on the desired performance 
information , agencies may have to use more than one kind of measurement. A properly 
designed performance measurement system may allow assessment of an agency's various 
attributes such as size or source of funding , employees' activities , relationsh ip among 
different activities , and the resulting goods and services and how they are perceived by 
various stakeholders. A well-designed performance system may allow an agency to arrive at 
an index that represents the combination of several measurement efforts . 
There are two postures apparent in government measurement systems (Halachm ie 1982, 
1992; Wholey, 1983): (i) results , outcome oriented management; or (ii ) process-oriented 
management. The two postures might be conflicting (Wh oley, 1983, p. 5), which expla ins 
why many performance evaluation efforts tend to focus either on the results or on the 
process for attaining the results (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996). Results-oriented systems 
will target the desired results and speCi fications of process are derived from the attri butes of 
the desired results . This approach is consistent with total quality management core teaching 
which treat the outcome as essential. Process-oriented system s involve efforts to re-
eng ineer the business processes of organizations (Hammer and Champy, 1993). Selection 
of em phasis on results or process for performance measurement should be based on the 
62 
REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMEN T 
objective of the assessment (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996). The reasons for assessing 
performance determine the necessary perspective of the evaluation, whether to look at 
process or impact (Halachmie, 1992). A different perspective of assessment may generate 
valid evaluation but will not be useful. In example, examining the changes in teachers' 
proficiency in specific subject areas may not help determine the proficiency of students in a 
particular grade (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 5). Students' achievement may be poor 
because of various other reasons such as learning or behavioural problems and little support 
from parents. 
End users and uses of the performance measures may be primary and secondary, internal 
or external depending upon the specific data used for assessing performance, its level of 
aggregation, the organizational level at which the data are collected, and where the 
performance report is compiled (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996). The end users (primary 
and secondary) may be agency managers, elected or appointed officials, legislators, 
auditors, public interest watch groups, unions, private interest groups, individuals, the courts, 
and representatives of other governments, countries, or international organizations. 
Publication of performance data that are collected and measured for several primary users 
may cause the data to be misrepresented, intentionally or inadvertently (Halachmie and 
Bouckaert, 1996; Leo, 1990). In example, a journalist may reach unreasonable conclusions 
and then communicate those conclusions to policy makers and the public as facts 
(Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996, pp.5-6). 
It is necessary to identify who would use the data and why it is required to avoid problems 
with the use of wrong aggregation in reporting on achievements (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 
1996). Those who generate data about the performance of organizations should not be too 
concerned about secondary users and secondary uses of the data. Confusion about the 
purpose of the measurement would lead to reporting data that are more favourable to the 
needs of the secondary users than the primary users. The most common example is the 
tendency to devise measures that facilitate dealing with external auditors (such as summary 
evaluations) instead of developing measures that are more suitable for improving 
performance or developing the program under consideration (such as formative evaluation) 
(Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996, p. 6). 
Performance measurement can be used for various purposes; oversight by the legislature or 
by various staff functions of the executive branch, budget decision tools, fine-tuning an 
agency by the senior managers through corrective measures, providing feedback to 
employees, information for future plans, and communication tools for clients. Due to many 
and possibly conflicting purposes a performance measurement system could serve, 
designing a system that meets the needs of all possible users is likely to be impossible 
(Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996; Halachmie, 1993). Halachmie (1993) notes that the 
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temptation to use the performance appraisal data for other uses may backfire, reducing the 
appraisal's usefulness and increasing its costs. 
Good performance measurements are geared to meet the specific needs of specific users 
(Halachmie and Bouckaert, 1996). Several elements must be agreed to by the deSigners 
prior to designing the performance measurement instruments (Halachmie and Bouckaert, 
1996, p.?): 
i. the organizational level at which performance is measured; 
ii. the frequency of expected reports, the intervals between data collection efforts and , , 
if necessary to use sampling procedures; 
iii. the data to be collected and the data that constitutes the core of the report; 
iv. the intended users and intended uses; and 
v. who is responsible for collecting the data, compiling the performance report, and 
disseminating the information to the intended users 
These demonstrate that objectives, measurement items, targeted levels in an organization, 
who would be responsible, what kind of information is expected and who would need the 
information must be clear and agreed upon for an effective performance measurement 
system. Management or performance measurement techniques may also cause problems to 
productivity if applied or implemented incorrectly (Gabris, 1986).The author outline several 
traps in introducing or implementing a performance measurement system or making 
changes in it as time goes by: 
i. Process Burden: the implementation and maintenance of procedural and control 
requirements for the measurement system that distracts employees from their actual 
responsibilities (Gabris, 1986, p. 6); 
ii. Georgia Giant Syndrome: management techniques that work only under 
comprehensive supervision and control conditions. The expected and potential of 
the technique will not be achieved if control conditions are not met (Gabris, 1986, p. 
8); 
iii. Internal Incapacity: the result of superimposing a technique on an organisation that 
lacks the in-house capacity to implement and monitor the technique beyond it initial 
phases (Gabris, 1986, p.10); and 
iv. Credibility Anxiety: many management techniques piled on top of one another, 
although they do not work well. New techniques are expected to produce dramatic 
and quick results; when results do not materialize after a short time, top-level 
appointed and elected officials deem the techniques' application a failure and 
responded to it by trying a different set of techniques (Gabris, 1986, p. 13). 
The traps mention above would affect employees and organization in terms of productivity, 
motivation and morale. Thus, it is relevant to note that leadership also plays a big role in the 
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modernisation and improvement drive in local government; leadership is significant for 
organisation in adopting any reforms, and leaders have to support their subordinates in 
embracing the reforms. Kristensen and Laegreid (2008) found that civil servants are 
reluctant to adopt administrative reforms; only those who are in leadership positions and 
those who perform the functions which the reforms are embedded in their efficiency and 
management culture suggested that the reforms are significant. Fitzgerald and Moon's 
(1996) best practice guidelines state that performance should be driven from the top level 
management. Most leaders in any organizations, regardless of its size or structure, strive to 
maximize their subordinates' performance. Without a doubt, leadership is defined as 
mobilizing the workforce towards attaining organizational goals (Yuki, 1998) and leaders 
have always placed considerable attention on motivating their workforce. Thus, leadership 
style is also vital in achieving organizational goals as leaders can influence, motivate and 
evoke subordinates' performance (Barling et ai, 1996; Berson et ai, 2001; and Zacharatos et 
ai, 2000). 
Leaders are normally expected to provide supervisory feedback to subordinates: positive 
feedback for commendable performance and negative feedback for unacceptable 
performance. This reward and punishment system is viewed as a transactional leadership 
style (MacKenzie et ai, 2001). Several researchers have promoted a transformational 
leadership style over other traditional forms of leadership (Le. transactional) as best suited to 
achieve organizational goals (Awamleh, 1999; Conger, 1999; Dubinsky et ai, 1995). 
Transactional and transformational leadership are common in providing clarity of desired 
outcomes, recognizing accomplishments, and rewarding high performance but differ in 
process and behaviour (MacKenzie et ai, 2001). The transformational leadership style 
requires adaptation of values, goals, and aspirations to be consistent with subordinates, 
implements change through communicating vision, clarifying performance expectations, 
promoting acceptance of group goals, providing individualized support and intellectual 
stimulation. Consistent with Bass's (1997) description of transformational leadership as 
guidance through individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation, inspirational 
motivation and idealized influence. Individualized consideration emphasizes personal , 
attention, while intellectual stimulation encourages the use of reasoning, rationality, and 
evidence. Transformational leadership is claimed to have direct influence on organizational 
performance and indirectly through its effect on subordinates' emotions towards their leaders 
as well as subordinates' commitment (Barling et ai, 1996; Howell and Avolio, 1993; Hater 
and Bass, 1988). Mentoring programmes are also found to be effective in fostering 
subordinates' performance (Sosik and Godshalk, 2000). 
Emotions, ranging from positive (optimism and joy) to negative (frustration and anger), 
appear to playa significant role in relation to one's enthusiasm at work (Goleman, 1995). 
Leaders who understand subordinates' emotions appear to motivate them more effectively 
and efficiently (Grossman, 2000). Clarity of vision and establishment of objectives are 
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claimed to have the ability to promote enthusiasm and optimism (Dubinsky et ai, 1995). 
Losing enthusiasm for work may cause employees to reduce their effort and negatively affect 
performance (Bandura, 1977). Thus, Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) claimed that 
transformational leaders use emotions to control their subordinates: eliciting optimisms 
through positive vision and new ideas. Optimism has a direct relationship with the amount of 
effort and performance, and has been used to distinguish high and low performers in 
organisations (Seligman et ai, 1990; Schulman, 1999). 
Frustration develops if employees have little or no control over a desired objective and it is 
unlikely that they will put in enough effort to achieve the objectives (Campbell and Martinko, 
1998; Seligman, 1975). This normally happens when they attempted to achieve the 
objectives in the past but failed or are pessimistic towards the objectives, which they 
perceive extra work as wasted effort. Abramson et al (1978) claimed that feelings of 
helplessness and depression affect perception and performance. Hence, having good 
leaders is important in avoiding frustration among subordinates. 
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Figure 10: Frustration & Optimism Fully Mediating Leadership Style and Performance 
(Source: McColl-Kennedy and Anderson, 2002, p. 553) 
Figure 10 shows the relationship between leadership style and performance. McColI-
Kennedy and Anderson (2002) argued that emotions - frustration and optimism - fully 
mediate the relationship between leadership style and performance. Their study confirmed 
the positive influence on performance when employees perceived they are being led by a 
transformational leadership style and on the other hand perceived low level of 
transformational leadership resulted in a high level of frustration which then negatively 
influenced performance. However, they also found that the negative influence of frustration 
over performance is more significant than the positive influence of optimism. They concluded 
with a suggestion that organisations should seek to adopt transformational leadership style 
and to be more attentive to signs of frustration among subordinates. As Seligman and 
Schulman (1986) found, pessimistic sales person were twice as likely as their optimistic 
colleagues to quit by the end of the first year. 
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Hence, in the context of this study, there is some evidence that the activities of inspection 
can influence satisfaction and morale among inspected/audited bodies. Scanlon's (1999) 
studies on inspection at schools noted that 'some aspects of school life seem to have 
deteriorated substantially since inspection', especially staff morale in which she concluded 
that improvement in education standards and staff morale have an inverse relationship. 
Kogan and Maden (1999) also reported decreasing staff satisfaction where some schools 
changed their management structure, teaching styles, had experienced more staff 
retirements, and more staff absence linked to stress. Davis et al (2001) said that constant 
checking and workload could have enough damaging impact on staff morale regardless of 
the results of the inspection; moreover being judged as a failing service which makes it even 
more difficult to attract high calibre new staff to turn-around the failing organisation. Thus, it 
is necessary to consider perceptions, morale and leadership when dealing with the ever-
increasing inspection induced by NPM reforms. 
Performance measurement in UK public sector serves four different managerial roles of 
giving strategic direction, resources allocation, exercising control, and encouraging learning 
(Bovaird and Gregory, 1996). Different managerial roles of performance measurement may 
be applied in different government organizations. Each of these managerial roles for 
performance measurement may arise not from internal choices of the organisation, but from 
imposition by external agencies (Bovaird and Gregory, 1996). The authors (p. 240) note that 
most of the performance management systems of the 1980s in the UK have the following 
common elements: 
i. decentralisation of budget holding, often until the establishment of 'performance 
centres' or sometimes in the form of 'strategic business units'; 
ii. 'value for money' auditing, based on notions of economy, efficiency and 
effective ness; 
iii. systems of performance indicators, Pis, for monitoring and evaluation purposes; 
iv. evaluations and reviews of past performance of projects, programs, and policies, 
sometimes as an integral part of planning and management; 
v. sanction and reward systems based on formal assessment of performance, often 
tied to short-term management contracts and/or performance-related pay; and 
vi. use of market as a benchmark for comparison of performance (or as an ultimate 
threat in the case of perceived persistent low performers). 
The Fulton Report on the Civil Service in 1968 embedded the belief that management by 
objectives (MbO) and performance measurement must be components of accountability: 
Accountable management means holding individuals an.d units responsible for 
performance measured as objectively as .pos~ib~e. Its achievement depends upon 
identifying or establishing accountable units within gove~nment departm~nt~ -:-umts 
where output can be measured as objectively as pOSSible and where Individuals 
can be held personally responsible for their performance 
(Fulton 1968; p. 51, quoted in Bovaird and Gregory, 1996, p. 244) 
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Performance reporting has received extensive worldwide publicity as a means to achieve 
enhanced government accountability to the public (Cunningham and Harris, 2005). 
Performance reporting is also claimed as able to promote greater efficiency and 
effectiveness despite lacking in comprehensive theory to justify these claims (Cunningham 
and Harris, 2005). The implementation of performance measurement systems in the UK 
reveals government insensitivity to the different meanings of performance measurement, the 
different roles it can play and the varied ways in which reported performance is likely to be 
interpreted by different stakeholders in the policy-making process (Bovaird and Gregory, 
1996). This has occurred despite it being central theme in the UK under the Financial 
Management Initiative (FMI) and its subsequent extension (Bovaird and Gregory, 1996). 
Tomkins (1987) wrote that measuring outcomes links closely to the concept of effectiveness 
- the extent to which a public sector programme objective has been met. Thus, assessing 
effectiveness is impossible without satisfactorily measuring the outcome (Smith, 1996). 
However, measuring effectiveness is not easy and the AC (1991) stated that the public 
sector is more concentrated on inputs and outputs and the AC was not very successful in 
shifting that emphasis. 
Sanderson (2001) found that performance measurement systems have important limitations 
as drivers of change and improvement, especially when they are externally imposed. The 
author wrote that external pressures played a key role in promoting greater focus on 
performance in local government but rather than emphasizing on applying it as tools for 
change, it has been used as a tool to enhance accountability which is also evident in this 
study. Schick (1999) suggests several features for performance targets to achieve the 
objectives of change driver, among others: 
(i) the performance targets should be few in number so they can send strong signals of 
expectation and provide clear basis for assessing progress; 
(ii) the performance target should also challenge a local authority to make changes and 
should be jointly selected by each local authority and the authority responsible for 
overall government performance (the central government); 
(iii) the performance targets are monitored, audited, and it is ascertained whether 
targets have been met; 
(iv) the performance measurement is part of a larger managerial framework that 
encourages local authorities to improve performance. 
Sanderson (2001) highlights several key requirements for a performance measurement 
system to achieve its intended objective: 
(i) the organisation assessed needs to develop the capacity to achieve change and 
improvement based upon evidence of performance produced by the assessment 
system; 
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(ii) the nature of change must be consistent with the key goals and objectives 
expressing the desired outcomes. There will be distortion in focus and action if the 
key measures and targets in performance measurement systems do not capture the 
essence of primary values and objectives (Sanderson, 2001 t 1998; Smith, 1995); 
(iii) The perspectives of all major stakeholders should be captured in the performance 
indicators and domination of managerial interests, and top-down approaches should 
be avoided (Sanderson, 2001). The author wrote that these will help to ensure 
appropriate definitions of objectives and performance targets as well as spreading 
ownership and develop capacities for evaluative enquiry amongst key stakeholders. 
(iv) it is necessary for the organisation assessed to realise that they need to change 
their organisational culture to enable the capacity for evaluative enquiry to be 
embedded in their routines and ways of thinking and working (Sanderson, 2001, p. 
310). The author suggests several key attributes of a culture of evaluation and 
learning for a successful implementation of performance measurement system at 
local authorities: (a) a capacity for critical reflection, questioning and challenging 
existing practices, beliefs and values - overcoming the blame culture which 
promotes manipulative behaviour and achieving a high-trust culture which rewards 
honesty and risk taking; (b) a capacity for effective dialogue, collaboration and 
communication - breaking down both vertical and horizontal barriers to 
communication and extending beyond the authority to include external stakeholders; 
(c) a capacity for research and analysis to provide sound evidence upon which to 
base decisions, including recognition of the value of qualitative approaches which 
can help to foster dialogue with stakeholders and help to include and empower 
subordinate interests; and (d) a capacity for action planning and effective 
implementation to ensure that the required changes are achieved in practice. 
2.6.2 Management by Numbers 
New public management reforms rely heavily on quantitative performance indicators to 
describe outputs, outcomes, inputs and throughputs in managing public services. Hood 
(2007) suggests there are at least three major forms of managing by numbers: (i) target 
system, measuring actual performance against aspirational standards expressed as 
threshold numbers; (ii) ranking system, measuring performance of comparable service units 
against one another; and (iii) 'intelligence' systems, measure performance for background 
information. 
Using number management as 'intelligence' system has long been applied in the form of 
statistics produced to aid policy makers. Target systems are also common; New Zealand 
developed quantified targets for public service outputs in the late 1980s and many countries 
follow. Government's statistical intelligence has also been long used as basis for 
comparative league tables by firms and public-interest bodies. Van de Walle (2006) noted 
69 
REVIEW I: PUBLIC SECTOR EXTERNAL AUDIT, GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMEN T 
that the development of official international rankings of public service performance have 
been significant over the past two decades. It is difficult to say that managing by numbers is 
a new method as it has been applied for many decades. Hood (2007) argues that we are in 
'history denial' by viewing management by numbers as a 'modern' way of managing public 
services. 
Comprehensive mission statements, outcome-related goals and a description of how to 
achieve the goals are fundamental to achieve accountability for performance (Kluver, 2003). 
However, substantial problems arise in obtaining accurate and reliable data for 
measurement over longer time periods and with regard to the costs associated with doing 
so. The available data would encourage comparisons and thus lead to manipulation of 
performance data degenerating into a 'numbers' game' and obsession with counting 
numbers for questionable purposes. Pollitt (2006) found the UK stood out from three other 
countries in the degree of focus on performance indicators. Hood (2007) wrote that the pre-
occupation with the use of target and ranking systems, the domination of the executive in 
using performance measures rather than the legislature (compared to other countries like 
Japan, France and the USA) and the distinctive way government-mandated rankings of 
public service provision have developed within the state in England specifically. Hood (2007) 
also questions whether the development of 'management by numbers in England is 'best 
practice' and 'English cure' for every country's public service problems or an 'English 
disease' that others should avoid. 
Management by numbers might work but has some limitations. Flynn (1986) argues that 
there are so many problems with comparative data that they may not even be helpful in 
identifying broad problem areas. Hood (2007) suggests that management by numbers is not 
always straightforward, if there are aspirational standards expressed as numbers but without 
focus or priority in direction, too many numbers will confuse usage and categorisation as well 
as smudging the boundary between target and intelligence. Hood (2007) identifies three 
important things that are invisible about performance measures being used as targets, 
rankings or intelligence: 
(i) the validity and reliability of complex composite performance measurement 
systems: unavoidable measurement error arises from various sources including 
simple mistakes, sampling errors, categorization errors, gaming and cheating; 
(ii) coherent theories about what social conditions match up with what kinds of 
performance indicators in public service management: when to use what and their 
limitations (Table 5); and 
(iii) the unintended effects of league-table or intelligence systems or the broader 
effects of target systems: these could involve more than passing embarrassment 
to include serious casualties among top management, long term effects, high 
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stakes targets and rankings lead to further losses of public trust in government 
statistics. (pp. 100-102) 
Table 5: Three applications of performance measurement 
Application ... . 
of measures BasIc Principle Simple example Some variants 
Targets 
Rankings 
Intelligence 
Stipulated floor 
standard of 
performance or 
change in 
performance to be 
achieved within 
some time period 
Data allowing 
comparison of 
performance on 
stipulated indicators 
among a set of rival 
units 
Background 
information 
(Source: Hood, 2007) 
Percentage 
efficiency savings 
or staff reductions 
required over a 
budgetary period 
Sporting leagues 
Activity logs, for 
example of health 
care episodes 
Specific targets 
(applying to 
individuals or 
particular 
organizations) 
versus global or 
sector-wide targets 
Simple 
comparisons 
versus composite 
leagues (with 
numbers distilled 
from other 
numbers) 
Anonymized data 
(for example for 
near-miss 
reporting) versus 
attributed 
performance data 
Comment 
Produce threshold 
and ratchet effects 
in behaviour of 
individuals and 
organizations 
subject to targets 
Produce output 
distortions and 
pressures to 
change the 
composition of the 
league and the 
nature of the game 
Use in 
unpredictable by 
those performance 
is recorded; often 
combined with 
targets and 
rankings 
2.6.3 Publication of Performance Results- naming, blaming and 
shaming 
Releasing information to the public is believed to have ability to enhance the motivation of 
service providers. Increase in motivation is driven by a desire to protect or enhance public 
reputation whereas knowing that performance is inadequate, but without public release, is 
not sufficiently motivating (Hibbard et ai, 2003). These authors found that making 
performance information available publicly stimUlates quality improvement in the areas 
where performance is reported to be low. However, publicizing performance information may 
also generate negative attitudes, anger and distrust. They found that having a national set of 
standard measures, appropriately evidence-based and vetted by a credible organization, 
could help remove some of the tension and provide assurance to those being assessed that 
what they are being held accountable for is fair and appropriate. 
Hibbard et al (2003) suggest three key elements to enable the published performance to 
stimulate motivation and improvement: 
(i) the report must be widely disseminated in the community; 
(ii) the organisations (hospitals in their study) need to know that a future public 
report will be produced and widely disseminated again within a year or two; and 
(iii) the public report itself must be highly valuable - the report must be designed so 
that it is immediately obvious who the top and bottom performers are, and easy 
to understand and use. 
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Bevan and Hood (2006) argue that current audit arrangements encourage governance by 
target. Thus , measuring performance and updating the standards for target performance 
could help enhance improvement. The assessment process designed for local government 
seems to aim at encouraging improvement by local authorities which the local authorities will 
keep on striving to be better. Huang (1998) argued that skills , knowledge and intellect shou ld 
be treated and managed as a strategic asset of an organ isat ion , with the goal being to 
maximise the long term advantage over competitors . Stewart (1997) wrote that the 
intellectual capital of an organisation is a combination of its people 's talents , management's 
efficiency and type of relationship it has with its customers which look beyond traditional 
assets to the ability of a company to learn and adapt. 
2.7 Transparency, Public Trust and Confidence 
Public Sector 
Audit Governance Measurement 
~~--~~----~~~~--~~~~=-~---~~~----~~~~--~~~~-' 
REVIEW I 
2.7.1 Transparency in the public sector 
In accounting term, 'transparency' is called 'disclosure', the obligation to disclose an 
organisation's financial circumstances for the benefit of their creditors or principals (Hood , 
2006) . Governmental transparency can be explained as the ability to find out what is going 
on inside government (Piotrowski et ai , 2007) . Transparency has been generally supposed 
to make institutions and their office-holders trusted and trustworthy (O 'Neill , 2002) . Cases of 
untrustworthy politicians and officials have made trust a hard and risky issue. Therefore , 
remedies are needed to recover trust back by enhancing standards of accountability and 
transparency. Government imposes elaborate measures to make sure its agencies keep 
agreements and do not betray trust. Hood (2006, p. 19) suggests 'that transparency seemed 
to have established some kind of quasi-religious authority as contemporary doctrine of 
governance'. Increasing transparency as measured by some index may be different in reality 
due to the gap between nominal transparency and effective transparency (Heald , 2006a, pp. 
34) . The author described the gap as 'transparency illusion '. The author also notes that a 
receptor capable of processing , digesting , and using the information is necessary for 
effective transparency. 
Heald (2006b) wrote that transparency is believed to positively connect to performance 
because exposure to public view works as stimulus . The author notes that , however, 
transparency about operational aspects of process can affect behaviour in unexpected ways . 
The author also suggests that introducing or increasing transparency may have damaging 
effects rather than beneficial except if it is seen to make a difference . The author explains 
that if transparency is beneficial if it could lead to cessation or reduction of corruption and 
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punishment of offenders. Public knowledge arising from greater transparency would lead to 
greater cynicism and possibly wider corruption if the corruption exposed continues. But if 
trust is constantly observed, it is hardly earned and easily dissipated (O'Neill, 2002). Huge 
efforts have been placed into ensuring trustworthy performance, auditors scrutinise 
accounts, examiners control and mark examinees, police investigate crimes but the question 
as to whether they are trustworthy remains. The author also argues that evidence of trust 
distrust is not easy to pick up when people have no choice, like the case of public goods and 
services, the only evidence available is what people say. 
O'Neill (2006) wrote that many institutions and office-holders in UK of whom transparency 
requirements have been imposed across the last fifteen years are now seen as less 
trustworthy, and are apparently less trusted than they were before the requirements were 
introduced. The author further questioned the achievement of government notion that 
transparency is indispensable for accountability and good governance, for preventing 
corruption and improving performance; and for increasing trustworthiness and trust. 
Declining trust has led to a shift from relations based on trust and status to those based 
more explicitly on contractual relations (Hughes et.al., 1997). 
PRINCIPAL 
(Cental Government) Trust? 
AUDITOR 
(Audit Commission) 
Figure 11: The Displacing of Trust . 
(Source: Author's diagram adapted from Power, 1994, 1997 and other readings) 
I 
AGENT 
(Local Authorities) 
I 
I 
I 
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Monitor and certify 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 11 is developed based on arguments in Power (1994; 1997) and other readings. The 
figure shows the displacing of trust by new accountability assurance mechanism. Instead of 
trusting local authorities, central government put their trust in the AC to monitor and certify 
local authorities. According to Power, audit displaces trust from first-order to second-order 
verification activities; besides displacing trust, the assessment done by the AC especially the 
Value for Money (VFM) theme in the UoR assessment involves a displacement from first 
order experts, such as teachers, social workers, police and so on, to second-order experts, 
such as accountants and managers. Power (1994) argued that: 
An irony that audits of this kind bring a shift from profes~ions the public trusts more- such 
as doctors, police and teachers, to a profession the public .t~u.sts less (the accountants) at 
the instigation of a profession the public trusts least (the politician), (p.35) 
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Public confidence in public administration can be categorized to three fundamental 
principles, namely transparency, accountability and trust (Power, 1994). Therefore, when 
public trust is declining, public confidence will also decline. The author in his 1997 book (p. 
134-136) discusses the issues on what he called as 'distrusting the auditees' and 'trusting 
the audit process' which resulted from the new public sector management. There is a 
persistent trend across the developed world that public confidence in public institutions is in 
a state of decline (Davies et ai, 2001). In the public sector, public confidence will provides a 
bridge for mutual interest between the managers of service providers and the auditor. 
Publication of the performance result is very good to communicate performance and thus 
enhance transparency. Transparency also works to benefit service providers by allowing 
them to transfer liability and reduce risk. 
O'Neill (2006) suggests that those who aim to communicate must fashion their speech-acts 
with care, take account of the actual capacities and beliefs of their audience and must meet 
a range of epistemic and ethical norms that are constitutive of adequate information. Only 
when those norms are met, transparency may then extend communication by making 
information available to some audiences. In the event when they are not met, transparency 
may worsen communication by spreading confusion, uncertainty, false beliefs, and poor 
information. O'Neill further states: 
Indeed, it is often all too plain that the real aim of certain practices of disclosure is not to 
communicate. Standard practices such as using print so small that many will find it hard to 
read, or terminology so arcane that most will find it hard to follow, suggest that warnings, 
documents, and labels are meant to transfer liability without communicating risks 
effectively. ... Information is disclosed, transparency is achieved: but what is going on is 
not really communication with customers or with the public, but a form of defensive risk 
management, by which companies can claim to have warned those who buy their 
products, so reducing blame and litigation in the event of mishap, while avoiding genuine 
communication with those whom they supposedly warn. (p. 88) 
Power (2004) forwarded a similar argument that the real purpose of such uses of 
transparency is (it seems) not to protect the public or customers, but to protect providers and 
others by transferring liability for damage or injury. Stasavage's (2006) study of the 
European Council of Ministers found that secrecy of Council proceedings has led to serious 
problem of accountability, as a representative could say different things in public and private 
and avoid firm positions on policy. 
Advancement of technology also contributes towards enhanced transparency, in which many 
government agencies including local governments use the internet to disseminate 
information. Margetts (2006, p. 205) suggests three ways in which government might 
become more transparent in this digital era, which the author termed as digitization of 
government: 
i. the amount of information that government obtains and may disseminate becomes 
greater and being more accessible to more people; 
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ii. the process of digitization involves formalizing and codifying aspects of government 
processes which in turn can become more stable, less discretionary, and hence 
more transparent; and 
iii. digital government also reduces the needs for transparency by making it easier to 
'join up' government agencies and services and thereby reducing the need for 
citizens to understand government. 
Although digitization may make government more transparent, there are barriers to it, such 
as, the uncertainty and unpredictability produced by electronic processes, increased 
complexity, and difficulty of navigating digital government because of its size or design 
(Margett, 2006). 
Thus, the issue of balance between governmental secrecy and openness is always 
debatable. This is also due to different levels of individual demand for governmental 
transparency (Piotrowski et ai, 2007). Some people strongly feel the need to access 
government information and learn about government activities while some are less 
interested. Furthermore, different people require different kinds of information (Heald, 2006b; 
Piotrowski et ai, 2007). Piotrowski et al (2007, p. 320) found different dimensions to the 
public's demand for transparency in government: related to public finances, safety, the 
principle of open government and the notion of good or honest government. There is less 
public demand for transparency when the public perceives that government is already 
adequately opens (Piotrowski et ai, 2007). The authors also noted that people who are 
involved politically and communicate frequently with government demand greater 
transparency. Several other studies found relationships between trust in government with 
perception of democracy (Marlowe, 2004); demand for transparency and satisfaction with 
government services (Van Ryzin, Muzzio and Immerwahr, 2004); and that civic participation 
is higher in smaller places than in larger ones (Oliver, 2001). 
2.7.2 Expectation gap 
Diversity of views about the audit function leads to different expectations about what auditing 
could provide and therefore the expectation gap occurs (Humphrey, 1997). The role-
perception gap arises from different views regarding the role of audit and what can 
reasonably be expected of auditors by the shareholders or other users of audited financial 
statements which, in this research context, would be the general public which will include 
government officials and professionals. Different perceptions of the auditors' role could also 
arise from auditors, auditees and users view. The auditors could have their set of 
understanding and perception of what they should provide, while the auditees could have 
another different set of expectations. The target users in this research context, which are the 
local electors, might have other expectations, especially if they have no accounting 
knowledge. As written by Lee (1970): 
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'if auditors do not fully comprehend their auditing role in society, then how can non 
accountants be expected to understand it?' (p. 296) 
Understanding the basic concepts and postulates about the audit function is important to 
understand why expectation gap exists. Humphrey (1997) wrote: 
' ... it is quite clear that the auditing function is not a unitary phenomenon and can be 
taken as meaning different things to different people.' (p. 23) 
Flint (1988) argues that there has to be an explanation of why auditors do what they do, what 
they believe they achieve and what the public believes they achieve. There has to be an 
explanation of the nature, purpose, possibilities and limitations of auditing so that members 
of society who seek to draw benefit from the function can understand what they can expect 
to obtain (Flint, 1988, pA). 
Lee (1984) identified auditing as justifying, behavioural and functional postulates 
emphasised the importance of credibility assessment to investment decisions and 
stewardship functions, auditor independence and accountability, and the ability to obtain 
audit evidence in a cost effective manner. These approach is argued because the emphasis 
is more on the way that auditor should behave than on exploring the reasons why auditors 
may behave differently and why their performance may not reach expectations (Humprey, 
1997). Flint (1988, p 14-15) wrote that auditing is wholly utilitarian. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
wrote that 'a profession exists ... to serve society'. However, Turley and Cooper's (1991) 
found that the benefits stressed by the methodologies of major audit terms are not 
expressed in terms of any societal role of auditing, but as a commercial service to the 
management of the company the are auditing. 
Humphrey (1997) also wrote that various role-perception gaps could occur due to ignorance 
which can be overcome by the professional auditing bodies educating the recipients of audit 
services (and in some cases the auditors) as to what can reasonably be expected from an 
audit. Humphrey (1997) also wrote: 
The difficulty in operationalizing these various categorizations of the audit expectation 
gap is that they rely heavily on the use of the word 'rea~onable', and ~he im~lici~ 
assumption that there exists one real, absolute way of looking at the audit function. 
(p.9) 
Power (1997) argued that there is an 'expectation gap' between the explosion of demands 
and the expectations of auditing at a policy or system level and the reality of an audit's 
technical and operational capacity. Humphrey (1997), in discussing the audit expectation 
gap, divided his discussion according to four audit functions; audit assurance, audit 
reporting, audit independence, and audit regulation and liability. In terms of audit assurance, 
an expectation gap occurs because the audit report has always been viewed by users of 
financial statements and even auditors, as a certification, a guarantee of accuracy rather 
than a probabilistic statement (Lee, 1970). In terms of reporting, Humphrey said that due to 
misunderstandings of the nature of audit assurance, perceptions about the form and content 
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of audit reports also varies. He quoted CICA's (1988) study, which found that a significant 
proportion of the reader/investor public believes that an unqualified audit opinion is only ever 
issued in circumstances where company is not presently experiencing financial problems. 
Studies of qualified audit reports have also revealed the gap between the intended message 
of an audit report and the meanings attributed to it by users (Craswell, 1985; Holt and 
Moizer, 1990; Estes and Reimer, 1977; Estes, 1982). In terms of the independence of 
auditors, expectation gap exists between the auditor's responsibility to perform and being 
seen to perform, in an unbiased manner, and the auditor's ability to operate in sufficiently 
independent fashion (Humphrey, 1997). Regulatory systems have been seen as a valuable 
way to ensure that auditors provide quality work and to discourage the provision of 
substandard work through a system of active monitoring and the punishment of poor quality 
work. 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter explores various research and literature related to external audit in the public 
sector. Issues related to the impact of external auditing of local government in the UK were 
discussed, which include the literatures on regulation inside government in particular by 
Christopher Hood and others and audit explosion by Michael Power. Christopher Hood and 
others have argued that external audit has been applied as a tool to inspect and assure 
governance and accountability at local authorities. Increasing reliance on auditing as a 
means of assurance for accountability and governance has also been contributed by the 
NPM agenda. Hood (1995) highlights seven doctrinal elements of NPM which change the 
way the public sector operates. Several authors in their description of the changes brought 
by NPM, concluded that NPM focuses on the principles such as accountability, competition, 
results, efficiency, disaggregation and incentivisation (Gray and Jenkins, 1993; Dunleavy 
and Margetts, 2000). Christopher Hood in his various articles argues that the new concept 
of accountability in the public sector indicates low trust in public servants and professionals 
whose activities need to be closely evaluated by accounting techniques and suggests that 
NPM deserves further inquiry and debate. Hood and others describe regulation inside 
government as a bureaucracy that aims to shape other organizations' activities, where the 
regulator has an official mandate to scrutinize and seek to change regulatee's behaviour. In 
achieving this regulation, Hood et al (1998, 1999, 2000) claim that a typical public 
bureaucracy is now facing scrutiny by a growing army of waste watchers, quality checkers, 
'sleaze-busters' and other regulators as well as decreases in managerial discretion caused 
by stricter regulations, increased formality, complexity and intensity. 
These changes have also caused an 'audit explosion', the term which was coined by Michael 
Power in describing the use of audit beyond its traditional function of certification of annual 
accounts. The author suggests that the existing audit and inspection ability to promote 
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improvement seems to be failing (1994) and that the search for auditability to accompany 
stricter regulation has produced a formalized self-regulation (1997). Power argues that the 
explosion of auditing has its roots in the loss of trust in society, and has become extremely 
important to be able to give account of one's action and responsibilities. As auditing has a 
history of providing assurance, it has been institutionalised as a provider of comfort and 
legitimacy. Power also suggests that an expectations gap in local government audit is 
unavoidable because auditing is assumed to have vague criteria for effectiveness. Power 
also raised questions in regard to how auditees will react and the ability of audit to penetrate 
the organization. 
As for the local government in England, audit is being used as performance measurement 
instrument, with numbers attached to auditors' judgement to describe and rank local 
authorities. The results are then made available publicly. Publication of performance results 
based on the assessment regimes was intended at increasing transparency which is 
believed to have the ability to enhance trust. However, several issues arise in terms of what 
should be (is appropriate to be) disclosed, the extent of disclosure, what format is suitable, 
who should be the targeted user and other issues. In the effort to enhance accountability and 
transparency, the issue of trust and distrust also arise, as well as various other impacts. All 
of these issues have influenced local authorities' and their employees' behaviour, which this 
research aims to discover. Although Christopher Hood and Michael Power are quite critical 
of the assessment regimes and their impact on the public sector, understanding their ideas 
in approaching this study allows me to keep an open mind of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the changes as well as providing an opportunity to further explore issues 
relevant to the assessment regimes. This research will contribute theoretically and 
empirically on the extent of regulation inside government in particular at local government 
level. In view of the limited study on the audit explosion impact on auditees, this research will 
contribute theoretically and empirically to enlighten how auditees perceive the assessment 
regimes. 
The next chapter will review the technical aspects of audit and performance measurement at 
local government in the UK. 
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3 REVIEW II: EXTERNAL AUDIT AND ASSESSMENT OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 
Introduction ~ Literature 
Review II 
--. 
Methodology Findings & 
Discuss ion 
-. Conclusions 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter extends the literature review for this study to explore technical aspects of the 
external auditing of local authorities in England. The review in this chapter is necessary 
because the main aim of this research is to explore how the external aud it performed at local 
government in England is affecting local authorities. Therefore , it is important to first 
introduce local authorities and the external audit activities imposed on them. This chapter will 
introduce the subjects of this study; who are the auditees, local authorit ies in England , the 
Audit Commission , a body responsible for appointing external auditors for English local 
authorities, coordinating the audit work and reporting , and the external audit work conducted 
on the local authorities. Reviewing the topics in this chapter also fulfils my first research 
question which is: 'What are the functions of external auditors for local authorities in 
England? ' The word auditor will be used throughout this thesis to refer to the external 
auditor. The literature review topics outlined in Figure 3, Chapter 2 will be followed to guide 
the discussion in this chapter. 
I---- English Local 
External Audit Councils 
, 
I (( ~'>- ~( ~'> (( ~~ ( ( ~ (( ~'> 
Public Sector New Public Public Sector Accountability Performance Transparency Audit Management Governance Measurement 
-REVIEW I 
~ '\~ ~~"\~ ~ \~ ~j:' ~\ 
Use of Comprehensive Audit Works at Auditors , the Auditees , the 
Resources Performance Local Audit Local 
Assessment Assessment Authorities Commission Authorities 
-REVIEW II 
Thus the next section will explore the auditees which are local authorities in the UK and 
specifically local authorities in Yorkshire and The Humber, the focus region of this study. 
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3.2 The Auditees, Local Authorities in England 
Auditees, the 
Local 
Government Commission 
REVIEW II 
Use of 
Resources 
Assessment 
The local governments included in this research are 22 local authorities in the Yorkshire and 
The Humber region in England . Therefore, this section will review the position of these 22 
local authorities relative to all local authorities in the United Kingdom (UK) . 
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Figure 12: The Countries in the United Kingdom 
Source: http: //www.worldatlas .com/webimage/countrys/europe/lgcolor/ukreg ions.htm . accessed 3 September 2007 
Figure 12 above shows countries in the UK. The UK is union of individual countries of 
England , Scotland and Wales , collectively called Great Britain , and the north-eastern part of 
Ireland, the constitutionally distinct region of Northern Ireland. England is the biggest country 
followed by Scotland in the north . Wales and Northern Ireland are relatively small compared 
to England and Scotland . There are 468 local authorities throughout the UK. Figure 13 
shows the distribution and types of local authorities in the UK. 
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I TOTAL NUMBER OF LOCAL COUNCILS IN THE UK: 468 l 
I 
! ! ! ~ 
I ENGLAND: 388 I I WALES: 22 I I SCOTLAND: 32 I I N. IRELAND: 26 I 
I I 34 county councils I I 
I 26 unitary councils I I 47 unitary councils I l 
I 32 unitary councils I I 36 metropolitan councils I I 
I 33 London boroughs I I 22 unitary I I 
I 238 district councils I -I 
Figure 13: Numbers and Types of Local Authorities in the UK and England 
(Authors diagram compiled from Llewellyn, A., (2006) Local Authority Directory) 
Out of 388 local authorities in England, 22 are chosen for this research. The 22 local 
authorities drawn for this study are one county council, seven district councils, four unitary 
councils and nine metropolitan councils. These local authorities are responsible for providing 
various services to the local community depending on their types. Several local government 
reorganisations have been performed in 1973, 1986 and the 1990s which resulted in many 
changes in the structure of local government and to service provision. Currently two models 
of service provision apply, single tier and two tiers, which determine what services and which 
authority is responsible. Table 6 below presents information on the local authority types in 
England, including their service responsibilities. 
Table 6: Single Tier versus Two Tier Model 
SINGLE TIER 
Major urban areas, London, West 
Midlands (around Birmingham), 
Greater Manchester, Merseyside 
(around Liverpool), South 
Yorkshire (around Sheffield), West 
Yorkshire (around Leeds) and 
Tyne and Wear (around 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne). 
_ London Borough Councils (in 
London) 
- Metropolitan District 
Councils (in other areas) 
Outside the major 
urban areas 
Unitary councils 
(1990s 
reorganisation 
and consultation) 
Service Provision: 
Metropolitan District and Unitary Cou,!c~/s: 
Education, Housing, Planning (applications) and Bull~lng 
Control, Strategic Planning, Transport Plan~lng, 
Passenger Transport, Highways, .poli~e (not. a direct 
function), Fire, Social Services, Libraries, Lels~re and 
Recreation, Waste Collection, Waste Dlsp~sal, 
Environmental Health, Local Taxation (collection), 
Trading Standards 
(Source: Adapted from Llewellyn, 2006) 
TWO TIERS 
Outside the major urban areas 
_ County Councils, each covering a 
population in a rough range of 500,000 to 
1,500,000 
_ District Councils, between 4 to 14 in every 
County Council, covering a population of 
about 100,000 
Service Provision: 
County Councils- Education, Strategic 
Planning, Transport Planning, Passenger 
Transport, Highways, Police (not a direct 
function), Fire, Social Services, Libraries, 
Waste Disposal, Trading Standards; 
District Councils- Housing, Planning 
(applications) and Building Control, Leisure and 
Recreation, Waste Collection, Environmental 
Health, Local Taxation (collection) 
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Unitary authorities are a result of reorganisations in the 1990s when the central government 
view that the two tier model was inefficient and confusing because County Councils were too 
remote from those they served (Stevens, 2006). This view suggested that County Councils 
be abolished and their functions transferred to District Councils, with some of the smaller 
Districts being merged. This was implemented in Scotland and Wales but a process of local 
consultation in England was done which led to the single tier model being supported in some 
places and rejected in others. Thus, in England, the two-tier model still applies which also 
involved local authorities in the studied region of Yorkshire and The Humber. 
All local authorities in the UK are subject to traditional financial auditing similar to that in the 
private sector but extended to cover performance audit. Different governing bodies are 
responsible for the audit in different countries of the UK. Audit Scotland and the Northern 
Ireland Audit Office are responsible for governing the audits for Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, while the Audit Commission governs the audit for England and Wales. Though the 
Commission is responsible for managing and reporting of the audit for both England and 
Wales, the system of external audit for both countries are different. The Commission 
manages and reports separately for England and Wales. This study concerns the external 
audit governed by the Commission for England only as local councils in England are subject 
to a more developed external audit system introduced by the Commission. 
England is divided into a wide variety of boroughs, counties, cities, districts and regions. For 
coordination, the government has set up a network of government offices for every 
governmental region called Government Offices for the English Regions with its own national 
co-ordination centre called Regional Co-ordination Unit located in London. There are nine 
English Governmental regions for England as shown in Figure 14. 
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Source: http ://www.worldatlas .com/webimage/countrys/europe/lgcolor/ukeregions.htm. accessed 3 September 2007 
The nine Government Office Regions regions are North East, North West, Yorkshire and The 
Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England , South West, London and South 
East. Each government office region has its own government office located in their area. 
Figure 15 shows the government regional offices . 
I REGIONAL CO-ORDINATION UNIT I LONDON 
I Government Office for the North I I Government Office for the West East. NEWCASTLE UPON TYNE I L Midlands. BIRMINGHAM 
I Government Office for London , 1 J Government Office for the South LONDON I I West. PLYMOUTH AND TRURO 
I Government Office for the East I J Government Office for the South Midlands. NOTTINGHAM I I East. SURREY 
I Government Office for the East of I J Government Office for the North EnQland. CAMBRIDGE J I West . MANCHESTER AND 
I 
Government Office for Yorkshire j and The Humber. LEEDS 
Figure 15: Government Offices for the English Regions 
Source: http ://www.gos.gov.uk/contactus 
I 
j 
I 
I 
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The Government Offices for English regions represent ten Whitehall Departments and are 
the primary means by which a wide range of Government policies are delivered in the 
English regions. Their work covers the area of services provided by government throughout 
English regions which are Children and Young people, Community Safety, Culture and 
Leisure, Economy, Education and Skills, Environment and Rural. The Government Offices 
also work with local councils to help them improve service delivery and value for money, and 
to promote better policy integration across the country. An excerpt below was taken from the 
Government Offices' website on the various ways they work with local councils: 
i. advising local. authorities on Government policies and in turn using their local 
knowledge to Influence new policies affecting local government· 
ii. negotiating Local Area Agreement; , 
iii. ~~sessing ~heir '~apital Strategies' and 'Asset Management Plans' as part of 
Single Capital Pot programme (where the government provides the bulk of capital 
support to local authorities as one, replacing previous separate allocations of 
transport, housing, education, heath and others), and providing feedback on their 
performance; 
iv. advising Government on their bids for the Beacon Council and 'Invest to Save' 
programmes; and 
v. working closely with the poorest performing authorities, as identified in the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment process, to help address identified 
weaknesses and prepare recovery plan. 
Source: http://www.gos.gov.uklcontactus, last accessed 7 September 2007 
Because external audit is part of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
process coordinated by the AC, the external audit performed on local councils is based on 
the nine government regions. An audit office is set up for each government region to 
organize the audit work and reporting. Information on the audit offices and auditors will be 
discussed in section three of this chapter. 
All local councils in England are subject to various audit functions: the audit of financial 
statements; review of the corporate governance statements and of the standards of financial 
conducts; certification of grant claims and performance audit. Previously done as a value for 
money inspection; the performance audit is now known as Use of Resources (UoR) 
assessment. Detail on the performance audit will be discussed in sections four, five and six 
of this chapter. A total of 150 single tier and county councils throughout England have been 
subject to the UoR assessment since 2002 when the CPA regime was first introduced. The 
238 district councils were introduced to the CPA only from 2003, but the UoR assessment 
was first done in 2006 to assess the year ended March 2005. 
For reasons of practicality, to enable this study to be completed within three years and 
limited financial resources, only one government region, Yorkshire and The Humber is 
chosen. This study is intended to shed light on the impact of external audit on local 
authorities from the auditees' point of view, which will begin with exploring: the auditees; 
auditors and their work; published results and finally the auditees' view. Thus detail analysis 
will be maintained on the focus region. where the 22 local authorities will each represent a 
case-study. Table 7 shows the composition of local authorities in Yorkshire and The Humber 
region. 
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Table 7: Local Authorities in the Yorkshire and The H urn b er Region 
Audited Body Type 
North Yorkshire County Council (CC) 
Barnsley Metropolitan District Council (MDC) 
Bradford Metropolitan District Council 
Calderdale Metropolitan District Council 
Doncaster Metropolitan District Council 
Kirklees Metropolitan District Council 
Leeds Metropolitan District Council 
Rotherham Metropolitan District Council 
Sheffield Metropolitan District Council 
Wakefield Metropolitan District Council 
East Riding of Yorkshire Unitary Authority (UA) 
Kingston-upon-Hull Unitary Authority 
North East Lincolnshire Unitary Authority 
North Lincolnshire Unitary Authority 
York Unitary Authority 
Craven District Council (DC) 
Hambleton District Council 
Harrogate District Council 
Richmondshire District Council 
Ryedale District Council 
Scarborough District Council 
Selby District Council 
Humberside PA Police Authority (PA) 
North Yorkshire PA Police Authority 
South Yorkshire PA Police Authority 
West Yorkshire PA Police Authority 
Humberside FRA Fire and Rescue Authority (FRA) 
North Yorkshire FRA Fire and Rescue Authority 
South Yorkshire FCDA Fire and Rescue Authority 
West Yorkshire FCDA Fire and Rescue Authority 
There are 30 local authorities altogether in Yorkshire and The Humber region of which 22 
are the local councils, four are police authorities and another four are fire and rescue 
authorities. Among the 22 local councils , only North Yorkshire is a county council with seven 
district councils in its area, where this is a two-tier system. Elsewhere in the Region there are 
five unitary councils and nine metropolitan district councils that provide the full range of local 
government services on a single-tier basis. There are four police authorities and four fire and 
rescue authorities servicing the population of the 22 local councils. Every police and fire and 
rescue authority covers specific designated area of responsibility . 
All these authorities have to prepare their own Statement of Accounts , which will be aud ited 
by external auditors appointed by the AC . The external auditor's work for these police and 
fire and rescue authorities also extends beyond financial audit, as for other authorities . 
However, only the 22 local councils will be considered throughout this thesis because th is 
study concerns the UoR assessment in the CPA framework . Police and the fire and rescue 
authorities each have different assessment frameworks and were introduced to the 
assessment system much later than the local councils . 
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As this study involves evaluation of local authorities ' performance Table 8 sho . f . 
, WS In ormation 
on the area, population and 'larger towns and cities ' for the reg ion. 
Table 8" Yorksh" Ire an d Th H b R e urn er egion- Demographic Information 
LA 
Audited Body Cities* Population** Area 
Population 
Type (hectares)** IHectare 
North Yorkshire CC 569, 700 803 ,741 0.71 
Barnsley MDC Barnsley 218 ,100 32 ,863 6.64 
Bradford MDC Bradford 467 ,700 36 ,635 12.77 
Calderdale MDC 192,400 36 ,346 5.29 
Doncaster MDC Doncaster 286,900 58 ,276 4.92 
Kirklees MDC Huddersfield 388,600 40 ,860 9.51 
Leeds MDC Leeds 715,400 55 ,175 12.97 
Rotherham MDC 248,200 30 ,760 8.07 
Sheffield MDC Sheffield 513 ,200 36 ,333 14.12 
Wakefield MDC Wakefield 315 ,200 33 ,317 9.46 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 314,100 240 ,768 1.30 
Kinqston-upon-Hull UA Hull 243,600 7,145 34.09 
North East Lincolnshire UA Grimsby 158,000 19,227 8.22 
North Lincolnshire UA 152,800 85 ,000 1.80 
York UA York 181 ,100 27 ,200 6.66 
Craven DC 53,600 117, 994 0.45 
Hambleton DC 84 ,100 131 ,158 0.64 
Harrogate DC 151 ,300 130,471 1.16 
Richmondshire DC 47,000 131 ,867 0.36 
Ryedale DC 50,900 150,966 0.34 
Scarborough DC 106,200 81 ,678 1.30 
Selby DC 76,500 60,190 1.27 
* 
.. Sources. Based on the 56 larger towns and cities described by John Prescott , Deputy Prime Minister In 
the 'Urban Research Summary', Number 18, 2005, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. 
**Based on Llewellyn, A (2006) Local Authority Directory 2006, The Guardian , Sage 
Publication , London 
The Yorkshire and The Humber region covers 1,426,235 hectares of England and has a total 
population of 4,964,900. Having a city in an area indicates some extent of economic 
prosperity, a better job market which would invite quality employees for local authorities and 
higher population density. From the table above, there are 10 out of 56 'larger towns and 
cities' in England located in the region . Those 'larger towns and cities' are Barnsley , 
Bradford, Doncaster, Huddersfield , Leeds , Sheffield , Wakefield , Hull , Grimsby and York. 
None of the 'larger towns and cities ' are located in North Yorkshire indicating its relative 
remoteness. 
Population also determines the amount of grant allocation from central govern ment and the 
larger the area , servicing would become more complicated . Although North Yorksh ire covers 
56 .35 percent of the region 's area , population density is less than one person per hectare . 
The next largest authority after North Yorkshire in terms of area is East Riding of Yorkshire , 
covering 17 percent of the region. In terms of population , Leeds has the highest followed by 
North Yorkshire , Sheffield , Bradford and Kirk lees. The population of North Yorkshire , 
represents the total population of all its seven district councils , is slightly more than Sheffield 
and about 150,000 below the popu lation in Leeds Comparing populations for each hectare 
in the region , Hull has the highest number of people for every hectare which is 34 , followed 
86 
REVIEW II : EXTERNAL AUDIT AND ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND 
by Sheffield , 14, Leeds and Bradford , both 13. The district councils in the reg ion have the 
lowest population density. 
3.3 The Auditors and the Audit Commission 
Government Government 
REVIEW II 
Use of 
Resources 
Assessment 
The major difference from private sector audit is that while the external auditor for companies 
is their choice, but the auditors for local councils are appointed by the AC , which is an 
independent body. Hollingsworth et al (2006) wrote that the AC was created at a time when 
conflict between local and central government was particularly heightened . It was widely 
seen as part of the first Thatcher government's package of measure to curb local powers 
and was regarded with suspicion and hostility by many people in local government. 
However, the AC has increasingly been seen as an independent body over the past decade. 
The AC was established by the Local Government Finance Act 1982 to accomplish a range 
of functions related to external audit of local government. The AC functions then extended to 
include National Health Service bodies in 1990 by the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act. The AC claims that the fact that local government and NHS bodies do 
not appoint their own auditors helps to ensure that auditors are entirely independent and 
seen to be independent. The AC currently appoints auditors to: 
• 433 local authorities; 
• 350 NHS bodies; 
• 38 police authorities; 
• 96 other 'principal ' bodies , including fire and rescue authorities , national parks 
authorities and probation boards; and 
• 9,700 local councils (parish and town councils). 
(www.audit-commission .qov.uk/aboutus/whatwedo/audit.asp) 
The AC commenced its task in 1983, taking over responsibility for the local government 
District Audit Service from the Secretary of State for the Environment. District auditors had 
exclusive responsibility for the audit of local government for approximately 130 years , until 
the Local Government Act 1972 gave local authorities the choice of whether to have their 
accounts audited by a district auditor or by a private firm of aud itors (Holl ingsworth et ai , 
2006) . However, in 1976, the Layfield Committee concluded that it was wrong for any public 
body to be able to choose its own auditors and recommended that auditors should be 
completely independent of both central and local governments.
6 
The Comm ittee proposed 
the creation of a new body to which auditors should report but th is was rejected by the 
6 http://www.locaI.Odpm .gov.uklfinance/stats/ lgfs/19fs15/indeX.htm 
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government at that time. The Public Account Committee and the then Expenditure 
Committee of the House of Commons later suggested that the District Audit Service become 
the responsibility of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG). This idea was also 
rejected and the arrangements for local government audit remained unchanged until the AC 
was established. 
The AC was first established as an executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB) 
accountable through the Secretary of State to Parliament before been reclassified to become 
a Public Corporation (PC) in 20057 . The reclassification neither changes the AC's functions 
nor its governance. The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the 
AC's sponsor Department, have stated that the AC should treat itself as a NDPB for most 
governance purposes. The AC follows the requirements of the executive NDPB in many 
aspects especially when there is no specific guidance available for a PCB (http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/contactlfoipublicationscheme.asp). The Cabinet Office (2006) 
(www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk) explained that both the executive NDPBs and the PCs are to 
carry out their functions9 independently at arm's length from the government: 
NDPB is established to permit a service or function to be carried out independently at 
arm's length from the Government. These are bodies which have a role in the process of 
national government but which are not formally part of any government department. They 
function deliberately at a remove from Ministers. 
Public Corporation may also have the characteristics of an NDPB, a Trading Fund 
Executive Agency or an NHS body. Where it is a TFEA or NHS bodies, this is the 
principal classification for Cabinet Office purposes, but in other cases it will normally be a 
PC for the purposes of the Public Bodies' database if it fits the relevant criteria. 
Thus, the AC is now a statutory corporation constituted under the Audit Commission Act 
1998 which has statutory functions given to it by the Act and other legislations -Education 
Act 1997, The Local Government Act 1999, The Freedom of Information Act 2000, The Local 
Government Act 2003, The Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 
2003, Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, Children Act 2004 and Public Audit (Wales) Act 
2004 (Audit Commission, 2008a). The AC is jointly sponsored by the Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government (SSCLG) and the Secretary of State for Health (SSH). 
The sponsoring Departments, SSCLG consulted with the SSH, appoint Commissioners 
which is called Audit Commissioners. The Audit Commissioners are normally appointed for a 
period of three years with the possibility of re-appointment for a further period. There is a 
statutory minimum of 15 Audit Commissioners and a maximum of 20, but from 1 August 
2009, the requirement will change to a minimum of 10 and maximum of 15 (Audit 
Commission, 2008a). 
The formal Governing Board of the AC consists of several Commissioners and a Chairman. 
The Governing Board are responsible for setting the AC's values, standards, strategies, and 
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objectives during their 6-weekly meetings. The Governing Board also determines the budget 
and how the AC performs its functions, monitors its performance and accountability, and is 
r~sponsible for ensuring the AC acts within its statutory remits. A team of Managing 
Directors led by the Chief Executive is responsible for the day to day operation of the AC. 10 
The AC currently employs around 2,500 people throughout England. The AC's corporate 
services (communications, human resources and payroll) are based at main offices in 
London, Cardiff and Bristol. Supporting the main offices is a network of regional offices 
where the auditors and inspectors are based. Figure 16 shows the AC's position in relation 
to the central government, local authorities and other inspectorates throughout England in 
delivering the CPA regime. 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Auditors 
(PrivatelDistrict) 
Figure 16: Actors Involved in CPA 
Regional Offices 
.-._._. '-'-' 
Relationship . 
Managers .! 
-·-·-·-r·_· J 
The Commission's 
Inspectors 
Local Authorities 
(Source: Authors Diagram compiled from Audit Commission's documentations) 
As shown in the diagram above, boxes at second level of the diagram from top, there are 
several inspectorate body agents of central government inspecting on the accountability and 
quality of services delivery of local authorities including the AC which is responsible for 
administering the CPA. Under the CPA regime the inspectorates neither link with each other 
nor share information gathered from the local authorities. This sometimes causes local 
authorities to provide similar information multiple times to different inspectorates. Below the 
AC are the networks of regional offices, where the auditors, relationship managers and other 
inspectors are based. 
The appointed auditor for each local authority could come from the AC's staff referred to as 
the district auditors or from private audit firms. The relationship manager represented by 
dotted-line box in the diagram and attached the auditor's box is a member of the AC's staff. 
A local authority will have the same person act as auditor and as relationship manager at 
times especially when their auditor is the District Auditor. The relationship manager was 
responsible for writing the Annual Audit Letter to the local authority but the function is no 
longer available since 2007 (their function is now performed at the AC level with input from 
10 http://www.audit_commission.gov.uklaboutus/howwearerun/ 
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auditors) . Besides the auditors and relationship managers, the AC also appo ints various 
inspectors to meet their many inspection and judgment respons ibil ities under the CPA. 
These inspectors are the AC 's agents to carry out inspections on aspects other than the UoR 
assessment in the CPA. 
The inspection and judgment for the UoR assessment and the financial accounts rema ins 
the auditors' responsibility and will be the focus of this study. For management structure 
reasons , the AC breaks England into four regional management areas (the AC 's 
management region) . Each AC management region has a number of audit offices to cater for 
each government region . Table 9 shows the network of audit offices for the nine government 
regions within the AC's management region . 
Table 9" Aud"t C I ommlsslon S e wor , N t k f o Regional Audit Offices for England 
Commission's Regional Government Region Audit Office Management Area 
North East Gateshead 
NORTHERN North West Bolton 
Yorkshire and The Humber Leeds 
East Midlands Thurmaston 
CENTRAL West Midlands Solihull 
East of England Stevenage 
Bristol 
South West 
SOUTHERN Exeter 
South East Winchester 
LONDON London Millbank 
(Source : Adapted from Audit Commission 's information at wwwaudit-commission .gov.uk) 
The four management areas are Northern , Central , Southern and London . There are several 
audit offices within the AC management region. Every government region has one audit 
office except for South West region which has two audit offices. The audit office for London 
region is located near the AC's head office in London. Each AC's management region has a 
number of relationship managers and lead managers attached with the aud it offices. The 
lead managers are professional leads on a particular aspect of the AC's work in that region . 
The relationship managers were the main point of contact between the AC and the aud ited 
council they were assigned to before the function was stopped in 2007 and the AC took over 
their responsibility for writing the annual audit letters . 
At present 70 percent of local authorities ' audits are done by the District Auditor and 30 
percent carried out by private sector audit firms which have demonstrated that they have 
necessary skills , expertise , and resources to deliver high quality aud its that meet the AC 
standards. Private sector audit firms currentl y aud iting local governments are: 
• Baker Tilly ; 
• Delo itte ; 
• KPMG ; 
• PKF; 
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• PricewaterhouseCoopers; 
• Mazars; and 
• Grant Thornton. 
(www.a ud it-commission. gov. u k/aboutus/whatwedo/a u dit. asp) 
The AC appoints auditors for an initial five year period. The appointment can be extended 
allowing auditors to add significant value and inSights to benefit audited bodies. However 
, 
the engagement lead is required to be changed at least once in five years to comply with 
ethical standards for auditors issued by Auditing Practices Board (APB). The AC also rotates 
audits from time to time between suppliers to provide a fresh view and to strengthen the 
audit. The AC applies the following policies in making audit appointments from 2007/08, (the 
underlined portion are those related to the focus region): 
(i) prioritize the need to maintain and avoid possible threats to auditor 
independence; 
(ii) seek to rotate the audit supplier at any body where that supplier has been the 
auditor for ten years or more wherever possible; 
(iii) appoint only District Auditors from the Regions as auditors to Strategic Health 
Authorities; 
(iv) appoint no more than three audit suppliers to the: (a) Police authorities; (b) Fire 
authorities; (c) Probation boards; (d) National parks authorities; (e) Passenger 
transport executives and authorities; and (f) Waste disposal authorities; 
(v) appoint the same appointed auditor to London borough, metropolitan, and 
unitary councils and their coterminous PCTs wherever possible; 
(vi) seek to meet audited bodies' expressed preference for a change of audit 
supplier or for a particular audit supplier, subject to the overriding need to 
maintain auditor independence and to meet its contractual commitments to 
individual firms; 
(vii) exempt from the ten-year rotation policy any body where the engagement 
leader would have been in post for only two years immediately prior to when 
the rotation would be due to take place, unless specifically requested 
otherwise; 
(viii) seek to provide the firms and the Regions with portfolios of appointments that 
are economically and practically viable, by appointing them wherever possible 
to a logical geographical cluster of bodies, taking into account ease of travel 
(ix) seek to make changes in appointments in such a way as to minimise the short-
term disruption to business and people for both the outgoing and incoming 
audit supplier to allow them both sufficient time to re-plan resource allocation 
for the future; 
(x) seek, wherever possible, to provide the firms and the Regions with portfolios of 
appointments which are balanced in terms of perceived risk and performance; 
(xi) seek to meet, wherever possible, the firms' and the Regions' preferences for a 
portfolio of appointments which gives their staff a mix of work and provides 
opportunities for staff development. . 
(www.audit-commission.gov. u k/a boutus/whatwedo/audlt. asp) 
The auditors from private firms are appointed on tendering and contract basis. The AC staffs 
based at audit offices within each of the AC management regions meet and discuss the audit 
process before submitting their work to the AC head office in London. The Northern audit 
management region has three audit offices based in the government regions of North East, 
North West and Yorkshire and The Humber. The auditors and staff based at these audit 
offices work together in coordinating their judgments and scores before the AC's national-
level meeting. Table 10 shows information on the auditors and relationship managers, 
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2006/07 for the focus region of this study, Yorkshire and The Humber, which IS In the 
Northern Audit Region . 
Table 10" R I f e a Ions h" M Ip ana gers an d Auditors for 2006/07 
AUDIT APPOINTED Relationship Local Councils Type SUPPLIER AUDIT 
2006/07 AUDITORS MANAGERS 
Managers 
Barnsley MDC RSM RSM Robson Paul Hughes Rhodes Sue Sunderland 
Bradford MDC AC(NR) Paul Lundy Rachel Lindley Joanne McDonough 
Calderdale MDC PwC Pricewaterhouse Tash Scarisbrick Joanne Coopers McDonough 
Doncaster MDC AC(NR) Sue Sunderland Phil Parkin Sue Sunderland 
Kirklees MDC AC(NR) Paul Lundy Simon Dennis Paul Lundy 
Leeds MDC KPMG KPMG Lynsey Paul Lundy Simenton 
Rotherham MDC KPMG KPMG Richard Foster Sue Sunderland 
Sheffield MDC AC(NR) Sue Sunderland Dave Phillips Sue Sunderland 
Wakefield MDC AC(NR) Paul Lundy Graham Kettles Paul Lundy 
York UA AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Alastair Newall Mark Kirkham 
East Riding Of Yorkshire UA AC(NR) Mike Newbury John Wareing Michael Newbury 
Kingston Upon Hull UA AC(NR) Mike Newbury Alan Oliver Michael Newbury 
North East Lincolnshire UA AC(NR) Mike Newbury Chris Hartley Michael Newbury 
North Lincolnshire UA RSM RSM Robson Neil Smurthwaite Rhodes 
Michael Newbury 
North Yorkshire CC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Rob Chambers Mark Kirkham 
Craven DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Richard Craigen Mark Kirkham 
Hambleton DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Richard Craigen Mark Kirkham 
Harrogate DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Julie Talbot Mark Kirkham 
Richmondshire DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Richard Craigen Mark Kirkham 
Ryedale DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Peter Hanmer Mark Kirkham 
Scarborough DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Peter Hanmer Mark Kirkham 
Selby DC AC(NR) Mark Kirkham Peter Hanmer Mark Kirkham 
(AC(NR) : Audit CommiSSion, Northern Region ; Source: Compiled from the AC's publications) 
The AC has statutory power to appoint auditors , prescribe how they should perform their 
functions through a Code of Audit Practice (prepared by the AC under the Audit Commission 
Act 1998), set scales of fees for audit work and make arrangements for certifying grant 
claims and returns (the functions will be explained in Section 3.4). The AC claims that it aims 
at securing high quality , value for money audits through a mixed economy of suppliers and to 
promote a consistent approach both between different auditors and across the country . The 
AC may appoint an officer of the AC (District Auditor) , a firm or an indiv idual who is not an 
officer of the AC to perform an audit providing that they are appropriatel y qualified as defined 
by the Act. Before making appointments of auditors to local government bodies , the AC has 
a statutory duty to consult the body. The AC also issues guidance ann ual ly to aud itors under 
section 3(8) of the Audit Commission Act 1998 and paragraph 7 Schedule 1 to the Act. The 
AC annual guide includes the audit plann ing documents, annual audit letter , reports and 
other audit outputs for auditors . 
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The AC's main activities include (i) appointing the external auditors to local authorities 
(including police and fire authorities), local probation boards and health service bodies in 
England; (ii) assessing performance through its auditors and inspectors of the local 
authorities (including police and fire authorities), NHS bodies and housing associations; (iii) 
promoting improvement in public services provided by bodies subject to audit in England 
through the work of its auditors and inspectors, its national reports and working with other 
regulators and stakeholders; and (iv) undertaking data matching exercises in order to assist 
in the prevention and detection of fraud. The appointed auditors are mainly responsible for 
auditing the financial statements of local authorities and for auditing the arrangements for 
securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources. In carrying out their 
responsibilities the appointed auditors can ask for representations from management on 
important matters, both orally and in writing. However, to avoid prejudice of the auditors' 
independence of the body they audit, the audit roles performed by auditors do not include 
providing financial or legal advice or consultancy to the audited body. 
The management of every local authority, its members and officers, are accountable to 
ensure that their council's business is conducted in accordance with the law and proper 
standards. They have to ensure that money is safeguarded and properly accounted for, and 
is used economically, efficiently and effectively. They are responsible for establishing proper 
arrangements for the governance of their affairs and the stewardship of the resources at 
their disposal and to report their arrangements in their annual governance statement. They 
have responsibility to assist their auditors by providing all necessary documentations and 
explanation. They are also allowed to have dialogue with their auditors so the audit work is 
executed smoothly. 
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3.4 Audit Works at Local Authorities in England 
Government Government 
REVIEW II 
Use of 
Resources 
Assessment 
The history of auditing at local government in England began in 1846 when the District Aud it 
Service was founded to examine the accounts of local government districts in England and 
Wales . Local authorities were allowed to choose whether their accounts be aud ited by 
private auditors or the district auditors in 1972. In 1982 the auditing and examination of the 
overall management of local government was brought under the control of a sing le 
independent body, the AC. The extended audit began in 1992 when the AC was given the 
duty to direct local authorities to publish comparative indicators of performance annually . The 
AC then introduced several regimes of inspection frameworks to measure local authorities' 
performance. The extended work of AC 's auditors will be discussed under the performance 
audit section later in this chapter. 
Currently the external auditing of the public sector in England shares some similarity to the 
private sector but covers a wider range of audit work , due to a wider scope of accountability 
in the sector. The appointed auditor's duties would include the audit of financial statements , 
performance auditing, review of statements on corporate governance, review of standards of 
financial conduct and certification of grant claims . This section will comment briefly on these 
other duties of auditor but will focus on the performance auditing which is known as UoR 
assessment. The UoR assessment will be the focus of this study because it has become a 
major part of audit work at local councils . 
3.4.1 Auditing the financial statements 
Local authorities published accounts , the financial statements , are an essential means fo r 
accounting for its stewardship of the resources allocated and for its financial performance in 
the use of those resources (Audit Commission , 2005a). Therefore , local authorities have to 
establish systems of internal control to ensure the regularity and lawfulness of transactions, 
maintain proper accounting records and prepare financial statements that 'present fairly' its 
financial position , income and expenditure . A statement of internal contro l is also required to 
be published . 
Auditors will audit the financial statements and opine wh ether the financial statements : (i) 
'present fairly ' of the financial position , expenditure and income of the local authority for the 
year audited ; (ii ) have been prepared properly in accordance with relevant leg islation and 
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applicable accounting standards (Audit Commission, 2005a).11 The auditors observe 
materiality in their work and will provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements: 
(a) are free from material misstatement caused by fraud or other error; 
(b) comply with statutory and other applicable requirements; and 
(c) comply with all relevant requirements for accounting presentation and disclosure. 
In performing the audit, auditors will examine selected transactions and balances on a test 
basis and assess the significant estimates and judgements made by local authorities when 
preparing their financial statements (Audit Commission, 2005a). Auditors would also 
evaluate significant financial systems and internal financial controls before giving their 
opinion. Where the auditors identify any weaknesses in the systems and controls, they will 
inform the audited bodies. However, auditors are not to be expected to locate all 
weaknesses that may exist. Auditors review if the statement on internal control was 
presented according to relevant requirements and report if the statement does not or is 
misleading or inconsistent with other information. In accomplishing this task, the auditors will 
consider information about the audited body they gained through their work in the audited 
body's arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the use of its 
resources. However, the auditors are neither required to consider if the internal control 
statement covers all risks and controls, nor to form an opinion on the effectiveness of the 
audited body's corporate governance procedures or risk and control procedures. 
The auditor also has the right to report to the public on any matters of concern through a 
public interest report. The management of that local authority then has to respond to the 
public interest report publicly. 
3.4.2 Auditing the arrangements for securing economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness in the UoR 
Local authorities have to establish arrangements to secure economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness in its UoR, to ensure proper stewardship and governance, and to review the 
adequacy and effectiveness of the arrangements regularly (Audit Commission, 2005a). 
These form a key part of local authorities' internal control systems and comprise of: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
establishing strategic and operational objectives; 
determining policy and making decisions; 
ensuring that services meet the needs of users and taxpayers and for 
engaging with the wider community.; .. 
ensuring compliance with established poliCies, procedures, laws and 
regulations; .' d f' . I . k d 
identifying, evaluating and managing oper~tlonal an .lnancla rls.s an 
opportunities, including those arising from Involvement In partnership and 
joint working; 
. .' n the regularity of the audited body expenditure and income when 
II The auditors also would give Opinion 0 .' 
necessary (for NHS bodies and local probation board In particular). 
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(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
ensuri~g c~mpl~ance.with the general duty of best value, where applicable; 
managing Its ~lnan~lal and .other resources, including arrangements to 
safeguard the financial standing of the audited body; 
monitoring and reviewing performance, including arrangements to ensure 
data quality; and . 
ensuring that the audited body's affairs are managed in accordance with 
proper standards of financial conduct, and to prevent and detect fraud and 
corruption. 
(Audit Commission, 2005a, p. 6) 
Local authorities are required to report on these arrangements in their annual 'statement on 
internal contro/'. Auditors have to satisfy themselves that the audited body has established 
proper arrangements to secure economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its UoR To achieve 
that, the auditors would review and examine evidence relevant to the audited body's 
'corporate performance and financial arrangements' summarised in (i) to (viii) above, and 
issue a report. The auditors also have responsibility to review and report on the local 
authorities' compliance with statutory requirements in respect of the preparation and 
publication of its best value performance plan (BVPP). The AC requires auditors to report 
their conclusion on the arrangements annually depending on the AC specified indicators. 
Auditors would also report if significant matters have come to the auditors attention that 
prevent them from concluding that the audited body has establish proper arrangements. 
However, auditors are not required to review whether all aspects of the audited body's 
arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its UoR are effective. 
When planning for the assessment above, auditors would also consider and assess the 
relevant 'significant business risks' (Audit Commission, 2005a) and the arrangements local 
authorities have established to manage these risks. The relevant 'significant business risks' 
are the operational and financial risks significant to the achievement of local authorities' 
statutory functions and objectives, which apply to the local authority and are relevant to 
auditors responsibility under the Code of Audit Practice. Auditors will use their professional 
judgement and consideration of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the subject 
matter when assessing 'what is significant'. The auditors would review: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
the relevance and significance of the potential business risks faced by all 
local authorities; 
other risks that apply specifically to individual local authorities; 
the local authority's own assessment of the risks it faces; and 
the arrangements put in place by the local authority to manage and 
address its risks. (Audit Commission, 2005a, p. 7) 
Besides reviewing (i) to (iv) above, the auditors would also consider: 
(i) evidence gained from previous audit work, including the response of the local 
authority to previous audit work; 
(ii) 
(ii i) 
(iv) 
the AC measured performance results; 
the work of other statutory inspectorates; and . . . 
relevant improvement needs, identified through discussion With the AC or other 
inspectorates. 
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When reviewing local authorities' arrangements for its UoR, auditors may examine the 
arrangements by which policy decisions are reached and consider the effects of the 
implementation of policy but not to question the merits of the local authorities' policies (Audit 
Commission, 2005a). When making recommendation to local authorities, auditors should 
avoid perception that they have any role in the decision-making arrangements of the local 
authority audited. Local authorities have their own responsibility to decide how to implement 
any recommendations made by their auditors. Again, the auditors are not expected to have 
identified every weaknesses or every opportunity for improvement and local authorities 
should consider auditors' conclusions and recommendations in their broader operational or 
other relevant context. Auditors' work is limited to reviewing the systems established by the 
local authority in collecting, recording and publishing the information according to AC 
guidelines. Auditors are neither required to report to local authorities on the accuracy of 
performance information they publish nor to form a view on the completeness or accuracy of 
the information or the realism and achievability of the assessments published by local 
authorities. 
Auditors' work in reviewing local authorities' arrangements to ensure their affairs are 
managed in accordance with proper standards of financial conduct and to prevent and detect 
fraud and corruption. This does not remove the possibility that breaches of proper standards 
of financial conduct, or fraud and corruption, have occurred and remained undetected (Audit 
Commission, 2005a). The auditors do not have responsibility to prevent or detect breaches 
of proper standards of financial conduct, or fraud and corruption, although they will be alert 
to the possibility and should act promptly if they notify bases for suspicion. Auditors have 
specific powers and duties under the Audit Commission Act 1998 in terms of legality and, in 
local government, electors' rights. Local authorities have to bear the fees arising in 
connection with auditors' exercise of these powers and duties, including costs relating to the 
appointment of legal or other advisers to the auditors (Audit Commission, 2005a). 
3.4.3 Reporting the results of audit works 
In reporting their audit works, auditors will provide: 
(a) an audit planning document; . . 
(b) oral and/or written reports or memoranda to officers a~?, where approp~late: 
members on the results of, or matter arising from, specific aspects of auditors 
work; .. th k f th (c) a report to those charged with governance summarising e wor 0 e 
auditor; . . .. Itt t d (d) an audit report, including auditor's opInion on th~ flnancla sa emen s an a 
conclusion on whether the local authority ha.s put In place proper arrangements 
for securing economy, efficiency and effectlven~ss, In the UoR. For be~t value 
authorities, this conclusion incorporates the auditor s report on the audit of the 
BVPP; . (e) a certificate that the audit of the accounts has been completed In accordance 
with statutory requirements; and 
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(f) ~n an~ual ~udit le~er or, for local authorities where the AC carries out 
InSpectl.ons, information are to be reported to the AC in a specified format to 
enable It to prepare an annual audit and inspection letter to the local authority. 
(Audit Commission, 2005a, p. 9) 
Although annual audit letters and reports may be addressed to officers or members of the 
local authority, they are prepared for local authority use. Auditors do not have responsibilities 
to officers or members in their individual capacity (other than in the exercise of auditors' 
specific powers and duties pertaining to electors' rights in local government) or to third 
parties that choose to place reliance upon the reports from auditors. Auditors also issue 
other reports when necessary during the audit process: 
(a) a report dealing with any matter that the auditor considers needs to be raised in 
the public interest under Section 8 of the Audit Commission Act" , 
(b) any recommendations under Section 11(3) of the Audit Commission Act; and 
(c) information to be reported to the AC in a specified format to enable it to carry 
out any of its other functions, including assessment of performance at relevant 
bodies or to assist other bodies, such as the Healthcare Commission, the 
Commission for Social Care Inspection and the National Audit Office, in 
carrying out their functions. 
(Audit Commission, 2005a, p. 10) 
Auditors are allowed to be as helpful as possible when local authorities seek their views on 
the legality, accounting treatment or value for money (VFM) of a transaction before 
commenting upon it (Audit Commission, 2005a). However, the auditor is prohibited from 
giving a definite view in any case because they must not prejudice their independence by 
being involved in the decision-making processes of the local authority. They are not financial 
or legal advisers to the local authority and they may not act in any way that may refrain their 
ability to exercise the special power conferred upon them by statute. To respond to such 
request, auditors can only offer an indication of whether the information available to them (at 
the time of forming a view) could cause them to consider exercising the specific power 
conferred to them by statute. It is the local authority's responsibility to embark on any 
transaction. A response from auditors should not be taken as suggesting that the proposed 
transaction or course of action will be exempt from challenge in the future, whether by 
auditors or others entitled to raise objection to it. 
In performing their duty, auditors have wide ranging rights of access to documents and 
information related to their audit (Audit Commission, 2005a). The rights apply to documents 
and information held by the audited local authority, its members and staff, as well as the 
local authority's partner and contractors, whether in the public, private or voluntary sectors. 
However, a strict restriction applies to the disclosure of information obtained in the course of 
the audit. The Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not apply to the AC's appointed 
auditors because they are not considered 'public authorities' under that legislation. 
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3.4.4 Certification of grant claims 
Auditors may also be required to review the publ ic and private bod ies in rece iving 
government grants (Audit Commission , 2005a). Grant-paying body requ ires the rece iving 
body to provide evidence of both the amount spent and that the money has been used for 
the purposes for which it was granted . It is the local authorities ' respons ibility to ensure the 
completion, accuracy and completeness of grant claims and returns . The grant-paying body 
may also require independent examination as a condition of the ir acceptance of claims and 
returns and may ask the AC to make arrangements for auditor certification of claims and 
returns . The external auditors will provide the evidence through a certification they provide to 
accompany the claim for payment. It is up to the AC , prior to agreeing to make the 
certification arrangements with aud itors , to consider what is appropriate , practica lly and 
professionally for the auditors to perform . The AC issued a new statement of responsibilities 
of auditors and of audited bodies in 2008 to include additional requ irements in rega rd to 
electronic publication of local authorities' financial statements and to the aud it of charitab le 
funds (Audit Commission , 2008b) . 
3.5 Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
Government Commission Government 
REVIEW II 
Use of 
Resources 
Assessment 
This section will explain the CPA framework before the next section considers the UoR 
assessment. This is necessary because UoR is a component of CPA and contributes 
towards local councils ' CPA star rating . The CPA was introduced by the AC in 2002 as a tool 
that brings together the most significant elements of its audit and inspection work to enable a 
single judgement be formed about local authorities' performance and arrangements fo r 
improving services (Audit Commission , 2006a). When it was first introduced , the CPA 
framework only covered the single tier and county counci ls (Audit Commission , 2006b). 
Tailored frameworks for district councils and fire and rescue authorities were developed after 
2002 . Thus, currently there are three different CPA frameworks for the : 
(a) single tier and county councils ; 
(b) district councils ; and 
(c) fire and rescue authority. 
The AC noted that the application of the CPA approach to local authorities is to support the 
government's modern isation agenda (Aud it Commission , 2006b). The CPA .is part of a wider 
. d ( t out in the Local Government White Paper) aiming to remove 
Improvement agen a se . . . 
. . d . ment on planning spending and decIsion-making and to provide new 
restrictions an requi re ' 
powers to in novate and improve (Aud it Commission , 2002a): 
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The aim is to free up councils to innovate and deliver improvements in the quality of 
service and effective community leadership (p.2) 
The AC asserted that the CPA helps local authorities that find it difficult to judge their own 
performance and deliver service improvements through: 
• helping local authorities identify the actions they need to deliver improvement" 
• ensuring that audit and inspection of local authorities are proportionat~ to 
performance; 
• ensuring that the best local authorities receive significant reduction in audit and 
inspection; 
• ensuring that external audit, inspection and regulation are properly co-ordinated 
and support improvement; 
• streamlining other forms of external regulation; 
• providing a baseline assessment for the allocation and negotiation of fr~edoms 
and flexibilities; and 
• identifying local authorities where intervention is necessary to protect services to 
local community. 
(Audit Commission, 2002a) 
The CPA is also aimed at providing residents with a report card of how their local authority is 
performing overall compared to other local authorities in England (Audit Commission, 
2006b). The AC claimed that the essence of CPA is that it draws on a range of information 
such as performance indicators, assessments of corporate capacity, audit and inspection 
reports, and stakeholder opinions to reach a single judgement about a local authority's 
performance. The AC further claimed that the strength of CPA is that it results in a clear 
public rating on a local authority's performance and provides the basis for a proportionate 
and risk-based approach to regulation. 
The AC set out new 'objectives for CPA in the medium to longer term' in 2003 (further 
refined in 2004) which guided its development work of CPA frameworks and assessment for 
2005 onwards (Audit Commission, 2003a; 2004a). The objectives are: 
(a) The judgement needs to better reflect the experience of the citizen or user of 
services in a locality; 
(b) There needs to be full recognition within the CPA framework of performance 
against the 'shared priorities' for local government agreed by the Central Local 
Partnership; . .. . (c) CPA needs to measure the influence and impact of a counCil In Its locality -
fulfilling its community leadership role with the Local. Str~tegic Partner~hip 
when working with other partners, agencies and organisations to lever hlgh-
quality public services for all; . .. 
(d) CPA needs to measure performance against both national and local priOrities, 
providing an appropriate balan~e be~~en the two; . . 
(e) CPA needs to be aligned With eXisting performance frameworks, including 
national and local public service agreements, and neighbourhood renewal floor 
targets; ···1 rf (f) The impact of deprivation, diverSity and spending on counci pe. ormance 
needs to be renewed and further consideration given to how these Issues are 
included in the framework; . (g) CPA needs to measure the cost effectiveness and value for money delivered 
by councils; . (h) CPA needs to reflect local political choice (added In 2004). . . (Audit CommisSion, 2004a, p.4) 
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The AC continuously reviewed its approach to CPA taki ng into account local authorities' duty 
to secure continuous improvement, lessons learned , and new developments (Audit 
Commission , 2006b). In general , the three frameworks above stand alone except for the 
outcome of the fire and rescue service assessment of county and other local authorities 
responsible for fire services which fed into their overall CPA category from 2006/07 . CPA 
covers four assessment components , common in all the three frameworks: 
(i) corporate assessment; 
(ii) UoR assessment; 
(iii) service assessment; and 
(iv) direction of travel assessment. 
(Audit Commission , 2006b , p. 4) 
All four components contribute towards the overall CPA scores and rat ings, but vary in terms 
of how the components are assessed and conducted in different local authorities depending 
on legal and national framework (Audit Commission , 2006b). This study focuses on single 
tier councils , county councils and district councils only , thus, the next section will explore the 
two CPA frameworks applicable for these local authorities. 
3.5.1 CPA framework for the single tier and county councils 
Single tier councils (the metropolitan borough councils , the metropolitan city councils , un itary 
authorities) and county councils share the same CPA framework. These local authorities 
were the first to have been assessed under the CPA regime , and the first CPA framework for 
these local authorities was introduced in 2002. Figure 17 shows the framework wh ich was 
used in the assessment up to 2004. 
f du(ati on judg~men ts : 
in sp . ( tion, Pis and 
plan assessme nt 
Socia l Care judgements: 
inspection, Pis and 
plan assessmen t 
[ nviro nment judgements: 
inspectio n, Pis Jnd 
plan asst>ssme nt 
HOllSi ng ju dgement s: 
inspection, Pis and 
plan a:;S l?ssmel1 t 
Library and Leisure 
judgl?ments: inspection, 
P Is and pia n ass" ssment 
s.>nefits j udge, entS' 
inspection, Pis and 
pian ass!?ssn en t 
Resou,c<'!s: 
Audi tor judgeme nts, 
in~pe(ti o n , Pis, and 
plan ju dgell1l?nt 
Corporate AHessment: 
Se If -a sIess," en, 
insp"cti on 
M aking ti le Judgement 
Figure 17: Single Tier and County Councils CPA Framework from 2002-2004 
(Source : Audit Commission , 2002a) 
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In this initial framework , the CPA brings together judgements about: 
• core service performance in education , socia l se rvice , housing , environment, 
libraries and leisure and benefits ; 
• UoR including an audit judgement; and 
• The local authority's ability measured through corporate assessment. 
Each of the individual service judgements (6 boxes on the left in the diag ram), the UoR 
judgement, and each of the themes scored within the corporate assessment were awarded a 
score of '1=lowest' to '4=highest'. The scores were then combined through the CPA 
assessment framework above to reach an overall category for the authority. Under th is 
framework the UoR assessment is based on five themes of auditors' judgment. Services 
assessment includes aspects of education, social care, environment, housing , library and 
leisure and benefits which are judged by various inspectorates. Corporate assessments 
assess community leadership and corporate arrangement, and the capacity to support 
services in delivering improvements. The assessment is based on local authority 's self 
assessment and the AC's Corporate Assessment Team . Under this CPA framework loca l 
councils were scored and ranked on a five-point scale of excellent , good , fair , weak and 
poor. After various consultation and discussion , an enhanced CPA framework was 
introduced for the 2005 assessment, called 'CPA -the harder test' to replace the 2002 
version (Audit Commission , 2005b) . Figure 18 shows the enhanced framework introduced in 
2005. 
,./. 
, Use of resources Corporat e assessmen t 
• Financial reporting • Ambit ion 
• Priorit is8t ion 
• Capncity 
• Perforlnnncc manngemcn 
I • Achievement 
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Safer an stronger 
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I '\ .: Heafthie r com munities 
• Financial management 
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• Internal cont ro l 
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Note 1: The use of t'8SOlH'CeS anci service assessments art) anllual; tI~e corpora~e 
(lssessmellt will nOITnally take place once within the programme runn ing from 2005 to 
the elKJ of 2008. 
Note 2: Directiori of tr81/el scorecl judgements 'ilill be pulJlished when CPA categones 
are upd8ted. 
Note 3: Fir'e assessment for all relevant autlior ities from 2006. 
o ° I TO d County Councils CPA -the harder test Framework for 2005 Figure 18: Sing e ler an , 
(Source : A udit Commission , 2005b) 
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The 2005 framework maintains the three assessment components of corporate , se rvices and 
UoR but introduces levels for components to show their relative importance towards the 
overall CPA rating . The UoR assessment was placed at ' level l ' showing its significance 
alongside services the councils provides for children and young people and socia l care for 
adults . 'Level 2' components are less significant. The rating is still on a five-point sca le but 
renamed as star categories , with local authorities being ranked from 0 stars to 4 stars , 0 
being the worst and 4, the best. The 'CPA -the harder test' also involves many changes to 
the way the UoR assessment is carried out. Significant changes to the CPA and the UoR 
assessment in 2005 has made the scores under 2005 framework not comparable to the 
results published for 2002 to 2004 assessment. The Commission cla ims that the changes 
are necessary to improve the measurement system , to boost continuous improvement and to 
avoid gaming among the subjects measured (Audit Commission , 2005b) . 
Further consultation from the public was invited during the first year the 'CPA-the harder test ' 
was implemented and resulted in slight changes to the CPA framework in 2006 (Audit 
Commission , 2006b) . Figure 19 shows the framework for the single tier and county councils 
assessment starting from 2006 which will be used until 2008. 
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Figure 19: Single Tier and County Councils CPA -the harder test Framework for 2006-
2008 
(Source : Audit Commission , 2006b) 
Under the 2006 framework , the three components and levels of assessments were 
.' .' f T I (DoT) indicator was included in the framework as well as 
maintained . A Direction 0 rave 
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darifying the services assessment. The changes in the framework from 2005 to 2006 do not 
Influence the significance of the UoR assessment The Commiss 'lon d 
. announce th at the 
2006 framework will be used until 2008 and acknowledged that the time needed by local 
councils to respond and cope with the changes (Audit Commission , 2006b). 
3.5.2 CPA framework for the district councils 
District councils were introduced to the CPA regime later than the sing le-tier and county 
councils. The first assessment was done on the 238 district councils between June 2003 and 
December 2004 . Figure 20 shows the CPA framework used for the first district councils' 
assessment. 
PubliG space 
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District CPA framework 
District council self-assossmont 
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Corporate 3ssessnJent 
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IndiCators and 
plan assessn ents 
Exlernal a Jdi to( 
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Figure 20: District Councils CPA Framework for Assessment Years of 2004-2005 
(Source: Audit Commission , 2006a) 
In the first round of district councils ' CPA assessment, the methodology appl ied produced a 
single overall judgement including core service performance and council abil ity to improve 
(Audit Commission , 2006a) . The assessment was implemented and reported on county-by-
county basis and district councils ' CPA category have not been updated on annual basis like 
the single tier and county councils because the district councils rely solely on a corpo rate 
assessment. The assessment components include a corporate assessment, diagnostic work 
in key service areas of housing and work space, an assessment done by the Benefi t Fraud 
Inspectorate (BFI ) and the appointed auditors ' assessment. The first corporate assessments 
involved a self-assessment completed by the council followed by an accredited peer 
challenge. The co rporate assessment for each district counci l would later be added an 
external aud itor scored judgement, a housi ng benefit assessment (undertaken by the BFI ) 
and two thematic diagnostic assessments to produce an overal l CPA judgement. The self-
assessed corporate assessment methodology invo lved four key questions and ten themes , 
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with each theme scored on a '1 =weak' to '4=strong ' sca le. Table 11 details the corporate 
assessment framework. Three of the ten themes (investment, achievement of service qual ity 
and achievement of improvement) were given additional weighting . The weighted scores 
were added to produce a CPA category of excellent, good , fair , weak or poor. 
Table 11 etA orpora e ssessment Framework 
Key questions Themes 
1. Ambition 
1. What is the council trying to achieve? 2. Prioritisation 
3. Focus 
2. How has the council set about delivering its 4. Capacity 
priorities for improvement? 5. Performance Management 
3. What improvements has the council 6. Achievement of service quality 
achieved/not achieved to date? 7. Achievement of improvement 8. Investment 
4. In light of what the council has learnt, what 9. Learning 
does it plan to do next? 10. Future plans 
The AC published district councils ' first assessment results as well as lessons learned from 
the assessment in September 2005 (Audit Commission , 2005c) . Under the framework, 
auditor judgment on the UoR was used to influence corporate assessment before the CPA is 
rated . The CPA ratings were on the five-point scale measures of excellent to poor. Only 
overall CPA scores were published for the district councils ' 2003/04 assessment. The AC 
also reported that the future framework for district councils' CPA would come into effect only 
in 2006 (Audit Commission , 2005c) . The AC also notified its intention to consult on the 
development of a future CPA framework for district councils taking into account the findings 
obtained in the first round of the assessment. To allow for continued focus on improvement 
within district councils , the AC informed that it determined that the future CPA framework 
would: 
(a) undertake an annual UoR assessment, including an explicit judgement on VFM , 
for all district councils from March 2006; 
(b) make an annual statement on the DoT of each district council commencing In 
March 2006. 
(Audit Commission , 2005c, p.30) 
Subsequent to the publication of the first assessment results , the AC consulted widely on 
options for the district councils ' CPA and proposals to improve the framework (Aud it 
Commission , 2004a; 2006a) . The consultation included reg ional events, regular discussion 
with a reference group of district councils and meetings wi th several stakeholders includ ing 
government departments. Accordingly , in 2006 , the Commission published another 
framework for the district councils from 2006 to March 2009 . Figure 21 shows the framework 
introduced in 2006. 
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Figure 21: District Councils CPA Framework from 2006-2009 
(Source: Audit Commission , 2006a) 
The 2006 framework introduced a two-stage approach for re-categorisation on the CPA 
rating for the district councils (Audit Commission , 2006a) . Under this framework , the UoR 
assessment, the DoT statement and services performance information are used at 'stage l ' 
to assess the district councils ' request for re-categorisation of their previous year's CPA 
rating. The CPA rating is maintained on the five-point scale of excellent to poor but the AC 
decides whether or not the district councils will receive an annual UoR assessment and DoT 
statement. Starting from this framework , the district councils ' will receive the same 
assessment for UoR as single tier and county councils . The AC allowed an extension of 
several months for the district councils compared to the single tier and county council during 
the 2006 assessment because the district councils were new to the UoR assessment (Audit 
Commission , 2006a) . Regardless of the different contribution which the UoR had on the 
overall CPA between these two types of local councils , the assessment performed by 
auditors is not different. 
3.6 Use of Resources Assessment 
Government Commission Government 
REVIEW II 
Use of 
Resources 
This section discusses the UoR assessment. The assessment began at the same ti me CPA 
was introduced in 2002 as part of the CPA assessment framework for single-tier and cou nty 
councils . The assessment is done by the same external aud itor appointed by the AC to audit 
a council 's annual accounts and runs concurrently with the aud its of annual accounts. To 
achieve the objective of measuring how well local councils manage their financial resources, 
the UoR assessment is div ided into five main categories of auditors ' judgments, called 
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themes.12 Every theme is elaborated into several areas for aud itors' to gather evidence in 
making their judgment. Table 12 shows the five themes auditors used to judge use of 
resources in 2002-2004 and the areas where auditors search for evidence to assess the 
themes. 
Tabl 12 A dOt 'J d e : u I ors U Igment for Use of Resources Assessment in 2002-2004 
Themes of Auditor Judgment Areas for evidences 
. Financial standing Setting a balanced budget 
Setting a capital program 
Financial monitoring and report ing 
Meeting financial targets 
Financial reserves 
Systems of internal control Monitoring of financial systems 
An adequate internal audit function is maintained 
Risk identification and manaqement 
Standards of financial conduct and Ethical framework 
the prevention and detection of fraud Governance arrangements 
and corruption Treasury management (added in 2003 and 2004) 
Prevention and detection of fraud and corruption 
Financial statements Timeliness 
Quality 
Supportinq records 
Legality of significant financial Roles and responsibility 
transactions Consideration of legality of significant financial 
transactions 
New legislation 
(Source. Adapted from wwwaudlt-commlsslongov.ukJreports/CPA-AUDITOR-JUDGEMENT, 2002, 2003 and 
2004) 
The five themes used were: (i) financial standing ; (ii) systems of internal control ; (iii) 
standards of financial conduct and the prevention and detection of fraud and corruption ; (iv) 
financial statements; and (v) legality of significant financial transactions. The auditors judge 
each area of evidence and use their judgement to arrive at each theme's score using a scale 
of 1 to 4, with 1 being the lowest and 4 the highest. The score given for each theme is then 
used to determine the overall UoR's score, also based on the same scale of 1 to 4. During 
these years , 2002-2004, only the single tier and county councils were subject to these 
themes of UoR assessment. When the AC introduced its 'CPA -the harder test' in 2005, 
there were significant changes to the five themes and the way in which the UoR's score was 
assessed (Audit Commission, 2005b) . The five themes have been replaced by new 
categories . The Commission imposed a total revamp on the assessment system and the 
new themes were the latest structure developed based on various consultations , discussion 
and feedbacks on their previous assessment work and results . Figure 21 illustrates th is by 
comparing the themes used to assess UoR introduced in 2005 alongside the themes used 
for the earlier years , 2002-2004 . 
12 www.audit_commission .gov.uk/loCalgovernmenUuseofresourcesIwhat isuor 
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Figure 22: Use of Resources Themes: 2002 and 2005 Frameworks 
(Source: Adapted from Audit Commission's publications on guidance for assessment) 
The UoR assessment from 2005 onwards involves five themes of financial reporting, 
financial management, financial standing, internal control and value for money (Audit 
Commission, 2005b). Value for money was added in the 2005 assessment, while financial 
standing, internal control, financial statements, standards of financial conduct and the 
prevention and detection of fraud and corruption and legality of financial transactions have 
been enhanced or re-categorised to create the new themes. The arrangement of the themes 
in the figure is according to the AC's order of listing and does not reflect any transformation 
from old to new themes' title. Every theme comes with a specific question showing the extent 
of its coverage. 
Financial reporting looks at the strength of a local authority's financial accounting and 
reporting arrangements. Financial management looks at how well the local authority plans 
and manages its finance. Financial standing measures how well the local authority 
safeguards its financial standing and internal control measures how well the local authority's 
internal control environment enables it to manage its significant business risks. Value for 
money (VFM) assesses whether the local authority manages, improves and achieves good 
value for money. 
The auditor judgments used to arrive at theme scores have also been replaced with detailed 
performance indicators called Key Lines of Enquiry (KLoE). The AC claimed that the 
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enhanced system would better help local authorities to improve their management and th e 
services they provide (Audit Commission , 2005b). Various literatures argue that the reg ime 
introduced by the AC has increased centralised control and contradicts the initial 
government's objectives of comprehensive assessment and reporting which is to provide 
greater freedom for local authorities (Hood et. ai , 1998; Hoggett, 1996; Boyne et ai, 2002 ; 
Kelly , 2003) . The AC produces detailed guidelines for auditors on what to look for when 
assessing local authorities' UoR. Every UoR theme has several KLoEs. Evidence as to how 
local authorities should perform is provided for every KLoE. Table 11 through to Table 15 
show the KLoEs and areas where criteria (other themes) and descriptors (value for money) 
are sets out for all the 2005 UoR themes. 
T bl 13 K L· a e ey mes 0 fE nqulry - . I R mancla eportmg 
1. FINANCIAL REPORTING 
How good are the council's financial accountinq and reportinq arranqements? 
Key lines of enquiry: 
1.1 The council produces annual accounts in accordance with relevant standards and timetables, supported by comprehensive working papers 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
a. the council accounts are compiled in accordance with statutory and professional reporting 
standards 
b. the council's accounts are supported by comprehensive working papers 
c. the accounts and supporting working papers are prepared and approved in accordance 
with relevant timetables 
1.2 The council promotes external accountability 
Audit Focus- evidence : 
a. the council publishes its accounts in accordance with statutory requirements 
b. the council publishes summary accounts/annual report in a way that is accessible to the 
public 
(Source: Audit Commission , 2005d; 2006c) 
Financial Reporting (FR) theme comes with two KLoEs looking at whether: (i) the local 
authority produces annual accounts in accordance with relevant standards and timetables , 
supported by comprehensive working papers and (ii) the local authority promotes external 
accountability . Evidence is gathered around the local authority 's accounting process and 
publication . 
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T bl 14 K a e ey Lines of Enquiry - Financial Management 
2. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
How well does the council plan and manaqe its finances? 
Key lines of enquiry: 
2.1 The council's medium-term financial strategy, budgets and capital programme are sound ly based and designed to deliver its strategic priorities 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council 's corporate business plan (that sets out its aims and objectives) is linked to its 
financial planning and management 
The council's budget and capital programme are based on robust medium-term fi nancial 
projections and risk assessments 
2.2 The council manages performance against budgets 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council has arrangements in place for monitoring against budgets , taking corrective 
action where appropriate, and reporting to senior officers and members 
The council's financial information systems meets users' needs 
2.3 The council manages its asset base 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council has a capital strategy and fixed asset management plan 
The council reports to members on asset management 
(Source: Audit Commission , 2005d; 2006c) 
Financial Management (FM) theme comes with three KLoEs looking at whether: (i) the local 
authority's medium-term financial strategy, budgets and capital programme are soundly 
based and designed to deliver its strategic priority , (ii) the local authority manages 
performance against budgets and (iii) the local authority manages its asset base. 
Table 15: Key Lines of Enquiry - Financial Standing 
3. FINANCIAL STANDING 
How well does the council safeguard its financial standinq? 
Key lines of enquiry: 
3.1 The council manages its spending within available resources 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council is financially sound 
The council manages its levels of reserves and balances 
current spending plans match available resources 
(Source: Audit CommiSSion , 2005d , 2006c) 
Financial Standing (FS) theme comes with one KLoE looking at whether the local authority 
manages its spending within available resources. 
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T bl 16 K a e ey Lines of Enquiry - Internal Control 
4. INTERNAL CONTROL 
How well does the council's internal control environment enable it to manage its sign ificant 
business risks? 
Key lines of enquiry: 
4 .1 The council manages its significant business risks 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council has a risk management process in place 
The risk management system covers partnership working 
4.2 The council has arrangements in place to maintain a sound system of internal control 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council reviews and reports on its system of internal control 
The council has an audit committee or equivalent and an internal audit function 
4.3 The council has arrangements in place that are designed to promote and ensure probity and propriety in the conduct of its business 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council has adopted codes of conduct and monitors compliance 
The council's arrangements to prevent and detect fraud and corruption are effective 
(Source. Audit Commission , 2005d ; 2006c) 
The Internal Control (I C) theme comes with three KLoEs looking at whether: (i) the local 
authority manages its significant business risks, (ii) the local authority has arrangements in 
place to maintain a sound system of internal control and (iii) the local authority has 
arrangements in place that are designed to promote and ensure probity and propriety in the 
conduct of its business. 
Table 17: Key Lines of Enquiry - Value For Money 
5. VALUE FOR MONEY 
Kev lines of enquiry: 
5.1 The council currently achieves good value for money 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
Costs compare well with others allowing for external factors 
Costs are commensurate with service delivery , performance and outcomes achieved 
Costs reflect policy decisions 
5.2 The council manages and improves value for money 
Audit Focus- evidence: 
The council monitors and reviews value for money 
The council has improved value for money and achieved efficiency gains (limited to the last 
three years) 
Procurement and other spending decisions take account of full long-term costs 
(Source: Audit Commission , 2005d ; 2006c) 
The Value for Money (VFM) theme comes with two KLoEs looking at whether: (i) the local 
authority currently achieves good value for money and (ii ) the local authority manages and 
improves value for money. 
The evidence for every KLoE is then elaborated in detail for each level of score to be 
awarded (Audit Commission 2005d ; 2006c; 2006d ; 2007a). The elaborations are called 
criteria for other themes and descriptors for the VFM theme. Cri teria/descriptors are deta iled 
exp lanations and descriptions on what a local authority should do to be awarded a score of 
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'1' to '4'. The criteria for each of the five themes were spread accordingly on three levels: 
criteria at level 2 to criteria at level 4 (Appendix 6 shows an example of how the 
criteria/descriptors are described). Level 1 criterion was not tabled as local authorities which 
have not met all the criteria at level 2 will be given a '1'. Some of the KLoE's criteria 
tabulated at all levels are highlighted in bold indicating the criteria as a 'must-have' to obtain 
that particular level. The AC has set level 2 criteria as a basic requirement from local 
authorities. Local authorities not meeting the basic requirement stated at level 2 will be 
scored 1. Local authorities will move to higher level of 3 or 4 if they fulfil requirements set at 
the higher level. 
The KLoE, evidence and criteria/descriptor for the UoR assessment clarifies what is required 
from local authorities. This should help local authorities to work towards the criteria required 
to obtain better scores. The themes, KLoE and its evidence have not gone through any 
changes since it was introduced in 2005. However, from one year to another, the AC has 
reflected on the experiences of their auditors, the local authorities and various consultations 
they had through a revised version of criteria/descriptors for the KLoE evidence. For the 
assessment done in 2006, the changes made on the criteria/descriptors were only to clarify 
the description written for the 2005 assessment. The AC made the criteria/descriptors harder 
in the 2007 and 2008 assessments. This is claimed to promote continuous improvement 
effort among local councils. The changes made on the criteria/descriptors include movement 
from previously higher levels to lower levels, making compulsory the existing non-
compulsory features or adding new criteria/descriptors to tighten the assessment. 
When other themes are assessed based on the evidence and criteria sets out for KLoEs, 
auditors will use local authorities' self assessment as a basis and descriptors for KLoE 
evidence to help them judge the VFM theme. VFM is defined as the relationship between 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness or 'value-chain' (Audit Commission, 2006d). The AC 
provided guidance called 'VFM Profiler Tool' to assist local authorities in completing the self 
assessment for VFM (hUp://vfm.audit-commission.gov.uk). The AC has not set any VFM 
theme descriptors in bold to indicate must-have because of the subjective nature of VFM 
theme (Audit Commission 2005d; 2006c; 2006d; 2007a). The auditors responsible for 
assessing VFm theme would search for the 'best fit' descriptors in the levels set by the AC 
that represent the local authority's state of performance. 
The AC claimed the new KLoEs are more strategic and better than the previously less 
flexible criteria (Audit Commission, 2005b). The additional details introduced in KLoEs may 
help reduce the subjectivity of auditor's judgments. This may help to overcome the issue 
raised Boyne and Enticott (2004) on the lack of differences they found between authorities 
achieving the lowest two of 'Poor' and 'Weak' and the highest two of 'Good' and 'Excellent' 
ran kings. However the effectiveness and efficiency of these new indicators are still subject to 
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further investigation . Enhanced assessment for the UoR themes requires add itional work 
from auditors. Extra work means greater coverage of auditing and add itional cost for local 
authorities . Local authorities also need to prepare themselves to be audited on more aspects 
than before, which means more resources for compliance. 
The theme's score is determined after the auditor has decided the position of a local 
authority's on the KLoE levels. A four-point scale similar to the 2002 assessment framework 
applies but the Commission clarifies the four-point scale used in rating both the themes and 
overall use of resources with its 2005 document on the assessment (Audit Commission , 
2006d; 2007a). Listed below is the four-point scale and what is meant by each level in the 
scale : 
4 = well above minimum requirements - performing strongly; 
3 = consistently above minimum requirements - performing well ; 
2 = at only minimum requirements - adequate performance; and 
1 = below minimum requirements - inadequate performance. 
A local authority which does not achieve the minimum requirement reflecting inadequate 
performance will get a 1 while a local authority achieving well above minimum requirements 
reflecting strong performance will get the highest rating , 4. The five themes ' scores will then 
be used to score the overall UoR. Table 18 shows the rules used to determine the overall 
UoR score from its themes' scores. 
T bl 18 S a e cOring R I f U u es or se 0 fR esources A ssessmen t 
Scores on Use of resources themes Overall score 
At least two 4s; No score below 3 on any headings 4 
At least three 3s, no score below 2 3 
At least three 2s 2 
Any other combination 1 
(Source Audit Commission 's publication, 2006d ; 2007a) 
As a continuous improvement effort, the AC consulted and conducted discussion to enhance 
the assessment they performed (Audit Commission , 2005b) . They also received a 
suggestion to include making VFM as a compulsory element to achieve a higher UoR score. 
However, the suggestion was not followed in any of the AC 's assessment because the AC 
perceived that inclusion of VFM as compulsory was not feasible at this stage. The AC also 
claimed that the UoR assessment assesses local councils ' management and leadersh ip 
abilities and not the resources of the local council. The AC has also addressed the proposal 
to provide different arrangements for deprivation issues. 
The CPA will be replaced with Comprehensive Area Assessment (CM) in 2009 . The 
changes will be major where services assessment will be done on area-based instead of 
organisational based approach . However, the UoR assessment will still be done on 
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individual organisations although there would be significant changes to the assessment , 
such as inclusion of a sustainable approach in its assessment framework which requires 
economic, social and environmental issues to be addressed together. 
3.6.1 The use of resources assessment process 
The UoR is an annual assessment for local authorities. Some local authorities are assessed 
by the district auditors, but the AC provides training for all appointed auditors before they 
start their assessment work to help them familiarise and understand the work requirement. 
The AC also provided guidance documents for auditors to approach the assessment. Local 
councils are expected to consult their auditors and the AC on matters relevant to the 
assessment. Before the 'relationship managers' function was stopped in 2007, the AC 
expected a local authority to work closely with their relationship manager and auditor to help 
them learn from the assessment process and improve their council's performance and 
services they provide. 
The AC has a committee to develop the assessment rules and regulations. The rules and 
regulations are based on the Code of Audit Practice and the statutes. The AC invites 
responses from the public and local authorities prior to introducing any new rules and 
regulations. After feedback and consultations with various parties, the AC will produce new 
rules. The new rules will then be pilot tested on several local authorities before finalisation. 
After the AC is satisfied, the new rules will be issued for local authorities' application and 
published on its website for public information. This process applies to all aspect of CPA and 
UoR assessment. For UoR assessment the AC issues KLoE and guidance documents to 
help both local authorities and auditors approach the assessment (for example: Audit 
Commission 2006d; 2007a). The guidance documents are normally issued every year to 
guide assessment for that year. The guidance provides information on the timelines of the 
assessment, how auditors should judge and score the performance, and processes to reach 
a final score. 
There are other guides on the responsibilities of auditors and audited bodies and 'notable 
practices' published on the Commission's website. The responsibility guide presents detail 
explanation; mostly elaboration of the Code, on what the auditors and local councils should 
do (Audit Commission, 2005a). The 'notable practices' are case studies drawn from local 
councils which have been successful and improved their performance, normally those 
scoring 4 for overall UoR or achieving level 4 in the themes assessed. The 'notable 
practices' are collected and published to help local councils learn from the success of others. 
The timelines for UoR assessment in 2007 as published in the AC's guidance document is 
extracted and presented in Table 19 below. 
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Table 19' Timelines for Assessment 
Date Events 
February Commission consulted on proposals for the 2007 KLOE and published final changes 
2006 in the CPA-the harder test framework consultation document in April 2006. 
November KLOE published on the Commission 's website with summary of changes to the 
assessment 
February Use of resources guidance for councils and VFM self-assessment pro-forma 
2007 available on Commission's website 
April to Auditors undertake assessment fieldwork for all councils. 
October 
By the end Updated VFM profile tool available on the Commission's website 
of April 
Councils to provide update to previous year's VFM self-assessment - date to be 
agreed with their auditor 
From 19 Auditors discuss their theme judgements with councils while the Commission 's 
November national quality control is ongoing . 
10 Commission notifies councils of their overall score , following completion of national 
December quality control. 
21 Deadline for councils to request a review of their overall score 
December 
January Commission publishes overall councils ' use of resources scores and auditor theme 
2008 judgments on its website 
March Relationship managers issue their Audit and Inspection Letters to councils 
(Source : Audit Commission , 2007a , p. 11 ) 
Table 19 indicates that the AC published its KLoE for the 2007 UoR assessment a few 
months ahead of the assessment process. The KLoE is published with a summary of 
changes from the previous year's assessment. The AC then published its UoR assessment 
guide in February 2007 and uploaded the VFM pro-forma on their website for local 
authorities to begin their preparation . In 2007 , auditors started assessment fieldwork in April 
until October 2007 . Auditors use the self assessment pro-forma for VFM before they score 
the theme with local authorities being required to update the pro-forma before the end of 
April. In gathering evidence for their judgement, auditors will use various documents. The 
AC provided guidance on the documents from which auditors would draw evidence for every 
UoR themes (Audit Commission , 2007a) . This helps local authorities to prepare the 
necessary documents and inform the auditors on what document they should expect. Table 
20 shows the documents from which evidence will be drawn for assessment in 2007. 
Table 20' Source of Evidence for Auditors based in themes 
Themes Evidence 
Financial reporting 2006/07 financial statements , summary financial information 
and annual report 
Financial management 2007/08 budget and updated medium term financial strategy 
issued prior to March 2007 
Financial standing Financial position consistent with audited out-turn for 2006/07 
and reserves policies in place for 2007/08 budget 
Internal control Statement on internal control for 2006/07 
Value for money Costs and performance indicators re lating to 2006/07 and 
earlier years 
(Source : Audit Commission , 2007a) 
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Table 20 shows that the financial reporting theme depends a lot on loca l authorities ' financial 
statements and that the financial management theme concentrates on budget and financial 
strategy documents. The financial standing theme looks at the financial positions consistent 
with 'audited out-turn ' and reserves policies stated in local authorities ' budget. The internal 
control theme focuses on local authorities ' 'statement on internal control ' and the VFM theme 
would look at costs and performance indicators . The VFM theme assessment is different 
from other themes' in that the auditor would use a VFM self assessment pro-forma . The AC 
claimed that the assessment for VFM theme complements local authorities' processes in 
producing their 'annual efficiency statements '. Auditors will review arrangements related to 
the annual efficiency statements to assess the VFM theme. The auditor will decide the local 
authorities' achievement level of the KLoE criteria based on the evidence they have 
collected . The AC also provides guidance on how the auditor should score the local 
authorities' KLOE. Table 21 shows the scoring rules. 
Table 21: Rules for KLOE levels for themes other than VFM 
Performance Requirement 
Level 1 Not meetinq criteria at level 2 
Level 2 All criteria at level 2 met 
Level 3 All level 2 arrangements embedded and working effectively with clear 
outcomes 
All bold criteria at level 3 met and embedded 
Level 4 All bold criteria for levels 2 and 3 embedded 
Display innovation or best practice that can be shared with other councils 
*Level 4 criteria are indicative only of level 4 performance. They have been 
kept to a minimum and are not shown in bold type. This is to avoid the 
criteria for the top level of performance beinq prescriptive and limiting. 
(Source: Adapted from Audit Commission 2006d; 2007d) 
The AC claimed that the criteria at level 2 are the basic requirements of a local authority 
(Audit Commission , 2005b) . That would indicate that achieving level 2 is simple for local 
authorities which comply with government requirements and maintain sufficient 
documentation of their work. However, moving from level 2 to 3 needs some innovation and 
hard work , while level 4 is not easy to achieve , reflected in the fact that not many local 
authorities scored 4 on any of the use of resources ' theme. 13 The scores evidence that the 
majority of local authorities achieved level 2, reflecting their ability to meet all the basic 
requirements . 
Some local authorities experienced improvement in their published scores in 2005 to 2006 
and 2007. A few local authorities also experienced declines in their scores . To improve from 
level 1 to 2 could be easy for local authorities that do not have many problems with their 
organisation and few dropped from level 2 to level 1. However, moving from level 2 to higher 
levels could be more difficult relatively . Dropping from level 4 to the lower levels may occur 
when local authorities do not make any improvement from the previous year. This happens 
because the AC has moved several criteria which previously were at higher levels to lower 
13 www.audil_commission .gov.ukJlocalgovernmentiuseofresources/uorscores 
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levels to make the assessment tougher. Local authorities at borderlines in any levels would 
appear to have a higher risk of dropping their score in a future year. 
The scores allocated by auditors are subject to two levels of quality control, at the AC's 
regional management area and national levels (2007 Interview Data). Auditors would meet at 
the regional level to moderate the scores they allocate for local authorities before they 
submit the scores to the AC. At this point, auditors discuss the suitability of scores they have 
awarded to avoid some local authorities being rated more strictly than others. Auditors also 
discuss with each other when they come across cases for which they found it difficult to 
allocate scores. After moderation at the regional level, auditors will submit the scores 
electronically, using the Electronic Data Coding (EDC) system, to the AC's head office in 
London by 19th November (based on the timelines for 2007 assessment). 
The scores submitted to the AC's head office will then go through a second round of quality 
control, at national level, moderating the scores for all regions in England. Auditors can now 
discuss their themes' judgments with councils while the Commission's national quality 
control is progressing. The Commission uses statistical analysis and tests (Interview data: 
the AC manager, 2007) to check for consistency throughout England. The AC cannot 
change the scores allocated by auditors, they only observe the consistency and check if the 
auditors have done proper work and quality control at regional level. In the event of outliers 
in the scoring data or extraordinary cases, the AC panel at national level would investigate 
and refer the cases back to auditors who provided the scores (Interview data: the AC 
manager, 2007). Auditors will then have to explain their scoring accordingly to the AC. 
After the national quality control has been completed, the scores will be notified to local 
authorities through the AC's website. Local authorities are allowed 10 days to respond and 
request the AC to review the score if they are not satisfied with it. Local authorities are only 
allowed to ask for a review on their overall theme's scores, not on the KLoEs. Less than 10 
percent of local authorities appeal for the review and very few succeeded (Interview data: the 
AC manager, 2007). The numbers of local authorities appealing were also declined in 2006 
and 2007 compared to 2005. Several factors could have discouraged them from appealing. 
One of the reasons is the nature of the assessment being held annually does not present a 
significant benefit to obtain a better score through appeal and review. By the time their score 
was reviewed and changed, the next assessment cycle will have begun. It may be better for 
the local authority to discuss with their auditors and relationship managers to help them 
target the area of improvement for the future instead of requesting a review. After 
considering the review request, which would take around a month, the AC will publish the 
final scores for the UoR and its themes. The AC (previously done by the relationship 
managers) will then prepare and issue their Audit and Inspection Letter to councils. 
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3.7 Summary 
The review in this chapter covers the background and technical environment of this study 
which mainly answers the first research question: what are the functions of external auditors 
for local authorities in England; and opens the window to link with further research questions. 
Information on the local authorities, the AC, the auditors, the assessment frameworks, 
procedures and timelines were discussed. This information is necessary to answer the rest 
of the research questions, especially to inform the discussion of findings from the published 
performance measures in Chapter 5. The extent of the rules and regulations surrounding the 
assessment regimes of CPA, and in particular the UoR assessment, support Hood et ai's 
argument about the increase in intensity and formality of the regulation, as well as number of 
people involved in inspection. The author's arguments on the attempts by the regulatory 
body to standardise the assessment criteria and on the attempts to influence and change 
auditees' behaviour is evidenced by the detailed rules of the KLoEs. Power's argument 
about the explosion of auditing also prevailed from the review in this chapter, in which audit 
is used beyond its traditional functions of certification to cover the assessment of the use of 
resources and to provide accountability of the organization and its officers. Power (2003) 
suggests that the explosion effect can be seen in both an institutional and behavioural 
context. In local government, the explosion effect in terms of institutional context is prevalent 
in the formation of the AC to take over several inspectorates' functions and to coordinate the 
remaining inspectorates. In terms of the behavioural context, the AC presents a list of 
detailed indicators to measure performance. Thus, the monitoring and assessment, using 
specific indicators, would have an impact on the auditees' behaviour. Furthermore, the 
attempt to make everything auditable and quantifiable is complex and might work in 
opposition to what is intended by NPM. Undoubtedly these would have an impact on the 
auditees and their behaviour which warrants further investigation. 
The next chapter discusses the research methodology adopted in this study to achieve the 
aims and objectives set out earlier. 
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4.1 Introduction 
This chapter links the literature reviews presented in the previous two chapters and the 
research findings presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. The research questions, aim and 
objectives will be recalled before associating them with the research design and the 
methodological position followed in this study. According to Oliver (2004) 
the term 'methodology' is used in a general sense to refer to both theoretical and 
practical aspects of the conduct of the research (p.121) 
Several theoretical and practical issues are discussed such as research types , philosophical 
paradigms, methods, and approaches. The position chosen in each of these topics is justified 
in the corresponding section . Afterwards, the procedures used for data collection is 
explained, which comprises of several stages reflecting the sequence of research questions 
set to uncover the issues. This is followed by examining aspects of the main data collection , 
such as sample, access, checklist guide, and interview timings , duration , place and 
transcriptions. Finally, the methods of analysis chosen and how the credibility of the research 
was assured, are discussed. 
4.2 Research Question, Aim and Objectives 
Research 
Question 
Aim 
Objectives 
(Specific 
research 
questions) 
HOW DOES THE EXTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTION OF LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND AFFECT LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS 
AUDITEES? 
To discover how the external auditing performed at local authorities in 
England affect local authorities as recipients of the service. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
What are the functions of external auditors for local authorities in 
England? 
How do the local authorities perform based on their auditor's 
assessment (certification audit and Use of Resources assessment)? 
Do the auditees view the published scores as reflecting improvement 
and position of the local authorities? 
What factors contribute to the variations in local authorities ' 
performance? 
How do the auditees view the external audit process and the 
performance assessments? 
119 
RESE,AR CH METHODOLOGY 
To achieve the main aim , five specific questions were generated. The five specific questions 
guided the sequence of exploration, in which the first question is explored before movi ng to 
the second and so on . A case study design is considered appropriate , which allows deta iled 
and intensive analysis of external audit within a single region , Yorkshire and The Humber, 
where each local authority in the region constitute a separate case (Bryman and Bell , 2003). 
Multiple cases also allows for cross comparison . In terms of the method of data collection , a 
mixed method approach is chosen since one method of analysis alone will not be adequate to 
meet all the research objectives , the first analysis is then embedded in the attempt to discover 
the next, which makes this study explanatory in nature (Creswell and Clark , 2007). The first 
objective is approached through analysing archival government documents, presented in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. The findings were then embedded into the second objective, for 
which the auditors' reports and scores for various years were collected and analysed to 
discover how local authorities are performing , the findings will be presented in Chapter 5. 
These findings are then embedded and used in generating structured questions for interviews 
with the directors of finance (and the like) at local authorities to answer research objectives 
three to five . These findings will be presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The section that 
follows will explain in detail the methodological positions, research design and strategy 
adopted in this study. 
4.3 Methodological Position 
Methodology is considered the "overall approach to the research process" (Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997, p. 54) . Similarly, Easterby-Smith et al (2002) defined it as the "combination of 
techniques used to enquire into a specific situation" (p.31) . This section will examine the 
approach and methodological position of this study. 
METHODOLOGY 
Types Applied Research 
Paradigms 
Ontology 
Epistemology 
Unbiased 
Logic Deductive Inductive 
I I 
Rhetoric Form al sty le Inform al style 
I 
Figure 23: Methodological Position 
(Source : Adapted from Creswell and Clark, 2007) 
Partic ipatory Combining 
A dvocacy & Formal/informal 
C hange 
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Figure 23 describes the many research approaches that follow the choice of paradigm to 
exhibit the methodological position of this study. The shaded boxes represent what this study 
adopts as its philosophy and stances. 
4.3.1 Type of Research 
It is important to classify research as pure, applied or action research. The choice between 
these research types is dependent on the "outcomes that are assumed to emerge" (Easterby-
Smith et ai, 2002, p.8). The authors distinguished the three types of research according to its 
aims. 
(1) The aim of pure research is to develop theory with or without practical implications. In 
short, there are three forms of pure research: discovery, when a new idea emerges from the 
research; invention, when a new idea is created to a particular problem; and reflection which 
consists of applying an existing idea into a different context. (2) Applied research is concerned 
with the solution of a particular problem, often involving clients from organisations. Thus, the 
most important focus in applied research is the application of the theory to the practice. (3) 
The main idea of action research is that in order to understand a particular phenomenon the 
researcher should try to change it; an active involvement existing between the researcher and 
the process being researched (Thompson and Perry, 2004; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
Based on these arguments, and according to the specific aims of this study, applied research 
was considered most appropriate in order to generate theory which can be applied in practice. 
According to Hart (1998) the key idea of this type of research is "to take theoretical insights 
and apply these in real-world situations" (p.46), which is precisely the purpose of this 
research. This research aims to contribute (theoretically) to literatures on local government 
auditing, yet not forgetting its practical nature of considering what else could be done to 
improve the current assessment process. Findings will be shared with local authorities after 
this study is concluded and could be used by the AC to help them utilise the process 
effectively. Having decided to employ applied research, the research philosophy adopted in 
this study will be discussed. This is followed by a discussion on the research paradigms, 
stating which one was chosen and why. 
4.3.2 Research Philosophy or Paradigm 
All research needs a foundation for its enquiry, and enquirers need to be aware of the implicit 
worldviews they bring to their studies and the choice of the philosophical paradigm is a vital 
point in conducting a research project. According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2000) the 
"research philosophy depends on the way you think about the development of knowledge" 
(p.84). Basically, there are two major paradigms in the research process (verification of 
theoretical propositions): positivism and anti-positivism. Positivist research is empirical and 
quantitative and often said to be inappropriate in relation to social research (Brymen, 1993; 
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Anderson, 1990; Chadwick et al. 1984; Allison, 1993). According to positivism, the objective 
world exists independently of any perspectives of the researchers. Therefore, researchers 
must disclose the objective facts. Anti-positive philosophies, which adopt qualitative 
approaches are widely used in social research and known as interpretivism, ethnography, 
phenomenology and others. From these two basic philosophies, several other philosophies 
emerged. Creswell and Clark (2007) outlined four philosophies or paradigms, which they 
described as worldview, normally used as foundations in research; post-positivism, 
constructivism, critical theory, and pragmatism, described in Table 22. 
Table 22" Four Worldviews U d" R se In esearc hit d ,re a e h approac es and nature 
Worldviews Approach Nature 
Determination 
Post-positivism Quantitative Reductionism Empirical observation and measurement 
Theory verification 
Understanding 
Constructivism Qualitative Multiple participants meanings Social and historical construction 
Theory generation 
Critical Theory Political 
(Advocacy & Qualitative Empowerment and issue oriented 
Participatory) Collaborative Change oriented 
Consequences of actions 
Pragmatism Mixed methods Problem centred Pluralistic 
Real-world practice oriented 
(Source: Compiled from Creswell and Clark, 2007» 
Post-positivism which emerged after the end of World War II, is a modification of positivism 
(Rapoport 1970; Fox, 1990). Post-positivist admits that reality is difficult to be perfectly 
understood and researcher can only approach the truth with rigorous data collection and 
analysis. Post-positivism is often associated with quantitative approaches (Cresswell and 
Clark, 2007). Researchers' claim for knowledge is based on: a. determinism or cause and 
effect thinking; b. reductionism, narrowing and focusing on selected variables to inter-relate; c. 
detailed observation and measures of variables; and, d. testing of theories that are continually 
refined. Post-positivist is widely influential within qualitative research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998). 
Constructivism covers a wide span of positions from those indistinguishable by post-positivist 
approaches to relativist positions. On reality, constructivist advocate multiple, socially 
constructed realities which "when known more fully, tend to produce diverging inquiry" 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1986, p.75). Realities cannot be studied in pieces or as variables but only 
in a whole and in context. Constructivism rejected the traditional image of the split relationship 
between knower and known, researcher and subject. Lincoln (1990) wrote that the ontology of 
constructivism is that: 
... reality is a social, multiple construction ... the aim of constructivist science is to create 
idiographic knowledge, usually expressed in the form of pattern theories ... expressed 
as working hypotheses, or temporary, time-and-place-bound knowledge. (p. 77) 
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Constructivism is associated with qualitative approaches where understanding or meaning of 
a phenomenon is formed through participants and their subjective view. Research is shaped 
from individual perspectives to broad patterns and finally to theory (Cresswell and Clark, 
2007). Critical theory originated in the Frankfurt School, Germany, during the pre-war years 
(Danforth, 1995). Critical theory included a wider definition of qualitative research aimed to 
generate empowerment or emancipatory social change (Harvey, 1990, Popkewitz, 1990). 
Critical ethnography, feminist research and participatory action research are related to this 
paradigm. Critical theory admits researcher bias due to historical, political, societal, ethnic or 
gender conditions is unavoidable in the approach to understand reality. The researcher has to 
be related to social values while keeping in mind that the purpose of their research is to 
realise the social values. The advocacy and participatory paradigms also refer to critical 
theory because it is influenced by political concerns. This approach is more often associated 
with qualitative approaches than quantitative (Cresswell and Clark, 2007). This paradigm is 
characterized by a view of the need to improve our society and those in it, often addressing 
issues such as empowerment, marginalization, hegemony, patriarchy, and researchers 
collaborate with individuals experiencing injustices. In the end this type of researcher plans for 
social groups to be changed for the better, so that individuals feel less marginalized. 
Buchanan and Brymen (2007, p. 486) argues that organizational research boundaries has 
widened significantly since its foundation, has developed a multi-paradigmatic profile, and has 
been extraordinarily inventive with data collection methods. The authors wrote that the 1980s 
paradigm wars have turn into a "paradigm soup". Therefore the organisational research 
nowadays uses diverse social sciences paradigms. Pluralism in methodology has increased 
popularity of mixed-methods research which according to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) has 
made the relationship between epistemology and method problematical, weakening the 
confidence in and preoccupation of those links. Thus, method is increasingly located in the 
context of wider and more fluid intellectual currents, discouraging rigid adherence to 
epistemological positions, encouraging a more pragmatic 'do whatever is necessary' or 'pick 
and choose approach to choices of methods. However, Meyer (1991, p. 218) suggested that a 
"burst of innovation" and a "new pluralism in methodology" in organization science had not 
affected data collection methods. 
Cresswell and Clark (2007) describe this "paradigm soup" as pragmatism which normally is 
associated with a mixed-methods research. Pragmatism focuses on the results of research, 
and main importance of the research questions rather than the methods it adopts. Therefore 
this paradigm adopts multiple methods of data collection to inform the problem being studied. 
Pragmatism is chosen for my study because it attempts to discover issues underpinning the 
external auditing process imposed on local government, requires carefully designed questions 
to extract answers, and multiple methods of data collection. 
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The aim of this research is not directly to test any hypotheses, but the information collected 
will be developed into themes to analyse for regularities. Quantitative performance measures 
will be analysed to develop themes and direction for further investigation. Interviewees will be 
presented with structured statements for them to mark prior to face-to-face interview; the 
marked responses will be tested for frequencies. During the face-to-face interviews, the 
interviewees are allowed to explain their responses in detail to provide greater understanding 
of the themes' developed through the quantitative analysis. The face-to-face interviews also 
enhance the validity of research findings because they verify and support the quantitative 
analysis. 
Consequently, besides using some form of quantitative measures and analysis to develop its 
themes, this research primarily focuses on how interviewees "perceive, think and feel" 
(Saunders et ai, 2000, p.86), aiming to understand their perceptions on the external audit 
processes imposed on them. Thus pragmatism is the philosophical paradigm underlying this 
research. The key point was to explore the process and its outcomes through some 
quantitative measures which then will lead to exploring meanings, experiences and insights 
that the auditees give to the research topic. This pragmatic approach combines both 
quantitative and qualitative methods, adopts single and multiple realities and address 
practicality when it comes to data collection (the researcher collects data by "what works" to 
address research question). This paradigm is expected to contribute to meaningful exploration 
and discovery of the issues concerned. 
All the four paradigms have common elements but take different stances on these elements. 
Each paradigm represents different ontological and epistemological positions. These different 
stances influence how researchers conduct and report their inquiries. According to Thompson 
and Perry (2004) researchers should work with the paradigm which is consistent with their 
"ultimate presumptions" (pA03). Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) summarised the four 
important paradigms used in social and behavioural sciences, and their assumptions, as in 
Table 23 below: 
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Table 23: Comparison of Four Important Paradigms Used in Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 
Assumptions Paradigms -Cp~o~sT4it~iv~i~s~m~----~P~o~s~t-~P~O~S~it~iv~i=s=m~~~~P=ra~g~m~a~ti~s=m~------~C~o-n-s~t-ru-c~t7iv~i-sm-------
Ontology Na'ive realism Critical or Accept external reality. Relativism 
Epistemology 
Methodology 
Logic 
Axiology 
Causal 
Linkages 
Objective point of 
view. Knower and 
known are 
Dualism 
Quantitative 
Deductive 
Enquiry is value-
free 
Real causes 
temporally 
precedent to or 
simultaneous with 
effects 
transcendental realism Choose explanations 
that best produce 
desired outcomes 
Modified dualism. 
Findings probably 
Objectively "true" 
Primarily Quantitative 
Primarily Deductive 
Enquiry involves values, 
but they may be 
controlled 
There are some lawful, 
reasonably stable 
relationships among 
social phenomena. 
These may be known 
imperfectly. Causes are 
identifiable in a 
probabilistic sense 
that changes over time 
Both objective and 
subjective points of 
view 
Quantitative + 
Qualitative 
Deductive + Inductive 
Values playa large role 
in interpreting results 
There may be causal 
relationships, but we 
will never be able to pin 
them down 
Source: Tashakkori and Teddie (1998, p.23) 
Subjective point of view. 
Knower and Known are 
inseparable 
Qualitative 
Inductive 
Enquiry is value bound 
All entities 
simultaneously shaping 
each other. It's 
impossible to distinguish 
causes from effects 
The section that follows will discuss on the assumptions and choice of this study. 
4.3.3 Ontology and Epistemology 
Ontological and epistemological positions describe the researcher's beliefs about the world 
which is fundamental when choosing the research methodology. Traditionally, ontology and 
epistemology are considered the twin terms of methodology (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, 
p.30). Ontology is about the assumptions people make on the nature of reality. Epistemology 
is about the general set of assumptions that people make on the best ways of searching into 
the reality of the world, in other words epistemology is about the relationship between the 
researcher and the subject being researched (Oliver, 2004; Thompson and Perry, 2004; 
Bryman and Bell, 2003; Easterby-Smith et ai, 2002). 
Cassell (2001) emphasised the epistemological and ontological principles within the objectivist 
and subjectivist paradigms (see Table 24). The objectivist paradigm relates to positivism, and 
the subjectivist paradigm to post-positivism (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
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Table 24: Epistemological and Ontological principles within the Objectivist and 
5 b" "" U IJectlvlst paradigms 
Objectivist Subjectivist 
Epistemology Social scientific approaches are similar Unlike natural sciences there is no 
to those of the natural sciences. privileged vantage point that leads 
Researchers seek to explain and predict to understanding. We all interpret 
by searching for regularities and causal and make sense of the world in 
relationships different ways. All the researcher 
can do is report their interpretations 
without any claim to privileQe. 
Ontology The social world exists externally to us. There is no real structure to the 
It is made up of hard tangible structures world. It does not exist 
and exists before we enter on it. independently of us. Names for 
things are just artificial creations. 
(Source. Compiled from Cassell, 2001) 
In this study a combination of both subjectivist/objectivist epistemology and ontology were 
followed, resulting in a mixed methods approach. Themes of enquiries were established 
based on secondary data and documentation through regularities and causal relationship. The 
themes are then used to develop a set of structured interview questions where respondents 
marked their choice of answer. The marked answers are analysed statistically to check on 
regularities and frequencies. Interviewees are allowed to freely express their own 
interpretations, meanings, feelings and experiences on the research topic in structured-
interviews method. The main purpose of this research is to explore perceptions and 
differences among local authorities as auditees; how these interviewees perceive the 
assessment process; to understand their reasons and experiences in the field. In this study, 
findings emerged only from secondary data analysis and interviewees' insights. 
4.3.4 Axiology, Logic and Rhetoric 
Axiology is a stance that explains the role of values in the research undertaken (Cresswell 
and Clark, 2007). Pragmatism adopts multiple stances where the researcher combines both 
biased and unbiased perspectives. In this study, the discussion of findings will include both 
biased and unbiased values relevant to pragmatism. Discussion of quantitative measures will 
be based on scored performance, which is potentially unbiased, but discussion on 
interviewees' views will include biased elements based on the interviewees' perceptions and 
the researcher's interpretation. 
Logic is another important methodological selection between a deductive and an inductive 
approach. This choice is related to the philosophical paradigm (Creswell and Clark, 2007). 
The deductive methodology is where researchers test a-priory theory, and is usually 
associated to positivism. The inductive methodology requires researchers to take participants' 
views and build up to patterns, theories, and generalizations, and is related to anti-positivist 
and constructivist paradigm (Perry, 1998). The pragmatism paradigm chosen for this 
research, allows for both inductive and deductive approach where the researcher collects both 
quantitative and qualitative data and mixes them to arrive at meaningful discussion and 
conclusions. However, in this study, only an inductive approach is adopted where data were 
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used to identify patterns and generate understandings which were then explored to gain 
deeper knowledge on the area, without the intention of testing any hypothesis or theory. 
It is an advantage that I started this study without experience on the UK local government 
external audit process. This allows an open mind discovery based on available data, 
interpreting as an outsider. Although I have some expectation in regard to the usefulness of 
external audit from basic study of external audit, being an outsider or new to the process has 
help me to present findings pursuing an inductive approach. Consequently adopting 
embedded mixed-methods analysis (discussed in Section 4.4.2) brought immense 
advantages to this research, particularly in answering each research question and in 
discussing important and unexpected findings. Furthermore, an inductive approach follows the 
argument of Saunders et al (2000), who stated that when researchers are: 
particularly interested in understanding why something is happening rather than being able to 
describe what is happening, it may be more appropriate to adopt the inductive approach than 
the deductive (p.89). 
Nevertheless, choosing an inductive approach does not mean that some ideas from prior 
literature were not used, especially in generating the checklist guide used for the semi-
structured interviews. Researchers may have some ideas generated from theory as a starting 
point, and then adopt an inductive approach, aiming to gain new and rich insights from the 
qualitative data (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Saunders et ai, 2000). This idea was followed while 
designing the structured questionnaires. Statements to guide the interviews in this study were 
based on the literature review, in the consequent gaps found, and in the professional context 
of this research. However, in the data collection and analysis, an open mind to interviewees' 
answers and perceptions was kept from the first to the last interview, entirely following an 
inductive approach, the checklist being seen as a guide only. The research approach chosen 
was hence inductive, letting interviewees explain freely why they have certain perceptions on 
some aspects of the external audit process. 
Rhetoric 
Paradigm also determines how research is communicated to its audience, what kind of 
language researchers would us. Pragmatism, the paradigms adopted in this study, allows 
researchers to employ formal or informal styles of writing, or may employ both. Therefore 
throughout this study, a mixture of styles will be employed when reporting findings because 
the researcher deals with different data set in different stages of data collection. 
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4.4 Research Design 
The previous section justifies the paradigm positioned for this study. This section will 
describe in detail the research design adopted for this study suitable with the assumed 
paradigm. Research designs are procedures for collecting, analyzing, interpreting and 
reporting data in a research study. Research design is formed based on the literature 
review and gaps found, combined with researcher's interest in the research topic. The 
choice of research design reflects decisions about the priority being given to a range of 
dimensions of the research process. The design selected for this study is mixed-method 
analysis of case studies. Consequently, a description of the case study as unit of analysis 
will be done in Section 4.4.1 followed by discussion of the mixed-methods approach to data 
collection and analysis in Section 4.4.2. 
4.4.1 Case Study 
The choice of case study method was made during the early stages of this study. 
According to Keating (1995, p. 66): 
... case study research is certainly one means for accounting researchers to develop 
an intimate, contextual sensitive knowledge of actual management accounting 
practices. (p. 66) 
Case study methods offer scope for understanding the nature of accounting practice: in 
terms of the techniques, procedures, systems and techniques used, and the way they are 
used (Ryan et aI., 2002). As suggested by Scapens (1990), understanding how accounting 
information is used in day-to-day organisational activities can enrich the detailed study of 
accounting practices. Jensen and Rodgers (2001, p. 237-239) describe several types of 
case study: 
I. snapshot case studies- a detailed and objective study of one research entity at one 
point in time which involve hypothesis-testing by comparing across sub-entities; 
ii. longitudinal case studies- a quantitative or qualitative study of one research entity at 
multiple time points; 
iii. pre-post case studies- study of research entity at two time points separated by a 
critical event that impacted case study observations significantly; 
iv. patchwork case studies- a set of multiple case studies of the same research entity, 
using snapshot, longitudinal, and/or pre-post designs to provide a rather overall view 
of the dynamic of the research subject; and 
v. comparative case studies- a set of multiple case studies of multiple research entities 
for the purpose of cross-unit comparison where both qualitative and quantitative 
comparisons are generally made. 
Comparative case studies is the one described this research where 22 local authorities are 
the focus of this study, and they will be compared quantitatively and qualitatively to develop 
an understanding of the research problem. Case study research requires a detailed analysis 
of a particular case using multiple evidences, which sometimes is called triangulation of 
data. Yin (1984) suggests six primary sources of evidence common for case study 
research; documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artefacts. Using multiple data sources is important for the 
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reliability of a case study though not all the six sources are essential in every case (Stake, 
1995; Yin, 1984). Using multiple data sources provides strong support for the answer to the 
research question. In this study, documentation, archival records and interviews are the 
three sources of data collection. These three data sources were used as complementary to 
enhance the understanding of the research question. 
The relevance of each case study is more important than its ability to generalize. In terms of 
external validity or generalization, this study is not meant to generalise for the whole of 
England although all 288 local authorities went through same external audit processes. The 
nature of a case study is that it may not be representative of the entire population. However, 
some researchers do claim a degree of theoretical generalizability because studying in 
detailed enables concepts to be generated (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Therefore it can be 
concluded that the case study method is an intensive analysis which can help in theory 
generation (inductive) as well as theory testing (deductive) (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Selection of cases should also be theory driven; either through cross theoretic case 
selection or as suggested by Yin (1984) a researcher could select cases not only when they 
are critical (to reveal relationships which cannot be studied by other means) but also when 
they are revelatory or unusual (to throw light on extreme cases). Case study research is not 
confined to the study of a single case; studying multiple cases has becoming increasingly 
common in business and management research. A multiple-case study is an extension of 
the case study method, which focus on the cases and their unique contexts (Bryman and 
Bell, 2007). The multiple cases chosen for this study are all 22 local authorities in Yorkshire 
and The Humber region. The local authorities vary significantly in terms of performance and 
size. The region comprises all types of local authorities prevalent in England; from two-tier 
(district and county) to single-tier (metropolitan city councils and unitary authorities). 
4.4.2 Mixed Method 
As mentioned in the Section 4.3, adopting a pragmatic approach resulted in a mixed-
methods research design. Therefore, this section will discuss the mixed-methods research 
design chosen for undertaking this study. The debate on paradigm for mix-method 
research started during the 1970s and 1980s, mainly on whether qualitative and quantitative 
data could be combined (Smith, 1983). Some researchers argued that a mixed method was 
not compatible because the paradigms will need to be combined (Smith, 1983). However, 
Bryman (1988) challenges the argument and suggests that a clear connection existed 
between the two traditions. Rossman and Wilson (1985) called qualitative researchers who 
avoid mixed methods research because of the incompatibility of 'mixing' paradigms as 
purists; and others as: (i) situationalists - who adapt their method to situation; (ii) 
pragmatists - who believe that multiple paradigms can be used to address research 
problem. Pragmatism has been recognised as the best philosophical foundation for mixed 
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methods research, although reconciling paradigms is still an apparent issue (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003a, Chapter 2). 
Mixed-method approach allows researchers to combine qualitative and quantitative data to 
achieve research aims, which according to Meyer (1991) addressed the criticism directed 
towards using only qualitative or quantitative to conduct organizational research. Cassell 
and Symon (1994) pointed out that the adoption of qualitative approaches alone may be 
risky although qualitative methods are considered the most suitable when carrying out 
research in organisations, either to understand individual or group experiences at work. 
Several authors argue that qualitative methods allow deeper data collection than with 
quantitative methods. For example Goulding (2005) emphasised the need for more 
qualitative research "in order to gain valid insights, develop theory and aid effective decision 
making" (p. 295). 
Saunders et al (2000) emphasise that the choice of the philosophical paradigm and 
corresponding method depends mainly on the research questions to be answered. The key 
point is that both quantitative and qualitative methods are very important and useful 
depending on the research aims. Considering the nature of my study, using quantitative or 
qualitative methods alone seems insufficient to uncover the issues of interest. A mixed-
method is considered to be most appropriate to answer the research question, aim and 
objectives. According to Creswell and Clark (2007): 
Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as 
methods of enquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide 
the direction of the collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in many phases in the research process. As a method, it focuses 
on collecting, analyzing, and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study 
or series of study. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research problems than 
either approach alone. (Creswell and Clark, 2007, p. 5) 
Bryman and Bell (2007) classifies the study by Kanter (1977) as a 'mixed methods case 
study' where her research focuses on a single organization. She conducted questionnaire 
surveys on 250 sales workers and managers, structured interviews with 20 selected 
workers and content analysis of performance appraisals. These are similarly reflected in my 
study which involves a single region; where data gathering comprises of multiple units in 
the region. All the units represent a single case study of their own where I repeatedly 
conducted same data collection for each of them. The data gathering then meets the 
multiple methods approach; involves several stages of collection ranging from collating 
documentation on the processes involved, collating and analysing published performance 
measurement, designing and administering structured interview questions and visiting and 
interviewing the director of finance (or equivalent position) from relevant local authorities. 
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Creswell and Clark (2007) list several situations where mixed-method is most preferred to 
address a research problem; (i) when only one approach is inadequate by itself to address 
the research problem, (ii) when a quantitative design can be enhanced by qualitative data, or 
vice versa, (iii) when a need exists to explain the quantitative results, (iv) a need exist to first 
explore qualitatively. They also mentioned that a researcher might choose a mixed method 
not necessarily because of only one reason above, the reasons could be multiple. 
Given the nature of my research problem, almost all the reasons above apply to this study, in 
particular where one approach alone is inadequate by itself to address the research problem. 
The external audit process is relatively new to me, requiring extensive review of available 
documentation, as well as interviewing relevant parties involved with designing and 
administering the system. This fits with reason four above where a qualitative review is done 
initially to permit an understanding of the variables, construct, taxonomies, and theories to 
test, as well as the identification of items and scales to help develop a quantitative instrument 
(Creswell and Clark, 2007). Reviewing the processes led to the discovery that the AC had 
published performance indicators and scored performance for each local authority. Having 
these scored numbers for several years permitted a quantitative analysis to check for trends, 
irregularities or issues related to certain local authorities. Manipulating the figures allowed 
deeper understanding of the research environment and assisted in generating structured 
questions, while providing a list of quantitative information. 
The quantified information above then needed further explanation which only interviews with 
relevant individuals could provide. At this stage, interviews were used to explain the initial 
review of documents and procedures as well as the quantitative analysis of scored 
performance. Prior to each interview, the interviewees were required to answer a set of 
structured questions. This informed the interviewees of the context of this study and provided 
a set of responses which helped the researcher prepare for each interview. Understanding 
individual specific situations of a local authority is necessary as well as a general 
understanding of the process in order to identify which aspects should be explored in further 
detail during each interview. 
There are four major types of mixed-method research design: (i) Triangulation Design; (ii) 
Embedded Design; (iii) Explanatory Design; and (iv) Exploratory Design. Creswell and Clark 
(2007) described the process of data collection that I adopted as an Embedded Design mixed 
method, in which one data set (published scores) provides a supportive, secondary role in a 
study based primarily on the other data type (interviews). The Embedded Design mixes 
different data sets at the design level, with one type of data being embedded within a 
methodology framed by the other data type (Caracelli and Greene, 1997). The use of multiple 
units of analyses for case research is also recognised as embedded case studies by Yin 
(1994). Figure 24 below illustrates the mixed-method design adopted in this study. 
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Qualitative data can be embedded in quantitative research or vice versa. In my research, 
quantitative data is embedded within a qualitative methodology, which is also common with 
phenomenology design (Creswell and Clark, 2007). In this design, the collection of both data 
applies but one of the data type (quantitative) plays a supplemental role within the overall 
design. Hence quantitative data plays a supportive role to answer the main research question 
of this study. 
An Embedded Design can also involve either a one-phase or two-phase approach for the 
embedded data and the quantitative and qualitative data are used to answer different 
research questions within the study (Hanson et aI., 2005). The first qualitative review of 
archival documents in my study was to answer the first research question: what are the 
functions of external auditors for local authorities in England. This review was then used to 
consider the quantitative analysis of scored performance published annually by the AC to 
answer the second research question: how do the local authorities perform based on their 
auditor's assessment (certification audit and Use of Resources assessment). Both reviews 
and analysis were then embedded in designing the final stage of data collection which is the 
interviews to answer the remaining three research questions. In the final phase, a quantitative 
analysis of structured interviews was used to supplement qualitative discussion based on 
interviews. 
A study will be more manageable, simpler to implement and describe if the choice of design 
is carefully selected. A choice of research design may be influenced by availability of 
expertise (in qualitative or quantitative), resources, the length of time to complete the study, 
and funding to support research expenses (Creswell and Clark, 2007). The choice of design 
also relates to three decisions in the research process; (i) the timing of data usage for the 
study, (ii) the relative weight of the quantitative and qualitative approaches and (iii) the mixing 
decisions (Creswell and Clark, 2007). 
The timing decision refers to the time the data sets are collected and the order which the data 
sets are used. The weighting decision is the relative importance of the quantitative and 
qualitative methods adopted. The mixing decision is a choice of how the quantitative and 
qualitative data should be mixed. The mixing decision is important to avoid the different data 
sets becoming a plain collection of multiple methods. The choice of paradigm normally 
determines the priority of data set, post-positivist paradigm calls for quantitative priority, while 
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anti-positivist paradigm calls for qualitative and pragmatism calls for a combination of both 
either equal or unequal depending on the research questions (Morse, 1991). The strength of 
which data set is best suited to address the study's goals and purpose should also be the 
basis of weighting (Morgan, 1998). 
In terms of timing, researchers can choose concurrent or sequential timing. In this study, the 
data collection was done concurrently in two distinct phases: 
Phase 1: Documentations were reviewed, quantitative data was collected and 
analyzed, open-ended interviews were conducted; 
Phase 2: Structured interviews were conducted, marked responses to the structured 
statements were analysed quantitatively, and used to support a qualitative 
review of the interview responses. 
In terms of weighting or priority, both data types can have equal priority or one has greater 
priority over the other. In this study, during Phase 1, a qualitative review and quantitative data 
was used to build on the foundation. The information was then confirmed through open-
ended interviews to strengthen understanding. In Phase 2, a quantitative instrument was 
used to organize the interview sessions and to support the discussion of qualitative 
responses obtained. Therefore, I could say that qualitative data was given more priority and 
was used when explaining the findings in Chapter 6 of this thesis and that was achieved with 
the foundation built in Phase 1. 
In terms of mixing the data, a researcher could merge the data set, embed the data at the 
design level or connect from data analysis to data collection. For this study, the quantitative 
data is embedded in the design of qualitative. As Creswell and Clark (2007) suggests, 
researchers can use secondary, embedded dataset to make their interpretations by: 
(i) combining the two datasets together in the concurrent approach; and 
(ii) keeping them separate in the sequential approach. 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the data collection above describe how the data were mixed. Detail 
explanation on the two phases will be explained the next sections, Section 4.5 and 4.6. 
Consequently, having justified all the methodological positions and designs of this study, the 
discussion will now focus on data collection. 
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4.5 Data Collection - Phase 1 
Choosing the pragmatic paradigm links to adopting singular and multiple real ities , maintaining 
a distance between researcher and researched based on practicality , uses both unbiased 
and biased values for findings , combining deductive and inductive approaches and employing 
a formal reporting style for some parts of the findings and an informal style for others . The 
frameworks then guided the design for this study, a mixed-method case-study. Having 
chosen the frameworks and design , the researcher can then strategise the approach for data 
collection . Research strategy is the "general plan of how you will go about answering the 
research question(s) you have set" (Saunders et ai , 2000, p. 92). Data to answer my 
research questions involved both quantitative and qualitative types from secondary and 
primary sources. Thus, methods, defined as the means used to focus , collect and anal yse 
data (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), will be discussed in the following sections. 
Phase 1 data collection involved reviewing the published government and the AC 
documentations, collection and analyses of measured performance and open-ended 
interviews to triangulate the secondary data. 
I Archival Documents H Published Scores ~I Open Ended Interviews 
---------------------------------~ ~ 
Data Collection Phase 1 
Figure 25: Data Collection Phase 1 
Figure 25 illustrates the three main elements of data collection in this Phase 1, and discussion 
for this section will flow accordingly to the diagram. 
4.5.1 Archival documents 
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Data Collection Phase 1 
Collecting data began with a review of published documents on the external aud it at local 
authorities in England . These are mainly official document from government and its agencies , 
such as the AC , local authorities and the Department of Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG). This stage started from January 2006 intensively for almost a year, and continued 
with checking for updates and further details through to 2009. The findings from reviewing 
archival documents are discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis . W illiamson et al. (1997) argued 
in terms of reliability of the archival documents: 
"There are some records , however, which, by their very nature , we can logically assume to 
be most accurate . We WOUld , for example , expect there to be no intentional deceit or error 
in stenographic or taped records of courts , political bod ies, or committees . Notebooks and 
other memoranda are also high in credibility because they are intimate and confidential 
records" [Williamson et ai , 1997, p. 264] 
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Advances in internet technology has helped particularly at this early stage and also when 
collecting published assessment scores. Spending time browsing the internet on official 
websites provided information pertaining to my research interest, explaining the policies, 
procedures, processes, developments and links to other details. These have saved a lot of 
time and resources necessary to understand the foundation of this research. 
The AC has its own website providing detailed information of its background, function, tasks 
and reports (http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk). These include the reasons, justification, 
relevant policies and government papers, the external audit process, information on auditors, 
scored performance result, rules for the scoring, guidance for local authorities in dealing with 
the external audit process, information for appealing, consultation papers and national reports 
to name a few. Information on the AC's structure, committees and teams for various functions 
are also provided. Hardcopies of documents provided on this site can also be purchased. I 
reviewed almost all documents to gain understanding but the documents published and 
updated frequently related to the CPA were used in great deal at this review stage 
(http://www.audit-commission.gov.uklcpalindex). That site also contains information on the 
UoR which is vital for this study. Detailed information on the CPA and UoR history, the 
inspectorates, consultation documents (proposals for assessment framework, prototype, 
press releases, various consultation feedback and next steps, scope, issues in engaging 
public, joint inspectorate etc), events, discussion papers (the future of regulation on the public 
sector, assessment of local service), explanation on the evolution of regulation and suggested 
preparation for those involved are provided. 
I visited the Commission website regularly to check on updates and new information. I also 
emailed the web administrator to give feedback on my experience browsing through the 
website to get advice on access to information. I found them very responsive to requests; the 
website was updated on an almost daily basis and contains a lot of very recent information. 
The section on frequently asked questions (FAQs) was also very useful because it includes 
step by step guides to understand how the CPA works and related issues. Information on the 
appointed auditor for each local authority is also provided with their date of appointment as 
well as tenure, addresses, team manager and contacts. 
The AC also provided a 'Technical Directory' for its appointed auditors (http://www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/technicaldirectory/lglindex.htm). Access to this site is given to the public. 
This 'technical directory' provides various links to the Audit Commission Act 1998, Code of 
Audit Practice (Local Government 2005), Statement of Recommended Practice (Local 
Government SORP 2007), Standing Guidance Notes for local government auditors, SORP 
Guidance Notes for Practitioners 2007 and other information. I also checked and compared 
information provided at the Audit Commission's page for Scotland and Wales. The AC website 
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also provides links to other useful websites such as the local authorities and other government 
agencies. 
Individual local authorities have their own websites publishing all sorts of news, reports, 
records and other structural and environmental information. The same material provided in 
hardcopies for local people can also be accessed electronically via the local authorities' 
individual website. I accessed local news, events, happenings, innovations as well as 
comments from the councillors on their events and achievements. They also provided 
statement of accounts pre and post audit and minutes of meetings. One of the audit 
assessments is that local authorities should have an audit committee or similar. From the 
committee's minutes of meetings, I gained extra information to supplement those lacking from 
statement of accounts such as which director signs the statement of accounts, the auditor and 
audit team, and the person responsible for the UoR assessment. I also used other documents 
to crosscheck the information I obtained, and local authorities' websites in particular were 
used to extract information on the statement of accounts, the auditor's report and to gain 
access for interviews. 
The DCLG publishes reports on consultations, research and statistics, and many other reports 
relevant to local authorities (http://www.communities.gov.uk). I used the section on 'about 
cities and the region' to understand the Yorkshire and The Humber region and its situation 
relative to other regions throughout England. The DCLG website also provides links to other 
websites relevant to local government. Among the links that I found useful were: 
• the Association for Geographic Information (AGI) which provides a communication 
channel; 
• the Best Value Performance Indicators which provides information on all policy 
aspects of Best Value in England; 
• Central and Local Government Information Partnership (CLIP) provides information 
on consultation between Central and Local Government on non-financial data and 
statistical issues; and 
• the National Statistics which provides statistics on Britain's economy, population and 
society at both national and local level. 
Separate pages are created on this website to provide information for different government 
regions, called the 'government office network' including the Yorkshire and The Humber 
region (http://www.gos.gov.uk/goyh). Links to the other eight regions' web pages are also 
provided. Having all this detail helped me to generate a portfolio to each of the 22 local 
authorities in the focus region of Yorkshire and The Humber. The portfolio includes: 
i. local authorities' environment including location, socio-economics, politics, structures, 
council members; and details on finance departments in particular; 
ii. their statement of accounts (pre and post audit) from 1999 to 2008 as well as 
information on their auditors; 
iii. the external auditor's report for each of the years, and other reports accompanying 
their accounts; 
iv. their performance scorecard for each year from 2002 which is based on the CPA and 
UoR assessment; and 
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v. the annual audit letters written by the relationship manager assigned by th e AC for 
each local authority . 
The next section will discuss the collection and uses of the published scores. 
4.5.2 Published scores 
I Archival Documents HL_P_U_b_lis_h_e_d_s_c_o_r_e_s----l~1 Open Ended Interviews 
~_~========~===~~==~~========~~7 
Data Collection Phase 1 
Published scores from external auditors ' work at local authorities will be discussed in Chapter 
5 of this thesis. As their work covers certification audit and use of resources assessment two , 
distinct reports are available , which were collected and analysed. 
4.5.2.1 Certification Audit 
This stage was mainly done from June to December 2006, and continued every year as new 
statements of accounts and reports were published. Prior to the fieldwork interview, I reviewed 
the latest statement of accounts at each local authority's website to prepare questions to 
probe during interviews for information specific to each local authority. The analysis of 
certification audit included in my discussion in Chapter 5 was for the years ended March 1999 
to 2007. For certification audits , the main documents that I used were local authorities' 
statement of accounts, auditor's reports , annual audit letters and minutes of meetings. As 
local authorities are also required to publish pre-audited statement of accounts , this gives me 
two sets of statement of accounts each year for every local authority, the pre and post-audit 
statement of accounts.14 The pre-audited statement of accounts was made available for public 
inspection at several places where council offices are located . The announcement is then 
made via a local newspaper. The pre-audited statement of accounts is also uploaded to their 
website for public inspection alongside the notice. 
Local authorities upload much information pertaining to their organization and localities. This 
eased my task of creating their portfolios and understanding them as a unit of analysis of a 
case. When I began compiling the portfolio in 2006 , local authorities were in the process of 
improving their websites; I was able to collect recent statement of accounts especially for 
2004, 2005 and 2006. Contact emails and phone numbers were provided for vi sitors to their 
website to ask for more information. Hence, I contacted them whenever I could not locate the 
information needed. Responses to my requests were very encourag ing ; some local authorit ies 
sent hardcopies of their annual accounts , with others sent in email attachments . Those that 
were silent even after I submitted my requests uploaded all the sta tement of accounts on their 
website soon after. I had no problem downloading statement of accounts for year ended 
14 Some local authorities publish their annual pre-audited statement of accounts using high quality 
printing with glossy paper and colourful booklet , while others publ ish like a draft 
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March 2007 and 2008 (pre and post-audit) as they are all available on local authorities 
websites. I found that towards the end of year 2007, local authorities' websites throughout 
Yorkshire and The Humber region had improved significantly. Information which I requested 
via email in 2006 was mostly available on their web and similar series were made available 
very soon after audit (August every year) for the subsequent years 2007 and 2008. To 
conclude, data collected for discussion and analysis (in Chapter 5) of certification audit at this 
phase for all 22 local authorities were: 
Table 25: Documents collected for Certification Audit discussion 
Documents Period Notes 
1- Pre-audited statement of accounts 1999-2008 10 sets/years each 
2- Audited statement of accounts 1999-2008 10 sets/years each 
3- Auditor's report 1999-2008 10 sets/years each 
4- Auditors notices and objections 1999-2008 When available 
5- Annual audit letters 2002-2007 The function of relationship 
manager were stopped in 2007 
4.5.2.2 Use of Resources Assessment Score 
Besides auditing the annual accounts, auditors are also responsible for asseSSing local 
authority's Use of Resources (UoR). The AC published annual assessments for UoR and its 
details on their website. Scored performance for UoR and its themes were collected as well as 
the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) rating, from 200215 until 2007. The 
district councils' assessments were not scored until 2004, therefore scores from district 
councils' were available only from 2004 onwards. All these scores and relevant explanations 
are available at the AC website: overall results on UoR page and specific reports for each 
local authority on their own dedicated page. Local authorities' websites also publish the 
scorecard and explanation on the scores they obtained. Table 26 below specifies the 
documents collected for the UoR analysis and discussion. Annual audit letters were used for 
both certification audit and UoR audit discussion. 
Table 26- Documents collected for Use of Resources Assessment discussion 
Period 
Documents Single Tier District Notes and County Councils 
Councils 
UoR overall scores 2002-2008 2004-2008 
UoR themes scores 2002-2008 2005-2008 
CPA ratings 2002-2008 2004-2008 
Stopped when 'the harder test' 
Auditor judgements 2002-2004 was introduced in 2005, - available only for single tier and scores 
county councils. 
2002-2007 2004-2008 
The function of relationship 
Annual audit letters manager were stopped in 2007 
There are several scores available in the CPA regime: 
(i) the CPA rating, on a five-point scale of poor to excellent (2002-2004) and later on a 
five-star rating from zero to 4 stars (2005-2008); 
15 2002 is when the year UoR started to be assessed and scored 
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(ii) overall UoR scores, which is the result from themes' scores, on a four-point scale 
from one to four, 
(iii) UoR themes' scores, also on a four-point scale, comprises of five separate themes of 
financial reporting , financial management, financial standing , internal control and 
value for money. 
The scores related to UoR were tabulated , graphed and analysed to see trends or dispersion , 
for all themes and the overall scores. The discussion also included CPA scores and direction 
of travel rating which will then be embedded in the fieldwork interviews. 
4.5.3 Triangulation for Secondary Data: Open Ended Interviews 
I Archival Documents H Published Scores ~I Open Ended Interviews I 
~'-~==================~--~==::: ~ 
-----Data Collection Phase 1 
Interviews are basically conversation but for research reasons it can be defined as attempts to 
understand the world from the subjects' point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples' 
experiences, to uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations (Kvale, 1996). There 
are three main actors involved in the external audit and assessment at local governments in 
England , the AC, the external auditors and local governments. Local governments, as the 
main focus of this study, will be interviewed in data collection Phase 2. Data collection in 
Phase 1 are secondary data, thus it is necessary to 'understand from the subjects' point of 
views' besides confirming the accuracy and sufficiency of information collected as a means of 
triangulation, so the data is more reliable. Thus, interviews were also done in Phase 1, with 
the AC and external auditors to confirm information obtained via AC website , to seek 
explanation and help on information unavailable and to gain more understanding on the 
process. Access to these interviews was obtained through Professor Heald's contact. Two 
interviews were held , one with an AC manager directly involved with the UoR assessment for 
local authorities , and another with an external auditor from a private sector firm having 
experience of auditing local authorities under the AC 's regime. Specific details on these 
interviews will be explained in the subsection that follows . 
Both interviews used flexible open ended-questions allowing information to be extracted 
(Kvale, 2006). Qualitative interviewing is most useful for evaluating programs that are aimed 
at individualized outcomes, capturing and describing program processes, exploring individual 
differences between participants' experiences and outcomes, evaluating programs that are 
seen as dynamic or evolving , understanding the meaning of a program to its participants and 
documenting variations in program implemented at different sites. For these interviews a list of 
questions were prepared , specific questions for different interviewees, although covering the 
same aspects of the external audit process but vary depending on the position of the 
interviewees. Before each of the interviews, a checklist of items was created , which were 
asked accordingly with in the time permitted . Using semi-structured interviews allows the 
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researcher to be flexible with the guide, either eliminating or adding questions, in and across 
interviews. This proved to be an important feature since it allowed the interviewees to freely 
explain their experiences and link to various issues within the context. Therefore some 
questions were answered without being asked and some linkages of themes were also 
discovered to build upon the understanding based on secondary data available. Both 
interviews were transcribed and utilised for designing the main fieldwork interviews. The two 
sUb-sections that follow will discuss the two triangulation interviews held in data collection 
Phase 1 (4.5.3.1 Interview with the AC's manager and 4.5.3.2 Interview with the external 
auditor). 
4.5.3.1 Interview with the Audit Commission's Manager 
The interview was conducted on the 26th June 2007, in a two-hour session at the manager's 
premise, during which the structured questions for fieldwork interviews were being designed. 
The interviewee was chosen for being directly responsible for the UoR assessment system at 
the national level. Because the main aim of the meeting was to seek more understanding and 
information about the processes, questions were prepared based on six main themes. For 
each theme, I prepared a list of items that needed clarification. Table 27 summarised the topic 
prepared to guide the meeting (detailed questions used as checklist during the interview is 
available in Appendix 7). Professor Heald attended the meeting with me, therefore we used 
the guide as agenda for our meeting but it was not shown to the manager. 
Table 27: Summarised Checklist for open-ended interview with the Commission's 
manager 
1 DOCUMENTATION 
- to check for missing documents and to confirm published information 
2 UOR'S OVERALL AND THEMES 
- to seek explanation on the technicality of every themes, the mechanism for auditors' 
allocation, the relative importance of UoR themes, overall score and CPA, changes to CPA, 
changes in regulations and other requirements, help available to local authorities 
3. PERFORMANCE AND SCORES 
- to seek explanation on published scores, get details of KLoEs scores if available and 
possibility of obtaining 
4 RULES FOR THE SCORE 
- to seek explanation on how the scoring process is done and why only VFM requires self-
assessment 
5. KEY LINES OF ENQUIRIES 
-
to seek explanation on the development of KLoEs, guidance for local authorities, training for 
auditors and other related technical issues 
6. APPLICATION FOR REVIEW 
- to seek explanation on the review process, numbers of local authorities requesting for review 
and chances of successful review 
During the interview, the manager spoke freely on the topiCS. I ticked the checklists and asked 
supplementary questions on what was not covered in the manager's explanation. 
Administering the interview this way helped a lot in clarifying information found in published 
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documents and on the web. The manager allowed us to email for further explanation and 
details if necessary. Input from this interview was used to strengthen the design of structured 
interview questions because it confirmed and completed the information obtained through 
secondary sources. The interview also provided researcher with initial expectation of 
responses from auditees and cross-checked for their responses to ensure data reliability. 
4.5.3.2 Interview with the External Auditor 
The interview with the external auditor was conducted on the 13th March 2008 after designing 
and pilot-testing the structured interview questions but prior to fieldwork interviews. The 
interviewee voluntarily participated and was chosen for having had experience auditing 
several local authorities using the UoR assessment system. One hour was allocated for this 
session and the interview was held at the AC's premise. The interview was aimed at exploring 
experience of using processes designed by the AC from the evaluator's (auditor) point of view 
to help the researcher during data collection Phase 2. Table 28 shows the issues asked. 
Table 28: Checklist for open-ended interview with the External Auditor 
1. Auditors involvement in preparing, refining and administering the KLOEs for UoR 
2. Auditors involvement in moderation of scores; 
3. Views on the KLOEs level of difficulty to interpret, follow, or achieve by local 
authorities- themes and levels 
4. Opportunity given to auditors to contribute and challenge the KLoEs 
5. Views on the frequent changes and alterations in KLoEs and its components 
6. Relevant of UoR audit to auditors core competence 
7. Affect of the assessment process and judgement on relationship with audited body 
and local authorities acceptance 
8. Views on improvement seen in published scores 
The questions asked were aimed at encouraging the respondent to share his experience as 
external auditor and to express his views. As the interview was semi-structured, several 
prompt questions were asked to cover the issues above and the respondent was encouraged 
to freely express his opinions. Input from this interview was used to confirm information 
obtained from the AC documentations which influenced my understanding of the process. It 
helped to neutralized bias and correct misconception should there be. Understanding the 
auditors' point of view helped with initial expectation of auditees' responses and opportunity to 
prepare for additional probing questions for specific local authorities. The external auditor's 
view also provided a check-and-balance to the auditees' views that will be gained in Phase 2. 
Consequently, the following section will discuss on the data collection Phase 2 which IS 
structured interviews with auditees from the 22 local governments selected for this study. 
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4.6 Data Collection: Phase 2 
Phase 2 data collection is the fieldwork interviews with local governments in Yorkshire and 
The Humber region . Three main steps involved to accompl ish data collection for this phase, 
are illustrated in Figure 26. 
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Data Collection Phase 2 
Figure 26: Data Collection Phase 2 
This section will discuss the designing of interview questions followed with the pilot testing 
and finally the main interview, which involve gaining access to actual respondents , follow up 
to achieve the desired number of interviews, and transcribing the interviews to enable 
grouping and quotations of important explanation from the interviewees being done. Therefore 
sub-sections that follow will discuss the stages as shown in Figure 26 above. Before 
explaining the stages involved, introduction to and importance of interviews will be discussed. 
While secondary data in terms of documents and quantified performance measures are 
available and utilised, interviews to collect primary data is considered more valuable and 
meaningful in social research (Cassell and Symon , 1994; Kvale , 1996). Interviews are 
considered the most important qualitative method (Easterby-Smith et ai , 2002), West (1999) 
pointing out that an interview 
seeks information on respondents' actions, reactions , preferences , perceptions and 
requirements (p.93). 
Interviews can be structured , semi-structured or unstructured (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; 
Saunders et ai , 2000; Blaxter, Hughes and Tight, 1996). These vary from a formal verbal 
interaction with a closed and structured set of questions prepared beforehand (structured 
interviews), to an open and free exchange of ideas without any prepared questions 
(unstructured interviews) . Quotations gained from qualitative interviews may reveal the 
respondents level of emotion, views, experiences and perceptions , but a framework within 
which interviewees can respond in a way that represents accurately and thoroughly their point 
of view about the program is necessary (Patton, 1987). Open-ended , qualitative interview 
questions are often combined with more close-ended , structured interview formats . Qual itative 
interviews may be used as an exploratory step before designing more quantitative, structured 
questionnaires to help determine the appropriate questions and categories . Conversely , 
interviews may be used after results of more standardized measures are analyzed to gain 
insight into interesting or unexpected findings . 
For the purpose of this study , I used structured style statements for respondents to mark their 
answers and return to me before the interview. The marked answer-choices by respondents 
could be utilised for frequency tests to discover trends and be used to structure discu ssion of 
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findings from the fieldwork interviews. Structured interviews were chosen for the main data 
collection because it could help to contain discussion within context and it informed the 
respondent on the area of discussion. The respondent was encouraged to elaborate and 
explain reasons for their answers which provided an opportunity to capture more information 
and to testify complete coverage of the issues discussed. 
Though the questions prepared were structured, the interviews were run in a flexible way, 
allowing respondents to explain issues relevant to the questions asked, probing with other 
short questions where necessary depending on interviewee's local authority's performance 
and environment. The probing questions were prepared beforehand after receiving responses 
via completed questionnaires, and based on specific local authority's environment and 
performance. Having conducted all the interviews myself, I could say that having structured 
interviews has helped in managing the interview sessions and the discussion did not limit 
respondents at all but guided them on what should be explored. Therefore the instruments 
works as semi-structured interview guides to contain discussion within topics and covered all 
the issues concerned within time allocated. 
Interviews can be conducted in many ways; face-to-face, by telephone or bye-mail. Face-to-
face interviews allow: 
... answering a respondent's questions; probing; prompting; and the facility to use complex 
question sequences (Burton, 2000, p.323) 
Thus, in face-to-face interviews the researcher may explore emergent issues, understanding 
better the answers since there is a direct, physical contact between the researcher and the 
respondent. Telephone and e-mail interviews may save time, but have the disadvantage of 
being more superficial, since there is no 'eye-contact', which may lead to some 
misunderstandings. 
In this study, face-to-face, structured interviews were conducted, having in mind that 
"participants' perceptions, understandings of meanings and interpretations were most 
important" (Stroh, 2000, p. 201). I reviewed the local authority's background: demographic, 
economic, political, and recent CPA assessment scores to help with facilitating the session. 
The interviews provided an opportunity for the respondents to explain why they had chosen 
certain answers in the structured questionnaire. Before each session started, a copy of their 
responses to the structured questions was given to the interviewee. They also had the 
opportunity to ask explanations when they felt that the questions were unclear. I also used the 
opportunity to ask them to complete unanswered items on the questionnaires. The face to 
face interview sessions were very productive and encouraging. In the 19 interviews carried 
out the interviewees all seemed prepared and relaxed, which contributed to an open and 
, 
friendly atmosphere. They appeared to speak freely about their perceptions, experiences and 
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opinions. Thus, the next section will start will the first stage In this data collection phase, 
designing of the structured questions for interview. 
4.6.1 Designing of the Structured Questions for Interview 
1 ~eSigning Interview Question 1--1 ~:~:ot=T=e=s=t=in=g==~f-+_~1 ==M=a=in=ln=t=erv=ie=w=s:::: __ ::7
1 
Data Collection Phase 2 
The interview questions were designed based on the review of government regulation and 
procedures (discussed in Chapter 3) , review of literatures (discussed in Chapter 2) , the 
interview with the Audit Commission's manager and the external auditor (discussed 
concurrent with review in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) and the analysis of the secondary data 
(discussed in Chapter 5) . As the questions were planned to be structured , the design phase 
took much longer than expected to ensure it captured all relevant aspects. Statements instead 
of questions were created so respondents would have to explain further why they chose 
certain answer choices. Bryman (2004) noted that when using a Likert-scale , the items must 
be statements and not questions. 
Drafting the statements started from February 2007 , after the research proposal was 
approved beginning with mind-mapping from the research questions followed by issues 
discovered from reviews and published results . At the initial stage, many short questions were 
generated to itemise the issues that needed explanation/discovery. The issues and short 
questions were divided into three sections of (i) certification audit, (ii) Use of Resources 
assessment and (iii) overall CPA. This is to allow greater explanation from respondents and 
avoid mixing up issues which could result in missing them from discussion due to their link 
and overlapping with each other. Groupings of the questionnaire also provided more 
structured thinking when generating the statements. 
The statements were designed to invite respondents to explain the reasons for their answer 
choices . The statements' structure and wording had to be thought through carefully based on 
the importance of issues as well as the ordering of the statements. A concise statement was 
created to cover many short questions generated at the initial stage so that the structured 
interview question set was not too lengthy. That also required much thinking and resulted in 
statements that always invited respondents to explain more. A five-point Likert-scale was 
used which varies from 'Strongly Agree' to Strongly Disagree' to the statements. A 'No view' 
column was allocated should a respondent be unable to respond on the statements because 
of the technical nature of the issues asked. This recognized that some council may not 
experience certain issues so the respondent may not wish to provide a view. 
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Professor Heald was involved in the generation of the statements, thus , once the statements 
were ready, I let several colleagues who have management and accounting background 
review these. None could suggest answers to the statements because of its technical nature, 
but they suggested that the statements were easily understood and the set did not seem too 
long . The questionnaire also went through two one-hour discussion sessions with different 
English teachers . The first session was prior to my colleagues ' revision and the second one 
was prior to the pilot testing . The reason why I requested different English teachers was to 
confirm the readability of the statements and it was also suggested by the teacher from my 
first session . The instrument was then ready for pilot testing after 10 months of designing , 
see Appendix 5. At the end of November 2007, I started to identify local councils for pilot 
testing which is presented in the next section . 
4.6.2 Pilot testing the instrument 
1 Designing Interview Question 1-1 Pilot Testing ~I Main Interviews 1 
L,,-~~====================~ ___ L~::--:==========~ __ ~==============~~ --...---
Data Collection Phase 2 
It is generally recognised that a pilot test of the chosen research method should be made, in 
order to identify possible problems and to correct them before the major study starts (Oliver, 
2004; Easterby-Smith et ai , 2002; Clough and Nutbrown; 2002 ; Stroh , 2000; Blaxter et ai , 
1996). The main aim was to test whether or not the questionnaire would be likely to discover 
the issues concerned and to identify possible problems in order to improve it before the main 
data collection . It was important to verify if interviewees understood the questions, whether 
the structured-statements were correctly formed, their sequence was logical , whether an hour 
planned for interview was sufficient, and to check for any other limitations (Oliver, 2004; 
Clough and Nutbrown, 2002). Furthermore it provided practice before the interview with local 
authorities in the focused region . Having the pilot helped guide for improvement and gaining 
confidence in interviewing . 
4.6.2.1 Interviewees for Pilot Testing 
The respondents for pilot testing were chosen from local authorities in a region other than 
Yorkshire and The Humber. The North West region was chosen as it borders Yorkshire and 
The Humber and would resemble similar environmental and economical characteristics . The 
region is nearby and allowed accessibility . The authorities in the region go through same 
regional moderation as Yorkshire and The Humber for scores after the external auditor 
concludes their audit work . The respondents targeted were the Director of Finance, Manager 
for Financial Accounting and Manager for Use of Resources , which will be the respondents for 
main fieldwork in the study region . 
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A similar approach to local authorities in the pilot region was adopted as in the focus region. 
This involved tabulating UoR and themes scores from 2002 to 2006 and studying trends. Five 
local authorities that were performing well were chosen from the region, and their audit reports 
were collected and analysed, and contact details for each Director of Finance were identified. 
Authorities that are performing well were chosen because it was assumed that they were 
more likely to respond to our request for meeting with them. 
4.6.2.2 Access for Pilot Testing 
From the local authorities' website, contact details and email addresses for the Director of 
Finance were collected. The Directors of Finance were chosen as contact persons because of 
their authority in the Finance Department for each local authority. They were then contacted 
through email in November 2007. Only one Director of Finance responded, expressing a 
willingness to participate, and providing all the three respondents necessary. The 
questionnaire was then sent with an email describing the procedures for the interview; asking 
them to complete the structured-statements beforehand and providing copies of the 
questionnaire for discussion during interview sessions. It is important to mention that these 
three pilot interviews were much easier to arrange than expected. In less than three weeks, 
on the 5th December 2007, the three interviews were arranged and carried out. Unfortunately, 
in the main interviews phase, access was much more time-consuming to obtain, which will be 
discussed later in the chapter. 
4.6.2.3 Reflection - Changes Made based on Pilot Test 
The pilot study went very well. Few amendments to the questionnaire were necessary. None 
of the statements were removed. Respondents reflected that the questions cover the 
assessment done by auditors and were easily understood. They even said the statements 
made them think about the value of the assessment which they never had time to think about 
before. The only alterations involved were to add space in between sections so respondents 
could write some comments when they mark their answer choice prior to the interviews. After 
discussions with supervisors, the font size used was increased and more space were 
provided in between statements and sections to allow the structured-statements prepared 
looks less compressed, and the questionnaire becomes six pages instead of four due to extra 
spacing provided. 
The pilot testing provided me with greater confidence about the questions. It assured me that 
the questions could work in getting people to talk about the external audit process, to probe 
with other questions specifically applied to individual local authorities and to discover other 
aspects if necessary. Another very positive aspect of the pilot test was to improve my 
interviewing skills. Although I have had experience meeting with the Audit Commission's 
manager, that was more of a meeting rather than interview, where the questions prepared 
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were open ended . The pilot test involved meeting with real subjects similar of those whom I 
would meet during main interview phase. 
The pilot test proved that the structured-statements would work and would fit into the one 
hour session providing that I exercised care and control so that respondents would not 
wander away in their explanation . Professor Heald and I also found that the two managers 
(Manager for Certification Audit and Manager for Use of Resources Assessment) responses 
could be removed should we able to get the Director or Head of Finance to response. This is 
because both managers tend to be expert only in their area and did not comment much about 
other areas. I n contrast, the Director or Head of Finance provided a clearer and broader view 
and was able to comment on wider aspects of local authority performance. 
The Director of Finance in the pilot interview had experience working with many different 
types of councils and was highly educated . Therefore the session we had with him was very 
fruitful. It was a helpful experience, enabling me to improve and prepare on several aspects 
for the main data collection, especially to listen carefully to the interviewees, probing only 
when necessary because the respondents normally were called to explain the structured 
statements, to follow the sequence of the structured questions, to remain calm and keep to 
time limit. Thus, I was ready to proceed to the main interviews. 
4.6.3 Main Interview 
1 Designing Interview Question 1--1 Pilot Testing ~I Main Interviews I 
'- ~--------------~ --------------------------------~ 
Data Collection Phase 2 
This section will discuss the main fieldwork interview process which lasted for 10 months 
from distributing the structured interview questions in March 2008 until the last interview held 
in December 2008. The period was long as it was not easy to access the Director or Head of 
Finance at each local authority , and the two managers which were also invited to respond 
often refused the invitation although some marked and returned the questionnaire. The total 
number of questionnaires received was 28 (two councils completed three each , and four 
councils , each completed two) . Out of that total 21 were from the Director or Head of Finance 
representing 20 local authorities. One Director of Finance had left the position before the 
fieldwork interviews had started , and the new Director of Finance also completed the 
instruments and was interviewed later. Therefore respon ses from the one who had left the 
council was not analysed and the non-parametric analysis were done only with the 20 
marked responses from 20 local councils throughout the Yorkshire and The Humber reg ion . 
One council ignored our request although many attempts were made to elic it a response and 
the other one replied in email expressing unwillingness to partic ipate because of not being 
convinced that the study would make any contribution to them. Only nineteen local councils 
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were interviewed because one Director or Head of Finance refused but provided written 
comments with the instruments. Table 29 below shows the deta ils. 
Table 29 F" Id Ie wor kit n ervlew F" Igures 
Description Numbers 
Local councils contacted via post 22 
Structured interview questions issued (3 to each local councils) 66 
Marked interview questions returned 28 
Responses from Director or Head of Finance 21 
Local councils represented 20 
Marked interview questions analysed 20 
Interviews held 19 
The main interviews involved several stages. The next sub-section will describe on the 
respondents of this study, followed by obtaining accessed to the respondents , ethical 
consideration, the checklist guide for interviewing and finally on the timing , duration , location 
and transcription of the interviews. Figure 27 informs the flow of discussion for main 
interviews: 
-
-----Main Interviews 
Figure 27: Implementation of Interviews 
Thus, the discussions now turn to respondents for the interviews. 
4.6.3.1 Respondents 
Guide 
iming, Duration, 
Place and Transcripts 
iming , Duration , 
Place and Transcripts 
-----------------------------------~-------~==~---------=======~----­
Main Interviews 
In every research project, either qualitative or quantitative, it is necessary to select a sample 
with which the study will be carried out. Sampling is concerned with the "segment of the 
population that is selected for investigation" (Bryman and Bell , 2003 , p.93) . There are two 
major types of sampling : the probability and the non-probability sample (Saunders et ai , 
2000) . 
In probability (representative) sampling , the probability of being selected equals to the whole 
population and a complete sampling frame (complete list of all the cases in the population) is 
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necessary to enable its application. In non-probability Uudgemental) sampling, the probability 
of being selected is unknown, since it is neither representative, nor necessary to have a 
sampling frame. Probability sampling is suitable when research questions and objectives 
need to estimate statistical characteristics of the population, while non-probability sampling is 
suited to research questions and objectives which do not require generalisations and are 
intended to explore in-depth characteristics of a smaller sample (Saunders et ai, 2000). Thus, 
a relationship exists between probability sample and positivism, and between the non-
probability sample and phenomenology (Oliver, 2004). 
Purposeful sampling is defined as "hand-picking supposedly typical or interesting cases" 
(Blaxter et ai, 1996, p.79). The "purposive" sampling enables the researcher to use his/her 
own judgement to select the sample cases which will best address the research aims, 
objectives and questions (Saunders et ai, 2000). This sample type is small, not 
representative and commonly used by grounded theorists (Goulding, 2005; Oliver, 2004; 
Robson, 1997). Saunders et al (2000) argued that one of the common strategies in 
purposeful samples is to choose homogeneous sampling, observing that this 
focuses on one particular sub-group in which all the sample members are similar. This 
enables you to study the group in great depth (p.174). 
Having in mind the research question, aim and objectives, an identical purposive sample was 
considered the most suitable to this study, which are the local authorities. It was considered 
that the Director or Head of Finance would be the most adequate to provide the perceptions 
of recipients of the aUdit-inspection regime imposed by the CG and administered by the AC. 
The Directors or Head of Finance from 22 local authorities in the government region of 
Yorkshire and The Humber were contacted. Various researchers agree to this approach of 
selected cases and selected respondents which are considered able to "best" address the 
"purposes" of this research to provide answers to research questions, aims and objectives 
(Goulding, 2005; Oliver, 2004; Saunders et ai, 2000; Robson, 1997). Blaxter et. al (1996) and 
Sauders et al (2000) state that purposeful sampling like this is ideal for research projects 
where the sample cases are chosen reflecting the researcher's own judgement in selecting 
the best cases to address the research aims. 
The fact that interviewees were a purposeful homogeneous sample (Saunders et ai, 2000) of 
a group of "Director or Head of Finance", with similar experiences and decision processes 
regarding the Use of Resources assessment activities was an advantage to this research 
because the interviewed Director of Finance had rich understandings and experiences of the 
research topic. As argued by Oliver (2004): 
the purposive sampling process may seek to identify people who, because of their 
experience or contacts, have special insights into the research question (p.129) 
Respondents or interviewees for this study was very specific because I need to get the 
Director or Head of Finance from the 22 local councils in Yorkshire and The Humber region to 
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agree for interview. Getting the Director or Head of Finance to provide his or her views gave 
solid information for this study as they represents the highest authority for the Finance 
Department which is subject to external audit. When the questionnaires were issued, three 
sets were sent to each local council to invite participation from the Director of Finance, 
Manager for Certification Audit and Manager for Use of Resources assessment. I found that 
usually only the Director or Head of Finance responded and agreed to be interviewed. Even if 
the managers were to agree, he or she would be agreeing by approval from the Director or 
Head of Finance. Based on the pilot testing done earlier, it seemed appropriate to interview 
the Director of Finance if available, because he or she was the most senior financial officer. 
At two local authorities, the Director or Head of Finance invited the manager who dealt 
directly with the external audit to join the interview. Once the meeting had started , all the 
respondents were very cooperative and willing to share and explain their experiences. The 
allocated one hour was sufficient to seek explanation on the structured-statements 
respondents have marked earlier, as confirmed during pilot testing. However some 
respondents allocated the whole afternoon for the meeting and some interview lasted for up 
to two hours because the respondent wanted to explain his/her experiences and views. 
I was surprised at respondents' enthusiasm for the study. They challenged me with many 
interesting questions when we finished discussing the structured interview questions such as 
asking me explain what I plan to do with my findings, what would be the contribution , is the 
system similar to Malaysia and how I would apply my study to Malaysia. The respondents 
also seemed content and engaged in my explanation and suggested many things for me, for 
example: (i) to come back and interview them after they experienced CM, (ii) to email them if 
I want to learn and document their improvement in 'data quality' measures, (iii) to visit them if 
I want to learn and share their internal audit development and experience, their 'procurement 
procedures' and etc. The interviews have always been enormously motivating factors for me 
and provided many hopes for my planned future research which could benefit my country. In 
total 19 Director or Head of Finance were interviewed. How access to interviewees was 
obtained will be discussed now. 
4.6.3.2 Access 
iming, Duration, 
Place and Transcripts 
----~----------------------------~------~==~--------~======~---­
Main Interviews 
This section is concerned with how access to interviewees was achieved. Some ethical 
considerations are also examined . Since all the interviewees were senior persons at each 
local authority 's finance department, they must be "busy people". The first contact to request 
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an interview appointment with the structured questions was made by post for formality 
reasons and to allow a follow up bye-mail, should the local authorities not respond. The 
letters which were sent to interviewees, the director of finance, in early March 2008, each 
contained (i) supervisor's support letter; (ii) synopsis of the research; and (iii) three copies of 
the structured questions with a self-addressed return envelope for each. This first attempt 
was targeted to each Director or Head of Finance and requested the two other managers to 
response. The strategy was to invite responses from key person dealing with the 
assessment/audits, so that at least we could receive a response from each local authority. 
Although the pilot test showed that the Director or Head of Finance has the overall view and 
was the most appropriate respondent, other managers may be experts in the area they 
manage. 
From the postal request, I received four responses within 2 weeks; each completed the 
questionnaires but all declined interview because of their busy schedule. After waiting for 6 
weeks from the day letters were sent out, a follow up email was sent in mid April 2008 to the 
silent local authorities. Electronic copies of synopsis and structured questionnaires were also 
attached. This second attempt yielded an additional 15 marked questionnaires from all three 
types of respondents at local authorities. None however agreed to interview. 
Six weeks after the first follow-up via email, in early June 2008 another follow-up (third 
attempt) was earned out by my supervisors. Professor Hodges sent the follow-up email, and 
Professor Frecknall-Hughes then communicated with the secretary from the local authorities' 
finance department who had responded to the email to arrange interviews. This resulted in 
interview appointments with nine local authorities in July and August 2008. The next attempt 
was done through Professor Heald and his assistant by email and phone calls to draw more 
participation from local authorities. Ten local authorities agreed to interview which were 
completed from October to December 2008. Thus 19 interviews were held from July to 
December 2008. 
Throughout March to December 2008, a total of 28 marked responses were received from 20 
local authorities. Interviews however, were done with one main respondent from each local 
authority. Thus, for the purpose of statistical analysis, only 20 marked responses to the 
structured questionnaires were considered; one from each local authority which responded. 
The results of frequency and mean analyses are presented in tables throughout Findings II, 
in Chapter 6 as a guide to discuss interview responses. Although one director of finance was 
not interviewed, marked responses from the local authority were considered, as the director 
provided his comments on the space allocated. Local authorities which had not responded 
were contacted and their refusals to participate were received. One local authority refused 
because they have not had a Director or Head of Finance since the previous person holding 
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office had moved and another local authority refused because they saw no contribution of this 
research to their local authority. 
I consider 20 responses from 22 local authorities in the region to represent an excellent 
response rate. The data collected should be reliable as they came from the main person 
involved in the assessment process. The Directors or Head of Finance generally had wide 
experience with many different types of council or through sharing with their circle of 
professional colleagues. Several positive factors have been learned from the process, 
The respondents' general environment was understood. This was an advantage because my 
research treated each local authority as a case study in which I knew a lot about their 
position, environment (political, economical, social, and demographical), performance and 
problems or issues they faced. Understanding those plus their marked responses helped a lot 
in listening to their responses and probing for more explanation. 
Having the respondents mark the structured questions before interview sessions. Enabled 
me to listen more to the respondents, understand their responses and prepare the aspects on 
which I should spend more time. The respondents were responsive as they knew, through 
the structured questions, the whole focus of this research. 
The credibility of the findings was enhanced through the academic nature of the research. 
The professional and intellectual level of respondents and the exact position they hold which 
enable them to respond directly based on their experience contributed to improved credibility. 
The research results were offered to interviewees. This was considered an important 
incentive for interviewees to participate since this research has direct relevance for them 
(Saunders et ai, 2000 and Blaxter et ai, 1996). It was noticeable that most of the interviewees 
were very keen in receiving the research results. A report with key findings and practical 
implications of the research findings will be generated in the end of the study and send to all 
the interviewees. 
The interviewees were persons visibly curious and open to new perspectives, which may 
result from the strong responsibility they have in their jobs. It was my feeling that most of the 
interviewees were keen in helping others, especially in a project they respect and are 
interested in. This supports the argument of Easterby-Smith et al (2002) who pointed out that 
there are "a few enlightened sponsors who are sufficiently curious about the world in which 
they work to support research for its own sake" (p.73). I would even suggest that people, 
specifically in this sample, not only wanted to help but they had a sense of "obligation" in 
doing that. Thus, although sometimes being difficult to arrange the interviews due to time 
constrains, I always sensed that interviewees were interested in the topiC and willing to 
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contribute to this research . In fact, it is not everyday that these people have this type of 
opportunity of sharing their feelings about a topic directly related to their jobs. That was the 
reason why I never quit to follow-up them, even the most "difficult" cases , until the interview 
was finally arranged . 
The interview request was made first via post, and then follow-up through e-mail before 
making phone calls was a positive choice in order to obtain access. By dOing this , it allows 
several steps to follow up on the researcher side and creates a little time pressure on the 
respondents' side. Curiously, some of the interviewees mentioned this point, when asked 
how they preferred to be contacted , some answering making a parallel with the interview 
request, considering that the e-mail is the best way . 
Finally, it is important to note that various ways to follow up with targeted respondents has 
help massively in ensuring all respondents were approached and convinced to participate in 
this research , and on the appeal made to encourage responses which includes: 
your responses is vital to this research as I am only studying this group of local 
authorities; 
results of this research will be sent to you when the analysis is completed ; 
and at the end of calling for more participation, to tell them that almost all local authorities 
in the region have participated, thus if they want their views heard, they should meet us. 
I think that this type of appeal was also seen as friendly and motivates interviewees to give 
access to the research project, hence accepting the interview request. 
4.6.3.3 Ethics 
iming, Duration, 
Place and Transcripts 
----------------------------------~-------~==~--------====~==~---­
Main Interview 
Ethical issues were another aspect carefully considered in this research . It is important to 
behave appropriately with interviewees, respecting their rights, since they are the main object 
of the research . (Saunders et ai , 2000) . Confidentiality and anonymity were assured to every 
interviewee (Oliver, 2004; Bryman and Bell , 2003; Saunders et ai , 2000; Blaxter et ai , 1996). 
Interviewees were asked permission before I began to record the interview and were 
informed that the interviews will be made anonymous and that their names will not be 
mentioned . Anonymity is very important in this research as a simple statement could allow 
the respondent to be identified. Thus, I have tried to be very ca reful when mentioning the 
responses in Chapter 6. 
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The principle of informed consent was followed , in which researchers have 
the obligation to ensure that before respondents agree to take part in the research , they are 
made fully aware of the nature of the research and of their role within it (Oliver, 2004 , p.136) 
Thus, information about the research was given to interviewees in all correspondence and at 
the beginning of each interview. The professional and intellectual level of interviewees has 
made things lot easier, as they normally asked me many questions about why I want to 
research this area and many asked for my opinion which I suggested to reserve to the end , 
so as to avoid influencing their views. I felt like going through a viva in many of the interviews 
as the respondents are very well-versed about the subject in which I am researching . Thus, I 
always felt satisfied after every interview. 
Finally, in the interviews there was an attempt to make interviewees feel at ease and with 
some control over the interview (Oliver, 2004). This control was given through explaining 
briefly, before the interview started , how and what I am looking for: and listening to their 
views on why they agree or disagree on the statements given in the structured questions. It 
was also mentioned that they could say anything they wanted, related to the issues asked . I 
mentioned that my supervisors and I are the only ones who will listen to the record , and they 
fully understand that it is impossible for me to write or remember everything without recording 
the information that they share with me. Nevertheless, in my view, the most important aspect 
is to make interviewees feel comfortable , to let them have the questions and their marked 
responses beforehand , as that will allow them to have ideas and thoughts about the research 
focus and avoid delay in understanding the questions. These have contributed a great deal 
towards keeping the interviews to the planned time of one hour each - unless the interviewee 
was willing to give more time as they feel like they want to share more! 
4.6.3.4 Interview Checklist Guide 
iming, Duration, 
Place and Transcripts 
----------------------------------~-------====~------~======~~---­
Main Interview 
I considered the interviews to be semi-structured , as interviewees were allowed to express 
their views, and the statements worked as guidance. As Bryman and Bell (2003) have noted , 
semi-structured interviews usually involve a list of questions and topics to follow. Thus the 
structured questionnaires work as part of the checklist guide besides my knowledge of each 
local authority's performance and their environment (political, economical , social and 
demographical) . The checklist guide was tested and carefully refined in the pilot study of this 
research . Stroh (2000) emphasised that the confidence that the interviewer has in the 
interview protocol guide dictates the success of the interview. In fact, the pilot study proved to 
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be very helpful in order to test, and improve both the checklist guide and my interview skills, 
with confidence being enhanced in the main interviews. 
The checklist guide included the marked structured questions with areas I highlighted for 
probing and emphasizing. Some questions were added based on my knowledge from 
reviewing the performance and environment of the local authorities, such as such as the 
number of accounting staff, communication with other local authorities, the program they had 
with their local public, summary of financial results etc. Nevertheless, the argument of Clough 
and Nutbrown (2002) was followed in the sense of the "schedule guided the interview but did 
not dictate the path" (p.105). Therefore, an open mind was kept, letting the interviewees 
express their views without imposing preconceived ideas dictating the interview 
(Gummesson, 2005, p.322). The structured questionnaires work as a guide to maintain the 
standardized coverage of the questions asked, so that every respondent would be asked to 
express their views on the area. 
Each interview was conducted in the way which the first question should be a general one, 
encouraging the respondent to give free feelings/thoughts about it (Perry, 2000). To stimulate 
the environment, the first question asked was about the length of time the director has been 
with the council to encourages him/her to explain their experience. Perry's idea was 
confirmed since the first questions on the interviewees' general work experience helped to 
create a more relaxed atmosphere. Generally, interviewees liked to talk about their jobs, what 
they do, sometimes being needed to "interrupt" them, giving focus to the interview research 
topic. In fact it must be highlighted that some important and quite unexpected findings came 
out precisely from the first group of "relaxing/general questions". The last question should 
also be prepared in order to give a sense of "closure" to the interview (Stroh, 2000). Thus, in 
the structured questionnaires, interviewees were asked if 'the UoR has been worthwhile 
innovation' and 'I would like the CPA to change as follows'. Both questions allowed 
respondents to conclude and justify their hope. 
As explained in the section on questionnaires design, the structured-statements were 
developed from: 
• review of the AC publications and auditors work at local authorities [research question 
1, presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis]; 
• review of local authorities performance assessed by the auditors, published by the AC 
and available at local authorities [research question 2, presented in Chapter 5 of this 
thesis]; and 
• review of academic literature which confirms issues related to the audit of local 
govern ment. 
Table 30 shows the checklist guide that was followed in all the 19 interviews. 
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Table 30 Checklist ~uide for interviews 
Introduction (Before turning on the record) 
• Introduce myself 
• I would like to start by thanking you so much for taking the time to help me with my research 
• Our conversation will last approximately one hour 
• We will go through the answers you provided in the structured questionnaires [handed a copy 
of the respondents marked answers] 
• As I mentioned in the previous contact , this research is aimed at understanding the impact 
external audit and UoR assessment has had on local authorities 
• Do you mind if I record the session , so I don't miss anything and can concentrate on your 
views and our conversation ; 
• I assure the confidentiality of your responses and the recording ; 
• I will send you a report with the main research findings as soon as I conclude my project 
• Do you have any questions before we begin? 
Respondent's Background (Try to be brief) 
I would like to begin by asking a few background questions: 
• How long have you been with this council? 
• Where were you before? 
• [to complete the background details: qualifications, professional body's membership] 
Main Interview 
We will basically review based on the sections of the structured questionnaire. You are free to 
express your views and reasoned why you agree or disagree to statements given. 
• [to add other questions relevant to local authorities if not mentioned by the director and if time 
permits , such as: number of accounting staff, attempt to invite participation from public, 
publication of summary of financial performance and results etc] 
Conclusion 
Finally , do you have any other suggestions? Thank you very much for your help in my research 
project . I will send you a report on my findings as soon as I conclude this research . Feel free to email 
me if you have any other concerns or views to share. 
4.6.3.5 
--
Timing, Duration, Place and Transcripts 
iming, Duration, 
Place and Transcripts 
------~==~----------========~------.... -
Main Interview 
This section discusses other aspects of the interviews: timing , duration , place and transcripts. 
Nineteen interviews were held between July 2008 and December 2008 in the region of 
Yorkshire and The Humber. All interviews were made in English. All the interviews were 
carried out at the respondents' premises - office or meeting room . All interviews' lasted 
between one to two hours. All the interviews were recorded , according to Stroh (2000) 
tape-recorded interviews, it is suggested , provide a far more reliable record of the interview than 
note taking (p.209). 
Moreover, taping the interview allowed the resea rcher to pay more attention to the interview 
and to focus on the interviewees' answers (Bryman and Bell , 2003 ; Blaxter et ai , 1996). I 
found that the directors generally were very wi lling to share their views , friendly and most 
will ing to help as much as they could with their experiences, opinions and perceptions on the 
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research subject. I had strong impression that interviewees seem interested to talk about the 
topics which are very related to their jobs, amuse them at times and they like hearing what 
others think of it. As one respondent from the pilot test have said (the manager for UoR), "the 
structured questions and the interview has made me think about the activities which I have 
never thought that way before". And one director said "it is always motivating when you find 
people are interested in your job". The interviews were then reviewed and transcribed to 
extract quotes from the respondents to support discussion. Clough and Nutbrown (2002) 
estimated that a forty-five minutes tape may take seven hours to transcribe. The structured 
questionnaire has helped a lot to understand the views of respondents though an immense 
amount of time was needed to transcribe them. It is also an advantaged that the interviewees 
were all spoke in very clear English during the session, and were easily understood when I 
transcribed. 
4.7 Data Analysis 
Bogdan and Biklen (1982, p.145) said data analysis involves "working with data, organising 
it, breaking it into manageable units, synthesizing it, searching for patterns, discovering what 
is important and what is to be learned, and deciding what you will tell others". Miles and 
Huberman (1994) note that transfer of data to index cards, coding of data, methodological 
notes, case summaries, charts and dummy variables are some of the techniques that can be 
utilised to analyse data. Nevertheless, some writers argue that the choice of technique in the 
data analysis is driven by research questions (McCutcheon and Meredith, 1993; Baxter and 
Chua, 1998; Robson, 1997), research strategies and theoretical framework (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967), methods of data traditionally used in such a study, the availability and 
accountability of data, and the resources at the disposal of the research (Layder, 1993). 
As mentioned in earlier section, this study adopts triangulation as its research method; 
consequently the method of data analysis employed follows the strategy of analysis 
separately: (i) first step - review of documentation to understand the assessment processes 
and review of literatures to understand issues; (ii) second step - review of published 
assessments done by auditors and (iii) finally - listen to the auditees' views. The first 
analyses were used to guide the second step, and then were integrated to inform the final 
data collection and analysis. Thus the findings reported were results of integration of findings 
and analysis as proposed by Greene et al (1989). Thus the next section explains how the 
data of this study were analyse and reported. 
4.7.1 Analysis of Published Data 
The published data were analysed statistically, these were explained in section 4.9, from 
4.9.1 to 4.9.3, which includes documentation from certification audit, UoR assessment and 
open ended interviews. The findings are presented in Chapter 5 of this thesis which is 
separated into two sections of certification audit and use of resources assessments. The 
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analyses are based upon descriptive statistics using excel where graphs were formed to 
check for patterns and identify issues. 
4.7.2 Analysis of Main Data Collection: Structured Questionnaires 
and Interviews 
The structured questions prepared were close-ended statements designed for exploration 
during interviews. Nevertheless, as respondents marked the statements beforehand, the data 
received were inputted into a Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) data file. The 
data then were analysed using descriptive statistics to identify frequency distributions, means 
and standard deviations which are relevant to address research questions of this study. A 
rank-order of data was developed from means where possible to check for perceived order in 
some of the relevant questions such as to rank based on risk, chances, difficulty, and 
preference. 
The interviews held were based on the themes from the structured questionnaires and 
statements. As the themes have been developed, the interviews were transcribed and used 
as quotations to discuss findings from fieldwork interviews in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Throughout the interviews, respondents expressed their views based on the themes and 
issues identified. From the 19 interviews conducted, the flow of themes and structured-
statements developed in the questionnaires were helpful to discover the issues of interest. 
This is consistent with experienced during the three pilot tests conducted. 
4.8 Reflection, Limitations and Credibility of Research 
Findings 
The methodology of this research is common to many as it involves exploration starting with 
reviewing documentation, followed with triangulation through interviews and quantitative 
analysis of assessed performance. From the review, interviews and analysis of assessed 
performance, issues and themes were developed and structured statements were prepared 
for fieldwork interview. Thus, the structured statements and pre-determined themes proved to 
hem-in the discussion within focused issues and assists in exploring the issues deeper. 
Sending the structured statements and requesting the respondents to mark their answer 
choices before interview have also been very helpful to contain the meeting within promised 
time limits and allowing respondents to think about the issues, so they can respond clearly. At 
times they even provided evidence to their argument and brought their work colleagues to 
help explain issues which they have limited knowledge. 
In this research, credibility was assured by having the professional and intellectually 
qualified respondents. Thus, this provides informed responses, not hearsay or baseless 
thoughts. The data were collected in various stages with triangulation which provides 
valuable support to the findings. Moreover, in order that other researcher could eventually 
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repeat this study in another context, all the research processes have been explained 
carefully, namely: 
• the discussion of the literature review· , 
• the gaps found; 
• the research question, aim and objectives; 
• the methodological position chosen, such as type of research, philosophical paradigm, 
methods, approach and strategy employed; 
• the research design; 
• the pilot study, its aim, changes and reflection made before the main data collection· 
• the implementation of the interviews in the main data collection, examining how'the 
sample was selected, how access was achieved, the interview checklist guide followed, 
and aspects such as the interviews' timing, duration, place and transcripts; 
• the analysis methods employed; mixed method analysis; 
• the reflection process after the preliminary analysis and pilot test and some limitations 
found; and 
• the findings emerged from data analysis are discussed in-depth in the next two 
chapters. 
All these important stages were explained in detail in order to ensure the credibility of the 
research findings. 
4.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the methodology adopted in this study. In doing so, this chapter 
introduces three different research types and the four main paradigms which guide 
management research and explains the approach used in this study. Since the study locates 
itself in applied research and adopts pragmatist paradigm based on the fact that both 
quantitative and qualitative data were collected, a triangulation research methodology in the 
context of case study research design was considered both an appropriate method and 
strategy in investigating the questions posed in this research. The significance of deploying 
triangulation methodology in this study are the benefits of drawing on the strength of both 
deductive and inductive methods to counterbalance the weaknesses of the mono-method, 
thereby enhancing the robustness of the findings in this study. 
Reflections and limitations of this study were also presented and how the credibility of the 
research findings was enhanced was explained at the end. To summarize, this chapter 
presented the rationale for selecting the mixed method approach, the case study research 
design, the preliminary data collection, analysis and triangulations, a detailed discussion of 
the construction of the questions for interviews, access for pilot test, main data collection and 
approach for analysis. The next two chapters will report and discuss the findings and analysis 
from two aspects of data collection. Chapter 5 presents findings from secondary data, the 
assessed performance published and available publicly. Chapter 6 presents findings from 
Phase 2 data collection which was the main interviews. 
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PUBLISHED PERFORMANCE 
Introduction --. Literature r--. Methodology 1--' Findings & --+ Conclusion Review Discussion I 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings and discussion of this research will be presented in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
Figure 28 shows the structure for these chapters which follow the sequence of the sub-
research questions created to feed into the main aim of this study. 
Analysis and Discussion 
.-._ ._._._._._._ ._._._._ ._._._._., 
Research Question 2 
How do local authorities perform on certification 
audit and Use of Resources assessment? 
! ' - . _ . _ . _ . _ . _ . . - . - . - . - . - . ~ ~ . - . - . - . - . -.- - . - . - . -.- . - . ~ 
I Research Question 3 ~ Research Question 4 ; 
Do the auditees view What factors contribute 
published scores as to the variations in 
reflecting their local local authorities ' 
authority's performance? 
performance? 
CHAPTER 5 
, '_. _._._._._._._._. _._._ . -
. I 
I Research Question 5 
How do auditees view 
the external audit 
process and the 
performance 
assessment? 
--------------------------------v------------------------------~ CHAPTER 6 
Figure 28: Flow of Analysis and Discussion for Findings 
The main research question and aim of this study from which five sub-research questions 
were created are (repeated from Table 1, Chapter 1): 
Research HOW DO THE EXTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN 
Question ENGLAND AFFECT LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS AUDITEES? 
Aim To discover how the external auditing performed at local authorities in England 
affects local authorities as recipients of the service. 
Feeding into the main aim, five sub-questions were created and answered. The first sub-
question : 
What are the functions of external auditors for local authorities in England? 
is presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis because it serves as a foundation for this research . 
This chapter will provide the analysis and findings to answer the second sub-question : 
How do the local authorities perform based on their auditor's assessment 
(certification audit and Use of Resources assessment)? 
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The results of the auditors ' assessment of local authorities are reported separately for 
certification audit and UoR assessment. These data are gathered from local auth orities' 
statement of accounts (SoA), annual audit letters and the UoR results , taken in part from the 
AC's published performance reports . The SoA for seven years from 2000 to 2006, annual 
audit letters produced by relationship managers and UoR measures published by the AC 
from the assessment done for 2002 to 2006 have been collected and reviewed . The results 
are presented in this chapter under two headings, namely, certification audit and UoR 
assessment. 
5.2 Certification Audit 
This section explores the annual SoA of local authorities in the focus region for audit 
certification of the SoA and the auditors' opinion . Discussion is divided into several sub-
sections shown in Figure 29 below: 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Figure 29: Flow of Discussion for Certification Audit 
Local authorities have to prepare their accounts and submit them for audit using the accrual 
basis similar to those of the private sector.16 Local authorities have to follow Local Authorities 
Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003 and Local Authorities Accounts and Audit Regulations 
(Amendment) (England) Regulations 2006 in preparing , submitting and publishing their 
accounts. A joint committee of CIPFA and LASAAC developed a Statement of 
Recommended Practice (SORP) based on the regulations above to specify the code of 
practice for local authority accounting in the United Kingdom . CIPFA is the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy while LASAAC is the Local Authority (Scotland) 
Accounts Advisory Committee. 
The accounting regulations were amended significantly in 2003 and 2006. Amendments 
made in 2003 were to ensure greater compliance with UK Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice (UK GAAP). The 2006 amendments were to simplify and streamline the 2003 
Regulations and to clarify which rules apply to which public body. The effort is to strengthen 
governance and accountability through new requirements (DCLG, 2006). The Regu lations 
require local authorities to produce their SoA annually according to 'proper practices' (DCLG, 
2006). The SORP has also been amended since 2002 to reflect the changes in accounting 
standards. The latest SORP was developed in 2007 to assist local authorities in meeting the 
16 A number of changes have been made to the SORP to comply with UK GAAP since 2002 . In 2005 , 
the changes were smaller compa red to previous years (see Stewardship and Governance Report 
2005 , published by Audit Commi ssion in 2006). 
16 1 
FINDINGS FROM PUBLISHED DATA: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
challenge of earlier preparation and publication of their SoA as required by the Accounts and 
Audit Regulations. The AC also recognised that accounting in accordance with UK GAAP is 
a precondition of proper accountability for the stewardship and use of publ ic money and 
defined local councils 'proper practices ' as compliance with the SORP (Audit Commiss ion , 
2006b). 
According to the guidance issued by the DCLG (2006) , three documents have been identified 
as relevant to Section 21 (2)(b) , Regulation 31 of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and 
Accounting) England) Regulations 2003 regarding 'proper practices ' for local authorities 
accounting . The three documents are: 
1. The Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the United Kingdom: a 
Statement of Recommended Practice, published by the Chartered Institute of 
Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA); 
2. The Best Value Accounting Code of Practice, published by the CIPFA; 
3. The Governance and Accountability in Local Councils in England and Wales, 
jointly published by NALC and the SLCC for parish councils . 
(DCLG Circular 03/2006) 
The Auditing Practices Board (APB) has published 'Practice Note 10: Audit of Financial 
Statements of Public Sector Bodies in the United Kingdom (Revised)' as guidelines to audit 
public sector bodies. The requirement to audit the financial statements of local government 
in England has been provided in statute. Auditors can refer to the Audit Commission Act 
1998 and Code of Audit Practice issued by the Audit Commission in carrying out their work 
(APB, 2006). 
Ta ble 31: Au itors d f L or oca ut on les In I A h T . th e reg Ion 
Year Ending 31 Private Audited District Audited Bodies March ... Auditors Bodies Auditors 
2000 6 MDC, UA 16 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
2001 6 MDC, UA 16 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
2002 6 MDC , UA 16 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
2003 6 MDC , UA 16 MDC, UA, CC & DC 
2004 6 MDC, UA 16 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
2005 5 MDC , UA 17 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
2006 6 MDC, UA 16 MDC , UA, CC & DC 
.. (Source : Compiled from local authorities SoA and AAL) 
Table 31 shows information on the auditors involved in auditing local authorities in the 
Yorkshire and The Humber region . The number of private auditors involved in aud iting local 
authorities did not change much during the seven year period . 27 percent were aud itors from 
private firms and auditing only the Metropolitan District Council (MDC) and Unitary Authority 
(UA). None of the auditors from private firms performed audit for the District Councils (DC) in 
the region . All seven DC were audited by the same district auditor, who also audited the only 
County Council (CC) in the region . As the auditors are assigned based on their locality with in 
the AC 's regional management area , private audit firms that won the tender will be assigned 
to audit local authorit ies in the AC 's region where they are based . 
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Tabl 32 D dr f A e ea mes or pprovin~ and Publishing Statement of Accounts 
Accounting Year End 31 
March ... Approval by Council Publication 
Until 2003 30 September 31 December 
2004 31 August 30 November 
2005 31 July 31 October 
2006 onwards 30 June 30 September 
(Source. The Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003) 
To improve the usefulness and timeliness of the SoA, local authorities were subject to 
tightening deadlines, starting from financial year ended 2004. Table 32 shows the changes in 
deadlines for local authorities' SoA from 2003 until 2006. The acceleration of statutory 
timetables has placed pressure on local authorities. Many local authorities managed to meet 
the deadline for submission of accounts for councillors ' approval but at the expense of the 
quality of their submitted SoA for audit (Audit Commission , 2006e). Local authorities 
submitted their SoA to meet the deadlines ignoring its quality because meeting the deadlines 
is part of their performance indicators. To help local authorities cope with the new deadlines 
and producing quality SoAs, the AC works with other bodies such as CIPFA to produce 
guidelines for producing quality accounts and meeting the deadlines (Audit Commission, 
2006e). The AC then published updated guidelines to advise local authorities on the 
obstacles to prompt accounts production and to suggest ways in which local authorities can 
overcome the obstacles (Audit Commission , 2005e). The AC also urged their appointed 
auditors to start their audit work earlier besides advising local authorities to speed up their 
accounting reports and improve their quality. 
5.2.1 Certification of the Statement of Accounts 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
The Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003 published dates for submission and publication 
of local authorities' SoAs but the deadline for audit certification was not included (refer to 
the statutory deadline timetable provided by The Accounts and Audit Regulations 2003 in 
Table 32) . However, according to the Regulations , local authorities can publish their SoA 
immediately after they obtain certification from their auditor. A source of evidence to prove 
that local authorities published their annual SoA on a specific date is yet to be discovered . 
Based on researcher observation on the local authorities ' websites , none have mentioned 
the date when they published their SoA. A number of local authorities have not uploaded 
their certified SoA on their website. Certification dates printed as on the audit report for each 
SoA have been used as evidence that a local authority 's annual SoA was ready for 
, 
publication . However, the AC (2006e) has mentioned that 13% of local government bod ies 
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throughout England failed to meet the statutory publication deadline of 31 October in 2005. 
The AC might have its own way of determining when local authorities published their SoA 
and where. 
Table 33· Numb er 0 fA th T F T t M u on les al mg 0 eet the Deadline 
Cl Numbers <1> 
e Statutory a. Statutory failing to % obtained >. "O~ deadline l-e (.) deadline obtained certification w"- for Authorities j!-ro for certification by the ~~ publication 
.;: 
publication by the deadlines 0 <1>""" (days) ~ )oM deadline ... ::J 
< 
2000 31-Dec 275 0 100% None None 
2001 31-Dec 275 0 100% None None 
2002 31-Dec 275 0 100% None None 
2003 31-Dec 275 1 95.45% North East Lincolnshire UA 
Kirklees, Rotherham , MDC Wakefield 
2004 30-Nov 244 6 72.73% North East Lincolnshire , UA 
Kingston upon Hull , DC Selby 
2005 31-0ct 214 2 90.91 % North East Lincolnshire , UA Kingston Upon Hull 
2006 30-Sep 183 1 95.45% Kingston Upon Hull UA 
.. , (Source. Compiled from local authorities SoAs) 
Table 33 shows the number of local authorities in the region failing to meet the annual 
deadlines required for their SoA. The dates printed on local authorities' annual audit 
certificate have been compared to the statutory publication deadlines. The statutory 
publication deadline was 31 December from 2000 to 2003. In 2004, the deadline was 
shortened to 30 November and further to 31 October and 30 September in 2005 and 2006. 
All local authorities in the region managed to get their SoA certified before the statutory 
deadline for publication for financial year ended 2000 until 2002 . 
When new accounting regulations were introduced in 2003 , North East Lincolnshire (UA) 
failed to get their SoA certified before the deadline due to a significant error in their 
accounting treatment. The other 21 local authorities managed to obtain certification prior to 
the deadline. Further additions to accounting regulations have been introduced in 2004 and 
the statutory deadline was shortened . This has put pressure on local authorities to respond 
to the new accounting regulations and at the same time earl ier publication of the SoA which 
resulted in six local authorities failing to meet the publication deadline. Only 16 local 
authorities met the statutory publication deadline in 2004 . 
During the second year of tightening deadlines, in 2005, 20 local authorities obtained aud it 
certification prior to the deadline of 31 October. In 2006, 21 local authorities obtained aud it 
certification prior to the publication deadline of 183 days. No new accounting regu lations 
were introduced in 2005 and 2006 and this could be a reason fo r the better achievement in 
terms of meeting the publication deadlines during these years . Both North East Lincolnsh ire 
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and Kingston upon Hull obtained a qualified opinion in their auditors' report in 2005 and 2007 
respectively. While North East Lincolnshire started to have problems from 2003, Kingston 
upon Hull was affected from 2004 when additional new accounting regulations were 
introduced. 17 An SoA obtaining a qualified audit opinion normally takes a longer time to 
obtain certification, causing delay in publication. 
Performance in terms of SoA certification for the 22 local authorities in the region is relatively 
similar except for two councils having trouble with their accounting treatments. Although the 
region consists of several DC which have less resources and expertise compared to the 
single tier and county councils (STCC), the DCs' performance in terms of statutory 
compliance does not differ from that of the other local authorities. A possible explanation 
could be that the nature of the preparation of financial accounts is technical and fairly 
objective. Once the system of recording and reporting is in place, local authorities have to 
maintain and update their systems with new rules and regulations. The first challenge for 
them is to have a proper system of recording and reporting. Having skilled accounting staff 
and less complex activities could help local authorities to comply with regulations and have 
their accounts ready faster. The STCC could have more resources to hire skilled accounting 
staff and the DC could have the advantage of less complex activities. 
Changes in the SORP will affect local authorities' ability to submit quality accounts to their 
auditor on time. The AC recognised that the increased complexity in the SORP since 2003 
had caused a deterioration in the quality of accounts submitted for approval and thus delays 
in getting certification (Audit Commission, 2006e). However, when the quality of submitted 
accounts did not improve even though fewer changes were made to SORP in 2005, the AC 
assumed that local authorities had not taken an adequate level of care in the preparation of 
their accounts and that there had been an inappropriate level of review by senior 
management prior to approval by councillors (Audit Commission, 2006e). The AC has 
encouraged and helped local authorities to establish arrangements for their accounting 
through guidelines and advice. The AC also urged auditors to start their audit work earlier on 
aspects that do not need completion of accounts. These factors may have helped local 
authorities to improve their arrangements. 
17 North East Lincolnshire obtained audit certification for their 2003, 2004 and 2005 SoA in December 2005, where 
all were qualified. The council's 2005 SoA was qualified because of the 2004 ~ompar~t.ive .figures. Kingston .up~n 
Hull also experienced delay in their 2005 SoA certification which r~sulted to qualified .oplnlon Issued by the auditor In 
2007 for both 2005 and 2006 SoA. The council's 2006 SoA obtained a qualified opinion also because of the 2005 
comparative figures. As North East Lincolnshire obt~ined un~uali~ed op~nion in 2006 because the old figures had 
disappeared, Kingston upon Hull too obtained unqualified certification for Its 2007 SoA. 
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5.2.2 Audit Lags 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Observation on the 22 local authorities' individual performance in terms of compl iance, time 
taken to obtain certification before the statutory deadlines for publication of their SoA and 
audit opinion for the seven years does not reveal any obvious differences between them. 
The DCs' performance does not differ from the STCCs. SoA performance analysis of the 
MDCs, the UAs, and the CC also does not reveal much variation . Audit lag for annual 
publication of SoAs have been calculated to check for patterns of SoA publication among 
councils in the region. Table 34 shows information on the audit lag . 
Table 34 A dOt L U I ags (in days) in the Yorkshire and The Humber GOR 
Year 
Statutory Ending Slowest Range Mean 
31 publica tion Fastest SoA Unqualified SoA (without (without deadlines (LA Type) qualifi ed qualifi ed Qualified SoA Ma rch (LA Ty pe) in days opinion) opinion) 
0 •• 
2000 275 206 (DC) 266 (MOC) 60 243 None 
2001 275 184 (MOC) 265 (MOC) 8 1 245 None 
2002 275 233 (MOC) 604 (MOC) 37 1 279 None 
2003 275 226 (MOC) 392 (MOC) 772( 166) 30 1(268) NEL-998 (UA) 
2004 244 189 (MOC) 288 (MOC) 443(99) 254(236) NEL-632 (UA) 
2005 2 14 160 (UA) 2 14 (MOC,OC) 483(54) 227(204) NEL-267 (UA) 
KUH -643 (UA) 
2006 183 175 (VA) 182 (MDC, DC) 103(7) 185(181) KUH-278 (UA) 
Note: The range and mean were calculated separately with and without qualified SoA. Figures 
in bracket for columns five and six show the range and mean calculated inclusive of qualified 
SoA. The last column shows days taken by North East Lincolnshire (NEL) and Kingston upon 
Hull (KUH) to obtained certification from the ir auditors. 
Audit lags were calculated in days for every local authority in the region. The ranges are 
calculated by comparing the fastest and the slowest local authorities in terms of days taken 
to obtain certification for their SoA. The range and mean for audit lags are calculated wi th 
and without unqualified audit opinions to avoid the irregular figures from qual ified SoA 
tampering the range and mean values for majority of local authorities in the reg ion . Aud it 
lags for qualified opinions were longer, as shown in the seventh column , and includ ing them 
in the mean and range produces higher figures. 
In this government region , only two local authori ties obtained a qual ified audit opinion during 
the period studied . The range calculated fo r all 22 local cou ncils in the region was 772 in 
2003 because North East Lincolnshire fa iled to get their 2003 SoA certified until 2005. The 
range is aga in high in 2005, 483 days, when Kingston upon Hull was having difficulties wi th 
their SoA. The cou nci l's SoAs for 2005 and 2006 have been certified in January 2007, 
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resulting in a lower range for 2006. In 2007 all local authorities obta ined unqual ified aud it 
opinion and published their audited SoA prior to the deadline. 
The mean and range without the two councils with qualified opinions is obviously better as 
shown in column five and six. The normal cause of local authorities' delay in getting their 
SoA certified is because of their failure to comply 18 with the SORP or particular FRSs, which 
requires their SoA to be resubmitted for councillors ' approval after a number of amendments 
(Audit Commission , 2006e). On average local authorities in the region obtained audit 
certification before statutory deadlines for publication every year except for 2002 where 
Rotherham (MDC) took 604 days to obtain certification . This has produced a longer mean for 
that year. Other than that, local councils in the government region met the statutory 
deadlines every year even though the deadlines were tightening . The range of days taken by 
local councils to obtain audit certification also increased in 2002 before levelling to a lower 
variation in later years . Changes in SORP requirements could have been the cause of the 
increase in ranges, as mentioned earlier in this section (Audit Commission , 2006e). 
The best achievement for local councils' in the region in terms of speed of publication their 
SoA was in 2006, the last year included in analysis for this study. All 21 councils (except 
Kingston upon Hull) obtained certification from their auditor with an unqualified opinion within 
175 to 182 days. The range shows that there is not much different in terms of audit lags 
among the 21 (95%) local councils in the region for the year. During the year, all local 
councils in the region uploaded their unaudited 2006 SoA (for public inspection) on their local 
website from August 2006 and their audited 2006 SoA from late September 2006. By the 
end of November 2006, all local authorities in the region had published their 2005/06 audited 
SoA on their local website .19 
Table 35: Audit Opinion 
Year Ending 31 March .. . 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Unqualified SoA 22 22 22 21 21 20 21 
Qualified SoA 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 
Table 35 summarised the audit opinion obtained by the 22 local authorities from 2000 to 
2006 . Only two authorities have had issues during the years analysed ; explanation on these 
two local authorities , North East Lincolnshire and Kingston upon Hull , will be provided in the 
following sections. Other local authorities in the region obtained an unqualified opin ion from 
their auditors . From the information gathered through their minutes of meeting to approve the 
accounts, local authorities normally consider and follow their auditor's suggestions and 
amend their SoA accordingly to obtain an unqualified opinion . As for North East Lincolnshire , 
18Local authorities have to resubmit their accounts for councillors approval due to fa ilu re to comply with the 
accounting and disclosure requirements of the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting - Statement of 
Recomme nded Practice (SORP), (which have become more complex In recent years) or relevant financial reporting 
standards (FRSs) . 
19 I browsed all the 22 loca l authorit ies ' websites regularly dUring August-November 2006. 
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the problems with their accounting treatment were tremendous and cannot be resolved 
within their own expertise. Kingston upon Hull failed to provide sufficient evidence and aud it 
work was suspended in 2005 when their auditor issued a publ ic notice to draw the attention 
of local electors to material errors found in the authority 's SoA. 
5.2.3 North East Lincolnshire - Qualified Audit Opinion 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Table 36 reports information on North East Lincolnshire . The council failed to complete their 
SoA for the financial year ending 31 March 2003 until a consultant was hired in summer 
2004 to help them with their accounts .20 Consequently, both SoA for financial years ending 
2003 and 2004 were submitted for Council's approval on the 9th December 2004. The 
2002103 SoA had been presented to the Final Accounts Committee meeting on the 1 ih 
December 2003 but was not approved due to 'significant issues of quantity and fundamental 
errors :2.1 in the accounts (NEL, FAC minutes of meeting , 16th Dec 2004) . 
Table 36: North East Lincolnshire - Qualified Audit Opinion 
LA SOA SOA SOA 
Authority Type Information 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
North East Lincolnshire UA Auditor District District District 
Cert . date 23.12 .05 23 .12.05 23 .12.05 
Audit Lag 998 632 267 
Opinion 23 .12.05 23.12.05 23 .12.05 
Accounting Accounting Comparative Causes figures from Error Error 2004 SoA 
Qualified Qualified Qualified 
Impact Audit Report Audit Report Audit Report 
Due to the error, their 2002/03 SoA could not be closed , and the auditor issued a "Public 
Interest Report", using their power under SAS 610, to the local authority in 2004 . The local 
authority was required to make changes to their 2002/03 accounts based on the auditor's 
comments in their 'Public Interest Report'. A consulting firm was engaged in summer 2004 to 
resolve the complexities in accounting treatment which resulted in the completion of both 
2003 and 2004 SoAs and approval by their final accounts committee in December 2004. 
The auditor then issued their opinion for both SoAs in 2005, giving a qual ified opinion 
because the local authority did not fully respond to all matters in the aud itor's public notice. 
20 Information obtained from Minutes of Meeting , Final Accounts Committee , North East Lincolnsh ire on the 9th 
December 2004. The minutes we re submitted to the Council at Council's meeting on the 16th December 2004. 
21 The terms borrowed from the Final Accounts Committee minutes are italicised throughout discussions in this 
document. 
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The 'qualified ' opinion was given based on "Iimitations of scope".22 The District Aud itor 
responsible for auditing the local authority's accou nt explained that the situ ation wi th regard s 
to the local authority's SoA for 2002/03 and 2003/04 'was very serious'. A disclaimer of 
opinion had to be issued due to the limitation of evidence ava ilable because of ' fundamental 
weaknesses within the Council 's financial management arrangements'. In 2005 , North East 
Lincolnshire obtained their certification in 267 days compared to 632 days fo r 2004 and 998 
days for 2003 . However, the 2005 SoA was also qualified due to the 2004 figures that appear 
in their comparative statements. After the complexities in accounting treatment has been 
resolved and the unreliable figures no longer appeared as comparatives in annual SoA, North 
East Lincolnshire council finally obtained an unqualified opinion in 2005 before the statutory 
deadline. 
5.2.4 Kingston upon Hull -Audit Suspended, Qualified Opinion 
SoA 
Certification 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Table 37 presents information on Kingston upon Hull. Although their 2005 and 2006 
accounts were submitted by the submission deadline, the local authority started to have 
difficulties since their 2005 SoA. The auditor was unable to form an opinion due to 
insufficient evidence. 
Table 37: Kingston u pon H II A dOt S u - u I uspen d d d Q IT d S A e an ua I Ie 0 
LA 
Authority Type Information SOA 2003/04 SOA 2004/05 SOA 2005/06 
Kil!.aston-upon-Hull UA Auditor District District District 
Cert . date 30.11 .04 03.01.07 03 .01 .07 
Audit Lag 267 643 278 
Opinion 30.11.04 03.01.07 03.01 .07 
Accounting Error-
auditor suspended Comparat ive 
Causes aud it work on figures from 09 .11.05 and 
issued public 2005 SoA 
notice 
Impact Qual ified Aud it Qual ified Aud it Report Report 
Their auditor then suspended audit work in November 2005 and issued a public notice23 in 
2005 regarding grant claim procedures and its documentation. The Council has to respond 
to the aud itor publicly regard ing the error. The issue was not yet resolved even after the 
22 Quoted from Final Accounts Committee minutes of meeti ng on the 13th May 2005 , submitted for Council's 
approval at its meeting on the 14th July 2005 . .. . . . . 
23 Section 8 , Audit Commission Act 1998 reqUi res auditors to conSider whether, In the public Interest, they should 
report on any matter coming to their notice. 
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2006 SoA deadline in September 2006.24 By October 2006 , Kingston upon Hu ll council had 
identified several areas of weakness that resulted from issues raised by the aud itor: among 
others, limited resources , staff failures and poor internal control to rev iew the grants and 
subsidy claims before submission . The council only obtained certification from their auditor in 
January 2007 for both the 2005 and 2006 SoAs. Both SoAs were qualified ; 2005 due to 
insufficient evidence and 2006 due to comparative figures from 2005. Kingston upon Hull 
obtained unqualified audit opinion certification in 2007 , having avoided the comparative 
figures from 2005 SoA. 
5.2.5 Opinion Prior to Audit Completion 
SoA 
--
--....- -
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Auditors sometimes issue their opinion prior to audit completion when they are satisfied that 
the documents they await will not affect the fairness of statement of accounts presented by 
the local authority. The authority can publish their statement of accounts with the auditor's 
opinion (informal certification) and change it later when they have received formal 
certification . Table 38 shows information on Bradford Moe whose auditor issued an audit 
opinion earlier than formal certification . 
Table 38' Opinion Prior to Audit Completion 
SOA SOA SOA SOA SOA SOA 
Authority Information 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Bradford Auditor Private Private Private Private Private Private 
MDC Cert. date 25.10.00 01.10.01 22 .11 .02 20.11.03 06 .10.04 29 .03.06 
Audit Lag 208 184 236 234 189 214 
Opinion 25.10.00 01 .10.01 22 .11 .02 20.11.03 06.10.04 31.10.05 
Audit work 
on asset 
manage-
ment Causes project is 
not yet 
complete at 
31 .10.05 
Impact UQ opinion 
The auditor can issue their opinion once they are satisfied with the local authority's SoA. The 
local authority had not submitted documents relating to their asset management project 
when their auditor issued an unqualified opinion on the 31 sl October 2005 (to meet the 
deadline for publication of SoA). When issuing their opin ion , the aud itor confirmed that the 
24 Information obtained from their Financial Management and Audit Overview and Scrut iny CommiSS ion report 
numbered CF/2006/37 , attached in minutes of meeting dated 16 October 2006 
170 
FINDINGS FROM PUBLISHED DATA: ANALYSI S AND DISCUSS ION 
documents they are waiting for will not affect MOe's SoA and it is just part of their aud it 
process. Their auditor later issued a formal certification on 23rd March 2006 when they had 
received all the documents. 
5.2.5 Objections to the Statement of Accounts by Local Electors 
Discussion - Certification Audit 
Besides new accounting regulations, tightening deadlines and qualified accounts , a local 
elector's objection the local authority's SoA could also cause delay in audit certification and 
SoA publication . Several local authorities in the region have experienced objections from 
their local electors in recent years. Many have been resolved before the publication 
deadlines but some lasted longer. Table 39 shows information on local authorities having 
local elector's objections to their SoAs taking them beyond the publication deadlines to be 
resolved. 
T bl 39 L a e oca lEI t ec ors ObO f )Jec Ion 
LA SOA SOA SOA SOA SOA SOA 
Authori!y T_ype Information 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 
Doncaster MDC Auditor District District District District District District 
Cert. date 14.02.05 14.02 .05 14.02 .05 14.02 .05 17.02.05 31 .10.05 
Audit Lag 265 263 1051 261 244 214 
Opinion 21 .12.00 19.12.01 18.12.02 17.12.03 30.11.04 31 .10.05 
Local Local Local Local Local 
Causes elector's elector's elector's elector's elector's 
objection objection objection objection objection 
UQ UQ UQ UQ UQ UQ Impact opinion opinion opinion opinion opinion opinion 
Sheffield MDC Auditor Private Private Private Private Private Private 
Cert . date 27.11.00 30.11 .01 13.12.02 18.12.03 27 .10.04 31 .10.05 
Audit Lag 241 244 257 262 210 214 
Opinion 27.11.00 30.11 .01 13.12.02 18.12.03 27 .10.04 31 .10.05 
Local Local Local 
Causes elector's elector's elector's 
objection objection objection 
UQ UQ UQ UQ UQ UQ Impact opinion opinion opinion opinion opinion opinion 
Shaded areas show the duration of the objection until the auditors issue their certification . 
When local electors submit their formal objection to the council 's SoA, the auditor will look 
into the matter and decide whether the objection is appropriate and ask the council to 
investigate and decide on the matter. The auditor can reject the objection if it is considered 
not appropriate. Although the auditor may be satisfied with the cou ncil 's SoA, a formal 
certificate cannot be issued until the objection has been heard and decided . Th is will cause a 
delay in publishing the final accounts. To help council publish their accounts faster, the 
auditor can prepare a substitute to the audit opinion . 
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The auditor normally writes a report in the SoA every year to confirm that the SoA presents 
fairly the state of financial affairs of the local authority and to mention that the official 
certificate cannot be issued until the objection has been resolved, as well as explaining the 
nature of the objection received. The council then publish their SoA once the auditor issues 
their opinion without waiting for the decision on the objections. They will later issue another 
formal certificate after the objection has been heard and decided. Formal certification may 
take years; which without the conditional auditor's report their SoA would become useless. In 
this case, the date when the auditor issue their opinion on the SoA and the certification date 
will be different.25 Out of the 22 local authorities, two local authorities have experienced 
prolonged objections by their local electors during the period studied. 
Doncaster MDC and Sheffield MDC both experienced various queries and objections to their 
annual accounts from local electors, where some have been either answered or rejected by 
their auditors. However, for Doncaster MDC, two objections have been investigated for about 
five years. The objections were regarding the propriety of the Council's award of grants to 
the Yorkshire Compensation Recovery Service26 and the Council's application of discretion 
in relation to some early retirements agreed upon in 1998.27 The authority had to take legal 
advice regarding the matter and the issue was finally decided in 2005. Among the various 
objections received and dealt with by Sheffield MDC's auditor, KPMG, one has resulted in a 
formal objection, started in 2000 (KPMG, 2000). The issue regarding the disposal of 
residential homes for the elderly to Sheffcare in 1994 has resulted in a formal objection to 
the council's accounts. 
The objection was made on several bases; the original transfer was not within the 
Authority's legal powers, making the items in the accounts relating to grant paid (in 
1999/2000 this was approximately £1.1 m) to Sheffcare ultra vires; the Authority's 
actions in providing grant aid to Sheffcare contravene the new Competition Act, which 
came into force during 2000; the Authority operates a differential fee structure in respect 
of fees for the Authority's own homes and those external to the Authority. This is linked 
to a number of closures of private homes in Sheffield and, as a result, the Authority is 
failing to ensure choice of accommodation as it is required to do under the National 
Assistance Act 1948. 
[KPMG in the Sheffield City Council Management Letter 2000] 
Sheffield MDC took legal advice on the transfer and formally consulted with the Secretary of 
State for the Environment who gave formal approval for the transfer and the associated 
financial arrangements. The objection has lead to a lengthy legal process lasting for three 
years (KPMG LLP 2000, 2001, 2003). 28 
25 Doncaster provided the formal certification for their SoA. but S~effield did not. . 
26 The YCRS established in 1996 to help ex-miners claim for InJunes and lo~s of earnlng~ had first came un.der 
scrutiny in 2000. (http://www.doncastertoday.co.uk/viewarticle2.aspx?sectlonld=786&artlcleld=375218, vIsited 
01/01/07) . . .. 
27 The objection raised concerns whether the Council took In.to account all relevant factors when deCiding on the 
early retirements agreed as part of the restructur~ th~t started In 1998. 
28 There is no public information as to how the objection has been resolved. 
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5.2.7 Discussion of Findings on Certification Audit 
The 7 -years' analysis on local authorities' accounts show that local authorities in the region 
were able to respond and meet the requirements for their SoA. The majority of local 
authorities obtained an unqualified audit opinion except for two local authorities. A SoA 
subject to a qualified audit opinion normally takes longer to obtain certification from auditors 
and thus delays publication. Two local authorities obtained qualified audit opinions when new 
accounting regulations were introduced. The local authorities managed to resolve these 
problems after one or two years. Of the two councils, one had their 2006 SoA unqualified the 
other obtained an unqualified audit opinion in 2007. No major issue was observed in terms of 
audit opinion. 
Investigation into the time required by each local authority to publish their annual SoA 
revealed several causes of delay. The tightening deadlines introduced from 2004 forced 
local authorities to change their annual SoA timetable. Local authorities which published their 
SoA within the previous year's time scale will not met the current year's statutory deadlines. 
The analysis revealed that local authorities have not had problems in responding to the 
tightening deadlines even during the year when the allowed time scale was only 183 days in 
2006. However, local authorities require extra time responding to new accounting 
regulations. The new regulations which were introduced gradually since 2002 have not 
caused delays for local authorities in obtaining certification. The tightening deadlines also 
have not caused problems for local authorities in obtaining timely audit certification. However 
when the new regulations were introduced together with the tightened deadlines in 2004, 
some local authorities failed to obtain certification on time. Tightening deadlines in 2005 had 
not caused delays in SoA publication as there was no change to the accounting regulations. 
The new accounting regulations have made local authorities accounts comparable to the 
private sectors and tightening publication deadlines have made the SoA more timely, which 
enhanced usefulness. Local authorities were also found to respond well to both the new 
accounting regulations and the tightening deadlines but the quality of their annual SoA has 
been declining. Local authorities were found to have attempted to meet the submission and 
publication deadlines at the expense of its quality. Their submitted SoA had to go through 
several resubmissions for approval due to lacking in quality and care. 
Analysis also reveals that auditors issued a substitute opinion prior to formal certification 
allowing local authorities to publish their SoA on time. This happened in cases where the 
auditors had been satisfied with a local authority's SoA but objection from local electors have 
not been heard and decided before the statutory publication deadlines. Local councils had 
published their SoA with the substitute opinion from their auditor prior to the statutory 
deadlines. Once the objection has been heard and decided, the auditor will issue another 
formal certification for the local authority. The formal certification is then used to update 
council's SoA published earlier. 
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5.3 Use of Resources Assessment 
This section explores the AC 's published results for auditors' assessment of the UoR at loca l 
authorities in England , focusing on the 22 local authorities in the Yorksh ire and The Humber 
region . Overall UoR scores will be presented first , followed by scoring for each theme under 
the UoR. The CPA scores will also be shared as well as a brief comparison of the scored 
performance for the focused region and other regions in England . Discussion for this secti on 
is organised as shown in Figure 30: 
themes 
Discussion - Use of Resources Assessment 
Figure 30: Flow of Discussion for Use of Resources Assessment 
Use of Resources (UoR) is one component in the CPA regime which assesses how well a 
local authority manages its finances and delivers VFM. The assessment is conducted on 
annual basis at all local authorities by the AC 's appointed auditor. Auditors ' work for local 
authorities is governed by the Code of Audit Practice prepared by the AC . The annual audit 
is carried out based on the Code , to avoid duplication or unnecessary add itional work . The 
Code provides information for auditors in delivering the audit of financial statements, 
reviewing the UoR and reporting the results of audit work and principles relating to the 
exercise of specific powers and the duties of local government auditors. Several statutes 
such as s5(1 )(e) , s7(1) Local Government Act 1999 specify auditors' responsibility in relation 
to UoR. However, under the Code of Audit Practice 2005, the audited body also has the 
responsibility to establish arrangements for internal control systems such as corporate 
performance management and financial management. Auditors will review the required 
arrangements and outcomes and report their findings based on both where available. More 
explanation on the UoR is available in Chapter 3. 
Performance results published by the Commission since 2002 have been collected and 
reviewed . Only results for 22 local authorities in the region will be analysed in detail because 
this study intends to focus on the region only . Thus, the next section starts with overal l UoR 
scores. 
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5.3.1 Overall Use of Resources Assessment Scores 
themes themes 
Discussion - Use of Resources Assessment 
This section discusses the overall UoR assessment scores , focusing on Yorkshire and The 
Humber region and uses the whole of England data to support analysis. UoR assessment 
was different for 2002-2004, which comes within 'CPA -the original ' version , wh ile 2005-
2006 comes with 'CPA -the harder test' version . Table 38 shows information on the overal l 
UoR scores for the region from 2002 to 2006. A separator was created between scores for 
2002-2004 and 2005-2006 to differentiate the two assessment systems . 
Table 40: UoR's Assessment Scores from 2002-2006 
Local Councils Type 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Barnsle.1.. MDC 3 3 4 3 3 
Bradford MDC 3 4 4 2 2 
Calderdale MDC 3 4 4 3 3 
Doncaster MDC 3 3 3 2 2 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 4 3 3 
Leeds MDC 3 4 4 3 3 
Rotherham MDC 3 3 4 3 4 
Sheffield MDC 3 4 4 3 3 
Wakefield MDC 3 4 4 2 2 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 3 4 4 4 4 
Kingston-u~on-Hull UA 1 2 3 2 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 2 3 2 1 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 4 4 3 3 
York UA 3 3 3 3 2 
North Yorkshire CC 3 4 4 3 3 
Craven DC 2 3 
Hambleton DC 3 3 
Harrogate DC 2 3 
Richmondshire DC 2 2 
Ryedale DC 2 2 
Scarborough DC 2 3 
Selby DC 2 3 
From Table 40, the UoR score for all 15 STCC either improved or remained constant from 
the second year of assessment (2003) until the third assessment (2004) except for North 
East Lincolnshire. Local authorities obtaining the highest score, 4, in 2003 maintained the 
score for 2004 assessment. Eleven local authorities out of 15 scored 4 in 2004 . North East 
Lincolnshire (UA) improved from 2002 to 2003 but dropped back to 2 in 2004 . The DCs were 
not assessed in 2002 and 2003 , and the overall UoR was not scored when the assessment 
had been done in 2004 29 
29 The Commission published UoR themes ' score for the district councils in 2004 but the overall UoR has not been 
scored. 
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In 2005, of 15 STCC , only two authorities , both UAs (East Riding of Yorkshire at 4 and York , 
3) , maintained their scores. The DC's achievement was poorer compared to STCC. On ly one 
DC scored 3 and a majority of others scored 2. Lesser variations are seen among the DC in 
both years. The assessment result shows improvement for some local authorities in 2006 but 
at a lower rate to improvements exhibited under 'CPA -the original' system , 2002-2004. 
Unlike 'CPA -the original ', some local authorities experienced a drop in their score with 'the 
harder test'. Table 40 also shows 10 local authorities improved their scores in the second 
year the UoR assessment was done, 2003. After the third assessment in 2004, 13 loca l 
authorities had shown improvement, unfortunately for North East Lincolnshire to have their 
UoR scored down in 2004 after showing improvement in 2003. Two local authorities 
maintained at the same score from 2002 to 2004. 
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Figure 31: Distribution for UoR scores in 2002-2004, for single tier and county 
councils 
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Figure 31 above demonstrates the distribution for the 3-years' UoR scores for all the local 
authorities in the region. The figure indicates the cluster of scores for local authorities 
increased on the UoR scale. Not a single local authority scored a 4 in 2002 to a majority of 
local authorities scoring a 3 in 2003 and 4 in 2004. This established the trend of increase in 
scores since the first assessment year to the third year. 
'CPA -the harder test' was implemented in 2005 and the DCs' involvement started in that 
year. Although 11 authorities (73 percent) obtained 4 during the third year of UoR under 
'CPA -the original' regime, in 2005 only one authority maintained that score. The scoring in 
2005 seems to have been restarted at a new lower level compared to 2004. More authorities 
scored 2 in the first year of 'the harder test' (2005), compared to 'the original' system. Fewer 
authorities achieved 4 in the second year unlike the 2002-2004 system where 8 out of 15 
single tier and county councils obtained 4 in the second assessment year. The scores were 
also clustered at 2 for the DC in 2005, only one reached 3. 
More improvement is evident for authorities scoring 1 and 2 in 2005, perhaps indicating the 
ease of movement from level 1 to 2 and 2 to 3. However, the majority of authorities that 
scored 3 in 2005 maintained the score in 2006, except for Rotherham which improved to 4 
and York which dropped to 2. This indicates the relative difficulty of movement from 3 to 4 
and the risk to a rating if a local authority is at a borderline position. The AC claimed that the 
assessment has not been made more difficult in 2006 compared to 2005, except for changes 
in wording of the KLoEs to make them clearer (Audit Commission, 2006e). 
The 'the harder test' implemented in 2005 caused UoR scores to restart at a lower value. 
Although the AC claimed that scores from the two assessment systems are not comparable, 
the new system should be able to place good performers from the previous system among 
the top scorers in the new system because both systems measure similar aspects. Both 
STCC and DC were subject to the same UoR assessment system from 2005 and the AC 
published all the assessment results. The DC did not have experience being assessed fully 
under 'the original' system, unlike the STCC, so the UoR assessment regime was new to 
them. The DC improvement from 2005 to 2006 imitated the pattern of STCC improvement in 
their second assessment year. 
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Figure 32: Distribution for the UoR scores in 2005 and 2006 
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Figure 32 illustrates the distribution for UoR scores in 2005 and 2006. The majority of local 
authorities clustered at higher scores in 2006 compared to 2005. A similar pattern of 
improvement in scoring to the original UoR assessment in 2002-2004 is demonstrated , 
although the rate of improvement in scores was not as big as with the original CPA. 
Table 41: Yorkshire and The Humber: Mean Score for Overall UoR Performance 2002-
2006 
Mean Score for Yorkshire and The 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Humber Region 
Single Tier and County Councils 2.80 3.47 3.67 2.67 2.73 
District Councils 2.14 2.71 
All councils 2.80 3.47 3.67 2.50 2.73 
Table 41 shows the overall UoR mean scores for the region from 2002 to 2006 . The mean 
score for the STCC had increased from 2.80 in 2002 to 3.47 in 2003 and 3.67 in 2004 . 
However in 2005, the mean score was only 2.67 , reflecting the impact 'the harder test' has 
had on local councils ' UoR assessments. 'The harder test ' covers more aspects of 
assessment than ' the original' system. The STCC's mean score increased slightly in 2006, 
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the second year of 'the harder test '. In general , the mean score for STCC show a big 
improvement from 2002 to 2003 , and the change became lesser from 2003 to 2004 , so as 
from 2005 to 2006. The DC's mean score was only 2.14 in 2005 but it improved to 2.71 in 
2006 to be closer to the mean score for the STCC. Separate mean scores were calculated 
for the DC and the STCC to demonstrate the generally lower scores for the DC and this 
reduces the 'all councils ' mean score. The STCC which has been assessed for their fourth 
and fifth year in 2005 and 2006 did not show much improvement probably because higher 
scores are more difficult to reach with the new system or because of the subjective nature of 
level 4 in KLoEs has made it difficult for local authorities to define what is requ ired from 
them . 
5.3.2 UoR Themes Scores 2005-2006 
themes themes 
Discussion - Use of Resources Assessment 
Discussion in this section will focus on UoR theme scores under the harder test, 2005 to 
2006. 
Table 42: Scores f F . I R or lnanCla epo rf th 1nJ! . 2005 d 2006 erne In an 
Financial Reporting 
Authority Name LA Type 2005 2006 
Barnsley MDC 3 3 
Bradford MDC 2 2 
Calderdale MDC 3 3 
Doncaster MDC 2 2 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 
Leeds MDC 2 3 
Rotherham MDC 2 3 
Sheffield MDC 3 2 
Wakefield MDC 1 2 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 4 
Kingston upon Hull UA 1 1 
North East Lincolnshire UA 2 3 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 
York UA 3 2 
North Yorkshire CC 2 3 
Craven DC 2 3 
Hambleton DC 3 3 
HarroQate Borouqh DC 3 3 
Richmondshire DC 1 2 
Rvedale DC 3 3 
Scarboroqgh Borouqh DC 2 3 
Selbv DC 3 3 
Table 42 shows scored performance for the financial reporting (FR) theme in 2005 and 2006 . 
For the FR theme , during the first year of the harder test , only one authority scored 4, the 
highest, ten authorities scored 3, eight authorities scored 2 and only one local authority 
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scored 1, the lowest score . Eight local authorities improved the ir FR scores and two local 
authorities had their scores lowered in 2006. 
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Figure 33: Distribution of scores - Financial Reporting, 2005-2006 
Figure 33 demonstrates improvement in 2006 compared to 2005 where the majority of local 
authorities scored 3 in 2006. The figure also indicates improvement for most local 
authorities which scored 1 or 2 in 2005. 
Table 43 shows scored performance for financial management (FM) theme in 2005 and 
2006. For the FM theme, during the first year of the harder test, no local authority scored 4, 
the highest, ten authorities scored 3, ten authorities scored 2 and two local authorities scored 
1, the lowest score. Eight local authorities improved their FM scores and no local authority 
had their score dropped in 2006. 
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Table 43: Scores f F . I M or mancla anag 
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Figure 34: Distribution of scores - Financial Management, 2005-2006 
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Figure 34 demonstrates also improvement in 2006 compared to 2005 where the majority 
local authorities scored 3. The figure also indicates improvement for local authorities which 
scored 1 or 2 in 2005. 
Table 44: Scores f F " 1St d" h or mancla an mg t erne in 2005 and 2006 
Financial Standing 
Authority Name LA Type 2005 2006 
Barnsley MDC 3 3 
Bradford MDC 2 3 
Calderdale MDC 2 3 
Doncaster MDC 1 3 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 
Leeds Moe 2 3 
Rotherham MDC 2 4 
Sheffield MDC 3 3 
Wakefield MDC 3 3 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 4 
Kingston upon Hull UA 2 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 1 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 
York UA 3 2 
North Yorkshire CC 3 3 
Craven DC 2 3 
Hambleton DC 2 3 
Harroqate Borouqh DC 2 2 
Richmondshire DC 2 3 
Ryedale DC 3 3 
Scarborouqh Borouqh DC 2 3 
Selby DC 2 2 
Table 44 is the scored performance for financial standing (FS) theme in 2005 and 2006. For 
the FS theme, during the first year of the harder test, one local authority scored 4, the 
highest, eight authorities scored 3, eleven authorities scored 2 and two local authorities 
scored 1, the lowest score. Ten local authorities improved their FS scores and one local 
authority had their score dropped in 2006. Two local authorities improved by two points on 
the scale for this theme, Rotherham improved from 2 in 2005 to 4 in 2006 , and Doncaster 
improved from 1 in 2005 to 3 in 2006. FS is the only UoR theme evident in which local 
authorities improved by two points within a year. Compared to FR and FM, FS is also the 
only theme so far in which two local authorities scored 4. East Riding of Yorkshire 
maintained at 4 in both years . 
Figure 35 demonstrates improvement shown in 2006 compared to 2005 where the majority 
of local authorities clustered at 3. The variation of scores was also reduced in 2006 when 
not one scored 1. The figure also indicates improvement for local authorities which scored 
lower scores of 1 or 2 in 2005. A similar pattern to the FR and FM is evident in the figure 
where the local authorities which improved are from the lower end . 
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Figure 35: Distribution of scores - Financial Standing, 2005-2006 
Table 45: Scores for Internal Control theme in 2005 and 2006 
Internal Control 
Authority Name LA Type 2005 2006 
Barnsley MOC 2 2 
Bradford MOC 1 2 
Calderdale MOC 3 3 
Doncaster MOC 2 1 
Kirklees MOC 3 3 
Leeds MOC 3 3 
Rotherham MOC 3 4 
Sheffield MOC 3 2 
Wakefield MOC 3 3 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 4 
Kingston upon Hull UA 1 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 1 2 
North Lincolnsh ire UA 2 3 
York UA 2 2 
North Yorkshire CC 3 3 
Craven DC 3 3 
Hambleton DC 2 2 
Harroaate Borouah DC 2 2 
Richmondshi re DC 2 2 
Rvedale DC 2 2 
Scarborouah Borouqh DC 2 2 
Selby DC 2 3 
183 
FINDINGS FROM PUBLISHED DATA: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSS ION 
Table 45 is the scored performance for the internal control (IC) theme in 2005 and 2006. For 
the IC theme, during the first year of the harder test, one local authority scored 4, the 
highest, eight authorities scored 3, ten authorities scored 2 and three local authorities scored 
1, the lowest score. Six local authorities improved their IC scores and two local authorities 
had their score lowered in 2006 . Compared to FR and FM, IC is also the only theme in which 
two local authorities scored 4. East Riding of Yorkshire maintained at 4 in both years. 
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Figure 36: Distribution of scores - Internal Control, 2005-2006 
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Figure 36 also demonstrates improvement shown in 2006 compared to 2005 but the 
change in pattern is comparatively less obvious than FR, FM and FS themes. This is 
because, unlike the FR, FM and FS themes, IC theme had fewer local authorities improving 
their scores coupled with two local authorities which dropped their scores in 2006 . 
As revealed in Table 46, for the VFM theme, during the first year of the harder test, one 
local authority scored 4, the highest, ten authorities scored 3, nine authorities scored 2 and 
two local authorities scored 1, the lowest score. Only four local authorities improved their IC 
scores and none had their score lowered in 2006. The VFM theme shows the least 
improvement made by the local authorities but none had dropped their score . East Riding 
of Yorkshire also maintained at 4 in both years for the VFM theme. 
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or a ue or Table 46: Scores f V I f M oney 
Authority Name 
Barnsley 
Bradford 
Calderdale 
Doncaster 
Kirklees 
Leeds 
Rotherham 
Sheffield 
Wakefield 
East Riding of Yorkshire 
Kingston-upon-Hull 
North East Lincolnshire 
North Lincolnshire 
York 
North Yorkshire 
Craven 
Hambleton 
Harroaate Borouah 
Richmondshire 
Rvedale 
Scarborouah Borouah 
Selbv 
'1 4 
1 :0 
10 
6 -
o I 
1 .0 2 .0 
14 
12 
,0 
2 
o 
1 0 2 .0 
th erne In an . 2005 d 2006 
LA Type 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
MDC 
UA 
UA 
UA 
UA 
UA 
CC 
DC 
DC 
DC 
DC 
DC 
DC 
DC 
3 .0 
VFM05 
30 
V FM06 
Value for Money 
2005 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
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• . 0 
2006 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
4 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
2 
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3 
2 
2 
2 
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$lei Dd .... . - 0.738 
1'1 - :22 
'Ae- an _ 2 .64 
Std Oev ",,0 58-1 
N -22 
Figure 37: Distribution of scores - Value for Money, 2005-2006 
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Figure 37 also demonstrates the improvement shown in 2006 compared to 2005 However 
. , 
the cluster of local authorities was at the lower end of the UoR sca le for this theme 
compared to other themes. This is because, unlike the FR, FM and FS themes, the IC 
theme had fewer local authorities improving their scores coupled with two local authorities 
lowering their scores in 2006. 
Table 47: Detail UoR scores for STCC in 2005 and 2006 
= -c: ro -Cl iii Q) iii Cl ... ... 
. ~ c: iii 0 o >-Q) (,,) .- .- E .- c: 
> c:t:: (,,) Q) (,,) .- c: ... - Q) 0 c: Cl c:'t:l ... - Q) c: ro 0 ro c: Q) c: ::::l 0 
c:: c: Q. ~ ro c: ro - 0 iii~ .- Q) .- c: 
.- - Eu 0 LLcr: LL ro LL(/) > ::> ~ 
LA 10 CD 10 CD 10 CD 10 CD 10 CD 10 CD Authority Name 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Type 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Barnsley MOC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 
Bradford MOC 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 2 
Calderdale MOC 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Doncaster MOC 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 2 
Kirklees MOC 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Leeds MOC 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Rotherham MOC 3 4 2 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 3 3 
Sheffield MOC 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 
Wakefield MOC 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 
York UA 3 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 
North Yorksh ire CC 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Table 47 above reports all the scores for UoR and its themes for the STCC. The table is 
presented here to compare local authorities' achievement in the two years . From the table, 
variation of scores is exhibited among the STCC. Only East Riding of Yorkshire which is a 
UA obtained a straight 4 for all the themes in both years (except for FM in 2005 which has 
improved in 2006). Rotherham obtained a 4 in 2006 for FS and IC themes in 2006. None 
of the other local authorities obtained 4. Out of 15 local authorities , five experienced being 
scored one. North East Lincolnshire scored 1 for four UoR themes in 2005 , but the 
authority had all its UoR themes ' scores improved in 2006 . Other local authorities had their 
scores clustered in the middle, either 2 or 3. 
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Table 48: Detail UoR scores for DC in 2005 and 2006 
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ni -Ol r:::: 
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. ~ r:::: ni Cl> ni Ol ni(5 ... Cl> I.) . - .- E . - r:::: 0>-
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r:::: Ol r::::'O ....... Cl> r:::: 
r:::: c.. ~ "' "' r:::: Cl> r:::: :::l 0 a:: r:::: "' .... 0 ni~ .- Cl> .- r:::: '- .... .=u 0 u..a:: u.. "' u..cn > ::J ~ 
LA It) CD It) CD It) CD It) CD It) CD It) CD Authority Name 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Type 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Craven DC 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 
Hambleton DC 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 
Harrogate Borough DC 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Richmondshire DC 2 2 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Ryedale DC 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 
Scarborough Borough DC 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 2 1 2 
Selby DC 2 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 
Table 48 above reports all the scores for UoR and its themes for the DC. Lesser variation 
in the DC scores was exhibited in the table compare to the variation shown in Table 45 for 
the STCC. Both Richmondshire and Harrogate experienced one theme from the UoR 
scoring 1 in 2005, but both had improved in 2006. None of the DC scored a 4 and all the 
DC generally had their scores clustered in the middle, either 2 or 3. 
The only council to suffer a drop in its overall UoR score from 2005 to 2006 was York , 
which dropped from 3 to 2 for both FR and FS themes. Sheffield had a similar fall from 3 to 
2 each for FR and IC themes but maintained their overall UoR score at 3. The difference 
was that the falls caused York to have three themes at 2 and Sheffield only two themes at 
2. 
Four DC and two STCC improved their overall UoR scores by one point each . These 
councils improved at least one theme, with no themes reduced . North East Lincolnshire 
improved in all the five themes and pushed their overall UoR score a point higher from 1 to 
2. Scarborough , a DC, improved one point each for four themes. Selby, Richmondshire and 
Rotherham each improved three themes, but only Selby and Rotherham had their overall 
UoR increase by one point. With two themes improved, Craven also got their overall UoR 
improved but other authorities that improved two themes like Bradford , Calderdale, 
Doncaster, Leeds, and North Lincolnshire did not. Harrogate improved its overall UoR score 
by improving only one theme by a point but other councils which improved their score in only 
one theme did not. Similar improvements made for some other council cannot guarantee an 
improvement in their overall UoR score. These indicate that improvements in scores are 
dependent on how close local authorities' achievements are to the borderlines. 
The North East Lincolnshire results show that a council can improve on all five themes within 
a year. The improvements made were from level 1 to 2, perhaps indicat ing that it is less 
difficult to progress from level 1 to level 2 compared to other KLoE levels. Level 2 represents 
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the council meeting basic requirements. Possibly a lack of documentation caused the council 
to get a 1 in the previous year, therefore, to improve to a 2 may not be too difficult in a year. 
However, Scarborough improved from level 2 to 3 for three themes and from 1 to 2 for VFM 
theme, proving that it is possible to improve to level 3 for three themes in one year. 
Doncaster and Rotherham, proved that an increase by two pOints is possible as both 
councils improved their FS theme from 1 to 3 and 2 to 4 respectively. 
The overall UoR score is determined by the AC 's rule , not through a simple averaging of 
the themes' score, so that, being excellent in one or two themes will not result in an 
excellent UoR. It is possible that the themes in UoR correlate with each other: being 
excellent in one theme will contribute to excellence in another. However, further 
investigation is necessary to confirm the relationship among UoR themes. To understand 
the movement in scores and among the themes from 2005 to 2006 , the mean for the 
themes' scores are calculated and shown in Table 49. 
Table 49: Yorkshire and The Humber: Mean Score for every UoR themes in 2005 and 
2006 
... 
C'\l -0> c: iii CII iii 0> ... ... 
. ~ c: iii (5 0>-CII .- E .- c: 
> 
c..> .-
c..> CII c..> .- c: ... 
- CII 
0 c:-e c: 0> c:"O ...... CII c: C'\l 0 C'\l c: CII c: ~ 0 
Cl: c: 0.. ~ C'\l 
.= .l9 ... 0 iii~ .- CII .- c: .Eu 0 Ll..Cl: LI.. C'\l Ll..C/) > 
:::> ~ 
It) (t) It) (t) It) (t) It) (t) It) (t) It) (t) 
Mean score 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N N N N N N N N N N N N 
Single tiers and 
counties 2.67 2.73 2.40 2.60 2.40 2.73 2.47 2.93 2.40 2.60 2.67 2.73 
Districts 2.14 2.71 2.43 2.86 2.29 2.71 2.14 2.71 2.14 2.29 2.00 2.43 
All 2.50 2.73 2.41 2.68 2.36 2.73 2.36 2.86 2.32 2.50 2.45 2.64 
The mean scores for all themes are better for both the STCC and the DC in 2006 
compared to 2005. The rate of improvement is higher for the DC on all themes compared 
to the STCC. The mean score for the DCs FR theme is better than that of the STCCs'. In 
2005 , the mean score for VFM is the highest for STCC but the lowest for DC. However, in 
2006 the VFM mean score for the STCC has not improved but improvement is seen in that 
for the DC. Although the AC claimed that VFM theme assessment is more subjective than 
other themes and combines the elements measured in other themes, the DC shows a big 
improvement within a single year. 
In 2006, the DC's FR mean score is the highest while the STCC's FS mean score is the 
highest. FR was among the best theme for the 22 councils stud ied . FR relates to the 
production of annual accounts , where almost all local authorities managed to submit their 
SoA on time and obtained an unqualified aud it opinion in 2005 . Improvement in FR theme 
can be observed since 2000 (see discussion on Certification Audit in section 5.2 of th is 
chapter) . IC was among the poorest theme for all authorities in the region . Among the 
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KLOE for IC is for local authorities to have an aud it committee. Not many local authorities 
had a specific audit committee prior to 2005, although the same functions as that of an 
audit committee might be by other committees. However, information reported in the local 
authorities ' meeting minutes available on their website revealed that in 2005 and 2006 
, 
majority local authorities in the region formed audit committees to fulfil th e KLoE's 
requirement. 
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Figure 38: Yorkshire and The Humber - Movement in Theme's Score from 2005 to 
2006 
Figure 38 compares the movement in themes' score for local authorities in the region. 
Fewer authorities dropped themes score compared to those improved or maintained. The 
majority of local authorities maintained their 2005 score in 2006 , though some councils 
show improvement on the themes. The VFM theme proved difficult to change with 18 out of 
22 councils maintaining their 2005 score in 2006. More improvement is seen in the FS 
theme followed by FM and FR. 
T bl 50 R k 0 d a e an r er- M ean S f core or every U R th 0 . 2005 d 2006 emes In an 
REGION STCC DC 
RANK 05 06 05 06 05 06 
1 VFM(2.45) FS (2 .86) VFM(2.67) FS (2 .93) FR (2.43) FR (2.86) 
2 FR (2.41) FM (2 .75) FS (2.47) VFMJ2731= FM (229) FM (2 71 )= 
3 FS (2 .36)= FR (2 .68) FM (2 .40)= FM (2 .73)= FS (2. 14)= FS (2.71 )= 
4 FM (2 .36)= VFM(2.64) Ie (2 .40)= Ie (2 .60)= Ie (2 .14)= VFM(2.43) 
5 Ie (2 .32) Ie (2.50) FR (2 .40)= FRJ2.601= VFM(2.00) Ie ( 2.29) 
Note: Means are calculated based on the UoR themes scores which were scaled from 1 to 4. Higher 
means indicate higher performance on the scale. 
Table 50 displays ran k order fo r the means of all the five themes in 2005 and 2006 . The 
ran k was ordered from the highest to the lowest means. Higher means exhibit higher 
performance on the UoR scale . Based on the combined local authorities ' performance , 
VFM theme had the highest mean scores in 2005 and the FS theme had the highest mean 
scores in 2006. The lowest mean scores for combined local authorities' performance was 
the IC themes for both years . The mean scores were also calculated separately for the 
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STCC and the DC to identify if the pattern of rank order for means would differ. For the 
STCC in the region , VFM had the highest mean scores in 2005, and FS has the highest 
mean scores in 2006. FM, IC and FR themes had same mean scores which is the lowest 
value in 2005. In 2006, the STCC lowest mean scores were for IC and FR themes. For the 
DC, the highest mean scores were for FR in 2005 and 2006. The lowest mean scores were 
for VFM theme in 2005 and IC theme in 2006. 
Thus, specific pattern was not observed to allow identification should anyone of the 
themes was easiest or hardest. Questions related to the relative difficulty of themes and 
reasons for it were asked during interview with the auditees. Respondents for this research 
will be asked to comment on the UoR themes under the new assessment starting from 
2005 , because the themes used were different and were not comparable to those of 2002-
2004 . Nevertheless, the results for UoR themes from 2002 to 2004 will be discussed 
concisely in the following sections just to check on local authorities ' performance patterns 
on the UoR. 
5.3.3 UoR themes scores 2002-2004 
themes 
Discussion - Use of Resources Assessment 
The five themes for UoR under 'CPA -the original' were Financial Standing (FSD) , Internal 
Financial Control (IFC), Standards of Financial Conduct and Prevention (SFCP) , Financial 
Statements (FSM) , and Legality of Financial Transactions (LFT) . Results for these themes 
were separated from the 2005-2006 because the five themes have been revised in 2005 
resulting in different categories for the proceeding years . Hence, results for UoR themes 
scores in 2002-2004 will be compared and discussed accordingly. As for the DC, scores are 
available only for 2004 and limited to the UoR themes. 
Table 51 shows scores for FSD theme obtained by STCC and DC from 2002-2004 with their 
mean scores. FSD measures local authorities' performance in terms of setting a balanced 
budget, setting a capital program , financial reporting and monitoring , meeting financial 
targets and financial reserves . The number of local authorities obtaining a 4 increased from 
two in 2002 to six in 2003 and eight in 2004 . Two DC scored 4 in 2004. These are unlikely 
with the new assessment regime, where very few local authorities scored 4 and none of the 
DC in the region were able to achieve such a score. The mean scores for FSD (STCC ) show 
increases in scores from 2.87 in 2002 to 3.40 in 2004. 
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Table 51: Scores for UoR themes 2002 2004 Fina "I St d" 
- - nCla an m9 
Authority LA Financial Standing type 
02 03 04 
North Yorkshire CC 2 3 4 
Barnsley MDC 3 3 4 
Bradford MDC 2 4 4 
Calderdale MDC 3 4 4 
Doncaster MDC 3 3 3 
Kirklees MDC 4 4 4 
Leeds MDC 3 3 3 
Rotherham MDC 3 3 3 
Sheffield MDC 2 3 4 
Wakefield MDC 3 4 4 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 3 4 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 2 3 
North East Lincolnshire UA 3 2 1 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 3 
York UA 4 4 3 
Mean scores 2.87 3.27 3.40 
Craven District Council DC 4 
Hambleton District Council DC 4 
Harrogate Borou\lh Council DC 3 
Richmondshire District Council DC 3 
Ryedale District Council DC 3 
Scarborough Borough Council DC 3 
Selby District Council DC 3 
Mean scores 3.29 
Table 52: Scores for UoR themes 2002-2004 - Internal Financial Control 
Authority LA Internal Financial type Control 
02 03 04 
North Yorkshire CC 3 4 4 
Barnsley MDC 2 3 3 
Bradford MDC 2 3 3 
Calderdale MDC 3 3 4 
Doncaster MDC 2 2 2 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 4 
Leeds MDC 3 3 3 
Rotherham MDC 3 3 3 
Sheffield MDC 3 4 4 
Wakefield MDC 2 4 4 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 3 4 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 2 3 
North East Lincolnshire UA 3 3 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 4 
York UA 2 2 2 
Mean scores 2.60 3.07 3.27 
Craven District Council DC 4 
Hambleton District Council DC 4 
Harrogate Borough Council DC 3 
Richmondshire District Council DC 3 
Ryedale District Council DC 4 
Scarborough Borou\lh Council DC 3 
Selby District Council DC 3 
Mean scores 3.43 
Table 52 shows scores for the IFC theme obtained by STCC and DC from 2002-2004 wi th 
their mean scores. This theme measures local authorities ' performance in terms of 
monitoring of financial systems, maintaining an adequate internal audit functions and ri sk 
identification and management. No local authorities scored 4 in 2002 , fou r in 2003 and seven 
in 2004. Three out of seven DC obtained 4 for this theme in 2004 . The mean scores for IFC 
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(STCC) also demonstrated increases from 2.60 in 2002 to 3.27 in 2004. The mean score for 
the DC is higher than the STCC for this theme. 
Table 53 shows scores for SFCP theme obtained by STCC and DC from 2002-2004 with 
their mean scores. This theme measures local authorities ' performance in terms of eth ical 
framework, governance arrangements, treasury management and prevention and detection 
of fraud and corruption. Three local authorities scored 4 in 2002, seven in 2003 and eleven 
in 2004. Two out of the seven DC obtained 4 for this theme in 2004. The mean scores 
(STCC) for this theme also increases from 3.07 in 2002 to 3.60 in 2004. 
Table 53: Scores for UoR themes 2002-2004 - Standards of Financial Conduct and the 
Prevention 
LA Standards of Authority 
type Financial Conduct 
and the Prevention 
02 03 04 
North Yorkshire CC 4 4 4 
Barnslel MDC 3 3 4 
Bradford MDC 3 4 4 
Calderdale MDC 3 4 4 
Doncaster MDC 3 3 4 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 4 
Leeds MDC 4 4 4 
Rotherham MDC 3 3 3 
Sheffield MDC 3 3 4 
Wakefield MDC 2 4 4 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 3 4 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 3 2 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 2 3 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 4 
York UA 4 4 3 
Mean scores 3.07 3.40 3.60 
Craven District Council DC 4 
Hambleton District Council DC 3 
Harrogate Borough Council DC 3 
Richmondshire District Council DC 4 
Ryedale District Council DC 3 
Scarborou_gh Borough Council DC 3 
Selby District Council DC 3 
Mean scores 3.29 
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Table 54: Scores for UoR themes 2002-2004 - Financial Statements 
Authority LA Financial Statements tvoe 
02 03 04 
North Yorkshire CC 3 4 4 
Barnsley MDC 3 2 4 
Bradford MDC 3 3 3 
Calderdale MDC 3 4 4 
Doncaster MDC 2 3 3 
Kirklees MDC 3 3 4 
Leeds MDC 3 3 3 
Rotherham MDC 3 3 3 
Sheffield MDC 3 3 3 
Wakefield MDC 3 2 3 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 3 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 3 3 
North East Lincolnshire UA 2 2 1 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 3 4 
York UA 3 3 3 
Mean scores 2.87 2.93 3.27 
Craven District Council DC 3 
Hambleton District Council DC 4 
Harrogate Borough Council DC 4 
Richmondshire District Council DC 3 
Ryedale District Council DC 4 
Scarborouqh Borough Council DC 3 
Selby District Council DC 3 
Mean scores 3.43 
Table 54 shows scores for FSM theme obtained by STCC and DC from 2002-2004 with their 
mean scores. This theme measures local authorities' performance in terms of timeliness , 
quality and supporting records for their financial statements. Only one local authority scored 
4 in 2002 , two in 2003 and six in 2004. Three out of the seven DC obtained 4 for this theme 
in 2004 . The mean scores (STCC) for this theme also increases from 2.87 in 2002 to 3.27 in 
2004 . The mean score for the DC (3.43) is also higher than the STCC (3.27) for this theme. 
Table 55 shows scores for LFT theme obtained by STCC and DC from 2002-2004 with their 
mean scores. This theme measures local authorities' performance in terms of roles and 
responsibility , consideration of legality of significant financial transactions and new 
legislation . Six local authorities scored 4 in 2002, ten in 2003 and twelve in 2004. Four out of 
the seven DC obtained 4 for this theme in 2004. The mean scores (STCC) for this theme 
also increases from 3.27 in 2002 to 3.67 in 2004. 
193 
FINDINGS FROM PUBLISHED DATA: ANALYSIS AN D DISCUSSION 
Table 55: Scores for UoR th emes 
- -
2002 2004 L r e~ a Ity of Financial Tra nsactions 
Authority LA Legality of Financial 
type Transactions 
02 03 04 North Yorksh ire CC 4 4 4 
Barnsley MDC 4 4 4 
Bradford MDC 4 4 4 
Calderdale MDC 3 4 4 
Doncaster MDC 2 4 4 
Kirklees MDC 4 4 4 
Leeds MDC 3 3 3 
Rotherham MDC 3 4 4 
Sheffield MDC 3 3 4 
Wakefield MDC 4 4 4 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 3 4 4 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 2 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA 3 3 2 
North Lincolnshire UA 4 4 4 
York UA 3 3 4 
Mean scores 3.27 3.60 3.67 
Craven District Council DC 4 
Hambleton District Council DC 3 
Harrogate Borough Council DC 4 
Richmondshire District Council DC 3 
Ryedale District Council DC 4 
Scarborough Borough Council DC 3 
Selby District Council DC 4 
Mean scores 3.57 
Generally many local authorities scored 4 for all the themes. LFT had the most local 
authorities, 16, scoring 4 in 2004 followed by SFCP which was 13. FSD and IFC had ten 
local authorities each scoring 4 in 2004 and the least was FSM which had nine local 
authorities scoring 4 in 2004. Thus if we are to rank the theme which had the least local 
authorities scoring 4 as the most difficult, FSM could be considered the most difficult out of 
the five themes, followed by FSC and IFC. SFCP could be ranked fourth and the easiest 
would be LFT. In interviews, respondents were asked questions about the sudden change in 
local authorities' scores from 2004 to 2005 , and the order of difficulty of themes. 
Table 56: Yorkshire and The Humber - Mean Scores for the five UoR themes from 
2002-2004 
STCC DC 
Themes 2002 2003 2004 2004 
Financial Standing (FSD) 2.9 3.1 3.4 3.3 
Internal Financial Control (IFC) 2.6 3.1 3.3 3.4 
Standards of Financial Conduct and the Prevention (SFCP) 3.1 3.4 3.6 3.3 
Financial Statements (FSM) 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.4 
Legality of Financial Transactions (LFT) 3.1 3.6 3.7 3.6 
Table 56 shows the mean scores for all UoR themes from 2002 to 2004. The mean score for 
every theme is relatively higher in the first year of the assessment system compared to the 
2005 system. Mean score for all the themes improved from the base year. The DC means 
score for all the themes also relatively high compared to the 2005 system. Although 2004 is 
the first assessment year for the DC, the scoring was relat ively higher than the STCC first 
assessment year. The mean scores for LFT was the highest with the least variation . Unlike 
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the mean scores for all the UoR themes in 2005 and 2006, which were below 3 mean 
, 
scores for all the themes under the original system were greater than 3. Although both STCC 
and DC reached the mean score of more than 3 in 2004, the scores have been reset to 'new' 
lower scores in 2005 . The lower scores were possibly due to the effect of new measures: 
local authorities are not familiar with the new assessment yet; awarding authorities with 
lower scores provide rooms for improvement in the future ; or perhaps their performance 
declined based on the new indicators applied in the revised assessment. Questions about 
these issues were asked during interview. 
The DC mean score for IFC and FSM were higher than the STCC mean in 2004. This could 
be due to a smaller variation in the DC performance for this theme compared to the STCC. 
Among the STCC, North East Lincolnshire remains the worst performing authority which 
reduced mean scores for IFC and FS in 2004. North East Lincolnshire has had problems 
with their annual accounts since 2004. Among the interesting questions to be answered is 
what cause the huge differences in scores obtained by local authorities that come from same 
geographical area like North East Lincolnshire and North Lincolnshire . Thus respondents 
were asked to respond to these issues accordingly . 
Although this research focused only on the UoR scores, local authorities' scores for CPA will 
be discussed concisely in the following section . This is because UoR scores were reported 
together with CPA results and rankings. 
5.3.4 Overall CPA Scores 
themes themes 
Discussion - Use of Resources Assessment 
Table 57: Five-Point Scale for Local Authorities 
Scale 2002-2004 
1 Poor 
2 Weak 
3 Fair 
4 Good 
5 Excellent 
(Source : Adapted from the Audit Commission 's reports) 
2005-2008 
(Star categories) 
o (Stars) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Table 57 shows the five scale ranking used since 2002 and the new star ranking introduced 
in 2005. For overall CPA performance, star categories of '0' to '4' stars have been introduced 
to STCC in 2005 to replace the previous five scales ranking of 'Poor', 'Weak ', 'Fair', 'Good ', 
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and 'Excellent'. The new star categories were applied to the DC only from 2006 . The AC has 
not mentioned anything about the equivalence of the poor-excellent ranking with the star 
categories , but maintaining the five scales ranking . The highest score which was 'excellent' 
authority is now replaced with '4 stars' and the lowest score , 'poor', is now substituted by 
'zero stars'. 
Table 58 shows the overall CPA scores for the 22 local authorities . CPA scores for the DC 
after 2005 were only published once in 2008. The CPA scores above show little variation 
among the MDC during 2004 and 2005 although a different test was being used in 2004 and 
2005 . However, performance among the UA varies compared to the DC. From the CPA 
scores above, twelve STCC scored 3 and 4 stars in 2005, which is 80 percent. Comparing to 
previous scale, 3 and 4 stars are equivalent to good and excellent authority, eleven local 
authorities obtained these scores in 2004. Three DC (43 percent) obtained the good and 
excellent rankings . 
Table 58: Overall CPA Scores from 2002-2005 
Authority LA 2002 type 2003 2004 2005 2006 
North Yorkshire CC Fa ir Good Good 3 4 
Barnsley MDC Good Fair Good 3 3 
Bradford MDC Good Good Good 3 3 
Calderdale MDC Fair Fair Good 3 3 
Doncaster MDC Fa ir Fair Good 3 3 
Kirklees MDC Excellent Excellent Excellent 3 3 
Leeds MDC Good Good Good 4 3 
Rotherham MDC Fair Weak Fair 3 3 
Sheffield MDC Good Good Excellent 4 4 
Wakefield MDC Poor Weak Fair 2 2 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA Good Excellent Excellent 3 3 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA Poor Poor Poor 1 2 
North East Lincolnshire UA Poor Weak Weak 0 2 
North Lincolnshire UA Good Good Excellent 3 3 
York UA Good Good Good 3 3 
Craven DC DC Fair 
Hambleton DC DC Excellent 
Harrogate BC DC Fair 
Richmondshire DC DC Fa ir 
Ryedale DC DC Good 
Scarborough BC DC Good 
Selby DC DC Weak 
Table 58 also shows that excellent councils in 2004 may attained a 4-star in 2005 like 
Sheffield , but could also attained only a 3-star in 2005, which the score was awarded to 
majority of 'good ' local authorities in 2004. Leeds scored a 4-star in 2005 although the 
authority only attained 'good ' in 2004. Fair local authorities in 2004 also attained 2-star and 
3-star ratings in 2005 . Kirklees which was ranked 'excellent ' from 2002 to 2004 only scored a 
3-star in 2005. Kingston upon Hull was a 'poor' authority from 2002 obtained a 1-sta r in 
2005 , but North East Lincolnshire being a 'weak' authority which is better than Kingston upon 
Hull only obtained a O-star in 2005 . These indicate the lack of comparabil ity between the 
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'CPA -original test ' and the 'CPA -the harder test'. The scores in 2005 show that several 
local authorities scoring a 3 for its UoR were able to score 4-star in CPA: Leeds, Sheffield 
and North Yorkshire . However, two local authorities scoring 4 for their UoR were ranked at 3-
star for their CPA: Rotherham and East Riding of Yorkshire. 
No specific trends can be observed from the scores alone. Meeting with the local authorities 
would help to understand the impact these assessments have had on them, whether 
performance was improving or declining or whether it was just the effect of indicators and the 
assessment methods used. The CPA is a combined assessment of four aspects ; corporate 
assessment, UoR assessment, service assessment and DoT assessment. To obtain 4-stars , 
authorities have to be excellent in all the four aspects. UoR is only part of the overall 
measure, so getting the highest UoR score does not guarantee an overall 4-star. These raise 
issues as to the relative contribution of UoR to the CPA. Hence, questions on the relative 
importance of UoR to CPA will be asked during interview with respondents . The following 
section will present a summary of the combined performance of local authorities in all the 
nine government regions of England . 
5.3.5 Analysis for Whole of England Data from 2005-2006 
themes 
Discussion -Use of Resources Assessment 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, this study is not intended to generalise findings 
from the Yorkshire and The Humber region to all local authorities in England . However, this 
section presents a comparative performance of Yorkshire and The Humber region in relation 
to other regions in England . Mean scores were calculated and compared for all local 
authorities in England as well as combined local authorities in each region . This was done 
for UoR overall and its themes scores from 2002 to 2006. 
Table 59: Overall UoR Mean Score for E ng an d 2002 2006 -
Mean Score for England 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Single Tier and County councils 3.00 3.49 3.67 2.57 2.86 
District councils 2.32 2.57 
All councils 3.00 3.49 3.67 2.41 2.68 
Table 59 shows the overall UoR mean scores from 2002 to 2006 calculated for England to 
check should the pattern for England differ from that in the Yorkshire and The Humber 
region . As the DC only have scores from 2005, the mean score for 2002 to 2004 for Eng land 
is the same mean score for all STCC. The mean score for England also increased from 3.00 
in 2002 to 3.67 in 2004 and due to 'the harder test', the mean score was restarted at 2.41 in 
2005 and increased to 2.68 in 2006. The mean score for STCC throughout England 
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experienced similar steady increases from 2002 to 2004; a drop in the mean score in 2005 
and an increase from 2005 to 2006. The mean score for the DC is lower than the STCC in 
both 2005 and 2006. 
Table 60: Single tier and county councils - mean scores for overall UoR based on 
gove t I . rnmen a region 
Mean Score for Overall UoR 2005 2006 
England- 150 councils 2.57 2.86 
Yorkshire and The Humber- 15 councils 2.67 2.73 
West Midlands- 13 councils 2.85 3.15 
South West- 16 councils 2.38 2.69 
South East- 19 councils 2.53 2.89 
North West- 22 councils 2.55 2.86 
North East- 12 councils 2.58 3.17 
London- 33 councils 2.73 3.00 
East of England- 10 councils 2.20 2.50 
East Midlands- 9 councils 2.56 2.67 
Table 60 shows the UoR mean scores for STCC for the whole of England and divided into 
the nine government regions . The mean scores for STCC in the Yorkshire and The Humber 
region are similar to those of the whole of England. Variation between the regions scoring 
the lowest mean to the regions with the highest mean was 0.65 in 2005 and 0.5 in 2006. 
Table 61: District councils - mean scores for overall UoR based on governmental 
region 
Mean Score for Overall UoR 2005 2006 
England- 238 councils 2.32 2.57 
Yorkshire and The Humber- 7 councils 2.14 2.71 
West Midlands- 24 councils 2.21 2.50 
South West- 35 councils 2.09 2.40 
South East- 55 councils 2.56 2.76 
North West- 24 councils 2.46 2.46 
North East- 13 councils 2.15 2.77 
East of En~land- 44 councils 2.27 2.45 
East Midlands- 36 councils 2.28 2.58 
Table 61 shows the mean scores calculated for all DCs in England and divided into eight 
government regions. The mean score for DC in the Yorkshire and The Humber region is 
different to the mean score for England by 0.18 point lower in 2005 and 0.14 point higher in 
2006 . The mean score for DC is lower than the mean scores for STCC except for the DC in 
South East and East of England regions . The variation in mean score between the regions 
from lowest to the highest is small , 0.47 in 2005 and 0.37 in 2006 with the South West region 
being the poorest performing in both years. The range of mean scores between regions 
narrows from 2005 to 2006 for both the STCC and the DC. 
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Table 62' All councils - mean scores f or overa II U R b 0 ase d on governmental re gions 
Mean Score for Overall UoR 2005 2006 
England- 388 councils 2.41 2.68 
Yorkshire and The Humber- 22 councils 2.50 2.73 
West Midlands- 37 councils 2.43 2.73 
South West- 51 councils 2.18 2.49 
South East- 74 councils 2.55 2.80 
North West- 46 councils 2.50 2.65 
North East- 25 councils 2.36 2.96 
London- 33 councils 2.73 3.00 
East of Enqland- 54 councils 2.26 2.46 
East Midlands- 45 councils 2.33 2.60 
Table 62 shows mean scores calculated for the whole of England and its nine regions 
combining both the STCC and the DC. The mean score for Yorkshire and The Humber 
region is higher than the whole of England by 0.09 point in 2005 and 0.05 point in 2006 . The 
best performing was London in both years (London has no district councils) . The worst 
performing was the South West region in 2005 and East of England region in 2006. 
However, the range between the best and worst performing region not wide , 0.55 in 2005 
and 0.54 in 2006. 
5.3.6 Discussion for Findings on Use of Resources Assessment 
The results analysed above revealed patterns of performance which raise issues to be 
explored during fieldwork interviews with local authorities. The different pattern of 
improvements in 2002-2004 regime compared to the 2005-2006 regime point to the question 
of whether the indicators were made different or more difficult. The change in the 
assessment regime in 2005 also causes a systematic drop in scores for all local authorities 
which raise interesting questions to be explored with the local authorities. 
The different pattern of improvement in the UoR themes of FR , FM, FS , IC and VFM point to 
a query of which theme would be more difficult or easier to improve or to witness a drop in 
scores. Thus questions such as the opportunity to improve, risk of declines, easier 
indicators, usefulness of the indicators, factors influencing the performance and their effort to 
deal with the assessment needed further exploration . 
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Table 63 A dOt U lors u I mg the 22 Local Authorities in 2005 A dT 
LA rz:: 
Q) ... ... ... 
Authority 
... 0 u 0 
0 Auditors t'U~ .~ .~ type ::> .~ "C ]!-g 
... ::J 
Il.~ c~ 
Barnsley MDC 3 RSM Robson Rhodes (Sarah Howard) ..J 
Bradford MDC 2 AC Kernel House ..J 
Calderdale MDC 3 PWC (Ian Looker) ..J 
Doncaster MDC 2 AC Sue Sunderland ..J 
Kirklees MDC 3 AC Ivan McConnell ..J 
Leeds MDC 3 KPMG LLP (Adrian Lythgo) ..J 
Rotherham MDC 3 AC Sue Sunderland ~ 
Sheffield MDC 3 KPMG LLP (Kevin Wharton) ..J 
Wakefield MDC 2 AC Ivan McConnell ..J 
East Riding of Yorkshire UA 4 AC Michael Newbury ..J 
Kingston-upon-Hull UA 2 AC Michael Newbury ..J 
North East Lincolnshire UA 1 AC Sue Sunderland ..J 
North Lincolnshire UA 3 RSM Robson Rhodes (Sarah Howard) ..J 
York UA 3 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
North Yorkshire CC 3 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Craven District Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Hambleton District Council DC 3 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Harroqate Borough Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Richmondshire District Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Ryedale District Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Scarborough Borough Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Selby District Council DC 2 AC Mark Kirkham ..J 
Table 63 show a list of auditors assigned to perform the 2005 audit for local councils in the 
region and the UoR score awarded to each council. Not one of the DC was audited by a 
Private Auditor, and all the STCC audited by the Private Auditor scored 3 for their UoR in 
2005. The auditors auditing specific local authorities may differ now as a result of rotation . 
The UoR component in the CPA regime has brought in subjectivity to the auditor's judgment 
when compared with financial auditing task. Other categories in the CPA assessment: 
direction of travel ; services; and corporate, may involve justifications made by separate 
bodies coordinated by the auditor responsible for auditing the local council. UoR assessment 
is a justification made entirely by the auditor with guidelines provided by the AC and a self-
assessment submitted by local council for the VFM theme. 
Out of 22 councils under investigation, only five were being audited by private auditors , 
Leeds and Sheffield were audited by KPMG; Barnsley and North Lincolnshire were aud ited 
by RSM Robson Rhodes; and Calderdale by PWC. Other councils were audited by the 
Commission staff, called District Auditor. It would be interesting to find out if Private Aud itors 
judgment differ from those of the District Auditor's. The Audit Commission (2006e) 
mentioned that the UoR's scores will be quality assured to ensure consistency across the 
country and between audit suppliers. Auditors are not allowed to share scores with local 
councils until the quality assurance process has taken place although they are encouraged 
to be as open and transparent with local authorities as possible . The aud itors are 
encouraged to be transparent and open with local councils particular ly to make sure that 
councils are aware of areas where a need to improve is identified. No specific crite ria for 
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councils to be audited by private or district auditor is given other than their locality and the 
location of which audit firm won a government tender. Only 23 percent councils were audited 
by Private Auditors and all are single tier and county councils and among the top performing 
authorities in the region. Sheffield and North Lincolnshire were 'Excellent' and Leeds and 
Barnsley were 'Good' councils in 2004 and in 2005 Sheffield and Leeds obtained 4 stars 
while North Lincolnshire and Barnsley have obtained 3 stars. 
5.4 Summary 
Chapter 5 addressed the second research question: how have local authorities performed 
based on their auditor's assessment (certification audit and Use of Resources assessment). 
The findings attempt to fill the gap found in the literature about "how" the local authorities 
performed based on their auditors' assessment and to guide further exploration in the 
fieldwork analysis to achieve the main aim of this study. Local authorities are found to 
improve on the aspects of certification audit as well as on the scale used for assessing 
overall UoR and its themes. The pattern of improvement on the UoR scale was quite 
standardised with annual improvement shown in the CPA -the original being at a higher rate 
than in the CPA -the harder test. This suggests that the enhanced regulation to some extent 
promoted improvement at local authorities, in particular when based on the assessment 
scale. Thus, Power's (1994) argument that the existing audit and inspection regimes fail to 
promote improvement is challenged here. However, views from the auditees would add more 
to close the theoretical and empirical gap on the impact of regulation and audit explosion on 
auditees. These will be considered in the following chapter. 
Findings from this chapter as well as from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, were used to create 
structured statements for interview with local authorities in the focus region. Results from 
the interviews will be reported in the following Chapter 6. 
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Introduction --. Literature r---. Methodology ---+ Findings & r---+ Conclusion 
Review Discussion II 
6.1 Introduction 
Recalling the research aims and objectives presented in Table 1, Chapter 1, there are five 
research questions derived from the main aim . 
Research 
Question 
Aim 
Objectives 
(Specific 
research 
questions) 
HOW DO THE EXTERNAL AUDITING FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES IN ENGLAND AFFECT LOCAL AUTHORITIES AS 
AUDITEES? 
To discover how the external auditing performed at local authorities in 
England affects local authorities as recipients of the service. 
1. What are the functions of external auditors for local authorities in 
England? 
2. How do the local authorities perform based on their auditor's 
assessment (certification audit and Use of Resources 
assessment) ? 
3. Do the auditees view the published scores as reflecting their local 
authority's performance? 
4. What are the perceived factors contributing to the variations in the 
local authorities' performance? 
5. How do the auditees view the external audit process and the 
performance assessments? 
The first research question is answered in Chapter 3 which guided exploration of published 
performance results from auditors' assessment to answer the second research question , 
presented in Chapter 5. Findings, analysis and discussion emerged from the first two 
research questions were used to assist investigation of the rest of research questions, which 
explores auditees views: 
3. Do the auditees view the published scores as reflecting improvement and 
position of the local authorities? 
4. What factors contribute to the variations in local authorities ' 
performance? 
5. How do the auditees view the external audit process and the performance 
assessment? 
These three research questions were explored through structured fieldwork interviews; each 
respondent marked a set of structured questions and their answers were discussed in a 
face-to-face interview. This chapter seeks to fill the gap mention by Power (1997) of the lack 
of research on how auditees react to the audit explosion resulting from changes in publ ic 
sector administration . This chapter will discuss specifically the responses gathered from 
auditees from the fieldwork interviews to complete the main aim of this research . The flow of 
discussion will follow the diagram presented in Figure 28 from Chapter 5. 
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Part I of the findings presented in Chapter 5 was separated into sections: (i) certification; and 
(ii) use of resources because the two audits produced two distinct reports. However, in this 
chapter, the findings from both audits will be combined and discussion be based on research 
questions three, four and five. Merging the two audits together in the discussion for this 
chapter is appropriate because the auditors conducted both audits together; certification 
audit also serves as a requirement for UoR themes assessment, particularly the 'Financial 
Reporting' theme. Other themes; 'Financial Management', 'Financial Standing', 'Internal 
Control' and 'Value for Money' also partially related to the certification audit activities. 
The structured questions for interviewing applied a five-point Likert-scale from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree with no view as an alternative for those who have no knowledge or did 
not wish to express a view about an issue. However, the two scales of strongly and generally 
agree (disagree) were combined because many respondents conSistently mark generally 
agree (disagree) and avoid marking strong opinion. To maintain the anonymity of 
respondents, the discussion will not mention the responses as coming from good or poor 
scoring local authorities nor type of council. Some respondents did give their opinion on the 
different effect the assessment has had on different types of council, and this will be 
generally addressed in this chapter. 
Some statements from the structured interview questions resulted in mixed responses, 
where the percentage of agreement/disagree were similar. Nevertheless, during the 
interview sessions, respondents were found to agree on many things even when their 
marked responses were different. Although responses vary depending on the issue, their 
explanation during interview sessions confirmed that many share similar views. Throughout 
the discussion of findings in this chapter, respondent views will not be differentiated between 
those of the District or the Single Tier and County councils as movements of the directors 
from one council to another are frequent, i.e. some of the directors had experience in 
different councils, different government regions and in police and fire authorities. 
Even those who had served the same local authority for many years often had experience 
working with other types of councilor knowledge of other councils through discussion among 
their circle of professional colleagues. Thus they were able to reflect views from their wide 
experience, and it did not seem appropriate to differentiate the views of the directors from 
different types of council. The quotes throughout the discussion in this chapter are extracts 
from dialogue with the respondents, the director of finance (DOF). 
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6.2 Do the auditees view published scores as reflecting their 
local authority's performance? 
Analysis and Discussion 
Research Question 2 
How do local authorities perform on certification 
audit and Use of Resources assessment? 
r ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' -' .- . -._._ . _ . -
• 1 
1 Research Question 3 
Do the auditees view 
published scores as 
reflecting their local 
authority's 
performance? 
f ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - _ . _ . _ . _._ . _ . -
• 1 
1 Research Question 4 
What factors contribute 
to the variations in 
local authorities' 
performance? 
CHAPTER 5 
r ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' -'- ' - ' - ' -
• 1 
1 Research Question 5 
How do auditees view 
the external audit 
process and the 
performance 
assessment? 
------------------------------ ~ ~-----------------------------CHAPTER 6 
This section reports views on the published scores and ranking , contribution of the external 
audit towards efficiency and effectiveness, contribution of external audit towards 
improvement in aspects of certification audit; contribution of external audit towards public 
trusts and participation; impact on voting decisions; public inspection of local authorities SoA; 
impact of local electors' objections; impact of public interest report; and perception as to 
whether the use of resources assessment is a worthwhile innovation . The discussion will be 
divided in subsections 6.2.1 to 6.2.9. 
6.2.1 Scores and Ranking 
In this section, issues related to the published scores and rankings by the AC after 
assessment is completed , and the perceived relative importance of the value for money 
(VFM) scores to the use of resources (UoR) and the comprehensive performance 
assessment (CPA) will be discussed . 
6.2.1.1 The Published Ranks 
Hood et al (1999) suggest four mechanisms of control over public management, oversight 
which involves command and control , and another three inspector-free mechanisms that 
works through competition, mutuality and contrived randomness . According to the authors , 
competition is achieved through the ranking of performance. Having their performance 
ranked provided the inspector-free control mechanism as suggested by the authors. Table 
64 displays the results for questions of whether the published UoR rankings by the AC are a 
fair reflection of the local authority 's relative position and whether the ran ki ngs have 
promoted competition among local authorities. 
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Table 64: The Commission's Published Ranking 
Statements 
The UoR rankings published by the Audit Commission 
i. are a fair reflection of my local authority's relative 
position 
ii. have promoted competition among local authorities 
Notes: N 20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
65.0 
70.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither No 
Agree view 
nor 
disagree Disagree 
5.0 30.0 
5.0 20.0 5.0 
The results show that a majority of respondents agree that the published rankings are a fair 
reflection of their position and have promoted competition amongst local authorities. These 
were seen especially with councils which were rated higher than their previous scores, as 
one director has responded: 
"Yes, we are an excellent council, so it must be right" [DOF 1] 
Mean analysis to support the frequency is shown in Table 65, which reflected higher means 
for both statements (3.40 and 3.58) and standard deviations below 1. 
Table 65: Mean Analysis - The Commission's Published Ranking 
Statements Min-Max Means 
Standard 
Deviation 
The UoR ran kings published by the Audit Commission 
i. Are a fair reflection of my local authority's relative position 2-5 
ii. Have promoted competition among local authorities 2-5 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.40 
3.58 
0.99 
0.90 
While some disagree that the published score is a fair reflection, although they have been 
rated better, based on their experience: 
"Some areas are better than the scores we get, and some areas are worse than the 
scores they have given' [DOF 5] 
The reason for this disagreement is the dispute between auditors' and directors' 
interpretations of the indicators provided by the Commission. These lead the auditors to look 
for a different set of measure as evidence while the local authorities are providing something 
else. A number of respondents suggested that, at times, the auditor gets a wrong message 
from what is intended by the local authority. The respondents explained that these happen 
because the auditors depend on description and evidence provided by local authority rather 
than searching and investigating for it themselves: 
"I provided them with the story and evidence to get the score rather than they search 
and investigate for it. They have interpreted it (the question in indicators) differently as 
to how I interpreted it. .. they have got literal interpretations, based on the questions. The 
questions can sometimes be in the wrong area, or they might be asking the wrong 
question" rOOF 5] 
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These issues point us to the auditor's qualification and efficiency in conducting their audit at 
local authorities as well as coherent understanding of the KLoEs, its questions and evidence 
required. As highlighted in Davis et al (2001), inspectors need to exhibit an understanding 
and appreciation of the services they inspect which include their technical expertise as well 
as sensitivity to local political contexts. The majority of interviewees agree that the published 
rankings promoted competition between local authorities: 
"Yes, that is definitely true, you only have to be in a room with two or three executives to 
understand the case" [OaF 1] 
"Absolutely, competition not cooperation, look at how one council often brag about how 
they scored 4, it is a competition" [OaF 7] 
The directors explained that they are competing with each other to reach higher rankings but 
they knew where they should stop as not all the indicators are achievable. Although they are 
competing, that does not prevent them from working together. A director pointed that they 
are cooperating for the sake of improvement, not because of the assessment: 
" ... in the early days, there's a lot of scepticism, cynicism, ... local authorities achieving 
4 stars, either didn't want to reveal what they were doing or you'd have to pay to find out 
how they do it. .. with the harder test now, it has promoted sharing, I can just pick up the 
phone and rang up my friend, the director of another local authority and ask them how 
they are doing this .. " [OaF 2] 
Many of them choose to work with each other to improve their authority, thus having 'healthy' 
competition: 
" ... we have got our league tables, we share resources and reports when we meet. We 
verbally share experience and we get a seven-page document that identifies areas to 
improve and areas not to improve. We have done this on local basis" [OaF 5] 
The directors also agree on cooperation and sharing between them; some excellent council 
allowed staff from other councils to visit and look at how they work. 
". " not aware of competition, but move towards collaboration between local authorities, 
sharing 'best practices' far more than in the past ... probably more of competition 
among high flyer chief executives to get the best scores ... promoted more 
communication and sharing among all levels at local authorities, network through 
CIPFA, finance advisory team, and other authorities within Yorkshire and The Humber 
region." [OaF 6] 
Their stories of achievement are also made available at the AC's website as 'best practice'. 
However, the sharing at times disheartened other authorities as they found that the same (or 
sometimes better) effort at their local authorities resulted in poorer scores than those 
considered 'excellent'. Sometimes it seemed that the local authority rated as 'excellent' was 
not doing anything better than the rest of them. This appears to have led to them cooperating 
more and recognizing when they should stop following the indicators. Hood et al (1999) 
recognized competition as an important inspector-free control over public bureaucracy, in 
which the authors suggest is achievable by generating a ranking based on performance. 
Mutuality is another inspector-free control mechanism evident here, where an authority is 
influenced by a group of local authorities (Hood et ai, 1999). 
206 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION II: AUDITEES VIEWS 
6.2.1.2 Improvement in Published Scores 
The previous section discussed views on the published rankings; this section will uncover 
views on the published scores. The published scores show improvement at local authorities 
from one year to another since 2002, thus several statements were posed to explore what is 
going on at local authorities. The results are displayed in Table 66. 
Table 66: Improvement in Published Scores 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Statements Agree disagree Disagree 
The published scores by the Audit Commission show a significant 
improvement from one year to another since 2002: 
i. The scores are a fair reflection of performance 
ii. The scores rose because local authorities knew where to 
improve through the indicators provided 
iii. The assessment indicators become easier to achieve after a 
number of years 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
65.0 
90.0 
20.0 
20.0 15.0 
10.0 0.0 
20.0 60.0 
A majority (65%) agree that the improvement shown in the published scores are a fair 
reflection of their performance although a small percentage disagree (15%). Mean scores 
reported in Table 67 for this statement is 3.55 also indicates agreement, although not very 
high. A director responded: 
"I think local authorities are getting better now, not sure if they are lot better, but we know 
how to answer the questions now". [DOF 5] 
The view above is shared by many respondents, in which they agree that their councils are 
much better now compared to previous years. The underlined part in the response above is 
evidence of learning and mastering of the instruments-indicators. The directors also agree 
that 'learning' could have contributed more to the increase in published scores than real 
improvement. Wilson (2005, p. 228) study also reported majority of respondents view that 
the classification of CPA outcomes by the AC 'was a fair reflection of their authority's 
performance'. Although several researchers (Broadbent, 2003; Wilson, 2004) argue the 
grading policy for all local governments in one of five categories, many respondents in 
Wilson (2005) study agree to the categorization. 
That brought us to the second statement in this category: the scores rose because local 
authorities knew where to improve through the indicators provided. This statement attained a 
very high majority (90%) agreement. A director said: 
"Yes, we are intelligent people; we know how to play the game. What you do is you 
identify the area where you are weak and you make sure that is the area you are 
improving, so it would be wrong to say there is not an element of game playing here." 
[DOF 1] 
The agreement is also supported by mean analysis reported in Table 67 which shows a 
higher mean, 4.10 indicating strong agreement and a relatively lower standard deviation, 
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0.55, signify unanimity in views. Some directors, though admitting gaming element, 
suggested that the increases in scores do reflect improvement and that they use the 
indicators in a positive way, for example: 
"We are. better at dealing with the indicators, but the scores are not superficial it is a 
general Improvement." [DOF 15] , 
Table 67: Mean Analysis - Improvement in Published Scores 
Statements Min-Max Means 
Standard 
Deviation 
!he published scores by the Audit Commission show a significant 
Improvement from one year to another since 2002: 
i. The scores are a fair reflection of performance 2-5 
The scores rose because local authorities knew where to 
ii. improve through the indicators provided 3-5 
The assessment indicators become easier to achieve after a 
iii. number of years 1-4 
Notes: N 20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.55 0.83 
4.10 0.55 
2.50 0.95 
The final statement considered whether the assessment indicators become easier to achieve 
after a number of years. A majority of respondents (60%) disagreed. A mean reported in 
Table 67 for this statement is also low, 2.50 signifies the disagreement. A director 
responded: 
"The criteria have become harder. It is easier and you learn through experience in terms 
of what the Commission are looking for but you have still got to do the same amount of 
work. You know what standards they are looking for, but you still need to go through the 
process to produce good quality financial accounts. In that sense, it is not easier." [DOF 6] 
The quote above suggests that the indicators are not getting easier but that the local 
authorities learn about the assessment processes which make them accept and establish 
facts about the assessment system so they can better deal with it. Many respondents agree 
that there are simpler indicators although many of them are considered more difficult. 
Another director explained: 
"Yes it gets easier because you get familiar with the game. The indicators do get more 
difficult but the beauty of these indicators is that they keep changing all the time. You get 
familiar with the game and you get used to what the auditors want and so what you need 
to do to satisfy the auditors, that is why you can improve scores." [DOF 11] 
Respondents believe that they are now better at dealing with the indicators; have had the 
discipline and better time management to respond to the assessment requirement, have 
brought in expertise to help with problem areas and to motivate staff to be more productive 
as well as maintaining good relationship and dialogue with the auditors. These are 
evidenced by the improvement in their published scores, which they agree that it is a fair 
reflection of their performance. However, they disagree that 'the indicators are getting 
easier'. The indicators are made difficult with movement along the scale's levels and 
additions to compulsory requirements at every level in the scale. Wilson's (2005) study also 
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found majority of respondents believe that CPA could lead to national priorities taking 
precedent over local ones due to the weighting attached to key components within its 
methodology. Thus, 'gaming' is unavoidable when local authorities may prioritize services 
that are given most weight in the determination of overall core service scores (Pollitt, 1989; 
Wilson, 2005). 
6.2.1.3 Relative Importance 
The statements in this section were generated to probe the relative importance of value for 
money to the UoR's score and UoR's score to the overall CPA score. Table 68 and Table 69 
report the analysis of directors' responses to the statements. 
Table 68: Relative Importance 
Statements 
Scoring higher for the 
i. overall UoR score is important to obtain good CPA stars 
VFM theme score is important to achieve good overall ii. 
score 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
95.0 
UoR 80.0 
Frequenc~ (%~ 
Neither 
Agree nor 
disagree Disagree 
0.0 5.0 
5.0 15.0 
As revealed in Table 68 above, both statements attained very high majority agreement, but a 
higher majority (95%) agree that the overall UoR score is important to obtain good CPA stars 
than the majority (80%) for VFM theme score is important to achieve good overall UoR 
score. Both statements fetched high means indicating agreement, exhibited in Table 69, but 
evidenced higher mean for the importance of UoR to CPA stars than VFM to overall UoR 
score. 
Table 69: Mean Analysis - Relative Importance 
Standard 
Statements Min-Max Means Deviation 
Scoring higher for the 
i. 
ii. 
overall UoR score is important to obtain good CPA stars 
VFM theme score is important to achieve good overall UoR 
score 
Notes: N=20 
2-5 
2-5 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 {='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
4.25 
3.85 
0.72 
0.93 
A majority of respondents' view that the UoR score is an important determinant for CPA stars 
although a few said that some local authorities attained a better UoR score but lower CPA 
stars than those attaining a lower UoR score. This is also evidenced in the AC's published 
scores. A director said: 
"UoR is one of the frontline. Yes VFM had a higher rating on UoR but if you did well on the 
other themes, you do well without VFM." [DOF 6] 
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The quote above confirmed the frequencies and means pattern revealed in Table 68 and 
Table 69. Another director explained: 
"For UoR, it is not just about VFM, but about the entire themes." [DOF 1] 
Based on the respondents' responses, they view VFM as the most difficult theme in UoR 
assessment but they do not think that the theme fetch higher credence than other themes in 
the decision for UoR. 
6.2.2 Contribution towards Efficiency and Effectiveness 
The AC's mission statement emphasises that UoR is aimed at increasing the efficiency and 
effectiveness of local authorities. Hence, statements were generated to explore respondents' 
views on whether they think efficiency and effectiveness are achieved as a result of the UoR 
exercise. Table 70 reports frequency results for responses on the achievement of efficiency 
and effectiveness at the respondent's authority and all local authorities in general. 
Table 70: Contribution of Use of Resources Assessment 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
The UoR assessment contributes to Agree disagree Disagree No view 
Increased efficiency in my local authority 
Increased effectiveness in my local authority 
Increased efficiency in local authorities generally 
Increased effectiveness in local authorities generally 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
45.0 
40.0 
35.0 
35.0 
30.0 25.0 
30.0 30.0 
35.0 25.0 5.0 
30.0 30.0 5.0 
As reported in Table 70, the most common view for increased efficiency and effectiveness in 
'my local authority' is to agree, 45 percent agree that UoR contributes to increase in their 
local authority efficiency and 40 percent agree that UoR contributes to increase 
effectiveness. A director responded: 
"The assessment is part of the pressure for a local authority to become more efficient, but 
it takes longer for efficiency." [DOF 6] 
Although the percentage is low, many respondents recognised that efficiency increases at 
their local authority, while effectiveness is improved more slowly. Table 71 shows mean 
analysis for views on the contribution of UoR assessment to increased efficiency and 
effectiveness. Means are slightly greater than 3 for increased efficiency and effectiveness at 
'my local authority' indicate agreement but not very strong. Mean for efficiency is higher 
(3.20) than the mean for effectiveness (3.10). 
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Table 71: Mean Analysis - Contribution of Use of Resources Assessment 
Standard 
The UoR assessment contributes to: Min-Max Mean Deviation 
increased efficiency in my local authority 2-4 3.20 0.83 
ii increased effectiveness in my local authority 2-4 3.10 0.85 
iii increased efficiency in local authorities generally 0-4 3.11 0.81 
iv increased effectiveness in local authorities generally 0-4 3.05 0.85 
Notes: N 20 
T~e mean is a~er~ge on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means mdlcate stronger agreement on the contribution of UoR to increased efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
A director explained: 
"It didn't increase efficiency; it is an action plan on how you deliver what the Commission 
thinks world class FM system, etc. It is a validation process that is being applied to me 
rather than helping hand that is being lent to me to sort out as an organisation. It is very 
much a hurdle I had to jump over rather than anything else. Again it has improved some of 
the things we done. In all local authorities tend to be quite similar now in terms of accounts 
etc. Neither efficient nor effective, I would rather have my team sit down and think of how 
to improve rather than providing set of evidence." [DOF 5] 
The response above exhibited the respondents doubt over the necessity of having that 
extant of assessment regime. The response also included views for local authorities 
generally. The frequency of responses for increased efficiency and effectiveness of local 
authorities in general also follow the same pattern of responses for individual local 
authorities but at a lower rate. The mean analysis reveals means of 3.11 for increased 
efficiency and 3.05 for effectiveness which indicate inclination towards disagreeing. Wilson's 
(2005) study on the views of local governments' chief financial officers on the effect of Best 
Value also found that the initiative had no effect on either the costs of blue collar services or 
their quality. 
Many directors responded that they have no evidence about local authorities generally to 
enable them commenting on it. Another director responding about whether UoR contributes 
towards improvement in efficiency and effectiveness said: 
"That is possibly not because UoR's statements are great. But where UoR's judgement 
has been useful to people are in itself it has raise a profile of certain things and so, in 
terms of efficiency and the like, you are able to back up any changes that you make, any 
concerns that you have with the auditors view and the UoR judgement." [DOF 1] 
The response exhibits a lack of belief that the UoR assessment regime has contributed 
towards efficiency and especially effectiveness at local authorities, which is also shared by 
many, for example: 
"Increase in effectiveness? No generally. Effectiveness is measured by public satisfaction. 
Achieving good UoR scores mayor may not help effectiveness of a local authority, 
because at the end of the day you may increase the UoR score but does that make you 
more effective in delivering services to the public? It is interesting that up and down the 
country, local authorities attain good UoR scores, good service standards, good CPA b~t 
the public don't think they are doing very well. So there is a mismatch, that's why I said 
that is not necessarily the case. [DOF 11] 
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The view suggests that the indicators did not reflect local citizens' expectation but more 
towards the expectation of the central government and what the AC thinks is best-practice 
which is discussed in Section 6.3.1. Some directors view that there are other ways of 
promoting efficiency and effectiveness instead of using the indicators. They view the 
indicators as sometimes discouraging especially when other local authorities who are not 
doing any better than them obtained much better scores (see further discussion in Section 
6.3.6). Thus, they agree that the AC should listen and learn more about the needs of local 
citizen and take into consideration local factors affecting authorities' performance. Some 
suggested that views from the directors or head of finance at local authorities should be 
heard before the design phase of the assessment indicators rather seeking consultation after 
it has been done (further discussion in Section 6.3.3). 
6.2.3 Contribution of External Audit towards improvement in 
Aspects of the Certification Audit 
Respondents were asked for their views on the extent of the contribution which external 
audit had on aspects of certification audit. Results from descriptive analysis of responses in 
these aspects are presented in Table 72 and Table 73 below. 
Table 72: Contribution of External Audit towards improvement in Aspects of 
Certification Audit 
Frequency (%) 
External audit contributes significantly towards: 
Improvement in Financial Accounting System 
Improvement in Financial Reporting 
Improvement in Quality of Presentation of the Statement of Accounts 
Improvement in Time taken for Approval of the Statement of Accounts 
Improvement in Time taken for Publishing the Statement of Accounts 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
45.0 
65.0 
55.0 
60.0 
40.0 
Neither Disagree 
Agree 
nor 
disagree 
35.0 20.0 
25.0 10.0 
35.0 10.0 
10.0 30.0 
15.0 40.0 
No 
view 
5.0 
Table 72 shows the most popular choice is to agree that external audit has contributed 
significantly towards improvement in financial accounting system (45%), a bigger majority for 
financial reporting (65%), quality of presentation of the statement of accounts (55%) and time 
taken for approval of the statement of accounts (60%). In terms of contribution towards 
improvement in time taken for publishing the statement of accounts, the most preferred 
response is disagree (40%). Variances in frequency responses for significant contribution 
towards aspects of certification audit above provided an opportunity to rank as to which 
aspect is perceived to have been helped the most by the external audit function. Thus, Table 
73 displays results of rank-order from mean analysis performed on the statements. 
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Table 73: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Contribution of External Audit towards 
Improvement in Aspects of Certification Audit 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
External audit contributes significantly towards: 
Improvement in Financial Reporting 
Improvement in Quality of Presentation of the Statement of 
Accounts 
Improvement in Financial Accounting System 
Improvement in Time taken for Approval of the Statement of 
Accounts 
Improvement in Time taken for Publishing the Statement of 
Accounts 
Notes: N-20 
Min-Max 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Mean 
3.65 
3.45 
3.35 
3.25 
2.95 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.99 
0.89 
1.09 
1.16 
1.18 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the external audit contribution towards improvement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
As revealed in Table 73, respondents agree that external audit contributes significantly 
towards improvement in financial reporting aspect, followed by quality of presentation of the 
statement of accounts; financial accounting system is ranked third before time taken for 
approval of the statement of accounts. All of the four aspects carry means of higher than 3, 
indicate agreement to the aspects. The highest mean is 3.65 and the lowest for agreement is 
3.25. Means higher than 3 but lower than 4 indicates mild agreement. 
In terms of financial reporting, which obtain the highest in the rank-order, respondents 
explained that comments made by the external auditors have helped them improve financial 
reporting aspects. Detailed indicators in the KLoEs have also helped to point towards which 
items should be targeted for improvement for financial reporting. A director said: 
"Generally they have forced us to do things. The fact that they have the time scale of what 
they are has forced us to improve the way we do things." [DOF 7] 
A rather different view is expressed by one of respondent: 
"I don't feel that the Commission and the external audit existence are necessarily 
improving our financial reporting. This is partly because the reporting we are doing now is 
absolutely bonkers. The format we are required to use is absolutely flawed. Several years 
ago our financial account were 50-70 pages, they are now horrendous." [DOF 17] 
A majority of respondents share similar views to the above response. Although they agree 
that some aspects were improved with the 'force' from the external audit requirement, they 
perceived some of the changes are unnecessary. Another director responded: 
"It depends on what you believe reporting is for. If reporting is for accountants, I agree. But 
if reporting for the residents, I disagree, because I don't think there are many members on 
the local residents that understand the accounts, or have an interest with it". [DOF 2] 
Many directors expressed concern that the accounts are not comprehensible by many and 
that local authorities publish summary of financial performance for local residents. They also 
said that a session to explain the accounts for councillors is held every year. 
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Respondents explained that having the requirements specified for presentation of the annual 
report has helped notify them of areas for improvement in the quality of presentation of the 
accounts. They agreed that the quality is getting better because of the force from annually 
enhanced KLoEs indicators and requirement by statutes. The force has also contributed 
towards an improvement in the timing for approval of the statement of accounts, which has 
to be brought forward to comply with auditor's request so that local authorities could avoid a 
poor scoring. Thus respondents do not disagree that external auditing has contributed 
towards improvement. They however, doubted the needs of having such a comprehensive 
annual reports and quality level. 
In respect of financial accounting system, a director explained: 
"I am not sure if the external auditor contributes because our auditors never get their 
hands dirty by touching the finance system, they always rely on the paper based output or 
distributed output or things that coming out of the accounting system rather than looking at 
the accounting system itself. ... They didn't help in terms of systems. They are not 
interested. They don't have access rights and they don't wish to have." [DOF 5] 
This view is shared by many respondents. They explained that external audit did not help 
with the financial accounting system at local authorities directly; local authorities may have to 
find their ways out, and they received no help or suggestion from either the auditors or the 
AC in this aspect. Respondents notify that they occasionally seek help from other local 
authorities. Many respondents suggested that the high cost of installing new accounting 
systems discouraged them from changing to the ones commonly used by other local 
authorities. Nevertheless, almost all directors accept the fact that having the assessment 
forces them to improvise their accounting system. However, some respondents expressed 
that even without the assessment they would have improved. 
In respect of publication time, a low mean is evidenced (2.95), indicating disagreement 
because respondents view that improvement in time taken for publishing the statement of 
accounts is an enforcement by statute which local authorities have to comply with. The 
deadline for publication of statement of accounts is specified in the statutes; therefore little 
contribution comes from external auditors. 
6.2.4 Public Trust and Participation 
Power (1997) argues that the audit explosion has its roots in the loss of trust in 
contemporary society, and therefore, it has become important to provide an account of one's 
actions. Thus, the enhanced regulation resulting from NPM seeks to make government 
officials accountable. Power (1997) doubts that audits deliver greater accountability, 
efficiency and quality, but suggests that they encourage distrust; the auditees would become 
less trustworthy when they adapt their behaviour strategically in response to the audit 
process. Figure 11 on p. 73 and the explanation that follows describes the displacement of 
trust in local government. 
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Hood (1995) also highlights the high-trust and low-trust relationship with 'accountingization' 
(a term used by Power and Laughlin, 1992, p. 133). The high degree of auditing in local 
government signifies low-trust in the organizations. 
Thus, statements were generated and used during the interviews to probe respondents' 
views on public trust and public participation in local authorities. The objective was to 
ascertain whether interviewees' experienced improved trust and public participation as a 
result of the assessment regimes. Table 74 and Table 75 show results from analysis of 
responses for the statements. 
Table 74: Influence on Public Trust and Participation 
The UoR exercise has improved 
i. public trust in my local authority 
ii. public participation in my local authority's activities 
iii. public trust in local government generally 
public participation in activities organised by local 
iv. t II govern men genera y 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
15.0 
5.0 
5.0 
0.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither Disagree No 
Agree view 
nor 
disagree 
30.0 55.0 
15.0 80.0 
35.0 55.0 5.0 
20.0 75.0 5.0 
The frequencies of responses shown in Table 74 indicate a high majority of disagreement. 
80 percent disagree that the UoR exercise has improved public participation in 'my local 
authority's activities' and 75 percent for 'activities organised by local government generally'. 
Frequency of responses for the 'UoR exercise has improved public trust in my local authority' 
fetches 55 percent disagree as well as for 'public trust in local government general/y'. The 
responses signify a mismatch between the objectives of the assessment to enhance public 
trust and the perceptions of finance directors of the achievement of these objectives. 
Table 75: Mean Analysis - Influence on Public Trust and Participation 
The UoR exercise has improved 
i. Public trust in my local authority 
ii. Public participation in my local authority's activities 
iii. Public trust in local government generally 
Min-Max Mean 
1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
2.55 
2.05 
2.42 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.83 
0.76 
0.69 
iv. Public participation in activities organised by local 1-3 2.00 0.67 
government generally 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1(='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean analysis reported in Table 75 evidenced the disagreement, relatively lower means for 
all the statements, and standard deviations below 1 indicate harmony in views. From the 
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Min-Max column, not a single respondent marked '5=strongly agree' for any of the 
statements on trust and participation. A director responded: 
And: 
"I don't think the public want to know or care about it." rOOF 5] 
"I have not seen the evidence, in my.experience. I know we tried to invite participation in 
the budget through budget co~sultatlon and I think it is a general problem, a national 
problem. I have not seen UoR dIrectly as being the cause or the guiding light." rOOF 2] 
Many directors shared similar views to the two quotations above. This problem link to the 
previous section 6.2.3 in terms of financial reporting requirement which is 'beyond 
comprehension' of members of the local public and on the issues of the UoR indicators 
representing less of public expectation but more for the central government's and the AC's 
views of best-practice (Section 6.3.1). An explanation from one of the directors which was 
shared by many: 
"I don't think it is useful for the public. It is more useful for me as to how I am doing as 
opposed to other councils are doing. It is more of the professional pride. It allows you to 
do league tables, compare yourself with neighbours but not to local citizens. I don't think 
the press have even picked on it in terms of such and such is better than us or we are 
better than them." rOOF 5] 
The explanation from another director also supports and elaborates the view above: 
"The way the Commission are going down of making information on their website more 
accessible in terms of red and green flag may help. I think the difficulty is that the 
Commission view of good practice of UoR is a professional view whereas the public view 
is 'what is the impact on their council bill- their tax bill'. The public are not aware of 
government grant formulae and other things that have far more impact other than council 
tax bill." rOOF 6] 
The response above highlights the needs for reconciliation between what is presented and 
what is comprehensible by the local citizen. Many directors explained that they re-produced 
their annual accounts in a summarized, simplified format and produced pamphlets on the 
budget, planning and other achievements at their local authority to attract public's attention. 
A few directors suggested that having a workshop with the local public could help in 
delivering messages about the assessment and stimulate their interest and understanding. 
Although the majority disagree with the two statements, a few directors do view that the UoR 
that requires extensive reporting and the publication of ranks should improve public trust in 
them. Their responses were influenced by their own expectations but they agreed with the 
majority and accepted the fact that they have not seen any evidence of improvement either 
in public trust or public interest in the UoR and CPA. Many expressed disappointment that 
the local public would not care if they are doing we", would have no interest or concern to 
the local council, only if something goes wrong, then the press would 'in no time' make that a 
headline in their newspaper. The directors also expressed their concern over negative 
publicity which might influence an auditor's perception and therefore affect the judgement on 
local authorities. It was difficult to repair the tarnished reputation they had when things went 
wrong. Some directors admitted that bad reputation and poor results from the assessment 
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was linked to a decline in their staffs' motivation which the directors have to work extra hard 
to improve. 
6.2.5 Voting Decisions 
Statements in this section were generated to explore whether the publication of assessment 
results is reflected in the public's voting decisions. Responses to this statement would 
confirm the views on the importance of the assessment to the public at large. Table 76 and 
77 display the results analysed from responses to the statements. 
Table 76: Influence on Voting Decisions 
Frequency (%) 
Agree Neither Disagree 
The published Comprehensive Performance Assessment results 
have influenced the decision of local electors 
Agree 
nor 
disagree 
i. on whether to vote in local elections 0.0 10.0 90.0 
ii. on which political party to vote for 0.0 10.0 90.0 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
As revealed in Table 76, a huge majority (90%) disagree that the published CPA results 
have influenced the decision of local electors on (i) whether to vote in local elections, or (ii) 
which political party to vote for. It is interesting to note that nobody agrees that it would. The 
directors viewed UoR and CPA as being of no interest to the public, and therefore have no 
influence on the public's decision on politics or politicians. A director responded: 
"People are willing to stand on which impact them more compared to CPA. It is very much 
based on the politics of the council rather than the council being classified as fair or 
whatever." [DOF 5] 
The view is supported by another director who said: 
"Totally, they quite frankly don't care. There is no impact on whether people would vote; if 
it did we would have seen the turn-out increasing. It is not, it remain relatively stable in all 
areas. In terms of which party to vote for, the controlling groups are the greater majority in 
this council as well as in my previous council." [DOF 1] 
Respondents' views in this section harmonized with their responses in the previous section 
on whether the UoR exercise has improved public trust and participation, which also attained 
a very high percentage of disagreement. A mean analysis was further done to check on 
means of responses and standard deviations, reported in Table 77. 
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Table 77: Mean Analysis - Influence on Voting Decisions 
The published Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
results have influenced the decision of local electors 
Min-Max Mean Standard 
Deviation 
i. on whether to vote in local elections 1-3 1.80 0.62 
ii. on which political party to vote for 1-3 1.70 0.66 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Low means are reported for both statements, confirming the high percentage of 
disagreement. The 'Min-Max' column also shows there are respondents who marked 
'1 =strongly disagree' for both statements. These indicate the insignificance of the CPA 
results to politics or politician. Unanimity in views for this category is evidenced by the low 
standard deviations for both statements. 
6.2.6 Public Inspection 
Local citizens were given rights to inspect their council's statement of accounts during 
certain periods before auditors issue their final reports. Exposure to the public in terms of 
greater transparency is believed to be a stimulus to performance (Heald, 2006). Hence, 
statements were generated to call for views on issues related to public inspection of the 
statement of accounts produced by local authorities. Table 78 and 79 report the results 
analysed from responses to both statements. 
Table 78: Public Inspection of the Statement of Accounts 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Statements Agree disagree Disagree 
The requirement for public inspection of the council's pre-audited 
statement of accounts contributes to improved financial reporting 
performance 
Some local electors use their rights to inspect the council's pre-
audited statement of accounts 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
35.0 15.0 50.0 
45.0 20.0 35.0 
Table 78 shows most, 50 percent, disagree that 'the requirement for public inspection of the 
council's pre-audited statement of accounts contributes to improved financial reporting 
performance'. The directors explained that their council's statement of accounts was neither 
improved for public inspection reasons nor does the requirement force them to have their 
accounts reported properly. A director responded: 
"They have all come with ulterior motive and use that as a vehicle to get their hands on 
invoices etc for other purpose, rather than to look at the net worth, the capital outlook, the 
balance sheet. It basically for their personal use or they use it for their agenda." [DOF 5] 
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Many of the directors said that the local public does not contribute to improvement in their 
financial reporting. However, a few of them share the opposite view, for example: 
"I think it does, nobody inspected our accounts, so it is really perception thing. We try our 
best t~ ma.ke things understandable and we try our best to make sure that everything is 
there Just In case somebody does come along. In reality nobody does, but it does put 
pressure on us because the day that somebody does come along and we haven't got it 
right, then we will have problems, so I think it does." [DOF 1] 
The respondents reflect the forces that the requirement has had on them to make sure 
things are done right the first time. Other directors, who disagree with the statement, did not 
deny that they make sure that their pre-audited statement of accounts open for public 
inspection is made of reasonable quality similar to the final audited statement of accounts. 
Mean analysis for this statement as reported in Table 79 revealed a low mean of 2.65 which 
indicates disagreement to 'the requirement for public inspection of the council's pre-audited 
statement of accounts contributes to improved financial reporting performance'. 
The response above brings us to the second statement discussed with the directors: 'some 
local electors use their rights to inspect the council's pre-audited statement of accounts' 
where the most popular choice is agreement, 45 percent. A slightly lower percentage, 35 
percent disagree. As indicated in the above response, local authorities rarely have their 
account inspected. Many respondents explained that even if their accounts were inspected, 
the inspection is not done for accounting reasons but with ulterior motives as mentioned in 
responses quoted from OaF 5 above. 
Table 79: Mean Analysis - Public Inspection of the Statement of Accounts 
Statements 
Min-
Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Some local electors use their rights to inspect the council's pre-
audited statement of accounts 
The requirement for public inspection of the council's pre-
1-5 3.05 1.39 
audited statement of accounts contributes to improved financial 1-4 2.65 1.18 
reporting performance 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Although the popular choice is agreement to 'some local electors use their rights to inspect 
the council's pre-audited statement of accounts', mean for that response as shown in Table 
79 is 3.05, indicating middle view. A relatively higher standard deviation for that statement 
also indicated mix in views. Respondents agree that some local electors exercise the rights 
but only a maximum of two in some years while none in many other years, while some 
respondents disagree because they have never had any request from local electors. A 
director said: 
"Very rarely that they inspect. Tend to be individuals who got an issue about ~ervice 
matter, comment about legal and service issue rather than the accounts etc. I think .th.e 
accounts themselves are of no interest to the general public as long as the counCil I~ 
sound financially and able to continue providing services without excessive rise in counCil 
tax" [DOF 6] 
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The responses above indicate that public do not inspect the accounts and that the public will 
be concerned only when it involve issues directly related to them, like the council tax. Some 
respondents explained that the statement of accounts itself is incomprehensible to the 
general public: 
"I don't think that many members of the public now would understand the accounts. We 
have got one person this year, the first time in four years and that is politically motivated. I 
have worked with many councils, it is the usual few, because of specific aspects, such as 
a listed building is being closed or a road network. It is a local social interest that normally 
causes public inspection." [DOF 2] 
And the view is supported by many, for example: 
And: 
"I think the statutory format of local authorities account doesn't make them immediately 
accessible to the public." [DOF 16] 
"Many people do not appreciate (the accounts) and do not feel they can look at it. We 
have put this traditional accountancy barrier up between us and the residents." [DOF 3] 
Some directors explained that they normally hold sessions to present the accounts to their 
councillors as not everyone understands accounting terminology and its presentation. Local 
authorities have taken steps to encourage the interest of the general public in their financial 
report by publishing a summary of the statement of accounts to help local electors 
understand and appreciate the council's operations. Nevertheless that does not attract much 
interest or response from the local electors. A director said: 
"We publish a summary of the accounts every other year, but not many people actually 
look at it." [DOF 8] 
Respondents suggest that the local public are interested much more in a clean and healthy 
environment and good facilities. Many of the directors agree that very few inspections of the 
accounts lead to questioning and objections to the pre-audited accounts and that some local 
electors use the channel to express their dissatisfaction or disagreement with the councilor 
individuals in the council. According to the respondents, many of the questions were 
unrelated to statement of accounts and not entertained by the auditors, although on several 
occasions auditors have had to investigate and clarify the effect it would have on the 
statement of accounts, which increases audit fees charged to the local authority. Thus, the 
following section will discuss the impact of local electors' objection on the council's statement 
of accounts. 
6.2.7 Impact of Local Electors' Objections 
Objections would have several impacts on the statement of accounts because it requires 
external auditor's investigation on the inquiry which takes up some time. Though not many 
local authorities experienced objections in the study region, when there is an objection, it 
does influence several aspects of certification. Thus, statements were posed to explore 
respondents' views on the rights to object the local authorities' accounts. Table 80 and Table 
81 detail results of analysis for responses on the statements. 
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Table 80: Impact of Objections 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
Statements nor No Agree disagree Disagree view 
Generally, objections to the local authority's pre-
audited statement of accounts would cause delay in 
receiving approval from councillors 
ii obtaining certification from the auditor 
25.0 20.0 55.0 
65.0 20.0 15.0 
iii publishing the statement of accounts 45.0 30.0 20.0 5.0 
Generally, some objections to the pre-audited 
statement of accounts signal problems with the local 
authority's 
financial management 10.0 25.0 65.0 
ii financial accounting system 10.0 25.0 65.0 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
A majority (55%) of respondents disagree that 'objections to the local authority's pre-audited 
statement of accounts would cause delay in receiving approval from councillors'. Many 
directors explained that the pre-audited statement of accounts goes through councillors prior 
to public inspection, and it rarely has to go back for councillors' approval again after the 
public inspection exercise. The councillors generally leave financial matters to the finance 
department. Another reason is that local authorities very seldom get an objection on their 
statement of accounts. So, not many directors have experienced this and some of them only 
expressed their views based on others' experiences. The mean of 2.50 reported in Table 81 
supported the disagreement to the statement. A director responded: 
"I don't think it would cause particular any delay with the councillors, because in this 
authority they are relatively relaxed, and they have confidence in the way that we run the 
financial system and if we say, "Actually we have got an objection, therefore what we need 
to do is to approve the account with the exceptional of this particular item", because we 
have got a history of managing the council's finance, well, they would say, "that is ok"." 
[DOF 1] 
This response, besides expressing disagreement that an objection would cause delay in 
obtaining councillors' approval also aligned to the shared responses that some inspection 
requested were of personal interest and many objections received were then proved 
baseless by the auditors after they conducted investigation. 
When auditors need to investigate the objection, certification will be delayed. This is proved 
by their responses to 'the objections to their pre-audited statement of accounts would cause 
delay in obtaining certification from the auditors', where a high majority (65%) agree to this 
statement, as shown in Table 80. The auditor has to spend time to conduct investigation into 
the matter raised before they could confirm if the objection is valid and the issue raised 
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would affect statement of accounts. The high mean (3.60) for this statement supported the 
agreement. A director responded: 
"We had one objec~ion. A quite ~o~al citizen who will challenge the whole council across 
the whole .range of Issues and this IS a~other veh~cle how you could challenge and disrupt 
the councIl. H~ argued. because of his clash With the Chief Executive, so he uses all 
channels to vOice out hiS clash. The auditor investigated and concluded 'no case stand'. 
Th~t co~t us up to £5000 to pay additional fees to the auditor for their extra time incurred 
to investigate." [DOF 8] 
Additional auditors time would add to their fees and causes delay in obtaining certification 
and publication of the accounts. Another director explained: 
"Sure, it .would c~use delay in certification and publishing the accounts. It would be 
beca~se If the auditors were not happy then they will not certify the accounts. If there was 
matenal problem, we wouldn't publish them either." [DOF 11] 
Table 81: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Impact of Objections 
Min-
Rank Statements Max Mean 
1 
2 
3 
Generally, objections to the local authority's pre-
audited statement of accounts would cause delay in 
Obtaining certification from auditor 
Publishing the statement of accounts 
Receiving approval from councillors 
Generally, some objections to the pre-audited 
statement of accounts signal problems with the 
Rank local authority's 
1 Financial management 
2 Financial accounting system 
Notes: N=20 
2-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.60 
3.32 
2.50 
2.15 
2.15 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.88 
1.06 
1.24 
1.14 
1.14 
The last statement in that category is that 'objections to the local authority's pre-audited 
statement of accounts would cause delay in publishing the statement of accounts'. Many of 
the respondents chose to agree (45%) agree and a smaller percentage (20%) disagreed. 
Mean of 3.32 indicated low agreement and mixed views. Respondents who had experienced 
an objection explained that local authorities can publish their statement of accounts without 
formal audit certification if their auditor is satisfied that the objections will not affect the true 
and fair view of the statement of accounts. Formal certification would be issued once the 
processes required to deal with that objection are completed. A rank order generated from 
the means (shown in the first column of Table 81) for all the statements related to the impact 
of objection to the pre-audited statement revealed that it impacted the most on the delay in 
certification of the accounts, followed with delaying the publication of the statement of 
accounts and the least on delay in obtaining approval from councillors. 
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The second category asked was that 'generally, some objections to the pre-audited 
statement of accounts signal problems with a local authority's: (i) financial management; 
and (ii) financial accounting system'. Both statements show that a large majority disagree, 
65 percent for both financial management and financial accounting system. A director 
responded: 
"That is not necessarily the case. People have objections but that doesn't mean we have 
problems. There is some objection to it. It is as simple as that." [DOF 1] 
This response also supports the notion that objections raised by local electors are motivated 
by personal interest. Another director explained: 
"It is more because of the local issue, not the management system. There are some cases 
but it tends to be politically motivated." [DOF 2] 
Not many directors commented on this issue perhaps because they have no doubt that the 
objection (if there is one) does not occur because of problems with the local authority's 
financial management and financial accounting system, nor would they rely on an objection 
to signal problems in their financial management or financial accounting system. However, 
some respondents suggested that objections do make the officials more careful with the 
financial management aspects of the local authority. Mean analYSis for both statements also 
confirms the disagreement. Objections from members of the local public do not seem to be 
of huge concern among the respondents and their local authorities. The objections may stem 
from a lack of understanding of accounting terminology and the less comprehensible nature 
of the statement of accounts among local citizens which also causes lack of interest in the 
annual accounts of their council. Local citizens may be content with having their council 
delivering all the basic services required from a local authority and they would not wish to 
bother themselves with other issues at the council which are not directly related to them. 
6.2.8 Public Interest Report 
Auditors have rights to issue a 'public interest report' to raise public concern about a financial 
and accounting issue at a local authority if they believe the public has to be informed about 
the matter. A 'public interest report' is normally issued when a matter is significant and not 
limited to the statement of accounts. Very few local authorities in the study region were 
issued a 'public interest report', but views related to the report needed exploration as it could 
relate to certification audit. Hence, seven statements were generated to probe views on the 
impact of having a 'public interest report' issued by their auditor. Table 82 and Table 83 
report the results. 
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Table 82: Impact of the Public Interest Report 
If a local authority were to be the subject of a 'Public Interest 
Report' issued by the auditor, that event would 
i. 
ii. 
alert the local authority to weaknesses in its financial 
accounting system 
alert the local authority to weaknesses in its financial 
management 
iii. damage the local authority's reputation 
iv. pose problems for the finance department 
v. 
pose problems for the local authority's senior 
management 
vi. pose problems for the elected councillors 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Agree disagree Disagree 
35.0 40.0 20.0 
60.0 30.0 5.0 
95.0 5.0 0.0 
55.0 35.0 5.0 
80.0 10.0 5.0 
65.0 25.0 5.0 
.. indicate that the local authority has a poor relationship 
VII. with its auditor 15.0 35.0 50.0 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
No 
view 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.0 
Mixed responses were received when respondents were probed 'if a local authority were to 
be the subject of a 'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that event would alert the 
local authority to weaknesses in its financial accounting system'. Table 82 revealed that that 
the most popular choice is to neither agree nor disagree (40%) followed by agree (35%). 
Respondents commented that that it had never happened to them but weaknesses in 
financial accounting systems could be one of the reasons for their auditor to come to a 
decision to inform the local public. A director said: 
"We were issued a 'public interest report'. But that was with our 'decision making 
framework' and nothing to do with financial system." [DOF 3] 
Mean of 3.26 reported in Table 83 confirmed the mixed views with inclination towards 
agreement, resulting in the highest standard deviation for questions in this category. 
From Table 82, a majority (65%) of respondents agree that 'if a local authority were to be the 
subject of a 'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that event would alert the local 
authority to weaknesses in its financial management'. Respondents explained that financial 
management is highly likely to be an issue which an auditor thinks that local public should be 
informed about as it would affect them. That however, would not necessarily affect the 
statement of accounts, and normally involved higher levels of management. Mean of 3.74 
reported in Table 83 supported the agreement. 
A high percentage (95%) of the respondents agree to 'if a local authority were to be the 
subject of a 'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that event would damage the local 
authority's reputation', as reported in Table 82. Nobody disagrees with the statement. A 
respondent from a local authority which had received a public interest report said that the 
report is considered a big issue at their local authority and the impact would last for many 
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years. A high mean (4.40) and relatively low standard deviation revealed in Table 81 indicate 
high agreement and unanimity of views. A director responded: 
"If you get a 'public interest report', it is a problem for you and the whole organisation in 
terms of reputation for a start, whether you like it or not." [DOF 17] 
Table 82 also shows that a majority agree 'if a local authority were to be the subject of a 
'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that event would: (iv) pose problems for 
finance department (55%); (v) pose problems for the local authority's senior management 
(80%); and (vi) pose problems for the elected councillors (65%). A higher majority is attained 
for 'problems for the local authority's senior management' as respondents said the public 
interest report normally concerns manipulating the systems or decision making which 
normally would occur at higher management levels. Majority agree to all the three 
statements indicating that a public interest report, besides damaging a local authority's 
reputation, is also a setback for the finance department, the local authority's senior 
management and the elected councillors. 
The last statement probed in this category is 'if a local authority were to be the subject of a 
'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that event would indicate that the local 
authority has a poor relationship with its auditor'. Table 82 reported a half of the respondents 
(50%) disagree to the statement and 35 percent neither agree nor disagree. A director said: 
"I do not think that it depends on relationship. That is about professional ethics. I will put 
my faith in the auditor." [DOF 2] 
Many respondents explained that auditors should have their own ethical stand and they 
disagree with the statement because public interest reports cover greater aspects than 
financial accounting alone. However, respondents agree that having good relationship with 
the auditor could help avoid a local authority from getting the report. Good relationships help 
in communication and discussion with their auditors, thus become a plus factor for local 
authorities. The auditor normally discusses the matter with local authority and advises the 
local authority to amend the accounts. In the event where it cannot be resolved, a public 
interest report is unavoidable. Nevertheless, respondents also explained that they support 
their auditor's issuing the 'public interest report' because it would alarm the local authority's 
high officials, so they would be more careful. 
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Table 83: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Impact of Public Interest Report 
If a local authority were to be the subject of a 
'Public Interest Report' issued by the auditor, that 
Rank event would: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Damage the local authority's reputation 
Pose problems for local authority's senior management 
Pose problems for elected councillors 
Alerted the local authority to weaknesses in its financial 
management 
Pose problems for the finance department 
Alerted the local authority to weaknesses in its financial 
accounting system 
Indicate that the local authority has poor relationship 
with its auditor 
Notes: N-20 
Min-Max 
3-5 
2-5 
2-5 
2-5 
2-5 
1-5 
1-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean 
4.40 
4.16 
4.00 
3.74 
3.68 
3.26 
2.45 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.60 
0.83 
0.94 
0.81 
0.82 
1.10 
1.00 
Mean analysis is used to rank all the seven statements on the impact of a 'public interest 
report'. The rank order for all the seven statements is reported in the first column of Table 
83. According to the respondents' view the highest impact goes to damaging the local 
authority's reputation, followed by posing problems to local authority's senior management 
and elected councillors. 
6.2.9 Use of Resources, Worthwhile Innovation? 
Respondents were asked whether 'the UoR assessment has been a worthwhile innovation'. 
Table 84 and Table 85 report the results. 
Table 84: Is the Use of Resources a Worthwhile Innovation? 
Frequency (%) 
Agree Neither Disagree 
Agree nor 
disagree 
The UoR assessment has been a worthwhile innovation 75.0 20.0 5.0 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
As revealed in Table 84, a majority (75%) of the respondents agree that the UoR 
assessment has been a worthwhile innovation. Despite reservations they have expressed on 
various aspects probed to them about the assessment regime, majority fail to disagree that 
UoR assessment has been a worthwhile innovation. It has helped to provide them with 
bases to focus (through the KLoEs) and that has contributed to the improvement shown in 
the AC's published scores. Many respondents also view the assessment regime as 'it is 
better to have something than no assessment at all' with the exception that there is room for 
improvement in the current assessment. 
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Table 85: Mean Analysis - Is the Use of Resources a Worthwhile Innovation? 
Min-Max Mean 
The UoR assessment has been a worthwhile innovation 2-5 
Notes: N 20 
T~e mean is a~er~ge on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.80 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.70 
Table 85 reports a mean of 3.80 for the statement supporting the majority agreement, and 
low standard deviation indicating unanimity. Min-Max column in Table 85 shows that none of 
the respondent marked' 1 =strongly disagree'. A respondent said: 
"Definitely, we gained lots and lots of improvement and discipline." [DOF 2] 
And the agreement is supported by another respondent: 
"It generally improved standards of professional practice and also it has got 'financial 
management' more into corporate agenda for local authorities."[DOF 6] 
Another director who agrees that UoR is a worthwhile innovation explained: 
"I think there are a number of improvements need to be made, to be more flexible. It has 
been worthwhile innovation, in that it has force local authorities to concentrate in that 
issues and they are not necessarily public faces thing, a lot of the things are internal to the 
organisation, governance and the Iike."[DOF 1] 
The response indicates their desire that UoR be more flexible and incorporates local issues 
into the assessment indicators. The view is supported by another director who said: 
"It helps some areas but hinders some others."[DOF 15] 
Many directors share the view above. Discussion throughout this chapter also confirms the 
notion that some aspects were improved but dissuade other aspects. An explanation from 
another director added to the belief: 
"The UoR does promote improvement but it is seen as a compliance process rather than 
offering any true fundamental benefit to the Council. An example, we had an Audit 
Committee in operation, but had not formally adopted a set of TOR (Terms of Reference). 
We failed on this, where other council had their TOR in place, but had not physically met 
as an Audit Committee, got the tick from their auditor." [DOF 5] 
This view points to doubts in terms of rigidity of the assessment which depends on 
documentation rather than actual performance. Another director added: 
"Although the CPA, Use of Resources assessment has encouraged local authorities to 
improve the quality of their financial management, it still remains a relatively subjective 
judgement. As such, it is neither understood nor trusted by the majority of residents." 
[DOF 19] 
Many respondents extend their concern over the value of the assessment regime; 
subjectivity in auditors' judgment had made the assessment less convincing to the 
respondents as a proper performance measures, and the assessment regime has been 
unable to impress the local public. This is consistent with the argument presented by Kelly 
(2003) that the current role of AC to improve the standards and quality of services provided 
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by local authorities presents several significant challenges to local authorities , central 
government and the AC itself. 
6.3 What factors contribute to the variations In local 
authorities' performance? 
Analysis and Discussion 
.- ' -'- ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' -'- ' - ' - ' -
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How do local authorities perform on certification 
audit and Use of Resources assessment? 
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How do auditees view 
the external audit 
process and the 
performance 
assessment? 
This section discusses views on the factors contribute to the variations in local authorities' 
performance, which includes the assessment rules of key lines of enquiries , requirement for 
continuous improvement, influence on the relationship with auditors , self assessment, 
consultation , appeal , resources , effort and focus. 
6.3.1 Key Lines of Enquiries 
The AC provided local authorities with detailed 'key lines of enquiries ' (KLoEs) for the annual 
external auditors' assessment for UoR. The KLoEs serve as guidance for local authorities to 
find the area and factors they should work out. Thus, five statements were generated to call 
for responses from respondents, the directors or head of finance. Table 86 and Table 87 
present frequency and mean analysis for responses. 
Table 86: Key Lines of Enquiries 
The assessment indicators of Key Lines of Enquiry (KLoE) 
have 
provided my local authority with a clear picture of what is 
I. expected of them by local citizens 
provided my local authority with a clear picture of what is 
ii. expected of them by central government 
III. increased the workload of my local authority 
reduced my local authority's freedom in deciding what is 
iv. best for local citizens 
help my local authority to focus on what should be 
v. improved in order to obtain better scores 
Notes N=20 
Source: Interview Data , 2008 
Agree 
10.0 
70.0 
90.0 
60 .0 
100 
Frequency (%) 
Neither Agree 
nor disagree Disagree 
20 .0 70 .0 
10.0 20 .0 
0.0 10.0 
5.0 35.0 
0.0 0.0 
228 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION II: AUDITEES VIEWS 
The first two statements explore their views on whose expectation is reflected in the KLoEs. 
A majority (70%) expressed a view that KLoEs reflected the central government expectation 
and not the local citizens (70%). A director said: 
"If you .",!ere to wai~ at the streets of our local authority and survey what is important to 
local citizens, the Issues covered by UoR would barely get a mention if at all. It is 
necessary to listen to the public and our council put an awful lot of money into achieving 
that. When we do that, it is not the UoR issue that come out" [DOF 6] 
Another director supported: 
And: 
And: 
"If that provided clear picture from local citizen, local citizen would have designed them. 
They don't even know what the UoR are. What gives you a clear picture is the service that 
you do; where you ask people what they think of services and local issues and the like. It 
(the KLoE) is the expectation of central government." [DOF 1] 
"It is not the language of local citizens, they weren't consulted" [DOF 2] 
"Reflected what they (local citizens) want? The Commission has not done any 
consultation with the local public in terms of what they want." [DOF 5] 
Another director concluded after his long explanation: 
"I suppose there is different between what the local citizen wants and the central 
government ask us to do. There are a lot of local things which are not high on national 
priority, there's a lot of national priority which are not high on the local lists." [DOF 15] 
Table 87 shows in the Min-Max column that respondents marked 'strongly disagree' when 
asked for whether 'KLoE provided my local authority with a clear picture of what is expected 
of them by local citizens', compared to '... what is expected of them by the central 
government' which a majority of respondents agree. This indicates their strong disagreement 
to the first statement. A very low mean (2.15) shown in Table 87 for the first statement also 
evidenced respondents' disagreement. The directors suggest they should listen more to the 
local citizens and many of the KLoEs do not address local citizen's needs. They also claimed 
that they usually focus more on indicators which are related to their services to local citizens. 
Evidence of consultation the local authorities had with local citizens is obvious from their 
responses: 
"With our consultation, they want lower tax, a happy council that empty their bins, keep 
their streets free of litter rather than those behind the scene like finances" [DOF 15] 
However, some directors did express the difficulty of getting views from local citizens: 
"I don't think the citizens are bothered about UoR. I don't think they understand, or are 
aware of it. I don't think it benefited them." [DOF 5] 
And another director mentioned: 
"Listen to local citizens? Yes, if they can be bothered to talk to us '" It is unanswered or a 
conundrum. You can get people to talk on local issue that affect them. You never are 
going to get people interested in the final accounts; it is not a topic that interests people." 
[DOF 7] 
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It has been difficult to engage local citizens in discussion on UoR because it does not directly 
reflect their interests. As mentioned in the quote above, local citizens would be willing to talk 
about issues that affect them. And majority respondents claimed that local citizens would 
rather local authorities have their streets' cleaned and garbage emptied than publishing 
hundreds of pages of annual accounts (reflected in quote from OOF 15 and OOF 7 above). 
The third statement asked was that 'the assessment indicators of KLoE have increased the 
workload of my local authority'. As evidenced in Tables 86 and 87, a large majority (90%) 
agree that it does, and a mean of 4.20 indicates strong agreement, supported by a relatively 
low standard deviation (0.89) which shows unity in views. A director has said: 
And: 
"All these boxes to tick, KLoEs which we didn't have before, we have to satisfy them. To 
satisfy them, we actually have to do more work than we actually did previously." [DOF 11] 
Yes, there's area where we never would do (that) we have to now because of the 
requirement. We want to be a '3', we don't want to hold the council back, and therefore we 
have to achieve a better score and work harder." [DOF 9] 
But the respondents do not view the extra work requires of them from the assessment 
negatively: 
And: 
"Yes, but is not a bad thing, it does produce work but in many ways it is work that has 
beneficial outcomes in many ways. Undoubtedly we have better processes because of 
some challenges in the UoR. But it has taken time to deal with." [DOF 7] 
"Some things are useful, helped in terms of structuring how finance blends with the rest of 
the organisation and to appreciate the work of finance, etc" [DOF 8] 
Respondents view the assessment has made them efficient in some of their functions but 
several have suggested that this led to a sacrifice of front line services, as one director has 
said: 
It increases our workload, because we have to find resources for this and we can't 
increase our resources because we are kept within certain amount. Basically what it does 
is just restrict the amount of resources we put onto front line services." [DOF 1] 
So, the increased workload is may be good for their improvement but affects front-line 
services. In line with increasing workload and having to satisfy the indicators in KLoE, a 
statement was created to encourage discussion as to whether the indicators have reduced 
local authority's freedom in deciding what is best for local citizens. The responses received, 
as reported in Table 86, majority (60%) agree that it does. A director responded: 
It is, very much it is a set of rules coming down from the central government and 
its body, saying you must do x, y and z." [OOF 13] 
The response above suggests the pressure from the central government that local 
authorities have to comply which is to the quote from OOF 9 above. Another director 
complained about the requirement to produce an extensive annual report which that director 
believed to be unnecessary for the public sector and alien to the local citizen: 
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"The fact that our annual accounts is getting thicker and thicker is beyond comprehension. 
We are not here to produce 200-250 pages of accounts where members of the public 
neither concern nor understand them" [DOF 7] 
Some responses suggest that they were forced into doing what they believed to be 
unnecessary but would be punished if they did not: 
"Sometimes we have to follow what the Commission sees as best practice rather than 
what the local citizens want. Once we were straying more from UoR into a more authority-
wide position and we had a poor score couple of years ago" [DOF 14] 
Although many directors agree that their freedom to decide what is best for their local 
authorities has been limited by the KLoE, a director who has a different view suggested that 
they should be taking the assessment and KLoEs as opportunities to show their own view of 
excellent and should not feel restricted. The view is not shared by many, although some did 
say that they give up seeking to improve their scores when the indicators get too 
unreasonable for them to follow. Many local authorities are content at level '3' for they 
believe achieving a '4' to be meaningless to local citizens and would require resources 
beyond their financial capacity. They prefer not to sacrifice front-line services for higher 
scores. The issue then brought us to the last statement on their strategy, whether 'the 
assessment indicators of KLoE have helped my local authority to focus on what should be 
improved in order to obtain better scores'. A hundred percent of the respondents agree to 
this statement. One of them said: 
"Yes, definitely, it directs us to areas where we have to improve, thus giving us opportunity 
for better scores with the next assessment" [DOF 12] 
And they explained that the indicators are helping them to improve and they avoid targeting 
better scores only without making improvement from the core. However, they admit some 
elements of target and gaming, for example: 
"My focus is not about better score, that is great, that is the measure, but there's ~ots of 
other measure from the citizen rather than the Commission's that I am more passionate 
about" [DOF 2] 
The KLoEs informed them of areas to target while the evidence detailed what they should 
do. The last statement attains the highest mean, 4.35, and lowest standard deviation, 0.49, 
as shown in Table 87. 
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Table 87: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Key Lines of Enquiry 
The assessment indicators of Key Lines of 
Rank Enquiry (KloE) have: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Helped my local authority to focus on what should be 
improved in order to obtain better scores 
Increased the workload of my local authority 
Provided my local authority with a clear picture of 
what is expected of them by central government 
Reduced my local authority's freedom in deciding 
what is best for local citizens 
Provided my local authority with a clear picture of 
what is expected of them by local citizens 
Notes: N-20 
Min-Max 
4-5 
2-5 
2-5 
2-5 
1-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean 
4.35 
4.20 
3.60 
3.40 
2.15 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.49 
0.89 
0.94 
1.17 
0.93 
As these statements are related to KLoEs, a rank order is generated from the mean analysis 
to confirm which aspects are considered to be the most helped by having the KLoEs and 
otherwise. The report in Table 87 evidenced that KLoEs contributed most in assisting local 
authorities to focus on what should be improved to obtain better scores, but increased the 
workload of their organisation. The KLoEs also 'provided a clear picture of central 
government' expectation and thus 'reduced local authority's freedom in deciding what is best 
for local citizens', and the respondents view the KLoEs as not providing a clear picture of 
local citizen's expectation. 
6.3.2 Other Issues Related to Indicators and Assessment Rules 
Besides issues directly related to KLoEs, there are other issues which arise from the 
indicators and assessment rules. Thus, opinions were sought on (i) the evolution of the 
indicators; (ii) the impact of the assessment on the authority's relationship with external 
auditors; (iii) the extension of the self assessment to other UoR themes; (iv) the fairness of 
the rules; and (v) the fairness of the auditor's interpretation of the rules. Table 88 and Table 
89 report analyses of responses to the statements. 
Table 88: Issues related to the Performance Indicators 
Statements 
A local authority's score will drop if it does not 
continuously improve its performance on the indicators 
The assessment has helped improve my local authority's 
relationship with the external auditor 
The Self Assessment currently used for the Value for 
Money (VFM) theme should be introduced for other UoR 
themes 
The assessment rules for UoR are fair 
Notes: N=20; Source 
Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
80.0 
30.0 
50.0 
45.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
disagree Disagree No view 
5.0 15.0 
50.0 20.0 
25.0 20.0 5.0 
25.0 30.0 
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As revealed in Table 88, the majority (80%) agree that their scores will drop if they do not 
continuously improve their performance on the indicators. A director responded: 
"Yes, because the bar is being raised all the time." [DOF 1] 
This indicates that they cannot be content with their level of achievement in previous 
assessments even if they want to maintain the same score. This is because the AC's UoR 
indicators keep moving to higher requirements each year. Another director responded: 
"I think the criteria are getting harder to meet year after year. Some of the criteria that 
previously were level 4 are now in level 3. Some of them are now in bold type which 
means if you fail that one criterion you can't get a level 3 or Whatever." [DOF 16] 
Respondents agreed with the notion of continuous improvement but they expressed concern 
that the evolution was made too soon. 
"It is good to keep changing the indicators so we are encouraged to improve continuously, 
but changing the indicators too soon has pushed us towards getting the indicators done 
without understanding it. We can't avoid target and gaming here, because it affects our 
reputation if scores drop." [DOF 17] 
When asked if the indicators were made too difficult for them to achieve, a director said: 
"Some of them are achievable; others would only be achievable with vast increases in 
expenditure. For example ... we have taken a view that the cost of doing either of those 
would outweigh the benefit that we would get from that. That's not the route that we are 
going down despite the Commission pushing us heavily down that. So, generally we 
thought about what the public wants." [DOF 18] 
Respondents agree that some scores are achievable which they try to reach, while others 
that are not will be weighed accordingly to their achievability and main objectives. Mean 
analysis for the statement reported in Table 89 is 3.80, indicating strong agreement to the 
statement, supported by low standard deviation showing unanimity. 
Table 89: Mean AnalysiS - Issues related to the Performance Indicators 
Statements 
A local authority's score will drop if it does not continuously improve its 
performance on the indicators 
The assessment has helped improve my local authority's relationship 
with the external auditor 
The Self Assessment currently used for the Value for Money (VFM) 
theme should be introduced for other UoR themes 
The assessment rules for UoR are fair 
Notes: N=20 
Min-Max 
2-5 
1-4 
1-5 
2-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean 
3.80 
3.05 
3.37 
3.15 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.89 
0.83 
1.07 
0.88 
Respondents were asked whether the assessment has helped to improve their relationship 
with the external auditor. This statement fetched a mixed response, 50 percent marked 
neither agree nor disagree. Mean of 3.05 confirms the mixed in views. A director said: 
"No, it doesn't matter. My relationship with my auditor is that I want to be neutral with him. 
I am not going to chat him up, neither would I antagonise him. UoR for me doesn't change 
it." [DOF 7] 
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This view was supported by another director: 
"Th.e a.ssessment di~ not. con.tribute to a good relationship with auditors. We normally 
mamtam good relationship with them. It does make the relationship bitter if a local 
authority disagrees on certain issues." [DOF 17] 
Another director responded: 
"Last year because our score went down, there was deterioration in our relationship. We 
try hard to repair our scores, at this time last year there was definite damage to that 
relationship". [DOF 16] 
The third statement was whether the self assessment currently done for VFM should be 
introduced to other themes. Half the respondents agreed. A mean of 3.37 indicates slightly 
higher agreement compared to the second statement in Table 89. Respondents said the self 
assessment provided them with an opportunity to present and justify their achievement 
which they agreed at times helps them to attain better scores than without presenting the self 
assessment report. Many respondents said that they have been doing a self-assessment for 
the other themes as well although it is not required because it allows them to update their 
performance and prepare necessary documentations for external auditors. However, a few 
local authorities cannot afford to do the self assessment because of their limited resources in 
terms of staffing to pullout all the evidence to do self assessment. A director responded: 
"We agreed with our auditor that each year we would do self assessment for all themes. 
That was something I suggested in 2002. It is the arrangement that suits both ourselves in 
that we make sure by doing that the auditors consider the full body of evidence and also it 
saves the auditors' time in gathering that evidence. They asked us to do the self-
assessment first and then they critically evaluate that self-assessment and evidence. It 
would reduce audit fees indirectly". [DOF 6] 
It is interesting in the quote above, their view that audit fees could be reduced if they do self-
assessment because it lessened the audit time from the auditor's side. Another director also 
noted that it helps them in terms of improvement planning for their local authority: 
"We did self-assessment not only for the UoR but so that we can understand where our 
strengths and weaknesses are and we can start doing something about the area where 
we may not be meeting the criteria now but aimed for the future. It is for learning and 
improvement." [DOF 16] 
Respondents were also asked their views as to whether 'the assessment rules for UoR are 
fair'. Only 45 percent agreed with this statement and a mean of 3.15, indicating more of 
mixed views, supported by a relatively low standard deviation of 0.88. A director said: 
"I think the assessment process needs to be done, I personally don't feel we have been 
hard done by because to me there is ample opportunity to get your point across to the 
auditor and if you have done your job properly, there's nothing to worry about" [DOF 7] 
Many directors shared a similar view: 
"It is like an exam question. You have got the question, answer them. How can that not be 
fair, we all got the same questions? The fact that someone got a 3 and you've got 2, to 
me, it is: he is better than you at it." [DOF 17] 
However, they agree that some of the indicators are difficult to understand, which could 
create disputes in interpretation. A director responded: 
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"Some questions are literal, for example, about the audit committee; and some are 
interpreted differently by the auditors." [DOF 5] 
Another director responded: 
"There ought to be better recognition of the council's position in the indicators." [DOF 1] 
Generally, respondents suggested that local factors are also influencing an authority's 
scores, and the AC should consider these factors in their assessment indicators and the 
auditors should be made aware of. 
6.3.3 Consultations 
The AC issues consultation papers when they look towards changing indicator and 
assessment rules. Therefore, statements with regard to consultations were generated. Table 
90 and Table 91 report frequency and mean analysis for those statements. 
Table 90: Consultations 
Statements 
The Audit Commission consulted local authorities in an 
appropriate way before the indicators and assessment 
rules were determined 
The consultation opportunity is worthwhile 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
70.0 
60.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
disagree Disagree 
5.0 25.0 
15.0 25.0 
Table 90 reports that a majority agree to both statements. A director responded: 
No view 
"They did consult, the consultation methodology was sound but it was worthless. You 
could look out the original consultation and the eventual output from it. They were similar, 
very few changes were made. They removed one category but added questions from that 
category in another category which made us gain nothing." [DOF 8] 
Generally the respondents agreed with the process of consultation, but doubted the value of 
being consulted or responding to the consultation. Some viewed the consultation as not 
worthwhile as they would rather focus on meeting the indicators for assessment. However, 
some respondents (majority of those who marked agree) suggest that it is more worthwhile 
responding to the consultation for Comprehensive Area Assessment (CM) because they felt 
their views were listened to more, compared to consultation for the CPA regime. Thus, this 
indicates that the consultation was not as the directors expected with CPA. They also agree 
that if, local authorities join up and submit their views together, it is more likely that the views 
are entertained. A director said: 
"I marked agree because of our input on fees where we lobbied hard and made a U-turn 
on our fees ... I think if you get enough people to respond on the consultation, you actually 
can turn their view where they actually don't have their set view. If they have set their 
view, I don't think any amount of lobbying will actually address the issue they want to go 
for". [DOF 11] 
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Another director supported the notion: 
"The consultation responses very much depend on how hard-hitting the new proposals 
are. If the new criteria were critical, it would invite immense responses and thus the 
Commission would have to consider." [DOF 5] 
Table 91: Mean Analysis - Consultations 
Statements Min-Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
The Audit Commission consulted local authorities in an appropriate 
way before the indicators and assessment rules were determined 
The consultation opportunity is worthwhile 
Notes: N-20 
2-5 
2-5 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.50 0.95 
3.40 0.94 
Mean analysis for both statements, reported in Table 91 also indicates that responses 
inclined towards agreeing, with means of 3.50 and 3.40. 
6.3.4 Appeal 
The AC allows local authorities to appeal after they have published the final results of 
assessment. Analysis of published documents shows that very few local authorities 
throughout England appeal. Views from the directors were sought to understand the 
situation. Not many local authorities in Yorkshire and The Humber appealed against their 
scores. Responses to statements related to appeal were analysed and reported in Table 92 
and Table 93 that follows. 
Table 92: Appeal 
Frequency (%) 
Agree Neither Disagree No 
Agree view 
nor 
Statements disagree 
Making use of the appeal process 
i. would increase the chances of obtaining improved 10.0 40.0 50.0 
scores 
ii. would damage our relationship with auditors 35.0 20.0 45.0 
iii. would invite more news coverage 35.0 30.0 35.0 
iv. would increase costs 60.0 5.0 35.0 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Half of the respondents disagree that appeal would stand better chance for improved scores. 
However, many have responded: 
"Never had to use it, never had a problem" [DOF 7] 
"Never appeal" [DOF 1] 
"I have not, but I have known some others that have" [DOF 2] 
According to the respondents, they never appeal because they do not believe that the 
chances of successful appeal are high: 
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"I don't believe in it, except that it will give you extra work. I would rather work for the next 
assessment. " [DOF 16] 
The response is supported by another director who said: 
"We looked at appealing last year when we got a 2 again when we believe we should be a 
3, but we stepped back. We didn't think it would be successful." [DOF 5] 
Mean analysis in Table 93 also reveals a mean of 2.60, indicating disagreement. A director 
explained: 
"If you are an authority that you think you have been genuinely underscored, fine. But my 
view is that if we were to have one, it would damage our relationship with the auditor, 
attract news coverage and incur costs." [DOF 7] 
As for damaging relationship with their auditors, many respondents marked disagree (45%). 
A mean of 2.85 indicating inclination towards mixed views. A director said: 
"I believe the auditors are professional, and that is a chance given to you." [DOF 12] 
However, many agreed that they should consult their auditor before they were scored, for 
example: 
"If you have got a constructive, on-going dialogue with your auditor, it will be very obvious 
what score will be given to you. So you should do something about it, or through the 
dialogue process you convince the auditor what they didn't get right." [DOF 17] 
It appeared that that consultation and active dialogue with the auditors could help to clarify 
the local authority's position with the auditor and avoid being scored unreasonably. This 
supported the respondents' disagreement to the chances from the appeal process and the 
low number of local authorities that attempted to appeal. 
Table 93: Mean Analysis - Appeal 
Statements Min-Max 
Making use of the appeal process 
i. would increase the chances of obtaining improved scores 1-5 
ii. would damage our relationship with auditors 1-4 
iii. would invite more news coverage 1-4 
iv. would increase costs 1-4 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Standard 
Means Deviation 
2.60 0.88 
2.85 0.99 
2.90 1.02 
3.20 1.06 
As reported in Table 93, respondents view that an attempt to appeal would increase cost and 
do not stand much chance of obtaining improved scores. 
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6.3.5 Resources 
Dealing with the assessment requires resources to provide reports, so respondents were 
asked about whether availability of resources influenced local authorities' scores. Table 94 
reports the frequency analysis for responses on this statement. 
Table 94: Resources 
Frequency (%) 
Agree Neither Disagree No 
Agree view 
nor 
Statements disagree 
Local authorities with more resources are likely to achieve 
better scores 65.0 15.0 20.0 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
A majority (65%) agreed that having extra resources would help especially in terms of staff to 
provide enough documentation and evidence for their auditors. A director said: 
"Yes, undoubtedly; it is not an absolute correlation, but if you got more resources, if I had 
16 accountants, I would really struggle with it. If I got 30, I would have done not too bad, if 
I had 47, I would score a 6, because you have time to do stuff' [DOF 7] 
Auditors normally seek evidence through documentation, thus having a function that works 
without documentation will not be counted in the assessment, causing local authorities to be 
scored down. In contrast, local authorities having full documentation for a function may be 
marked up by their auditors, according to the following director: 
"If I have someone to dedicate to UoR, I can guarantee better scores. It depends on how 
you put the stories to them. The auditors do not find the stories; they depend on us, local 
authorities, to tell them the stories." [DOF 5] 
Consequently, local authorities may instead concentrate on having the documentation ready. 
Another director who does not share the majority view said: 
"For me it comes down to leadership, political and officer. You could give me all the 
resources I need. It doesn't make our job easy if we are not focused on outcome and 
discipline and I have seen that too many times." [DOF 2] 
The importance of having good leadership and qualified staff were shared by all 
respondents. Many directors mentioned about their efforts to attract staff involvement, 
participation, and making them feel valued and promoted their staff when necessary to avoid 
job frustration. These are necessary because staff morale dropped when their local authority 
was unable to get better scores and were scrutinised by the external auditors. Respondents 
also agreed that having the assessment also contributes to motivation for their staff because 
they felt their efforts valued, especially when they obtained good scores. 
The AC's manager interviewed prior to this fieldwork emphasised that the UoR assessment 
will not advantage the highly resourced local authorities. Thus, it is not surprising to see that 
some small local authorities with minimum staff could get good scores and some larger local 
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authorities with larger directorates unable to obtain good scores. One of the director 
responded: 
"Our neighbouring authority gets far more resources, they are the highest spending authority, 
but they have not found it as easy as us to achieve good UoR." [DOF 6] 
However, in view of the necessary documentation required for the assessment, a reasonable 
number of staff is necessary. Majority of the respondents agree that resources alone would 
not help to score better, but they recognized the needs for staffing to deal with the 
assessment is necessary because it does increase their workload. A director suggested that, 
they could do much better if they could afford to have an officer dedicated to the 
assessment. Many small authorities with one or two accounting staff are struggling with the 
assessment and get really frustrated. This is expressed by many directors, to quote one: 
"We just don't have enough people to work on it. We are struggling with our annual 
accounts and difficulty in getting permanent, qualified staff." [DOF 13] 
And to strengthen the argument, another director said: 
"I knew a district council which has 1.5 accountants. That is it. They may have accounting 
issues, it is not difficult but it is impossible for them." [DOF 7] 
Some respondents from the district councils admit that have very limited accounting staff to 
support their finance function, causing them difficulties when dealing with the assessments. 
This is related to another issue related to the district councils, discussed in Section 6.3.6 
which revealed views that resources are the main factor causing the district councils to score 
lower than the single tier and county councils. Respondents from other than the district 
councils have also suggested similar concern, for example: 
"I sympathise with the district councils, they just don't have a resource base, and they 
don't have enough people. We just don't have enough people to work on it. We are 
struggling with our annual accounts and difficulty in getting permanent, qualified staff." 
[DOF 13] 
Table 95: Mean Analysis - Resources 
Statements Min-Max Means Standard Deviation 
Local authorities with more resources are likely to achieve better scores 2-5 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.75 1.12 
A mean of 3.75 is reported in Table 93 indicating agreement that optimum resources in 
terms of staffing are important to accomplish the requirements in the assessments, but 
having more staff does not guarantee a better achievement without good leadership, 
commitment and motivation. Therefore organisational human resources development 
strategies at authority wide level designed to identify and address development needs is 
necessary (Harris, 2003). 
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6.3.6 Effort and Focus 
Statements in this section were generated to encourage discussion about attempts by local 
authorities in dealing with the assessment activities. The objective is to seek their views on 
the effort and focus they consign. Hence, issues about target, emphasis, focus, easier-
harder indicators and learning will be covered. Table 96 and Table 97 report the frequency 
and mean analysis for the statements asked. 
Table 96: Effort and Focus 
Statements 
The scores allocated for each assessment have helped my 
local authority target areas for improvement 
My local authority puts more effort and focuses on the areas 
where performance is worse 
Focusing on easier indicators will improve scores more than 
focusing on the worst performance areas 
The UoR scores were declined for 2005 when 'the harder test' 
was first introduced because local authorities were not familiar 
with the new system 
District Councils are scoring lower than the Single Tier and 
County Councils because of the novelty to them of the 
assessment system 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
90.0 
80.0 
40.0 
40.0 
10.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither Disagree No 
Agree view 
nor 
disagree 
10.0 0.0 
20.0 0.0 
20.0 40.0 
20.0 30.0 10.0 
20.0 55.0 15.0 
A strong majority is reported in Table 96 for ~the scores allocated for each assessment have 
helped my local authority target areas for improvement' (90%) and 'my local authority puts 
more effort and focuses on the areas where performance is worse' (80%). It is interesting to 
note that none of the directors disagree with the two statements and only a small percentage 
(10%; 20%) marked neither agree nor disagree. The two statements are related to each 
other, thus the patterns of response appear similar. Both statements also generated high 
means: 3.95, shown in Table 97, indicating strong agreement and low standard deviations 
(0.39; 0.60), indicating similar views. A director responded: 
"In some of the areas we would say, 'sorry we don't agree with the Commission'. In most 
areas we sort of agree with their assessment that we need to improve ... It certainly helps 
our finance function because the UoR score is critical for a local authority's reputation. I 
think it helps us as a finance function to convince our corporate management team that 
these areas need urgent attention." [DOF 6] 
Respondents agree that the scores helped them to identify areas they need to improve and 
concentrate more on enhancing the functions to ensure better scores in the next 
assessment. The directors also expressed views that the scores have helped them to 
convince senior management that they need to focus on certain functions. Moreover, some 
directors use the scores as motivation for their staff that 'our jobs are vital to the 
organisation'. As a director mentioned: 
"I work hard to attain motivation of my staff, where they were very frustrated with the 
complaints they had after being scored low. I have to tell them our job is important for the 
organisation. It is evidenced by having the indicators which pointed directly towards our 
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~unction. That helps and I found that my staff are now getting the confidence and strive for 
Improvement." [DOF 8] 
Many respondents also supported the importance of emphasising on areas that they are not 
performing well so that they could avoid poor scores in the future, as their reputation 
depends on performance: 
"We work as hard as we could to improve and maintain good scores because local 
authority and CEO reputation depends on good score" [DOF 16] , 
Table 97: Mean Analysis - Effort and Focus 
Min-Max Means Standard 
Statements Deviation 
The scores allocated for each assessment have helped my local 
authority target areas for improvement 
My local authority puts more effort and focuses on the areas where 
performance is worse 
Focusing on easier indicators will improve scores more than 
focusing on the worst performance areas 
The UoR scores were declined for 2005 when 'the harder test' was 
first introduced because local authorities were not familiar with the 
new system 
District Councils are scoring lower than the Single Tier and County 
Councils because of the novelty to them of the assessment system 
Notes: N-20 
3-5 
3-5 
2-5 
1-4 
1-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1(='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
3.95 0.39 
3.95 0.60 
3.05 1.00 
3.06 1.00 
2.24 0.97 
Consequently, the directors were asked if 'focusing on easier indicators will improve scores 
more than focusing on the worst performance areas'. This statement resulted in mixed 
responses; 40 percent agree and the same percentage disagrees. The mean reported in 
Table 97 is 3.05 confirms the mixed views. A director responded: 
"They aren't any really easier indicators ... especially when you reached higher levels on 
the scale." [DOF 6] 
The view is supported by many; they agree that they could focus less on some indicators 
and emphasis more on others, as a director said: 
"Probably the one we could put in less effort is financial standing; that is because our 
finances are generally sound. Some local authorities get to a bad position, taking several 
years for them to repair that damage and build up financial standing." [DOF 12] 
Some directors appear to use the options positively, especially when reaching higher levels 
on the scale: 
"Yes, I am not talking about areas that are particularly failing. When you get to the point 
where you are scoring 3s and you want to get to 4s then that is what you do. That is part 
of the game playing in this that you will look for areas where you can say that actually we 
can raise our score by doing this and this is easy. So there is a tendency to do that. n [DOF 
1] 
Therefore, although there are no easy indicators, some could be easier than others on which 
they can work with their available resources, so it could push their scores further up the 
scale. However, they agree that worst performance areas also need attention, especially if at 
the lower level of the scale it would cause them dropping their score and damaging their 
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reputation. At times, the score they attain is lower only because of a lack of documentation 
, 
and it may not be too difficult for them to repair this before the next assessment. 
A statement was asked on 'the UoR scores were declined for 2005 when 'the harder test' 
was first introduced because local authorities were not familiar with the new system'. This 
statement was generated because the published scores show a systematic decline following 
the new assessment regime and then a steady increase the following year with that regime. 
The responses as shown in Table 96 evidenced 40 percent agreement, with a mean of 3.06 
reported in Table 97 confirming the inclination towards agreement. From the interviews, 
many respondents seemed not to realize that their performance is being lowered down by 
the new regime. This is because the new CPA-the harder test started in 2005 have restarted 
the UoR scores at a lower level, for a" local authorities throughout England. Therefore, the 
effect does not influence their reputation. A director responded by saying: 
"We didn't notice that. Some local authorities were slower than others to get to grip with 
what was required."[DOF 6] 
And another director explained the insignificance of that decline to them: 
"The things are just watered down. We will see that again in 2009, because the 
government cannot afford to have a number of councils ranked as excellent or 4 stars or 
whatever. What tends to happen with the auditors is they make the test too hard and 
people can't meet the higher standards and then someone says: '0 dear, we have got 
problem here' and things are just watered down to make sure people actually hit the right 
target." [DOF 11] 
The last statement asked in this category is whether the directors think that 'the district 
councils are scoring lower than the single tier and county councils because of the novelty to 
them of the assessment system'. This statement was created because the published scores 
show that district councils generally scored lower than the single tier and county councils. 
This statement shows a response of 55 percent disagreeing as reported in Table 96. A low 
mean reported in Table 97 for this statement, 2.24, verified the disagreement. Respondents 
suggested that being new to the assessment was not the reason but the main issue is the 
lack of resources to enable them to respond to the requirements, for example: 
"It is about resources." [DOF 1] 
Another director supported this view: 
"They don't have enough resources and staff to commit with the assessment regime. I 
think to expect the District Councils to have the same standards of universal governance 
that a large authority has got is unrealistic. It is like a local chemist compared against 
Boots, it is not a fair comparison. I think they are in difficulties." [DOF 7] 
Many directors share the views above and suggested that the indicators should have a 
better recognition of the position the district councils are in and the local factors of some 
councils should be incorporated in the assessment so it would best reflect their position and 
situation (Ke"y, 2003). The issue with district councils is in alignment with the findings from 
previous section on resources which concluded that having reasonable resources to commit 
with the assessment regime is important to achieving good scores. 
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6.4 How do the auditees view the external audit process and 
performance assessment? 
Analysis and Discussion 
Research Question 2 
How do local authorities perform on certification 
audit and Use of Resources assessment? 
, ' _ . _. _._ . _. _ . . _._._._._ .-
. I 
, . _._ . - . _ . _ . - _._._ ._.- ._.-
I Research Question 3 . 
Do the auditees view 
published scores as 
reflecting their local 
authority's 
performance? 
Research Question 4 
What factors contribute 
to the variations in 
local authorities' 
performance? 
I 
CHAPTER 5 
r ' - ' - ' - ' -'- ' - ' - ' - ' _ ' _ ' _ ' _ ' _ 
. I 
I Research Question 5 
How do auditees view 
the external audit 
process and the 
performance 
assessment? 
-------------------------------- -.-..---------------------------~ --...-CHAPTER 6 
The last research question to achieve the main aim of this study is 'how do the auditees view 
the external audit process and performance assessment' . This section discusses statements 
and responses which are directly related to the auditees' views on the process and 
assessments. Their views were sought on the chances to improve on the indicators' scales 
(6.4.1), the risk of decline on the indicators' scales (6.4.2) , the order of difficulty for the UoR 
themes (6.4.3) , their views on the central government and the AC (6.4.4) , their views on the 
auditors (6.4.5), and finally their views on how the CPA should be changed (6.4.6). 
Discussion of views on the central government and the AC is combined but views on the 
auditors is separated under its own section because auditors deal directly with local 
authorities ' assessment and exercise judgement, hence more issues arise regarding them . 
6.4.1 Chances to Improve on the Indicators' Scale 
The directors were asked to rank the chances to improve on the UoR scales from '1' which is 
the lowest to '4', the highest. Their responses , in Table 98 show a clear pattern . 
Table 98: Improvement on the Scale Used for the UoR Themes' Performance 
Indicators 
Please rank the following improvements in UoR Frequency (%) themes' score in order of difficulty (1 being ___ ....:.....:..=....::t.:::..::..:..:~-'--'...:..J'----_____ _ 
easiest, 3 hardest): Easiest Between Hardest No view 
i. From '1' to '2' 80.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 
ii. From '2' to '3' 5.0 90 .0 0.0 5.0 
iii . From '3' to '4' 10.0 00 85.0 5.0 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data , 2008 
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From the table, 80 percent marked to improve from a '1' to '2' on the UoR scale as being the 
easiest and 90 percent marked to improve from a '3' to '4' as being the hardest. A director 
responded: 
"It is a ~~ssi~e I~ap from '3' t? '4', it is ~II about innovation, basically just best-practice. 
Fro.m a 3 which IS good to being totally Innovative, being inevitably best-practice is quite 
a big leap" rOOF 11] 
Very few suggested that to improve from a '1' to '2' was hard because it is the foundation 
that should be in place and having that done, improvement at a later stage is believed to be 
easier. This view however is not shared by many. 
Another director noted: 
"It is not impossible to achieve level '4' if we increase resources ... To be innovative is 
about doing things differently. To do so, I need to have more people who can sit back and 
think of doing things more differently and then implement whatever they have decided. I 
have got teams that are just working flat out, doing the accounts and then preparing 
budgets. They haven't really got time for that reflection and haven't got time to implement 
any ideas they have." rOOF 11] 
This response related to having enough resources and ability to reflect on their work. Many 
directors commented that they have minimum response time to meet the assessment 
requirement, and need more to reflect and be innovative. The issues were discussed in 
detail in Section 6.3.5. 
Table 99: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Improvement on the Scale Used for the 
UoR Themes' Performance Indicators 
Improvement in UoR themes in order of difficulty; Coefficient 
Rank {1 =easiest, 3=hardesQ Min-Max Mean of Variation 
1 From '1' to '2' 1-3 1.26 0.52 
2 From '2' to '3' 1-2 1.95 0.12 
3 From '3' to '4' 1-3 2.79 0.23 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Easiest') to 3(='Hardest') 
Lower means indicate ease of improvement on the scale of '1' to '4' used for the assessment indicators 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Table 99 shows the rank-order generated from mean analysis evidenced a clear order of 
easiest to hardest. These would suggest that the indicators that the AC set for every level of 
KLoEs reflected its necessary position, indicators to score a '2' is the easiest and the 
indicators to score a '4' is the hardest. None of the directors commented on the indicators set 
at any level being inappropriate. They however said that the changing of indicators 
(indicators from level '4' this year becoming a level '3' in the following year) were too fast to 
assist learning and improvement. They have to chase for new indicators every year and at 
times are unable to reflect on the previous year's achievement. Harris (2003) suggest that 
using an external set of measurements based on past performance indicators to define 
future agenda is not likely to encourage proactive approach or innovation. The author further 
argues that measurement based on a set of identified 'best practice' standards drawn from a 
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range of similar organisations in the same sector does not encourage a flexible 
developmental approach and can be a constraint to more innovative thinking about what 
constitutes good practice relevant to the organisational context. The author suggests that a 
more balanced approach is required which uses wider external bench-marking and internal 
evaluation and promotes strategic HRM based on best fit with the specific organisational and 
environmental context. Using past performance as indicators would encourage, especially in 
less proactive authorities, a tendency to 'play the game' by adhering strictly to what is 
measurable (Harris, 2003, p.15) 
6.4.2 Risk of Declines on the Indicators' Scale 
Table 100: Risk of Declines on the Scale of UoR Themes' Score 
Please rank the following declines in UoR Frequency (%) 
themes' score in order of risk of occurrence (1 --L-ow----'-'------'-''-''-'~-------
being low risk and 3 high risk): Risk High Between Risk No view 
i. From '4' to '3' 15.0 
ii. From '3' to '2' 
iii. From '2' to '1' 
Notes: N-20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
0.0 
80.0 
15.0 
75.0 
5.0 
65.0 5.0 
20.0 5.0 
10.0 5.0 
Some local authorities experienced declines in UoR scores. Consequently, the directors 
were asked to rank the risk of decline on the UoR themes' scores, and the frequencies are 
reported in Table 100 above. As perceived from the rules, a majority (80%) suggested that to 
drop from level '2' to a '1' is low risk; from a '3' to a '2' in between (75%); and to decline from 
'4' to '3' has the highest risk (65%). 
Table 101: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Risk of Declines on the Scale of UoR 
Themes' Score 
Declines in UoR themes' score in order of risk of Coefficient 
Rank occurrence; {1 being low risk and 3 high risk~ Min-Max Mean of Variation 
1 From '2' to '1' 1-3 1.26 0.52 
2 From '3' to '2' 2-3 2.21 0.19 
3 From '4' to '3' 1-3 2.53 0.31 
Notes: N=20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Low risk') to 3(='High risk') 
Lower means indicate ease of improvement on the scale of '1' to '4' used for the assessment indicators 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
A rank-order of risk is generated to confirm the results above, reported in Table 101. The 
coefficients of variation are relatively higher than when the directors were asked to rank for 
improvement on the scales. Although not shared by the majority, some directors who marked 
a decline from '2' to '1' as the highest risk explained that there was a risk of not having the 
basic requirements (which the AC normally sets the basic requirements at level '2') in place 
properly for the assessment compared to the indicators at higher levels. The directors also 
245 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION II: AUDITEES VIEWS 
explained that they thought of having marked down from '2' to a '1' would certainly tarnish 
their reputation, for example: 
"It is easy to drop from '4' to '3' because of its constant innovation. In terms of reputation, 
dropping from '2' to '1' is a nightmare scenario' [DOF 1] 
A majority of directors also expressed their worry should they drop from a '2' to '1' because 
that is the most basic level an authority should have. They considered that after many years 
of assessment, their local authority should not be in that level; they should have learned and 
made improvements. Hence they said the highest risk to their reputation is to drop scores at 
the lowest level. 
6.4.3 Order of Difficulty for UoR Themes 
Many commentators argue that measuring the value for money (VFM) theme is not easy 
because of its subjectivity (Buttery et. ai, 1993; McSweeney, 1988). As VFM is included 
among other themes, respondents were asked to rank the UoR themes to check their views 
on which is perceived to be most difficult, easiest and in between. Table 102 and Table 103 
report the findings on frequency and mean analysis. 
Table 102: Ranking of UoR Themes in Order of Difficulty Meeting KLoE's Requirement 
Order of difficulty meeting KLoEs' Frequency (%) 
requirement No 
(1 being easiest, 5 hardest) Easiest Easy Between Hard Hardest view 
Financial Reporting 35.0 25.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 
ii Financial Management 20.0 30.0 15.0 25.0 5.0 5.0 
iii Internal Control 0.0 25.0 40.0 25.0 5.0 5.0 
iv Financial Standing 40.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 
v Value for Money 0.0 0.0 15.0 20.0 60.0 5.0 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
The bold percentages in Table 102 are the highest frequency for each UoR themes. It is 
interesting to note that 60 percent marked the 'Value for Money' theme as the hardest to 
meet its KLoEs, while 35 percent marked the 'Financial Reporting' theme as easiest and 40 
percent viewed 'Financial Standing' as being the easiest. As for the 'Internal Contro\' theme, 
40 percent marked this theme at between easy and hard. An analysis of means is generated 
to create rank order for the five UoR themes. 
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Table 103: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Ranking of UoR Themes in Order of 
Difficulty Meeting KLoEs' Requirement 
Order of difficulty meeting KLoEs' requirement Min-
Rank (1 being easiest, 5 hardest) 
1 Financial Reporting 
2 Financial Standing 
3 Financial Management 
4 Internal Control 
5 Value for Money 
Notes: N-20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Easiest') to 5(='Hardest') 
Max 
1-5 
1-5 
1-5 
2-5 
3-5 
Mean 
2.42 
2.37 
2.63 
3.11 
4.47 
Coefficient 
of Variation 
0.62 
0.48 
0.28 
0.62 
0.17 
Lower means indicate ease of meeting the KLoEs requirement to achieve better scores on the same scale of 
'1' to '4' used for the assessment indicators 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
An order of easiest-hardest themes based on the respondents' perception indicates that the 
'Financial Reporting' theme is perceived to be the easiest and 'Value for Money' is the 
hardest. A relatively low coefficient of variation for 'Value for Money' evidenced unanimity for 
the theme being hardest, and the 'Min-Max' column shows that none marked the theme as 
being easier or easiest. A director responded: 
"The most difficult one is 'Value for Money', because it is all about interpretation, it is not 
clear. The other themes are clear for you to do this and that and achieved a '3'. That is not 
with 'Value for Money', it is subjective. When I say interpretation, I mean, we will introduce 
things we think in terms of 'Value for Money' are extremely good and the way we measure 
it is extremely good, but the auditors don't necessarily have the same view" [DOF 9] 
The views reflect the difficulty and subjectivity of the 'Value for Money' theme which makes it 
the hardest theme to meet its' KLoEs. There appears to be some differences of interpretation 
between local authorities and auditors which will be discussed further in Section 6.4.5. 
6.4.4 Audit Commission and Central Government 
The AC liaises with local authorities on behalf of the central government in terms of auditing 
work. Checking auditees' perception on these two institutions was thought to be useful. 
Table 104 shows the frequency of responses for statements and Table 105 reports means 
analysis and standard deviations. 
Table 104: Issues related to the Audit Commission and Central Government 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Statements Agree disagree Disagree No view 
Sufficient policy support has been available from central 15.0 35.0 40.0 10.0 
government 
Sufficient technical support has been available from the 40.0 30.0 25.0 5.0 
Audit Commission 
Having the Audit Commission as performance reviewer has 
reduced intervention from central government 
35.0 25.0 40.0 
The Audit Commission fairly allocates auditors to audit local 65.0 25.0 0.0 10.0 
authorities 
Notes: N=20 
Source Interview Data, 2008 
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As revealed in Table 104, only 15 percent agree that central government provided sufficient 
policy support for the Use of Resources assessment. Majority of respondents either disagree 
(40%) or neither agree nor disagree (35%). A director commented: 
"central government is not directly involved in the UoR assessment ... some of the 
Commission's key lines of enquiries indirectly reflects some of the central government 
policies but it really is the Commission's view of best practice and the central government 
is not involved" [OOF 6] 
The response quoted above reflects a view that local authorities do not expect guidance 
from the central government and they perceived the KLoEs as coming from the AC's point of 
view about what best practices should be. Respondents either disagree or were neutral on 
the statement because they consider that central government could have provided clearer 
objectives for the assessment and how it contributes towards improvement in services to the 
public. Even one director who agreed to the statement said: 
"There is guidance, rules in terms of how they are going to score you, down to the detail 
level about each aspect of it.3o It gives you a tick list of what to do. But there is no 
definition of why they are doing ii." [OOF 5] 
The response signals that local authorities do not understand why they are doing all the 
reports and they view it as a tick-box exercise. Thus, they may not value the effort of driving 
improvement. Another director said: 
"The drafts of policy and direction we get from central government pull us in various 
directions... they have different guidelines for UoR, they issue new one for other 
inspectorates, but it hasn't been necessarily a coherent voice. The Commission has done 
a good job in terms of pulling the guidelines together as their own but from the central 
government we have quite a lot of mixed messages specifically around what VFM is and 
what it means." [OOF 2] 
This response indicates the lack of clear guidance from central government. Another director 
said: 
And 
"Not really, just get on with it. What kind of policy support can they give you? No need for 
such guidance, you just read the words." [OOF 7] 
"I am not quite sure whether there has been or not, there has been some, but it has not 
been fantastic as far as I am concerned but it wouldn't be fair to say there's been none. 
There has been some, but I wouldn't get excited about it as far as I am saying." [OOF 1] 
Besides agreeing that there is no clear guidance from the central government, respondents 
suggest that they do not expect anything from the central government and assume the 
Commission is responsible for the whole assessment. 
Mean analysis reported in Table 105 below shows the range of responses (Min-Max column) 
reached '5' which is strongly agree on the statement. Some respondents explained that they 
prefer the central government to remain with the way they do now, not to interfere much in 
the assessment to avoid multiple directions. They prefer having the AC as the only institution 
driving the assessment. 
30 This is provided by the Commission 
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Table 105: Mean Analysis -Issues related to the Audit Commission and Central 
Government 
Statements 
Sufficient policy support has been available from central 
government 
Sufficient technical support has been available from the Audit 
Commission 
Having the Audit Commission as performance reviewer has 
reduced intervention from central government 
The Audit Commission fairly allocates auditors to audit local 
authorities 
Notes: N-20 
Min-Max 
1-5 
2-4 
1-4 
3-5 
T~e mean is a~er~ge on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean 
2.72 
3.16 
2.90 
3.78 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.96 
0.83 
0.97 
0.55 
The second statement asked is whether they received sufficient technical support from the 
Commission to deal with the assessment. Mean analysis in Table 105 shows a higher mean 
for this statement (3.16) compared to the first statement (2.72) on central government; 
signify more respondents agree that the AC provided them with sufficient technical guidance. 
Table 104 on frequency also shows many (40 percent) agrees with sufficient technical 
support received from the AC, compared to the statement on policy support from the central 
government which shows many (40 percent) disagrees. The extent of agreement however 
did not reach '5=strongly agree' for the statement on technical support received from the AC. 
A director said: 
"No, that has been really poor. In terms of UoR, when you read things, they are open to 
interpretation." [DOF 11] 
Although most guidance was distributed by the AC, split responses were evident for various 
reasons. Respondents explained that the guidance they received was sometimes too late to 
be useful in the assessment; the best practices provided on the AC website were outdated 
and not suitable for the assessment. Respondents suggest the AC should take a firmer view 
and provide clearer guidance for them. A director said: 
"The only way you can resolve the subjectivity is through discussion with your auditor as 
they are the one giving judgement, you need to be able to say to the auditors, 'What is 
your interpretation of this? This is ours, what is yours, because ours doesn't count, it is 
yours that matters'." [DOF 1] 
Another director responded: 
"When the systems changed, the key lines of enquiries changed and we are in subjectivity 
again. When we asked our auditor, they responded that they are not ready to answer that 
yet, and they will be ready before they do the audit. Well, that is not good for us; we need 
to understand that now, because we might be preparing for the wrong thing." [DOF 10] 
The ambiguity in the KLoEs may create disputes between local authorities and their auditors. 
They also explained that they sometimes asked their auditors about what they would look for 
to score for certain indicators, but the auditors would not want to explain how they interpret 
the indicators. The auditors normally would ask local authorities to use their own 
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interpretation of the indicators to prepare documentations and the auditors will comment on it 
after they have done the assessment. One director noted: 
"~he Commissio~ will ~it on th~ fence .. : they will never come down with something that 
will fetch future digression. I think sometimes I would like them to just take a little bit of a 
step-off the fence and give us clearer view, which will help us in learning to improve" 
[DOF 2] . 
Another director supported the notion of using the assessment as learning tools said: 
"The. Commission and the auditors don't always give us a great learning tool in terms of 
sharing knowledge although they do produce good papers, case studies, and have got 
better over the years" [DOF 12] 
The AC supports learning through case studies shared on their website, but many directors 
complained that the 'best practices' were out-dated, which was best with old indicators and 
no longer appropriate to the newer indicators. They also suggested that the AC might share 
more examples of 'best practice' which they believe must be available from its data-banks. 
The third statement asked was whether having the Audit Commission as performance 
reviewer has reduced intervention from central government. Views were split with 35 percent 
agreement and 40 percent disagreeing. The directors responded that there are still many 
other inspectorates seeking various reports from local authorities, and the AC is one of the 
central government agents. They view the AC as doing the job the central government asked 
them to do but that does not limit central government intervention at all. 
The last statement was whether the AC fairly allocates auditors to audit local authorities. The 
frequency revealed in Table 104 shows a majority, 65 percent agree and none of the 
directors disagreed. A small percentage (25%) adopts the middle view. The auditors were 
rotated after a few years servicing one local authority. A director said: 
"I think they do it reasonably well, it is difficult to argue. We were with the Commission's 
auditor and recently moved to the ... (private auditor) for this year. They have been here 
for a couple of months" [DOF 1] 
Some directors made it clear that the process of allocation was difficult to determine: 
And: 
"I have no idea; the process is a complete mystery to me. We received a letter saying we 
have a rotation policy, your new auditor is '" u [DOF 7] 
"I don't really know how they have done that. I know every 5 years they will re-assess and 
move the team around and they will re-apply who we actually get as our auditor. I don't 
know what process they actually do. I get a letter from the Commission head office saying 
that we are currently reviewing who your auditors are and we will be in touch when we 
appoint the new one. That is about the size, length and detail I get in terms of who the 
auditors are, the next letter there is 'we have appointed ... (audit company) as your 
auditors'. In terms of whether they fairly allocate or not, I don't know." [DOF 5] 
Mean analysis shown in Table 105 for this statement also reveals a very high mean, 3.78, 
indicating agreement to the statement, is supported by a relatively low standard deviation, 
0.55 showing unanimity of views. The AC noted their statutory duty of consulting local 
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government prior to the allocation of auditors in their explanation of what they do. However, 
none of the respondents recognised the process and responded that they received a letter 
about their auditor will be changed for rotation and then shortly after they will receive details 
of the new auditor. 
6.4.5 Auditors 
This section is thought necessary because the auditor is the individual dealing directly with a 
local authority and so that respondents are able to share their experiences. Some local 
authorities were audited by the District Auditor which is the AC staff and some were audited 
by a Private Auditor. Some local authorities have experienced both the District and Private 
Auditor. A 'No view' option is provided for respondents who had never experienced different 
auditors. 
6.4.5.1 Private Auditor versus District Auditor 
As local authorities may be audited by an auditor from the private sector or the AC staff, 
respondents were asked if the private auditors differ from the District Auditors (the AC staff) 
in certain aspects. Table 106 reveals the frequency of responses. 
Table 106: Private versus District Auditors 
Statements 
In general, if a local authority is assigned to be audited 
by private auditors instead of the District Auditor: 
i. communication with the Audit Commission will be 
lessened 
ii. assessment activities will not differ 
iii. judgement and scoring will not differ 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
35.0 
35.0 
20.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
disagree 
25.0 
40.0 
40.0 
Disagree 
30.0 
15.0 
35.0 
No view 
10.0 
10.0 
5.0 
Split views were received in terms of communication with the AC: those agreeing with the 
statement explained that they communicate more with the audit team assigned to them and 
not directly with the AC. If they were assigned a private auditor instead of the District Auditor 
that could mean they communicate less with the AC. Those disagreeing suggest that they 
were receiving instructions from the AC, thus they still communicate with the AC especially 
when they need to inquire on certain issues. Those adopting a middle view or no view 
generally have never experience both type of auditors. Mean analysis for this statement 
reported in Table 107 confirms the mixed views. 
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Table 107: Mean Analysis - Private versus District Auditors 
Statements 
In general, if a local authority is assigned to be audited by 
private auditors instead of the District Auditor 
i. communication with the Audit Commission will be 
lessened 
ii. assessment activities will not differ 
iii. judgement and scoring will not differ 
Notes: N 20 
Min-Max 
1-5 
1-5 
1-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1(='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Mean 
3.00 
3.22 
2.74 
Standard 
Deviation 
1.14 
0.94 
0.93 
In terms of assessment activities, the views were mixed between agree (35%) and neither 
agrees nor disagree (40%) with very few disagreeing (15%). Respondents suggested that 
they realised the different between the District Auditor and the private auditor, although both 
auditors follow the same guidelines. However, they have no valid evidence to support the 
difference. This is also reflected in the means reported in Table 107, which is slightly higher 
than average, 3.22, indicating inclination towards agreement that the assessment activities 
will not differ. Some respondents said that the District Auditor tended to adopt more detailed 
procedures than the private auditor. They perceived that the District Auditor's field team has 
more skills and experience than the private auditor's team, while the audit managers for both 
teams are viewed as expert. A director said: 
"Private auditors do things faster. They are chasing money and time. I don't think they are 
more efficient compared to the Commission's auditor, the issue is that they don't have 
public sector experience; they may have at senior manager level. The troops on the 
ground that come in and do the checking generally have come from private sector 
background and they try to transfer their private sector knowledge into the public sector. 
We had to tell them what various returns were when we send it to audit." [DOF 5] 
A few respondents commented that some auditors are very new and not familiar with local 
government's activities; their assessment work requires more assistance from the local 
authority's staff and therefore their ability to arrive at a reasonable conclusion is doubted. A 
few suggested that the private auditors are better at understanding the requirements for the 
UoR indicators, for example: 
"They (the private auditor) will look for the evidence; they can understand UoR a lot more 
than they do with the public sector accounts terminology." [DOF 10] 
A few respondents share the response above, explaining that they believe that the 
assessment activities would not differ as the auditors follow a specified set of guidelines in 
collecting evidence, but the skills and experience of audit teams vary and sometimes 
generate difficulties for the auditees' organisation in providing evidence and explanation to 
auditors. Another director mentioned: 
"I think the criteria they are assessing against are identical. My experience in terms of 
AAA as a private auditor is that staff on the ground were less knowledgeable on the local 
authorities so they needed more explaining to them, but the audit manager/partners who 
are involved at senior level were very able. So there were two different emphases but at 
the end of the day, they were assessing against the same criteria." [DOF 6] 
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Nevertheless a majority of respondents agree that the District Auditor's team have more 
experience and knowledge of the local government environment compared to private auditor. 
When it comes to judgement and scoring which is reported in the last row of Table 106, the 
mixed were maintained with 40 percent neither agree nor disagree, 35 percent disagreeing 
and only 20 percent agreeing to the statement that judgement and scoring will not differ 
between the two types of auditors. The views differ from the responses for assessment 
activities, where the mixed views were inclined towards agreement. A director said: 
"I disagree. The private sector auditors tend to be slightly generous than the 
Commission's. I don't know why that is, it is my experience and that might not be shared 
by other colleagues. That is true on a whole range of issues relating on the accounts and 
other things and it may well be that the private sector people have seen much bigger 
problems elsewhere in the general market than they do here, so they are a little bit more 
relaxed about it." [DOF 1] 
Some respondents appeared to have experienced harsher scoring from the District Auditor 
compared to the private auditors. The mean analysis for this statement, reported in Table 
107, indicates disagreement to the statement. This confirms to Davies et al (2001) argument 
that inconsistencies exists between different inspectorates in which the authors raise 
questions about what inspectors see as their role and whether the view is commonly shared 
amongst them. 
6.4.5.2 Other Issues Related to Auditors 
Respondents were also asked about a few other issues related to the auditors. Table 108 
and Table 109 report the results on analysis of their marked responses to the structured 
statements on the issues. 
Table 108: Other Issues Related to the Auditor 
Statements 
Satisfying the auditor is more important than satisfying 
local citizens 
The auditor's interpretation of the UoR assessment rules 
is fair 
The auditor spends more time on Use of Resources 
assessment at the expense of financial audit 
Notes: N=20 
Source Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
25.0 
40.0 
20.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
disagree Disagree No view 
15.0 60.0 
20.0 40.0 
35.0 30.0 15.0 
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The first statement in this category checked respondents' opinion as to who is more 
important to satisfy between the auditor and the local citizens. As revealed in Table 108 a 
, 
majority (60%) of respondents disagree that the auditor is more important to satisfy than 
local citizens: 
"My ~eliefs tell me .not because you should be doing what is right for the citizens, but 
practically I recognise that one of the measures is the Audit Commission. But I am 
passionate that what made us around is about public service to residents and customers 
which should be the focus, what flows from that then are good performance for the 
Commission to come and confirm. So, you put citizens and customers first which is the 
better trait. I think if you start with the Commission, then you are going to get it wrong." 
[DOF 2] 
And another director expressed a similar view: 
"Although improving scores are important, but if we satisfy local citizen, in medium or 
longer term that would be reflected in our score especially with the new CM." [DOF 6] 
The responses show that respondents believed that it is more important to satisfy local 
citizens because they are the customers of their services. However they recognised the 
need to satisfy auditors when it comes to scoring for the assessment. Another director said: 
"It depends on the issue. For UoR, I would rather satisfy the auditor than local citizen. 
When I am discussing set of budget and local tax, I would rather satisfy the local citizen 
than the auditor." [DOF 5] 
Thus in the context of the assessment although they disagree with the statement, they 
recognized the need to satisfy auditors for better scores. Some other directors agree to the 
statement, for example: 
And: 
"I agree because I don't think the citizens give a monkey about the standards of financial 
information, therefore it is far more important for me to satisfy the auditor in the context of 
UoR." [DOF 7] 
"Yes, there is this theory they espouse that actually if you do the things that satisfy local 
citizens, then you will improve your scores. To a degree that is true and therefore should 
we should be doing things. But when you read UoR, some of the things are real text-book 
accounting stuff which people out there don't really care about. So, I would argue that 
sometimes we are actually doing things just to please the auditors and not the local 
citizens. In fact, if you give local citizens the UoR jUdgement, they would suggest stop 
doing all these and do more street cleaning. That is the context for me." [DOF 1] 
Hence, regardless of agreement or disagreement with the statement, the respondents share 
common views that satisfying the local citizen is important but that satisfying the auditors for 
better scores may also be prioritized. They explained that, when a requirement in the 
indicators requires extra resources but bears no benefit to local authority's activity and local 
electors, they would ignore those even though this might result the auditor marking them 
down. Table 109 reported a mean of 2.35 for responses to this statement confirm the 
disag reement. 
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Table 109: Mean Analysis - Other Issues Related to the Auditor 
Statements 
Satisfying the auditor is more important that satisfying local 
citizens 
The auditor's interpretation of the UoR assessment rules is fair 
The auditor spends more time on Use of Resources 
assessment at the expense of financial audit 
Notes: N 20 
Min-Max 
1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Standard 
Mean Deviation 
2.35 1.18 
2.95 1.00 
2.76 0.97 
The directors were also asked their views on the auditor's interpretation of the UoR 
assessment rules; whether they think this is fair. Some (40%) of the respondents agreed that 
auditors' interpretation of the UoR assessment rules is fair, but 40 percent also disagreed. 
However, the mean for this statement as reported in Table 109 is 2.95 indicates inclination 
towards disagreement. Many of the respondents viewed that there were inconsistencies in 
auditors' interpretations of the assessment rules and local authorities rarely get an opinion 
when they sought their auditors' views on certain issues. The auditors could not give firm 
answers on what a local authority should have in place to obtain a particular score. A few 
respondents suggested there are inconsistencies because there are local authorities which 
they perceived to have equivalent processes in place but obtained different scores. A 
director responded: 
"They don't have their own interpretation because the Commission lay down their rules 
and the auditors just follow those. When there are discussions about interpretation of key 
lines of enquiry, I don't feel their interpretation is fair, I think it is rigid, they have a set of 
rules which they follow." [DOF 1] 
However, one of the respondents said: 
"I think they (the auditors) did (interpret fairly the UoR assessment rules). It (their 
assessment) has helped developed finance function at local authorities." [DOF 5] 
And another director responded: 
"We experienced different interpretation with different auditors, but we have no valid 
evidence (to suggest the variation in auditors' interpretation) and always take that as 
challenge." [DOF 3] 
Although some respondents agree that different auditors would result in different 
interpretations and hence different scores (discussed in Section 6.3.2), but they avoid using 
unfairness in auditors' interpretation as an excuse for their performance. From their 
responses, a few local authorities obtained better scores with the new audit team. While 
some others get their scores marked down and their councillors urged for going on appeal to 
the AC. 
The last statement relating to auditors was whether the auditor spends more time on UoR 
assessment at the expense of financial audit. Responses were again mixed, but with more 
disagreement (30%) than agreement (20%). Those disagreeing commented that the auditors 
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do more work on the UoR assessment but not at the expense of certification audit because 
(i) they charged more fees for the extra hours spent on the UoR assessment, and (ii) the 
work for certification audit is done concurrently with their assessment of the UoR. Many of 
those who agreed and adopted the middle view confirmed that the auditor spends more time 
on UoR assessment but they did not know whether this was at the expense of the 
certification audit. They also accepted that the two audits are related. Mean analysis for this 
statement is 2.76 confirms the disagreement and obtained the lowest standard deviation 
(0.97) for this category. 
6.4.6 Changes to the Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
Wilson (2005) study reported that majority of chief financial officers have confidence in CPA: 
they believe it will be an effective tool to deliver better services to local communities and 
would help local people understand how authorities are performing. In the study also the 
author reported that majority of the respondents believe CPA should be retained because 
they feel that any replacement of CPA would be worse although majority of the respondents 
are unconvinced that the benefit of CPA will exceed the costs (Wilson, 2005). Respondents 
in this study were also asked to respond on changes in CPA. 
Table 110: Changes to the Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
I would like the CPA system to change in the following 
ways: 
Increase the difficulty of each point on the UoR 
i. scale 
Lengthen the UoR scale beyond the four points 
ii. currently apply 
iii. Change the UoR indicators 
iv. Focus more on outcomes as UoR indicators 
Move from the CPA to the proposed Comprehensive 
v. Area Assessment 
Notes: N=20 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
Agree 
5.0 
15.0 
20.0 
70.0 
50.0 
Frequency (%) 
Neither 
Agree 
nor 
disagree Disagree 
5.0 90.0 
10.0 75.0 
50.0 25.0 
20.0 10.0 
30.0 20.0 
No 
view 
5.0 
Table 110 shows the frequency of responses when respondents were asked how they would 
like the CPA system to change. Almost no-one wished to see the difficulty of each point on 
the UoR scale increase because they felt that the AC's current requirements were already 
increasingly difficult and burdensome to them. The AC had moved some requirements from 
level '3' to become level '2' and new requirements were added every other year. 
Respondents said that they had little time to respond to the changes which put them in a 
difficult situation. A few respondents who supported the idea of increasing the difficulty of 
each point on the UoR scale agreed that the AC had always done that already and would do 
it anyway, and suggested that it was good to keep authorities working towards improvement. 
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Similarly very few respondents supported the lengthening of the UoR scale beyond the four 
points currently used. They suggested that four points are already well represented. The 
majority of local authorities already scored a 3 and were content at that level. They believed 
that lengthening the scale would not help make things easier or better. The few who 
supported the lengthening of the scale beyond four pOints believed that it could help 
distinguish local authorities' which majority are now at level 3; the local authorities obtained 
the same score although their performances are different. Lengthening the scale could help 
differentiate them better and encourage further improvement. 
There were few strong views on the suggestion of changing the UoR indicators, although the 
number who disagree (25%) was more than agree (20%). The middle views were chosen as 
UoR indicators were being altered every year. Respondents generally agreed that the UoR 
indicators needed some change so it could drive improvement and emphasise outcomes 
rather than processes. They had reservations on the indicators being changed every year 
which gave them little response time and thus reduced their motivation to improve. They 
believed that the AC should allow more time for them to reflect on indicators and to learn and 
improve. They also reflected that changing the indicators too often make them feel that their 
current efforts are meaningless because they do not enable change to be made before the 
system has been altered again. 
A majority (70%) agree that outcomes should be used more as indicators for UoR instead of 
processes. Only one respondent disagreed on this statement, doubting the ability to 
measure outcomes which would be more subjective. Half (50%) of the respondents looked 
forward to Comprehensive Area Assessment (CM), because they believe that the indicators 
in CM are more rounded on many issues which were not considered under CPA. Those 
adopting a middle view said that the change will take place anyway; they have no say on it, 
and are sceptical on whether it would be better than CPA. They feel that before they have 
harvested the fruit of labour from the CPA, they will be forced to change again. Some believe 
that changes will further benefit large and highly resourced local authorities, and would leave 
smaller authorities like the district councils with no chance to be among the top ranks. 
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Table 111: Mean Analysis and Rank Order - Change to Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment 
I would like the CPA system to change in the following 
Rank ways: Min-Max 
1 
2 
Focus more on outcomes as UoR indicators 
Move from the CPA to the proposed Comprehensive Area 
Assessment 
3 Change the UoR indicators 
4 Lengthen the UoR scale beyond the four points currently apply 
5 Increase the difficulty of each point on the UoR scale 
Notes: N-20 
The mean is average on a scale of 1 (='Strongly Disagree') to 5(='Strongly Agree') 
Higher means indicate stronger agreement on the statement 
Source: Interview Data, 2008 
2-5 
1-5 
1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
Standard 
Means Deviation 
3.70 0.80 
3.40 1.10 
2.89 0.81 
2.20 0.95 
1.90 0.72 
A rank order generated from means to arrange the preference for change to the CPA. 
Respondents most favoured if outcomes are made as indicators for UoR and least favoured 
if the difficulty of each point on the UoR scale is increased. 
6.5 General discussion 
This study highlights the impact of performance measurement system on local authorities -
it helps to foster changes and improvement at local authorities but not without limitations 
and side effects. This is consistent with findings by Sanderson (2001) that performance 
measurement systems have important limitations as drivers of change and improvement, 
especially when externally imposed. The author also found external pressures played a key 
role in promoting greater focus on performance in local government but rather than 
emphasizing on applying it as tools for change, it has been used as tools to enhance 
accountability which is also evident in this study. 
This study shares similar suggestions by Schick (1999), to achieve the objective of driving 
change at local authorities, performance targets have to (i) be few in number so it could 
send strong signals of expectation and allow a clear basis for assessing progress; (ii) 
challenge local authorities to make changes; (iii) should be jointly selected by each local 
authority and the authority responsible for overall government performance (the central 
government). Other suggestions by Schick (1999) which are found to have been embedded 
in the current performance measurement system are (i) the performance targets are 
monitored, audited and ascertained whether the targets have been met, and (ii) are part of a 
larger managerial framework that encourages local authorities to improve performance -the 
UoR assessment is part of the CPA regime. 
This study also shared similar key requirements highlighted by Sanderson (2001). The AC 
and central government should address several key requirements to improve the 
assessment regime so that the performance measurement exercise would better achieve its 
intended objectives: 
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(a) local authorities need to develop the capacity to achieve change and improvement 
based upon evidence of performance produced by the assessment system. In this 
study, local authorities are found to have reservations in terms of timing from one 
assessment to another and the frequent movement of indicators. These would 
raise issues on their capacity to achieve change; 
(b) the nature of change must be consistent with the key goals and objectives 
expressing the desired outcomes. This is also found to be ambiguous in some 
respects in the UoR assessment at local government researched, as majority of 
the indicators measure processes, which local authorities viewed as not vital in 
serving the local citizens. Sanderson (2001; 1998) and Smith (1995) suggest that 
focus and action will be distorted if the key measures and targets in performance 
measurement systems do not capture the essence of primary values and 
objectives. 
Perspectives of all major stakeholders shall be captured in the performance indicators and 
domination by managerial interests, or top-down approaches should be avoided 
(Sanderson, 2001). This study also found that participative approaches to performance 
measurement and evaluation are very important, with serious consideration over 
decentralization and empowerment relating to service users (citizens) and front-line staff. 
These would reflect and clarify the main objectives of local authorities, as well as unravel the 
ambiguity and conflict between processes versus outcomes and performance versus 
accountability. Sanderson (2001) wrote that these will help to ensure appropriate definitions 
of objectives and performance targets as well as spread ownership and develop capacities 
for evaluative enquiry amongst key stakeholders. I believe that this way, the local citizen 
would be more engaged with local authorities. 
Another implication of performance measurement system is that it changes the way local 
authorities work. Thus, it is necessary for them to realise that they need to change their 
organisational culture to enable the capacity for evaluative enquiry to be embedded in their 
routines and ways of thinking and working. Sanderson (2001) also concluded the same 
requirements to ensure success of a performance measurement system. The author 
suggests several key attributes of a culture of evaluation and learning for a successful 
implementation of performance measurement system at local authorities: (i) a capacity for 
critical reflection, questioning and challenging existing practices, beliefs and values; (ii) a 
capacity for effective dialogue, collaboration and communication - breaking down both 
vertical and horizontal barriers to communication and extending beyond the authority to 
include external stakeholders; (iii) a capacity for research and analysis to provide sound 
evidence upon which to base decisions, including recognition of the value of qualitative 
approaches which can help to foster dialogue with stakeholders and help to include and 
empower subordinate interests; (iv) a capacity for action planning and effective 
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implementation to ensure that the required changes are achieved in practice. Based on the 
findings of this study, these suggestions are shared. These elements are vital to an effective 
evaluation system. 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, data collected from fieldwork interviews using structured questions were 
analysed and discussed. The respondents were directors or heads of the finance function at 
19 local authorities in the studied region of Yorkshire and The Humber. The first two 
research questions discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 of this thesis fed into the design of 
fieldwork interviews analysed in this chapter. The respondents' views were utilised to answer 
the final three research questions of this study about whether the auditees view published 
scores as reflecting their local authority's performance (Section 6.2), what are the perceived 
factors contributing to the variations in local authority performance (Section 6.3), and how do 
the auditees view the external audit process and the performance assessment (Section 6.4). 
Section 6.5 discusses the overall findings from the research questions. The chapter that 
follows will conclude all the research questions and suggest directions for future research. 
The results suggest that the assessment regimes resulting from the NPM initiatives have to 
some extent promoted efficiency at local government level and have encouraged 
competition amongst local government organizations. Respondents explained that they 
seek assistance from other local authorities which are performing well and cooperate with 
one another to improve their performance. These findings support Hood et aI's (1999) 
suggestion that competition and mutuality could help governance without the need of 
external inspection; and could promote improvement. However, in the environment of this 
study, the ratings were achieved through external inspection. 
The assessment regimes have also to some enhanced transparency, and succeeded in 
improving management accountability in the public sector. Greater transparency benefits 
service providers (the local government) because it allows liability and risk to be transferred, 
and could therefore enhance public trust and confidence (Power, 1994; 1997). However, the 
findings from this study are still unable to conclude that greater transparency produced by 
the assessment regimes promoted trusts or participation. This supports Power's (2004) 
argument that transparency in the public sector seems not to protect the public or 
customers, but to protect providers and others by transferring liability from service providers 
to consumers. Power's (1997) argument in terms of the displacement of trust is also 
evident in this study from the extent of audit processes and documentation, as well as views 
of the auditees. 
This study supports Hood's (2007) argument that management by numbers is failing. The 
auditees have reservations in terms of the rating system and the quality of audit. The 
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auditees suggest that they learn the system and adapt their activities in order to target for 
better scores. An element of gaming with the system is unavoidable due to the pressure for 
better scores (Hood, 2007; Hibbard et ai, 2003). This confirms Bevan and Hood's (2006) 
suggestion that current audit arrangements encourage governance by target (i.e. specified 
measures of what should be achieved). Findings from this study also support several 
arguments in the literature, among others, that increased regulation has been accompanied 
by decreases in managerial discretion (Hood et ai, 1998); and has led to an increase in 
formal public sector regulation which has added to the procedural constraints and second 
guessing faced by public managers (James, 2003). The use of detailed indicators for local 
authorities reduces managerial discretion and the auditees view this as not being beneficial 
to local citizens. 
Findings from this study will be briefly concluded in the following chapter according to each 
of the five sub-research questions set for this study. Contributions, implication, 
recommendations and suggestions for future research will also be discussed. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction ----. Literature r---. Methodology 1-+ Findings & r---. Conclusion 
Review Discussion 
The chapter provides conclusions for this study. The discussion will start with conclusion to 
the research questions, followed by the main contributions and implications of this study and 
finally to provide reflections and considers opportunities for further research. 
Research 1-+ Contributions & 1--. Reflections & Questions Implications Opportunities 
Figure 39: Structure of the Conclusion Chapter 
7.1 Highlights of Research Questions 
Research 1 ___ Contributions & ;-+- Reflections & Questions Implications Opportunities 
This study began with the main aim 'to discover how external auditing performed at local 
authorities in England affect local authorities as recipients of the service'. To achieve the aim, 
five research questions were generated. The main gap that this research fills is to provide 
and analyse views and feedback from local authorities Director/Head of Finance which are 
the focus of external audit work. This section will review and conclude all the research 
questions set to achieve the main aim of the study. 
7.1.1 Research Question 1: What are the Functions of External 
Auditors for Local Councils in England? 
The functions of external auditors for local English councils were discussed in Chapter 3 (as 
Literature Review 2). From this review of external auditors' functions at local authorities in 
England, I found that their functions are extended from certification audit to cover 
assessment for UoR which is part of the CPA regime. The auditors report to the AC which 
administer auditing and assessment at local government on behalf of the central 
government. Auditors are responsible for the audit of the financial statements and to 
evaluate local governments' compliance with the requirement of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness under the CPA regime. Various literatures support that this initiative is derived 
from NPM doctrines and the managerial change in the public sector is captured by the 
acronym of 3Es (Barberis, 1998; Rhodes, 1994). The authors also suggest that the rise in 
NPM has increased regulation and inspection, which is evident in the extent of reporting 
requirements to feed into financial statement audit and UoR assessment. Audit teams 
include the AC staff (District Auditors) and Private Auditors who would spend time at local 
authorities to inspect and search for evidence for these assessments. 
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Both audits are done concurrently, and for UoR assessment, local authorities are measured 
based on five themes developed by the AC which are Financial Reporting, Financial 
Management, Financial Standing, Internal Control, and Value for Money. Auditors are 
provided with detailed guidelines and training on how to approach the assessment and their 
assessments are moderated at regional (audit region) level as well as national level to 
ensure consistency. Local authorities are given an opportunity to respond to the assessment 
regime as well as to the assessed performance. 
7.1.2 Research Question 2: How do the local councils perform 
based on their auditor's assessment? 
The analysis for this research question is included in Chapter 5. As the auditor's 
assessments are made public through the local council's website (the annual statement of 
accounts, CPA scorecards and annual audit letters) and the AC's website (the overall UoR 
and its theme score and rating), the findings were discussed as published results. Analysis 
of the local authorities' annual statement of accounts reveals that local authorities in the 
Yorkshire and The Humber region improved significantly in terms of submission, certification 
and publication of their annual accounts. Thus, in this situation, inspection did contribute 
towards better performance (Prat, 2006). 
On the aspect of UoR which covers five themes, the published scores show steady 
improvement since the CPA -the original was first introduced in 2002 to 2004. The published 
scores for 2005, when CPA -the harder test was implemented, show a decline throughout all 
local authorities before the scores improved again but at a lower rate than the original 
regime. Thus the published scores evidence that local authorities improved in all the aspects 
assessed, suggesting that extra inspection resulting from increased regulations enhanced 
performance. 
7.1.3 Research Question 3: Do the auditees view the published 
scores as reflection of improvement and position of the local 
councils? 
Findings for this research question are presented in Section 6.2. The published scores are 
viewed as a fair reflection of local authorities' performance relative to others. However, some 
reservations are raised in terms of auditors' ability to identify the evidence at local authorities 
in supporting the indicators provided to them by the AC. The issue of different interpretations 
by the auditors versus local authorities' for the requirements stated in AC's documentation 
was raised which caused dissatisfaction with some of the ratings. Publication of the , 
performance results appeared to promote improvement at local authorities; in some local 
authorities, it is viewed as competition but in others, it encourages collaboration - greater 
communication and sharing among all levels at local authorities. Respondents also viewed 
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that the indicators provided in the AC's KLoEs for UoR assessment have helped them focus 
their effort and therefore improve on the indicators and scores. However, that does not mean 
the indicators are getting easier but rather that local authorities are getting familiar with the 
system after a few years. An element of gaming with the system is unavoidable due to the 
pressure for better scores (Hood, 2007, Hibbard et ai, 2003). Hibbard et al (2003) suggest 
that making performance information available publicly would stimulate quality improvement 
especially in the areas where performance is reported to be low. This is in agreement with 
Bevan and Hood (2006) who suggest that current audit arrangements encourage 
governance by target (i.e. specified measures of what should be achieved). 
The assessment regimes however were not viewed by a majority as contributing towards 
efficiency and effectiveness at local authorities. It has been a pressure for greater efficiency 
but for effectiveness, a longer time is necessary. In terms of certification audit, the greatest 
contribution of external audit is seen as the improvement in financial reporting aspects such 
as the quality of presentation of the statement of accounts but not so much towards an 
improvement in financial accounting systems and the timing for approval and publication of 
the statement of accounts. The assessment regime are not viewed as contributing towards 
improvement in public trust nor in public participation, although part of the objectives of 
greater transparency is to improve trust. The assessment regime and its published results 
have not been viewed as affecting local electors' decisions to vote in local elections nor the 
choice of political parties. The public has showed little interest in responding to the invitation 
for public inspection of the local authorities' statement of accounts, possibly due to the 
difficulty in understanding the accounting terminologies. There is an opportunity to research 
further into why the public may not be interested in local authorities' assessment and what 
other information they need from local authorities. The assessment regime was viewed as 
worthwhile despite reservations about its implementation. 
7.1.4 Research Question 4: What factors contribute to the 
variations in local councils' performance? 
Findings for this research question are presented in Section 6.3. KLoEs provided local 
authorities with detailed indicators of what is going to be assessed. Although the indicators 
are viewed as helping local authorities in making improvements, the KLoEs are not viewed 
as reflecting the expectations from local citizens but instead are a reflection of what the 
central government expects of a local authority. Local authorities felt that some of their effort 
in fulfilling the assessment regimes was not for the benefit of local citizens. The KLoEs are 
viewed as increasing their workload which at times may be at the expense of their front-line 
services. The KLoEs contribute towards making a local authority focused on what they 
should do while also reducing their freedom in deciding what is best for local citizens. 
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Improvement in scores is also dependent upon a local authority's ability to continuously 
improve its performance (on the indicators) as well as its ability to produce a good self 
assessment report. Some respondents expressed reservations on the fairness of the 
assessment rules and their auditors' interpretation of the assessment rules. The opportunity 
to consult the AC on the indicators and assessment rules was not seen as appealing as it 
was not always beneficial to local authorities. Similar views were shared in terms of the 
opportunity to appeal for improved scores; in which local authorities prefer to strive for a 
better assessment in the following year. Resources are viewed as indispensable in achieving 
better scores; for example in terms of an optimum number of staff to cope with necessary 
documentation to provide evidence for auditors. Local authorities also viewed that having 
their performance ranked helped them identify areas in which they need to improve and they 
normally put more effort and focus on the areas where their performance is worse. Being 
new to the assessment regime (like the DC which were introduced to the system later than 
the STCC) is not viewed as factors which affect their scores. 
7.1.5 Research Question 5: How do the auditees view the external 
audit process and the performance assessments? 
Findings for this research question are presented in Section 6.4. Improvement from a '3' to a 
'4' is viewed as the hardest because level '4' requires innovation, which local authorities 
think should be a big leap and they are often content to achieve a '3'. To decline from a '4' to 
a '3' is viewed as highest risk and to decline from a '2' to '1' will affect their reputation which 
they viewed as very damaging. Of all the five themes assessed under UoR audit, Value for 
Money is viewed as hardest followed by Internal Control, Financial Management, Financial 
Standing and the easiest being Financial Reporting. VFM is viewed as hardest because of 
the subjectivity of its indicators. Some respondents also stated that more could be done by 
the central government to clarify the objectives of the assessment via policy documents. 
Although not a majority, some respondents viewed that sufficient technical support from the 
AC is available. 
Local authorities viewed that having AC as performance reviewer has not reduced control 
and intervention by the central government and having the private sector auditor conducting 
their audit does not mean that they communicate less with the AC. They often 
communicated more with the audit team assigned to them than the AC, but all the 
instructions and guidelines come from the AC and they always go back to the AC for 
clarification. Respondents have reservations in terms of assessment activities and 
judgement and scoring by the District Auditors and the private auditors, because some 
believe that they are evaluated more harshly by different auditors. Although many agree they 
have to satisfy their auditors and the assessment indicators, a majority viewed that their 
priority should be with satisfying local citizens. The auditors are not viewed as spending 
more time on the UoR at the expense of certification audit as both audits are related and the 
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additional time auditors have to spend on UoR audit is reflected in fees paid by local 
authorities. 
The development of each point on the UoR scale is already viewed as becoming more 
difficult. The four-points currently applied are considered as reasonable. Thus, respondents 
do not favour change in any of these two aspects. A majority believed that the UoR 
indicators should reflect outcomes required of them rather than being evaluated on 
processes. They have reservations in terms of the intensive changes made on the indicators. 
The time allocated for them to respond on every set of indicators is viewed as too short, and 
did not enable them to have some changes embedded in their system. Although not a 
majority, many viewed that moving towards CAA to be a better option than the CPA because 
they had been consulted on the new regime. However, many expressed concern that 
changes are made too quickly and were pessimistic about the new assessment system. 
7.2 Research Contributions and Implications 
Research 1-' Contributions & -. Reflections & Questions Implications Opportunities 
This study adds to the existing knowledge of the impact of public sector reforms, increased 
regulations and inspection and contribution of external audit (see Power, 2003; Hood et ai, 
1999; Pallot, 2003; Pollitt, 1994; James, 2003; English, 2003). This study confirms the 
argument that regulation inside government is significant (Hood et ai, 1999), as well as to 
support the theory that audit has exploded beyond the financial certification function (Power, 
1994; 1997). Similarly, this study confirms that the NPM notion of decentralization is not 
achieved but, instead, that top-down control is implemented (Hood, 1995; Power, 1997). This 
supports Pollitt's (1994) observation that in practice, NPM may work better in some areas of 
the public sector than in others, as well as that NPM focuses on accountability, competition, 
results and efficiency (Gray and Jenkins, 1993). 
Although the assessment regimes forced local authorities to improve on some aspects of 
their activities, it seems not to have been as successful at improving effectiveness. This 
study supports Power's (1994) argument that the existing audit and inspection may not 
promote improvement. The assessment regimes encourage governance by target, 
compliance accountability, and gaming. As top down control is enforced, it limits managerial 
discretion (Hood, 1995) and discourages innovation. It is important to give local authorities 
freedom to determine what is best for their local citizens in regard to their activities and 
services. However, this has been limited by the detailed rules and procedures required of 
them. Auditees believe that the intensity of the audit environment has taken out time 
available to accommodate their main services. 
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Hood et aI's (1999) suggestion that inspector-free mechanisms of control over public 
bureaucracy could work is supported in this study. Auditees revealed that the ranking of 
performance results promoted both competition and cooperation amongst local authorities. 
This thesis is the first of its kind to investigate the impact of external audit and use of 
resources assessment at local authorities in England. In that regard, the thesis creates the 
foremost knowledge base using the regulation inside government and audit explosion 
theories to understand the impact of external audit at English local government. This study 
also provided understanding of the external auditing processes going on at local 
government, the extent of the processes, its output and the actors involved. Besides 
analysing the results of the assessment regimes for five years, from 2002-2006; this study 
also documents changes in local authorities' certification audit performance for 7 years from 
2000-2006. Most importantly, this study documents auditees responses and views in terms 
of the assessment subjected on them. 
This study adds specifically to research on the audit and inspection of local government. The 
extension of the work of external auditors beyond certification audit has been debated by 
various researchers in terms of its impact and policy implications but there have been very 
few empirical stUdies concentrating on the views of local authority as auditees and none in 
this particular geographical region. This thesis is the first of its kind to document an 
investigation into the external auditing process and its impact when applied to the CPA and 
to consider its achievements, implications and explanations from the auditees' point of view. 
In that regard, this thesis creates a knowledge base on the application of auditing as 
performance assessment to drive performance in local authorities. It opens the opportunity 
for similar studies at various stages of the application of the assessment regime. This study 
provides an understanding into the actual dilemmas and experiences faced by local 
authorities lacking in existing literature. The knowledge could be used to improve the 
implementation of the regime as well as to design better ways to assess performance or 
possibly to align auditing procedures to best serve as performance assessment alongside 
more traditional financial statement audits. 
In sum, an important contribution of the thesis is that its empirical findings offer strong 
support to the theoretical explanations put forward to highlight the impact of external audit 
and use of resources assessment at local government. Table 112 presents practical 
recommendations concluded from my study. 
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Table 112: Practical Recommendations 
Practical Recommendations: 
Do more follow-up and diagnosis with local authorities. Indicators for measuring performance 
could be enhanced in terms of its accuracy if feed back and follow up is done with the local authorities. 
Although the AC wants to maintain independence, listening to local authorities is vital in generating 
appropriate indicators. Current consultation is not enough to gain feedback from local authorities. 
Auditees also wish that their views will be heard more and consultation should be more effective. 
The AC should provide clearer guidelines for local authorities, and the auditors should be able 
to specifically address what local authorities need to fulfil certain indicators. Auditees want the 
auditors to provide clearer guidance rather than having local authorities wondering and trying before 
later being told they are wrong. 
Make available and update recent best practices suitable with current indicators. The best 
practices available are outdated compared to the current indicators and the AC should provide more 
best practice case studies if they intend to assist local authorities to improve. 
Allow longer time period for each indicator, to allow learning and properly adopting the 
improvement. 
The AC and central government should be aware of the needs to adapt to the required 
indicators. Provide local authorities with more time to respond to each indicator. Current practice of 
issuing the indicators for assessment late into the assessment year has not been helpful as local 
authorities have limited time and manpower to achieve those. This causes frustration and stress 
especially in smaller local authorities. 
Engage with local electors to enhance trust and to convey the transparency mechanism in place and 
to understand their needs. 
Listen more to the auditees. Engage local authorities in the accountability mechanism for measuring 
performance and internal control. 
To get local authorities involved in designing the indicators. As the direct person dealing with the 
public and services to the local public, they are the right persons to identify what is needed in their local 
authorities and by the local electors. 
The AC to provide a detailed manual to introduce public sector and local government for the 
auditors. The auditors should be made to understand the nature of public sector and local authorities' 
operations as well as local factors affecting local authorities. 
Auditors are trained properly for public sector audit and local governments and have 
appropriate knowledge about the local authorities they audit. Information on local authorities and 
its specific criteria could be made available as manual for auditors and local authorities should be 
allowed to brief auditors on their environment prior to audit. 
The AC need to ensure that auditors are competent and have wide knowledge of public sector 
and local authorities' activities and background. Follow up with local authorities and listen to their 
feedback could help identify weaknesses in auditors' judgement and necessary information vital to 
auditors for their assessment. 
All of the practical recommendations mentioned in the table above appeared in this research 
as Significant factors in enhancing the practice of measuring performance and improvement 
of local authorities' services. Moreover, the AC should allow local authorities the flexibility to 
respond if an indicator is appropriate or not and to suggest more relevant indicators to 
measure them. This way reconciliation between what the central government and AC 
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assume as appropriate measurement and local authorities' perception can be ach ieved . The 
local authorities would also value more the indicators should their responses be heard and 
considered . The auditors must also be made to understand the indicators and its 
appropriateness to anyone local authority and to score accordingly with in that 
understanding . These would benefit all parties involved and achieve th e purpose of 
accountability mechanism in local government. 
7.3 Reflections and Opportunities for Further Research 
Research 1---+ Contributions & Reflections & Questions Implications 1---+ Opportunities 
The process of this study provided me with experience in the general conduct of research 
and the specific topic being researched. Throughout the years of researching for this thesis, I 
tried from time to time figure out how this could help me improve the system in my own 
country , how and where should I start adapting this comprehensive research process into my 
country's environment. Therefore this section will discuss the experience I went through and 
followed with the opportunities that I see for further research as a continuity of this study. I 
believe that the findings of this research can be considered new and to add value to existing 
literature. 
However, due to time and budget constraints this research is conducted on a focused region 
using a multiple-cases study of the Yorkshire and The Humber region only . Other regions 
might yield similar or different results . Therefore an opportunity to extend the resea rch to 
other regions is open. Reflecting on the period taken to gather responses from all 
respondents in the focus region , I should not underestimate the time and effort to do this. 
Respondents, being the chief/head of finance at local authorities , are not always available fo r 
researchers to talk to, so this poses risks in data collection . Utilising various ways of 
obtaining their responses step by step from postal mail to phone calls proved to be helpful in 
calling in responses and participation although it takes a longer time. 
It is also important to note that the director/head of finance at each local authority is the best 
person to approach for views on this aspect because other employees may not have the 
overall view of the topic. This is reflected in my pilot test where I interviewed both managers 
for certification audit and UoR audit as well as the director of finance, in which I found that 
the director of finance is able to provide the whole picture of the topiC while the managers 
normally have limited views beyond their own work area. 
This study was quite innovative; in a way that it fills gaps in literature in terms of aud itees 
responses to the aud it process and at the same time documents processes in the 
development of performance measurement innovation at local governments Step by step 
approach to understand the issue of concern are documented and discussed before 
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responses from auditees were explored, analysed and discussed. Several themes seem to 
emerge for the first time in this research, as examples: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the roles of audit and inspection in promoting improvement; 
the suitability of auditors to measuring local governments' performance; 
the suitability of the indicators; 
the clarity of objectives of local authorities to enable development of 
appropriate indicators; 
• impact on local authorities' staff in terms of their morale and motivation· , 
• impact on their front-line services, and their priorities 
It is necessary to mention the link between this research context and my professional interest 
on the external audit for local government, which is the key reason why I chose this topic to 
research. Many people would question why I choose to study local authorities in England 
when the sponsor of my study is the Malaysian Government and I am going home to serve my 
country after completing this study. How could this study contribute to Malaysia, a developing 
country which the accounting system at local government is still very different from England? I 
look forward to local authorities in Malaysia becoming transparent, accountable, efficient and 
effective (or at the least with transparency and clear accountability to detect the causes of 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness). 
Being a developing country, the accountability system, efficiency and effectiveness of local 
government are different and relatively unexplored compared to those of developed countries 
like the United Kingdom. There have been several attempts to introduce a 'star-rating' system 
in an effort to improve competitiveness among local authorities. These attempts somehow 
invited a lot of criticism as the evaluation criteria are often unclear and the reward system is 
controversial. That is why the storyline of this research started from the very beginning of the 
local government structure until the end. That is to equip me with the overall context of the 
external audit process so I could later break them into smaller chunks of research which will 
start from the beginning. 
In England, there is a lot of criticism from researchers on aspects of accountability measures 
for local authorities. However, little has been found which highlights how much the process 
has impacted on local authorities as the auditees. This research has attempted to contribute 
to both, (i) local authorities and regulators in England by discovering how local authorities as 
auditees are performing, responding and adapting to the process as well as (ii) a developing 
country by documenting the processes, measuring and analysing the improvement and 
experiences of local government in England. The findings should therefore be very useful for 
further research to generate improvement at local authorities. 
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7.4 Concluding comments 
This research has offered insight in the study of external audit used as performance 
measurement in local government. It provided an initial view of the situation in Yorkshire and 
The Humber with regard to external audit and what are the perceptions of auditees on the 
effects of external audit. Supporting the view that the assessment activity is going on at a 
large scale and auditing has exploded from its traditional function, this study proposed that the 
assessment process may be more effective if the AC as regulator and the central government 
enhanced consultation with the auditee, consider the local and organisational environment of 
a local authority and the auditors should better understand the nature of operations at local 
authorities. It also highlights some aspects were improved by the external audit exercise, and 
improvements and discussion are deemed necessary to make the activities more effective. 
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APPENDIX 1: CORRESPONDENCE TO REQUEST FOR 
PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS NOT AVAILABLE ON WEBSITE 
Dear Ms / Mr ..... , 
........................ COUNCIL 
I am Haslida Abu Hasan, PhD student at the University of Sheffield under 
Professor David Heald's supervision. Thank you very much for your response to my 
queries posted on your council's website. I have received your statement of 
accounts which completed my record for ........ Council's 
accounts from year 2000/01 to 2004/05. 
However, to assist my study, I still need some further documents and information 
regarding .......... Council: 
1. the statement of accounts for year 1999/2000 
2. unaudited accounts published for public inspection for the years 1999-2000 to 
2004-05 
3. information on which Council committee considers the unaudited accounts 
before audit and public, and a copy of the minutes of that meeting 
4. information on which Council committee considers accounts after they have 
been certified by the auditor, and a copy of the minutes of that meeting 
5. 2005-06 unaudited accounts when these become available 
If the above are available electronically, please send them to me at 
ecp05ha@sheffield.ac.uk. If they are only available in hard copy, please send 
them to me at: Haslida Abu Hasan, Management School, University of Sheffield, 9 
Mappin Street, Sheffield, S1 4DT. 
Thanks for your time and help. 
Kind regards, 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Research Student, Management School 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S1 4DT 
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APPENDIX 2: FIRST CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE 
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE- LETTER BY POST 
Mr/Ms ...... . 
Executive Director Financial Resources 
BARNSLEY METROPOLITAN BOROUGH COUNCIL 
Town Hall 
BARNSLEY S70 2TA 
Dear Sir, 
RESEARCH: THE IMPACT ON LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF EXTERNAL AUDIT AND OF 
'USE OF RESOURCES' ASSESSMENT 
I am a doctoral stUdent from The Management School, University of Sheffield, and currently 
undertaking research on "The Impact on Local Authorities of External Audit and of 'Use of 
Resources' Assessment". I am writing to request your assistance with my research which 
focuses on the government region of Yorkshire and The Humber. As your local authority is 
one of the 22 local authorities in the region, the data obtained are vital to the study. Data 
collection for this research is planned in two parts - an interview, preceded by completion of 
a questionnaire. 
I am hoping to interview (1) the director of finance; (2) a manager responsible for certification 
audit; and (3) a manager responsible for use of resources within your local authority, because 
this study covers both aspects of certification audit and 'use of resources' assessment. To 
assist in the interview process, I have developed a questionnaire for each respondent on 
which to mark his/her answers and enclose a self-addressed envelope for each respondent 
to return the questionnaire before the interview takes place. 
The questionnaire comprises three sections: A-Certification Audit; B-Use of Resources; and 
C-Comprehensive Performance Assessment. Choices for the answers are on a 5-point scale 
ranging from 1-Strongly Disagree to 5-Strongly Agree with a blank space after each section 
for the respondent to write other comments regarding the section should they have any. As 
not all questions will necessarily be relevant to all respondents, a 'No View' option is provided 
next to the 5-point scale for the respondent to choose if he/she feels unable to answer. 
The actual interview, which is expected to take not more than an hour for each respondent, 
would explore the reasoning behind some of the answers. It would be helpful if all three 
meetings could be held on the same day. I would ask if you could choose any day convenient 
to you in April 2008. If that is not feasible, could you please suggest alternative dates that 
would be suitable to you? 
I promise to maintain strict confidentiality in regard to all responses I receive and sincerely 
hope that you will be able to help with this research. Your assistance in collating information 
for this research would be invaluable. I can be contacted at the above address. 
Your help is greatly appreciated and I hope to hear from you soon. 
Yours faithfully, 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Encs: 1-Synopsis 
2-Questionnaires; and 
3-Self-addressed, pre-paid envelopes 
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APPENDIX 3: SECOND CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE 
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE- EMAIL 
Dear Mr. I Ms. xxxx, 
I am a doctoral student from The Management School, University of Sheffield, 
and currently undertaking research on the topic above. I am writing to request 
your assistance with my research which focuses on the government region of 
Yorkshire and The Humber. 
(1) As this study covers 22 local authorities in Yorkshire and The Humber, your 
help is very important. Data collection for this study is planned in two parts-
an interview, preceded by completion of a questionnaire. 
(2) I have sent three printed copies of questionnaires to your local 
authorities with synopsis of my study as well as self-addressed, prepaid 
envelopes for three respondents: (1) the Director of Finance; (2) a manager 
responsible for certification audit; and (3) a manager responsible for use of 
resources within your local authority. 
(3) Unfortunately, I have not received any respond from your local authority 
and am not sure as to whether you have received the questions. 
(4) Therefore, I attached with this email: (i) a synopsis of my study for your 
information and (ii) the questionnaire for you and other respondents to 
separately complete the questions electronically and returm to me via email 
attachment. 
(5) I would also appreciate if you would be willing to allocate an hour for a 
discussion with me on the topic, you can suggest any time convenient to you 
before 30 June 2008. I am hoping that you will not hesitate to respond via 
questionnaire even if you do not have time for interview. There are spaces to 
write additional comments should you have any. 
(6) I promise to maintain strict confidentiality in regard to all responses I 
receive and sincerely hope that you will be able to help with this research. 
Your assistance in collating information for this research would be 
invaluable. 
Your help is greatly appreciated and hoping to hear from you soon. 
Sincerely, 
Haslida 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Research Student, Management School 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S1 4DT 
Tel: 01142223447 
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APPENDIX 4: THANK YOU NOTE AND REQUEST FOR 
INTERVIEW EMAIL 
Dear Ms ..... , 
Thank you very much for the completed questions. I am sure it will help a lot 
towards my research. 
Part of my data collection is to have discussion on the responses given for the 
questions, I would be grateful if you can allocate some time for me to meet 
you, if that is possible. The discussion would take less than an hour and be 
based on the questions you have marked. You can allocate any time from now 
until end of August 2008. 
I look forward to hearing from you. 
Many thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Haslida 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Research Student, Management School 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S1 4DT 
Tel: 01142223447 
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APPENDIX 5: THANK YOU EMAIL AFTER INTERVIEW 
Dear Ms .... , 
Thank you very much for your help with my research. I will use your responses 
anonymously and will send you summaries of the research findings after I 
completed data analysis. 
I hope my study will be useful for local authorities and the Audit Commission. 
Many thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Haslida 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Research Student, Management School 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S1 4DT 
Tel: 01142223447 
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APPENDIX 6: EMAIL FOR REPORT ON RESEARCH 
FINDINGS TO RESPONDENTS 
Dear Mr ...... , 
THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL AUDIT AND USE OF RESOURCES ASSESSMENT ON LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES: A STUDY ON YORKSHIRE AND THE HUMBER REGION OF ENGLAND 
Many thanks for your invaluable help with my Phd research. 
As promised, I attached herewith a summary from the descriptive analysis of the 
quantitative data collected via questionnaires. The information are presented 
in tables according to relevant topics (from my point of views). 
I also included a table of practical recommendations concluded from the findings. 
Please email me should you require further information or wish to make suggestions. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
Haslida 
Haslida Abu Hasan 
Research Student, Management School 
University of Sheffield 
9 Mappin Street 
Sheffield S1 4DT 
Tel: 01142223447 
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APPENDIX 7: EXAMPLE OF THE KLOE LEVELS FOR UOR 
1. FINANCIAL REPORTING 
How good are the council's financial accounting and reporting arrangements? 
Key line of enquiry 
1.1 The council produces annual accounts in accordance with relevant standards and timetables, supported by 
comprehensive working papers 
Audit Focus 
Evidence that: 
• the council's accounts are compiled in accordance with statutory and professional reporting standards; 
• the council's accounts are supported by comprehensive working papers 
• the accounts and supporting working papers are prepared and approved in accordance with relevant 
timetables 
Criteria for Judgement 
Level 2 
* The council's accounts were 
prepared in accordance with 
statutory requirements, 
statutory/regulatory timetables, 
relevant accounting and reporting 
standards, and the council's 
agreed accounting policies. 
* The auditor received auditable 
accounts, including a complete set 
of financial statements, 
disclosures and notes, in 
accordance with the timetable 
agreed with the audited body. 
*The accounts submitted for audit 
presented fairly, but contained 
several non-trivial errors. 
* Comprehensive working papers 
supporting the accounts were 
provided at the start of the audit to 
the standard specified by the 
auditor. 
* Guidance made available to staff 
on final accounts closed own 
procedures, including relevant 
timetables agreed with the auditor 
and allocation of tasks to 
individual members of staff, were 
adhered to. 
Level 3 
* The accounts submitted for audit 
presented fairly and contained only 
a small number of non-trivial 
errors. 
* All additional requests from the 
auditor were responded to 
promptly in accordance with any 
agreed deadlines. (now bold) 
* The accounts submitted to the 
council/committee meeting at 
which they were approved were 
accompanied by an explanatory 
paper providing interpretation of 
the accounts 
and highlighting key issues for the 
benefit of members. 
* The accounts were subject to 
robust member scrutiny prior to 
approval. 
Level 4 
The accounts submitted for audit 
presented fairly and contained only 
errors considered 'clearly trivial'. 
The quality of the working papers 
provided was exemplary. 
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APPENDIX 8: CHECKLIST FOR OPEN-ENDED INTERVIEW 
WITH THE AUDIT COMMISSION'S MANAGER 
Table 27. Checklist for open-ended interview with the Commission's manager 
1 DOCUMENTATION 
- to check for documentation that is still missing such as detail KLoEs scores (from 2005 to 2006) 
- to confirm several information published on the web- rules for the scores, assessment of the KLoEs self 
assessment procedures and application (how far do the published rules being followed; any changes?)' 
2 UOR'S OVERALL AND THEMES 
- the technicality of every themes, to rank their order of difficulty to achieve (for themes with technical KLoEs-
faster to a~hieve?, more difficult KLoEs - requires longer term and cumulative effect of many functions) 
- Why VFM IS self assessed but not others? Will it be introduced to other themes? 
- VFM's score depends on achievement in other themes? Can we say that VFM concludes the other themes 
or overall achievement of local authorities 
- How does the mechanism for allocation of auditors to local authorities work? Any rules i.e. LA with 
problems will be assessed by AC's auditors or otherwise? 
- the importance of UoR to CPA scores, different framework for STCC and DC ( why some LAs with good 
UoR scores didn't obtain 4 stars but some with lower UoR obtained the 4 stars 
- Any changes to the relative importance of UoR when CM is implemented? 
- How often are the changes in regulation and requirement, very often/ fast? Why? (to check on its impact 
towards my data collection-need to collect data fast so that respond are standardised) 
- How do local authorities and auditors cope with the changes in requirement? Notification? Training? 
Guidelines? 
3. PERFORMANCE AND SCORES 
- local authorities performance and their scores (to bring the line graphs-color printed) 
- to ask for the detail KLoEs scores whether they collected, published and possibility of obtaining them 
- to discuss whether AC believes that the scores reflect local authorities improvement, how much is the 
impact of grading drift/manipulation (quote from newspapers/article) 
- how often does the auditors perform moderation for the scores they provided to the local authorities? (in 
the event when auditors find it difficult to allocate scores, they will consult other auditors, discuss and 
moderate the scores) 
- high risk of different valuation between auditors? Any differences when local authorities were evaluated by 
private auditors versus district auditors? 
- why are the DC weaker than the STCC, will DC scores influence their CC? 
- how can we compare performance from the UoR scored from 2002-2004 and the 2005-2006? are they 
comparable and reflect improvement 
_ [Has auditors collected centrally scores for KLoEs for each local authorities, if so for which years? 
- Are they publicly available, where, can I have them? 
_ Does local authorities' know the KLoEs' scores, do they have all information on the KLoEs' scores? 
4 RULES FOR THE SCORE 
_ how does the KLoEs scores contribute to theme's scores and therefore the overall UoR 
- (to bring the published rules from AC website) 
- the published rules applied, any changes and why? 
_ why is only VFM self assessed, how do auditors scored based on the self assessment . 
_ the application of VFM rules in scoring for overall UoR (AC mentioned that the .rule was not ap~i1ed for 
both 2005 and 2006 results and will not be applied for 2007 too because CPA Will be replaced With CM 
and 2007 is considered transition year) 
5. KEY LINES OF ENQUIRIES 
_ who develops the KLoEs: experts opinion, local authorities participation, committee (members?), 
- what is the KLoEs based on (public needs?) - who define the needs . 
_ guidance provided to local authorities and auditors: published guide (availabl~ on the web); expertise 
assistance for local authorities to help them achieve the KLoE and for auditors to assess properly, 
supervision in the work performed by auditors?; any training provided . 
_ confirm auditors are the appropriate experts to assess UoR; any other profeSSion preferred? 
_ extent of difficulty to achieve in levels of KLoEs, the organisation of ~LoE levels, the need for movement 
between levels (tightening) and removal from the KLoEs (change requirements) 
_ short term versus long term targets in KLoEs: reflected in it's levels? 
- the nature of KLoEs for the themes 
_ which is more technical and faster to achieve [from FR to VFM] 
- the levels in KLoEs level 1 is faster (easier) to achieve? 
_ difficulty to move fr~m one scores to another, rank the order of difficulty to improve for each UoR theme 
6. APPLICATION FOR REVIEW .. .. ? 
_ how many percent relatively local authOrities request for review of their performan~. 
_ why (what motivates local authorities to request) and wh.~ norma!ly request for review? . 
_ the success rate, the impact on relationship local authOrities-auditors, who will perform the review 
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APPENDIX 9: STRUCTURED 
INTERVIEWS: FRONT PAGE 
QUESTIONNAIRES FOR 
T lw 
ni \'t'r ' it\' 
Of -
Slwfii 10. MANAGEMENT SCHOOL 
The impact on local authorities of external audit and of 'Use of 
Resources' assessment 
This fieldwork is part of the doctoral project of Haslida Abu Hasan, who is superv ised by 
Professor David Heald of the University of Aberdeen Business School and Professor Ron Hodges 
and Dr Jane Frecknall Hughes of The University of Sheffield Management School. The intention is 
that respondents will mark their answers before the interview, which will then explore the 
reasons for the answers that have been chosen. 
These questions are for separate interviews with the Director of Finance, the Head of Financial 
Reporting and the Manager with responsibility for the local authority's compliance with the Use of 
Resources system. Not all questions will necessarily be relevant to all respondents. Unless the 
question indicates to the contrary, each respondent should give their own views and answers in 
relation to their own local authority. Interview responses will be treated as confidential and they 
will be used only in an anonymous format. 
The questions prepared are to explore the impact of external auditors ' work on the local 
authority, covering both aspects of certification audit and 'Use of Resources ' assessment. There 
are three sections, A to C, with a blank spaces after each section for respondent to write 
additional comments regarding the answers for that particular section. 
NAME OF LOCAL AUTHORITY: 
RESPONDENT INFORMATION 
NAME: 
POSITION: 
QUALIFICATIONS : 
EXPERIENCE (IN YEARS) : Private Sector _______ _ 
Public Sector 
Local Government ______ _ 
MEMBERSHIP OF 
PROFESSIONAL BODIES 1. 
(YEAR QUALIFIED): (\-____ _ 
INTERVIEW DATE: 
INTERVIEW TIME : 
2. 
( 
CONTACT DETAILS: Email ______________ _ 
Tel no, __________ _ 
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APPENDIX 10: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRES 
INTERVIEWS: SECTION A- CERTIFICATION AUDIT 
Please circle your response to each statement that follows using the following scale: 
Strongly agree 5 
Generally agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Generally disagree 
Strongly disagree 
4 
3 
2 
1 
If you have no view on a particular question please tick the "No View" box , 
A Certification Audit 
A1 External audit contributes siQnificantly towards improvements in 
i financial accountinq system 
ii financial reportinq 
iii quality of presentation of the statement of accounts 
iv time taken for ap...Proval of the statement of accounts 
v time taken for publishinq the statement of accounts 
A2 The requirement for public inspection of the council's pre-audited statement of 
accounts contributes to improved financial reporting performance 
A3 Some local electors use their rights to inspect the council's pre-audited statement 
of accounts 
A4 Generally, objections to the local authority's pre-audited statement of accounts 
would cause delay in 
i receiving approval from councillors 
ii obtaining certification from the auditor 
iii publishing the statement of accounts 
A5 Generally, some objections to the pre-audited statement of accounts signal problems with the local authority's 
i financial management 
ii financial accounting system 
AS If a local authority were to be the subject of a 'Public Interest Report' issued by the 
auditor, that event would 
i alert the local authority to weaknesses in its financial accounting system 
ii alert the local authority to weaknesses in its financial management 
iii damage the local authority's reputation 
iv pose problems for the finance department 
v pose problems for the local authority's senior management 
vi pose problems for the elected councillors 
vii indicate that the local authority has a poor relationship with its auditor 
A7 The Audit Commission fairly allocates auditors to audit local authorities 
AS The auditor spends more time on Use of Resources assessment at the expense 
of financial audit 
Please provide any additional comments which you may have in relation to Certification Audit: 
~ 
Q) 0 Q) Q) c ~ ~ Jf Q) Q) 0) co ~ Q) 
~ O)g ~ 
- co co 0) co 
c Ii> ~ <II Q) .-0 £"0 ~ c 
..... Q) 
. iii C/) (!) z 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
5 4 3 
FOR 
Q) Q) ~ ~ 0) 
co 0) co ~ .!{1 
.!!l 
"0 Q) 
"0 .s; ~ ~ 
co 0 0) z ~ 
Q) c 
c e Q) ii) (!) 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
2 1 
295 
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81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
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811 
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813 
814 
815 
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APPENDIX 11: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRES 
INTERVIEWS: USE OF RESOURCES ASSESSMENTS 
Q) Q) Q) Q) 
~ ~ ~ Q) ~Q) Ol Ole: nl -Q) - Q) f!! Q) nl nl f!! g The Use of Resources (UoR) Assessment >- Q) q ~ en Q) nl Cl 55« Q) "-.r:;"C c: en c: Q) "-e C) ."!::::: .... C)"C CD 0 
Ci5 z c: 
Sufficient policy support has been available from Central Government 5 4 3 2 
Sufficient technical support has been available from the Audit Commission 5 4 3 2 
The Audit Commission consulted local authorities in an appropriate way before 
the indicators and assessment rules were determined 5 4 3 2 
The consultation opportunity is worthwhile 5 4 3 2 
The assessment indicators of Key Lines of Enquiry (KLoE) have 
i provided my local authority with a clear picture of what is expected of them 5 4 3 2 by local citizens 
ii provided my local authority with a clear picture of what is expected of them 5 4 3 2 by Central Government 
iii increased the workload of my local authority 5 4 3 2 
i reduced my local authority's freedom in deciding what is best for local 5 4 3 2 v citizens 
v 
helps my local authority to focus on what should be improved in order to 5 4 3 2 obtain better scores 
A local authority's score will drop if it does not continuously improve its 5 4 3 2 performance on the indicators 
The assessment has helped improve my local authority's relationship with the 5 4 3 2 external auditor 
Having the Audit Commission as performance reviewer has reduced intervention 5 4 3 2 from Central Government 
In general, if a local authority is assigned to be audited by private auditors 
instead of the District Auditor 
i communication with the Audit Commission will be lessened 5 4 3 2 
ii assessment activities will not differ 5 4 3 2 
iii judgement and scoring will not differ 5 4 3 2 
Satisfying the auditor is more important that satisfying local citizens 5 4 3 2 
The Self Assessment currently used for the Value for Money (VFM) theme should 5 4 3 2 be introduced for other UoR themes 
The UoR ran kings published by the Audit Commission 
i are a fair reflection of my local authority's relative pOSition 5 4 3 2 
ii have promoted competition among local authorities 5 4 3 2 
The published scores by the Audit Commission show a significant improvement 
from one year to another since 2002: 
i The scores are a fair reflection of performance 5 4 3 2 
ii The scores rose because local authorities knew where to improve through 5 4 3 2 the indicators provided 
iii The assessment indicators become easier to achieve after a number of 5 4 3 2 years 
Local authorities with more resources are likely to achieve better scores 5 4 3 2 
The scores allocated for each assessment have helped my local authority target 5 4 3 2 
areas for improvement 
My local authority puts more effort and focuses on the areas where performance 5 4 3 2 
is worse 
Focusing on easier indicators will improve scores more than focusing on the 5 4 3 2 
worst performance areas 
Making use of the appeal process 
i would increase the chances of obtaininq improved scores 5 4 3 2 
ii would damaqe our relationship with auditors 5 4 3 2 
iii would invite more news coveraqe 5 4 3 2 
iv would increase costs 5 4 3 2 
FOR 
>-Q) ~ 
-Q) g'g Q) 
"> o nl ;;en 0 (f)'C Z 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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1 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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819 
820 
821 
822 
823 
824 
825 
826 
827 
828 
Please rank the following improvements in UoR themes' score in order of difficulty (1 being easiest, 3 hardest): 
i From '1' to '2' 
Ii From '2' to '3' 
iii From '3' to '4' 
Please rank the following declines in UoR themes' score in order of risk of occurrence (1 being low risk and 3 high 
risk): 
i From '4' to '3' 
ii From '3' to '2' 
iii From '2' to '1' 
Please rank the following UoR themes in order of difficulty meeting their KLoEs (1 being easiest, 5 hardest): 
i Financial Reporting 
ii Financial Management 
iii Internal Control 
iv Financial Standing 
v Value for Money 
.... (J) 
(J) (J) 0 ~ (J) c:: (J) .... Cl .... Cl (J) (J) ~(J) Cl I'd 3: I'd « ~ (J) (ij(J) 
.!!l (J) 
>- ~ ClQ: .... g 
" 
.s; 
C> ~ I'd I'd (J) I'd >-c:: .... til 53 .!!l C> 0 (J) (J) '- z e c:: 
.s" 0" c:: U5 (J) '(j) 0 .... 0 z U5 
The UoR assessment contributes to 
i increased efficiency in local authorities generally 5 4 3 2 1 
ii increased efficiency in my local authority 5 4 3 2 1 
iii increased effectiveness in local authorities generally 5 4 3 2 1 
iv increased effectiveness in my local authority 5 4 3 2 1 
The UoR exercise has improved 
i public trust in my local authority 5 4 3 2 1 
ii public participation in my local authority's activities 5 4 3 2 1 
iii public trust in local government generally 5 4 3 2 1 
iv public participation in activities organised by local government generally 5 4 3 2 1 
The UoR scores were declined for 2005 when 'the harder test' was first 5 4 3 2 1 introduced because local authorities were not familiar with the new system 
District Councils are scoring lower than the Single Tier and County Councils 5 4 3 2 1 because of the novelty to them of the assessment system 
The assessment rules for UoR are fair 5 4 3 2 1 
The auditor's interpretation of the UoR assessment rules is fair 5 4 3 2 1 
The UoR assessment has been a worthwhile innovation 5 4 3 2 1 
Please provide any additional comments which you may have in relation to UoR: 
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APPENDIX 12: STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRES FOR 
PERFORMANCE INTERVIEWS: COMPREHENSIVE 
ASSESSMENTS 
Q) ~ ~ Q) Q) 0 Q) 
Q) e c: c, .... 
.... Cl Q) Q) !'tl Cl Cl « e Q) III !'tl !'tl 
'6 III C The ComQ.rehenslve Performance Assessment >- ~ Cl~ '6 c;, "§ !'tl !'tl ~ >-
c: .... III "§ c;, Q) Q) 0-0 c: £"0 Q) c: .... 
:t::: e Ci5 Q) c: 
" 
Q) 
<3 -z (/) 
C1 Scoring higher for the 
i overall UoR score is important to obtain good CPA stars 5 4 3 2 1 
ii VFM theme score is important to achieve good overall UoR score 5 4 3 2 1 
C2 The published Comprehensive Performance Assessment results have influenced the decision of local electors 
i on whether to vote in local elections 5 4 3 2 1 
ii on which political party to vote for 5 4 3 2 1 
C3 I would like the CPA system to change in the following ways: 
i Increase the difficulty of each point on the UoR scale 5 4 3 2 1 
ii Lengthen the UoR scale beyond the four points currently apply 5 4 3 2 1 
iii Change the UoR indicators 5 4 3 2 1 
iv Focus more on outcomes as UoR indicators 5 4 3 2 1 
v Move from the CPA to the proposed Comprehensive Area Assessment 5 4 3 2 1 
Please provide any additional comments which you may have in relation to Comprehensive Performance Assessment: 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE 
Haslida Abu Hasan, Doctoral Research Student 
Management School, University of Sheffield, 9 Mappin Street SHEFFIELD S1 4DT 
Email: ecp05ha@sheffield.ac.uk; Tel: 01142223447 or 07518636880 
298 
;: 
Q) os; 
0 
Z 
